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Tullius Cicero

three bookes of duties to Marcus his sonne, tourned out of Latine into English, by Nicolas *Grimald*. Wherevnto the Latine is adioyned.

¶ *Cum priuilegio.*

Anno Domini.
1583.

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¶ To the right reuerend Father in God, and his ſingular good Lord, Thomas, Biſhop of Ely, one of the King and Queenes Maieſties moſt honorable priuie Counſell.



HAuing recourſe of late (right reuerend Father) to the olde ſtudies that I once applied in the Vniuerſitie: & getting ſome fruite of quiet life to the peruſing & recording of thoſe things, wherevvith in time paſt I felt my ſelfe greatly both delighted and furdered: I gaue my minde chiefely to ſuch kinde of learning, as wold ſerue both beſt to the order of my ſtudie, and alſo to the gouernaunce of my life, ſo that comparing my experience and reading together, I might make my priuate diligence in ſtudying do ſeruice to the open vſe of liuing. In following of vvhich intent, what by increaſe of iudgement for yeres, what by trauailing abroad in the world, I found euer more and more ſo nevv profits and commodities: that whereas me thought, I had ſeene but the ſhadowe of things, novv I begin more to ſee (as it vvere) the whole body thereof. And moſt of all, this proofe I haue, in the greateſt and moſt profitable part of Philoſophie, vvhich is concerning maners: and namely in the bookes, that of duties be written, by Marcus Tullius Cicero: a matter contay-

ning the vvhole trade hovv to liue among men diſcreetly and honeſtly: and ſo rightly poynting out the pathvvay to all vertue, as none can be righter, ſurely Scripture excepted. Inſomuch, that vvhen I vvell conſidered altogether: I ſaide vvith my ſelfe concerning this, as did a certaine learned man not long agoe by Homer: This is the fifte time I haue read ouer this Author, & as oft as I read him, ſo oft ſomewhat I finde, that I marked not before, and that both need to be deeply pondered: ſo that I fanſied at the firſt, hee vvas eaſie, but novv mee thinkes, hee requires a very heedfull and a muſing Reader. Wherefore not vvithout meruailous great pleaſure, eſpying: that neither in priuate life to attaine quietneſſe and contentation: or in office bering to vvinne fame and honour: or in euery eſtate both to auoid diſorder and enormitie, and alſo to keepe a right rule, and commendable behauiour. This booke plainly is the mirrour of wiſedome, the fortreſſe of iuſtice, the maſter of manlineſſe, the ſchoole of temperance, the iewell of comelineſſe: I vviſhed many moe to be partners of ſuch ſweetneſſe, as I had partly felt my ſelfe, and to declare, that I ment no leſſe then I wiſhed: I layde too my helping hand, endeuoring by tranſlation, to doo like vviſe for my countrimen, as Italians, Frenchmen, Spaniards, Dutchmen, and other forreines haue liberally done for theirs. So chiefly for our vnlatined people I haue made this latine Writer engliſh, and haue brought into light that, that from them ſo long vvas hidden: and haue cauſed an auncient vvriting to become in a manner newv againe: and a booke vſed but of fevv, to vvax cõmon to a great many, ſo that our mẽ vnderſtanding

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vvhat a treaſure is among them, for the faſhioning of their life, and being by nature moſt of all other nations giuen to ciuilitie and humanitie, vvhen they ſhall be ayded and directed by theſe perfect precepts, may in all points of good demeanor become people pereleſſe. Yet iudge I all this labour, litle vvorth, and ſmally or nothing able to preuaile, vvithout your honourable Lordſhip vvere patron hereof, to vvhom I do dedicate both my good hart and my vvorke alſo. (I call it mine, as Plautus & Terence called the commedies theirs, vvhich they made out of Greeke, not as to teach your Lordſhip ought that you haue not already, but by your authoritie, to get it the more eſtimatiō vvith other. For as Tullies treatiſe being ſo full of learning, asketh a learned mans iudgemēt, vvhich vvho ſo refuſe they ſhevve themſelues to be vnvviſe, euen ſo ſuch a noble Counſailour of England, ſeemeth moſt meete to receiue ſo noble a Senator of Rome into a ſtraunge Region. Doubtleſſe, among ſo manye honourable deedes of your Lordſhips, it ſhall not be the leaſt honourable, if ye doo Marcus Tullius this honour to vvelcome him hether, and to bee the very cauſe, that ſo famous a Romane may become familiar vvith our Engliſh men. So ſhall a vvorthy pere be vvorthely intreted as very curteſie requireth, ſo your Lordſhippes iudgement muſt needes be vvell liked, vvhich is vvoont to allovve onely knovvledge and goodneſſe: ſo vvill the common people more highly eſteeme the thing, as it is expedient for them to doo, and the ſooner alſo vvill they follovv theſe vvholeſome leſſons, vvhich is ful neceſſary in a vvell ordered ſtate. To be ſhort, your Lordſhip for a choſen Patrone, my Tranſlation

for a vvelcome vvorke, & Tully ſhall be taken for ſuch a Tully as he is. And like as Marcus Cicero, vvith the authoritie of a Father commended theſe bookes to his young Cicero, ſo vvhen our Engliſh youth ſhall behold them once authoriſed by ſo reuerend a Father in God no doubt, they will be the rather in loue with them, and vvill count it pleaſant paine taking heere to inrich themſelues vvith informations of vertue, enſamples out of ſtories, morall doctrine, politike prudence, antiquitie, varietie of meruailous matters, ſo cunningly & oratorially treated, and indited, as he was able to declare and expreſſe, vvho vvas the firſt, & the chiefe that euer cladde Ladie Philoſophie in Romain attire. Thus, very loath to let your Lordſhippe from your vvaightie affaires, I make an end, and pray God, long to preſerue your honourable Lordſhip in health, vvith increaſe of, honour.

Your humble Orator,
Nicholas Grimald.

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TO THE READER.



All thinges in the worlde (good Reader) be made for some vse & ende, which ende is more worthy, than all, that doth seruice thereunto, and wher both the ende is good, and what so serues therto, ther the whole doing is likewise good. In vs the best worke is, to vse our selues well and worthely, who in the order of natural thinges are of the best and worthiest kinde. For what is ther, that can vse it self: vnlesse it be enformed with reason, and vnderstanding? Dumb creatures, and liueles of other be vsed: but themselues can they neuer vse. Beastes endewed with life and sence, may seme to haue some semblāt hereof: in that they vse their feeding, lodging, and other necessaries, yet therby they obtayne neither praise, nor dispraise, seing they do it not of any free choise, but onely by the motion of kinde, & as their appetite draweth them. But we, who haue ỹ great gift of wit, and reason, must not most of al stick still in that appetite, to get nothing els, but pleasure, & profit, but ensuing the heauenly guide of our nature, must be led to the desire of trouth, honour, and semelyneſſe, wherwith the more that we be decked, adorned, and beautified, the farder we be from the brutishneſſe of beastes, and the neerer approch wee to the nature diuine. In as much then as euery thinge is borne to doe that which to his kinde is most agreable, and vs it beseemeth most to vse our selues, our part without doubt, and our dutie shall we do best, if we imploy the vsing of our selues to

dedes, that be honest, & commēdable. Other things when wee vse, as landes, houses, armour, horses, hownds, money, clothes, or stuffe, wee can not yet vse them at all times, and with them we must enforce, & busie our selues also, whereas the vsing of our selues is in euery place at hand, & at no season to seeke. For whether we be doing somewhat, or at rest, whether we abide in the countrey, or in the citie: whether we be occupied in earnest, or in game: no pause ther is at all, but night & day we vse our selues continually.

Which thing sith in euery portion of a mans life it hath place, if it be well and wisely, and conueniently done, we shall bee wealefull, and in a blessed case, if vngraciously, and fondly, & wickedly, wretched shall we be, and in a wofull plight. This are we taught to much, by the cōmon life of men, who for default of skill, how to beehaue themselues, be confounded in deepe darknesse of error, and ignoraunce, and wanting the right rule, they take chalk for cheese, as the saying is, they can not frame their affections, nor kepe them in temper. But sucche maner cloudes be clerely dissolued, by ỹ beames of Philosophy, whiche set before our eyesight the very ends, & markes, ỹ selfe nature hath appointed vs.

For in this world here beneath, are three kinds of lyuing wights, whereof some haue no more but lyfe, as Plantes, hearbes, and trees, growing out of the ground, some haue not onely lyfe, but senses also: as Sheepe, Oxen, and other beastes: the third comprehendeth bothe these: and our life and senses, hath the soueraigne ruler Reason: as

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in the nature of man we see them all conioyned. It remaines, therefore, and meete it is for him such doings to practise: as may both seuerallye agree with eche of these partes, and generally with them altogether. To the parcell inferiour (by which wee receyue our nourishment, our growing, and the state of our body) wellfare is appointed the vtmost ende: wherein the thing consisteth that we call profitable: which concernes the getting, mainteining, or recouering of health. Of ỹ soule, or life endewed with scences, pleasures is ỹ end, that it woulde enioy. The third nature, which is partener of reason, hath this prick to shoote at (if you consider it by it selfe alone) science and knowledge of trouth: if you beeholde it with the other two accompanied, it hath honestie, worship, and honour.

These be the very endes, whereto mans life and nature must endeuour to attaine: hether dooth Philosphie promise to bring a man, by her information. For when she hath tolde in a generalytie, what is honest, comely, auaileable, praise worthy, and in euery poynt conuenient: then may men by intelligence perceiuing the troth, truly expresse the same in euerie particular deede.

Wherfore seeing reason containes the whole life of man, and to it as their captaine, the other parts bee obedient, or at least wise ought to bee: first, marke we the particular propertie of reason: then how with the other powers it exerciseth man, afterward the comely behauiour, and dutifull dealyng in the open resorte and fellowshippe of men.

Mannes minde is contented and satisfied with nothing so much, as the clere vnderstanding and ỹ vndeceiuable science of sooth. Chiefly standeth his minde in contemplation of immortall and perdurable things: thereto, in such as fade and fall, it teacheth, ordeineth, appointeth, commaundeth. Wherevpon the order, course, figure, light, influence, of Sunne, Moone, and Starres, it obserueth: conceiueth intelligences, Angels, soules, and formes immateriall, proceedeth from them, and so mounteth vp to the verie author, and Prince of this worldes vniuersitie: whom it knoweth and knowledgeth to be one, the best, the mightiest, the truest, the most righteous and euerlasting. Yet is the selfe same minde by the fellowship and companie of the sences, and desires, many a time called away from that principall office, to consider these vnstable, and mutable things, and sometime to cast in conceite, formes dissevered from the matter, mathematically: and sometimes to view thinges sensible, that canne in no wise bee sundered from the materiall substaunce, as Elements, Beasts, hearbes, trees, mettalls, stones, and such lyke: all that which must needes bee fenced and fortyfied wyth the trade of debating doubtes, and discerning of trouth from vntrouth: which is the arte of Logick, the very rule of reason, and instrument of all discourse.

Now to speake of the vsing of the whole man, by the continuall tenour, & stedfast rate of bodies celestiall and naturall, the mind of man learneth order, obedience, & concord. For like as God gouerneth things manifolde, mouable, & falling away, beeing himselfe but one, vnremoueable, & euer during: so

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reason within vs ought to rule ranging lust, & rash motions of the minde, and the other vnworthier & weaker parts, being it selfe stedfast, sage, principal, and strongly established.

In case a man loue anie one part of himselfe too much: or sew after the end therof by a wrong way, and cleane out of fashion: he shall not leade a lyfe all euen and straight, but hooked and crooked, nor easie, and quiet, but miserably distempered. For who so bee ouermuch enclined to pampering, and pleasing of the vital portion, they be all bent to gather good, and wholy giuen to gaine. They, that al onely serue their sences, and sette their delights to feele the pleasures of the same, by excessiue eyther in riotting and banketting, & in outragious fleshfondlings, or in other such pastances, as be sensual. They which holde them content to lead a lyfe contẽplatiue, hauing no regard, ne respect to ỹ forenamed parcels, do proue sower, lowring, blokish, rusticall, & far from all ciuilnesse of life. He, in whom reason ioynes with the sences, for to do them seruice: will inforce himselfe to winne worldly glory and soueraigntie.

Hee that can comprise in his thought no large compasse, nor deepe consideration: but is faint, feeble, wauering, and full of infirmitie: wyll shewe foorth himselfe chiefely wyth apparelling, or with some outwarde bragge, to supplye his want within.

To such sortes of annoyaunce, and disconuenience, light, and moderation is brought by morrall doctrin, ỹ which Marcus Tullius Cicero in these bookes of duties professeth. This lerning teacheth so much to graunt the vitall part, & the nethereſt,

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as will be sufficient to preserue the lyfe in health, and welfare. It willeth also, the feeling portions so to take fruition of pleasures, that neither it defraud the lower part of the profits, thereto appropriate, nor with importune egging annoy the mind which aspireth vnto veritie of opinions, and vprightnesse of manners.

Without more wordes, it assigneth for to raigne, which is borne to raigne, and that to be obeysaunt, which is framed for obeysaunce.

Now, when a man is so instructed with Philosophie, that he can full conueniently liue sole, and at point deuise by himselfe, he must be brought foorth abroad into the face of the worlde, to the intent hee may procure, not onelye that becomes hymselfe to doo, but also the wealth of other folk. Hee must remembrr the three folde state and diuersitie, that he hath espyed and practised in himselfe, & must transferre the same to the gouernance both of his housholde priuately, and of the whole commons openly. So shall the meanest sort lyke the vitall parcell in man be occupied about the most seruile & needfull workes, men of ỹ middle degree, like ỹ sensiue soule, shal attend to affaires and sciences most liberall. The nobilitie in the common gouernment, like reason in the nature of man, shall rule all the multitude. That thing also doth Tully touch in this tretise, and sheweth men in authoritie their duties, both in warre and peace, whereby they maye make themselues, and their subiects happie & fortunate. And not onely them, but all sortes of men he admonisheth, what they haue to doo, throughout theyr lyfe, according to their age, trade, and estate, wyth respect to the circumstaunces of times, places, and persons.

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persons. In the first booke hee first diuideth duetie into the perfect, and the meane, leauing the one, (which belongeth to the end of good, and is in it selfe right) to men of perfection, and prosecuting the other in certaine rules and preceptes, so that thereby euery man maye frame and order his lyfe. Then hee leades vs to the finding out of duties, by taking aduisement about the choyce of honest things, and refusall of the vnhonest. Afterwarde he sets foorth the originall causes, and the chiefe parties of honestie, wyth theyr dueties and properties. At the last, hee warneth vs to discerne the more, or most honest thing from the lesse or least, and alwayes in the vse thereof to preferre the greater.

In the second, rehearsing profitable and vnprofitable things, he sheweth howe to attaine and to vse the profitable, and how to eschew the contrarie, and in the end makes a comparison of profits, teaching to preferre the greater before the smaller, or the more before the fewer.

In the third, hee compareth profite wyth honestie, and wyth euery parte thereof, not as if there could in deede bee contrarie betweene them, but he meanes the profite, and the honestie which seemeth not profitable, or of eyther of them the apparant shew, and he tells vs what is to be done, when they so seeme to striue one with another, y honestie alloureth vs one way, and profit calleth vs another waie.

Thus the whole matter is referred and applyed to honestie and profit, two principal points of good, the third (which we call pleasure, and is placed by the

the Peripatetikes in the number of good things) Tully lyke a Stoike, doth but briefely touch, as a thing impertinent. But of the other two places, conteining all the doinges of men, Cicero hath told his minde, & left it vs in this booke: euen as fully, as in his lyfe tyme he conceiued it in his head. For who euer saw in so fewe leaues so much morall doctrine, and politicall, set out with so manye counning cases, and feats oratoricall? What a sort of stories be there so notable of themselues, so handsomely applyed, so elegantly tolde? You shall not lightly reade the lyke, within so little compasse, in any historian, that of purpose doth nothing els.

How finely, and feately, be the Poets verses alleadged? with what a discretion are some auncient writers reproued? With what subtiltie and finenesse of wit be certeine controuersies debated? Either of the chiefe philosophie, or of all humanitie what point is there lacking? Aristotle artificially hath written of manners: but what for the lightsomnesse & eloquent handling of the treatise, what for the Latine tongue, which wee doo vse more then the Greekes: Tullye is aboue him, Panetius wrote of ductifull demeanour: but though his worke in some pointes was Tullyes paterne: yet in all pointes, by all their iudgementes, that euer sawe them bothe: Tully is aboue him. Xeno the Stoike wrote of ductie: but seeing diuers Greekes, who are Tullyes inferiors, were as good as hee: certesse Tully is aboue him. Possidonius a Rhodian, medled with ȳ same matter, but nothing to Tullius. So did Hecato, but nothing to Tullius. And many other mo of latter time: but Lord, how far be they from Tullyus? Tullyus in his graue

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yeares, after he had heard a nũber of learned men: after he had read the moſt approued authors: after he had endyted ſo many volumes: & his ſtyle was waxen rype, his witte ſage, his learning full, his iudgemẽt perfect: enterpriſed to draw this draught and made it of ſuch excellence, as we may wel wonder at in vewing, and yet not attayne in following. Tullius, hauing done many glorious actes, in a ſtate of gouernement moſte tryumphant, learned the moſt part of theſe leſſons by experience.

Tullius out of the Greeke authors, of whom alſo ſome had bene gouernors in floriſhing Empires, tranſlated a great deale. Tullius to Marcus, his welbeloued ſonne, abiding euen at Athens, among the beſt Philoſophers, was not afraid to ſend this parcell of Philoſophie. No doubt as welcome it was to the learned Athenians, as the Greekes doinges were to the Romaines, or as nowe adayes, the French and Italyans, well framed wrytinges were to thoſe Engliſhmen, that vnderſtand them, yea & ſo much the more welcome, as it was a rare thing then, to ſee that kinde of knowledge expreſſed in pure latine.

But in Rome, in Italy, in Europa, in all quarters, where latine ſpeech had place, O, ſo it was imbraced at all times, of all men, in euery degree, order and eſtate. Rulers haue heere found much wittie policie appertaining to the gouernaunce of Realmes. Houſholders and Parents haue piked out of theſe bookes vertuous inſtructions for their children and their ſeruants. Doctors and diuines haue heere met with morall ſentence, and enſamples very excellent. Ciuil Lawyers haue eſpyed, touching iuſtice and equitie, both rules appointed

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and cases discussed.

Schoolemen haue taken heerehence problemes and questions, to debate at large, and haue fetched from hence philosophical conclusions, with reasons and arguments to proue and to disproue. Orators haue bene well furnished heereby with sundrie graces and ornaments of speech, and in the like manner of matter, haue marked howe to bestowe theyr stile. Rethoritians, who for their exercise doo vse declamations, haue taken out of this common places, lyke large fieldes, where men may walke at libertie. Schoolemasters neuer wist of finer phrases, for to make their Schollers acquainted wyth the verie vaine of the Latine language. At fewe woordes, all men that of wisdome be studious, may get somewhat heerein to sharpe the wit, to store the intelligence, to feede the minde, to quicken the spirit, to augment the reason, to direct the appetite, to frame the tongue, to fashion the manners, moreouer, to rule, to obeye, to dispute, to determine, to teach, to perswade, and to euerie needfull purpose in a mans life.

Unlesse the selfe thing witnesse as much as I saie, let me not be credited: but in case both the booke speake for it selfe, and to my testimoniall I am able to adioyne princely peeres, well beknowen, and well approoued, then shall both the worthinesse of the woorke, and also the weight of the authoritie winne credit and assent. Tullies dueties when Cesar Augustus had read ouer, stil standing on his feete, as he againe deliuered them to his nephew, of whom he had them. Eloquent (quoth he) was this man, eloquent hee was indeede: and one that loued well his Countrie. Tullies duelies had

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Seuerus, the noble Emperour, in so great price, & reputation: that of all the Romanes bookes, to read them he thought him best apaid. Tullies duties haue I knowen good Clarks and well learned men beare about in their bosomes, laying it full neere their hearts, that they would haue lodged in their heads: and entirely louing Tullies heauenly company, which way soeuer they went. Tullies dueties did Erasmus ỹ Roterdame, so greatly cõmend: ỹ in making mentiõ of thẽ. he could not chose but breake foorth into these words, What? writeth an Ethnike all this to Ethnikes? a prophane man to the prophane? yet in his precepts of conuersation, O Lord, what an equitie, what an holynesse, what sinceritie, what veritie? How well doth al together accord with nature? how is all framed euen by good reason? What a conscience requireth he of such as gouern ỹ state? How plainly sets he before our eyes ỹ meruailous & the amiable, beutifulnesse of vertue? How much, how religiously, yea howe like a diuine doth he teach of helping and releeuing other men? of getting and maintaining of loue & friendship? of the contempt of those vanities, for which the common sort of Christian folke, will either do or suffer, they care not what. Finally, hee deemeth them full worthy, and full meete both for schoole maisters in their schooles to reade vnto the youth, and also for old men again and againe to vse, and to peruse. These riches and treasures of wit and wisedome, as Cicero transported out of Greece into Italy, so haue I fetched from thence, and conueied thẽ into England, & haue caused also Marcus Tullius (more then he could do when he was aliue) to speake English. Meruailous is the matter, flowing the eloquence, rich the store of

stuffe, and full artificiall ỹ inditing: but how I, in our manner of speech haue expressed the same, the more the boke be perused, the better it may chance to appeare. None other translaiton in our tongue haue I seene but one, which is of all men of anye lerning so well liked, ỹ they repute it & count it as none, yet if ye list to compare this somewhat with that nothing, peraduenture this somewhat will seeme somwhat the more. Howbeit look, what rule the Rethorician giues in precept to be obserued of an Orator, in telling of his tale, that it be short & without idle words, ỹ it be plaine, & without darke sense, ỹ it be prouable, & without any swaruing frō the truth, the same rule shuld be vsed in examining & iudging of translation. For if it be not as briefe as the very authors text requireth, what so is added to his perfect stile, shall appeare superfluous, & to serue rather to the making of some paraphrase or commentarie. Therto, if it be vttered with inkhorn termes & not with vsuall words: or if it bee phrased & wrested or far fetched forms of speech, not fine but harsh, not easie but hard, not naturall but violent it shall seeme to be. Then also in case it yeeld not the meaning of ỹ author, but either following fansie, or misled by error, forsakes the true pattern, it cannot be approued for a faithfull & sure interpretation, which ought to be taken for ỹ greatest praise of al. These points as I haue studied to performe, so wher I haue not alwaies attained vnto thē, I shal desire you gētle reader, gētly to cōsider both the excellēcie of ỹ author, who is a perfect Orator, & also ỹ gretnes of ỹ matter, which is profoūd philosophy. Neuertheless, such as be exquisit in both ỹ languages already, may (& that with some profit & pleasure) trie what I haue done, & what

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they can do, all vnder one: if, laying my translation a part, they wil set ye latine before the, & so assaie their owne vaine. Eyther they shall like theselues ye better, whē they conferre it with my poore workmanship, or else perchance con me the more thanke for attempting, following, & accomplishing of this enterprise. Be it so, one hath neither the latine, nor ye English eloquence: yet by ye benefit of nature, sith a man may do much: namely, if he thereto adioyne vse & exercise, here is for him occasion both to whet his wit, & also to file his tongue. For although an Englishman hath his mother tongue, and can talk a pace, as he learned of his dam, yet is it one thing to tittle tattle, I wot not how, or to chatter lyke a Iay, and another to bestow his words wisely, orderly, pleasantly, and pithely. Such as haue English meetly wel, & but a smattering or smal tast in ye latine, which number is great among the schollers of this realme: may heereby fall into such acquaintance, & familiaritie with this most excellent latine man, that neither shall his deuyce seeme hard, nor his art obscure, nor his stile strāge. I darewel say, if this worke hap into a good students hand, he wil not thinke it inough to run ouer it once, as we fare with trifles & toies, but aduisedly, & with good leasure, three or foure, or fiue times, he will read it, & read it, & read it again: first by the principal points, by the definitions, & the diuisions: to see what is treated, how far forth, in what order, & with what varietie: then to marke the precepts, reasons, conclusion, and common places. After, vnto ye said places, to refer al the stories, with the verses poetical. Finally, as wel in ye English as ye Latine, to weigh wel properties of words, fashions of phrases, & the ornamēts of both. Moreouer, many clarks haue I

knowen eare this, which could cõceiue & vnderstãd ful well, whose tongue neuertheles in vtterance & vse of speech was in a manner maimed. Yea, & some ỹ could also speake Latine readily, & wel fauouredly, who to haue done as much in our language, & to haue handled the same matter, would haue ben halfe blank, what need mo wordes. I desire my trauel no otherwise to be takẽ in worth, thẽ ỹ diligẽt peruser shall in effect find fruit therof. Now therfore, good reder, fare ye wels remẽber how vnfit (as Aristotle saith) & vnprofitable hearers of morrall science young men be, as long as either they follow their youthly affectiõs, or do cõtinue vnskilful, & rude in ỹ deeds, ỹ of dutie belõg to mãs life. For, al ỹ while they yeeld themselues to be led away of their mad moods, if you talke to thẽ of vertues, & of maners: ye do but sing ỹ deafe a song. And how shal they be able to iudge, what is discreetly, rightfully, valiãtly, moderatly, & worthely done, who neither haue any such qualitie, nor vnderstand by experience any point of ỹ same: yet forasmuch as it must of necessitie be knowen what is vertue & vice, before a man can well & wisely liue, embrasing ỹ one, & eschuing ỹ other, either to make sound the sick mind (in case it be miseased, & hath a wil to be reliued) take this doctrine as a medicine, or else to confirme ỹ whole that is to meane, in case you haue ben wel & honestly trained vp, more perfectly to perceiue the path of good maners, wherin you may walk & entire delight, & come to ỹ honor of a laudable life. Thus I haue holdẽ you, good reder, & my homely tale: now wil I not borow your patience any longer, but for your gentlenesse & studious dispositiõ, will straight way send you frõ ỹ scholer to ỹ master, & frõ me to ỹ speth of this diuine orator & worthy philosopher.

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MARCVS TVLlius Ciceroes first booke of duties to Marcus his sonne.

ALthough you son Marke, hauing now a yere heard Cratippus, and that in *Athens* must needes flow ful of rules and lessons of Philosophie: because of the passing great excellencie both of your teacher, & of the citie: whereof the one may store you with knowledge, ỹ other with ensamples: yet as my selfe, to mine owne furderaunce, haue euermore ioyned the Latine with the Greeke: and haue done that, not only in Philosophie, but also in the practise of Oratorie: I think it meete for you to doo the same, that alike you may be in the readines of both the kinds of eloquẽce. To ỹ which purpose verily we (as wee suppose) haue brought gret ayd to our countrimen: that not onely

MARCI TVLlij Ciceronis de officiis ad Marcum filium, Lib.1.

QVanquam te Marce fili annum iam audientẽ Cratippum, idq́; Athenis, abundare oportet præceptis institutisq; Philosophiæ, propter summam & doctoris authoritatem, & vrbis: quorum alter te scientia augere potest, altera exemplis: tamen vt ipse ad meam vtilitatẽ semper cum grecis latina cõ iunxi, neque id in Philosophia solũ, sed etiam in dicẽdi exercitatione feci: idem tibi censeo faciendum, vt par sis in vtriusq; orationis facultate. Quã quidẽ ad rem nos (vt videmur) magnũ attulimus adiumẽtum hominibus nostris: vt

non modo grecarum literarũ rudes, sed etiam docti aliquantum se arbitrentur adeptos & ad dicendum & ad iudicãdum. Quamobrem discés tu quidem à principe huius ætatis Philosophorum, et discés quam diu voles (tam diu autẽ velle debebis, quoad te quantum proficias non pœnitebit). Sed tamen nostra legens, non multum a Peripateticis dissidentia, quoniam vtriq; & Socratici & Platonici esse volumus, de rebus ipsis vtere tuo iudicio: nihil enim impedio, orationem autem latinã efficies profecto legendis nostris pleniorem. Nec vero arrogãter hoc dictũ existimari velim: nam philosophandi scientiam concedens multis, quod est Oratoris proprium, aptè, distincte, ornatêque dicere, (quoniam in eo studio, ætatem consumpsi) si id mihi assumo, videor

the ignorant of the Greeke tongue, but also the learned recken themselues thereby to haue atteined somewhat, both to speech eloquent, and also to iudgement. Wherefore you shall learne indeede of the prince of philosophers in this age: and you shall learne so long as you will (so long perdie ought you to bee willing, as it shall not repent ye how much yee profite). But yet reading my Bookes, not greatly variant from the Peripatetikes, because wee will be both Socratians & Platonians, of the verie matters vse your owne iudgement: for I nothing let you: but of trouth, by readinge my workes, you shall make your latine tongue the fuller. For yet I would haue this supposed of a vaunt to bee spoken. For giuing place to manye in the knowledge of Philosophie, if I take vpon mee that, which is an Oratours propertie, aptly, orderlye, and finelye to speake: because I haue passed my time in that studye, I seeme

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after a certaine sorte. as in mine owne ryght to challenge it. For which cause I earnestlye exhort you my Cicero, that billigently you reade not onely my Orations, but these bookes also of Philosophie, which nowe welnighe to those haue euenned themselues in quantitie. For there is a greter force of eloquence in those: but this euen and tempered kinde of stile, is also to bee regarded. And this truly I see hath happened to none of the Greekes as yet: that one man trauayled in both the kindes: and followed as well that lawyerlye trade of pleading, as this quyet forme of reasoning: except perchaunce Demetrius Phalerius may bee counted in this number, who was a subtile reasoner, no vehement Orator, pleasaunt, yet so as you maye ãnow̃ him for Theophrastus Scholler. But howe much wee haue profited in both, I referre it to other mens iudgement: certes wee haue followed both. I thinke verilye

id meo iure quodam modo vẽdicare. Quam obrem magnopere te hortor mi Cicero, vt nõ solum orationes meas, sed hos etiãm de Philosophia libros, qui se iam illis ferè æquarunt, studiosè legas. Vis enim dicendi maior est in illis: sed hoc quoque colendum est æquabile, & temperatum orationis genus. Et id quidem nemini Græcorum video adhuc contigisse, & idẽ vtroque in genere laborarer, sequereturque & illud forense dicẽdi, & hoc quietum disputandi genus. Nisi forte Demetrius Phalerius in hoc numero haberi potest, disputator subtilis, orator parum vehemẽs: dulcis tamen, vt Theophrasti discipulũ possis agnoscere. Nos autem quantum in vtroq; profecerimus, aliorũ sit iudicium, vtrũq, certè secuti sumus. Equidem et

Platonem existimo, si genus id forense dicendi tractare voluisset, grauissime, et copiosissime potuisse dicere. Et Demosthenem, si illa quæ a Platone dedicerat, tenuisset, & pronunciare voluisset ornate, splendideq; facere potuisse. Eodemq; modo de Aristotele et Isocrate iudico: quorũ vterq; suo studio delectatus, contempsit alterum. Sed cum statuissem aliquid hoc tempore ad te scribere, & multa posthac, ab eo exordiri volui maximum, quod et ætati tuę esset aptissimũ, & authoritati meę grauissimum. Nam cum multa sint in Philosophia, et grauia et vtilia accutare, copioseque a Philosophis disputata: latissime patere videntur ea, quæ de officijs tradita ab illis precepta sunt. Nulla enim vitę pars, neque publicis, neque priuatis, neque

Plato could haue spoken verie grauelye, and plentifully, if hee woulde haue practised the lawlyke sort of pleading, and also Demosthenes could haue done full finelye and seemely, if hee had kept styll, and would haue vttered those thinges which hee learned of Plato. And after the same sorte I iudge of Aristotle, and Isocrates: either of which delyghted in his owne study, despised the other. But when I hadde determined to write somewhat vnto you at this season, and many things heereafter; I was most willing to beginne with that, whiche both for your age shoulde bee fittest, and for my authoritie the grauest. For whereas manye matters in Philosophie, both weightye and profitable, bee dilligentlie and plentifullie disputed by Philosophers, those seeme most largely to spread, which of duelies by them haue bene taught and prescribed. For no parte of mannes lyfe, neyther in common nor priuate affayres, neyther in matters

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abroade, nor at home, neyther if yee dooe ought alone, nor if yee contract with another, may bee without duetie: and in regarding thereof resteth all honestie of lyfe, & in despising the same, dishonestie. And this no doubt is a common matter with all the Philosophers. For who is hee, which giuing no rules of duetie, dare name himselfe a Philosopher. But there be sundrie doctrines, which in setting foorthe the endes of good and badde, domisturne all duetie. For who in suche wise appoynteth the souereigne good that it hath nothing adioyned with vertue: and measureth the same by his commodities, and not by honestie: it commeth to passe that this manne, if in himselfe hee agree, and bee not some time ouer-comme with the goodnesse of Nature, canne bee neyther friendship, neyther iustice, nor lyberalytie: and in no wise doubtlesse canne hee bee a manlye manne who iudgeth paine the bitterest euill: nor

forensibus, neque domesticis in rebus, neq; si tecum agas quid, neque si cum altero contrahas vacare officio potest. In eoque colendo sita vitæ est honestas omnis, & id negligendo turpitudo. Atque hęc quidem quæstio cōmunis est omnium philosophorum. Quis enim est, qui nullis officij præceptis traden-dis Philosophum se audeat dicere? Sed sunt nonnullæ disciplinæ, quæ propositis bonorum et malorum finibus, officium omne peruertunt. Nam qui summum bonum sic instituit, vt nihil habeat cum virtute coniunctū: idque suis commodis, nō honestate metitur: hic si sibi ipse consentiat, & nō interdū naturę bonitate vincatur, neq; amicitiā colere possit nec iusticiā nec liberalitatē. Fortis vero dolorē sūmū malū iudicās, aut

temperãs, voluntatem sũmũ bonor' statuens, esse certe nullo modo potest q;quãq; ita sunt in prõptis, vt res disputatione nõ egeat: sunt tamẽ à nobis alio loco disputata. Hę disciplinę igitur, si sibi consentaneæ esse velint de officio nihil queant dicere: neq; vlla officij pręcepta firma, stabilia coniuncta naturæ tradi possunt, nisi aut ab ijs qui solam virtute aut ab ijs qui maxime honestatẽ ꝓpter se dicãt expetendã. Ita que ꝓpria est ea pręceptio Stoicor' et Academicor' et Peripateticor' quoniã Aristonis Pyrhonis, & Herilli iãpridẽ explosa sententia est, qui tamen haberẽt ius suum disputandi de officio, si rer' aliquem delectũ reliquissent, vt ad officij inuentionem aditus esset. Sequimur igitur hoc quidem tempore et in hac quęstione potissimũ Stoicos:

he a temperat men, who coũteth pleasure the greatest good, which points though they be so apparant ỹ the thing needeth no disputation: yet they be debated by vs in another place. These doctrines then, if they will in themselues accord, can say nothing of duetie: neither of dutie can there be giuen any precepts, sure, stedfast, & with nature agreable, but by them, who mainteine that neither onely, or chiefly, honestie for it selfe is to be embraced. And therfore the teaching thereof properly belongs to the Stoiks, & Academikes, & Peripatetiks, because Aristoes, Pirhoes and Herillus opinion longe since hath bene hist out of the Scholes, who neuertheless should haue their lawfull libertie to reason of dutie, if they had lost anye choyse of thinges, that to the outfindinge of duetie there might haue bene an entrie. we will follow therefore at this season, and in this matter, chiefly the Stoikes, not as a trãslatour, but as we are accusto-

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enstomed, we will draw out of their fountaines after our owne minde and iudgement, as much and in such sort, as shall seeme good. It liketh me then, sithens all my discourse must be of dutye, to define before what is ductie, which I maruaile, was ouerscapad of Panetius. For euery teching of any matter, that by an orderly trade is taken in hand, must begin ẏ proceſſe at a definition, ẏ it may be perceiued, what the thing is, whereof the treating goeth. All the question of duties twofolde. One kinde there is, that belongs to the ende of good, an other that standeth in preceptes, by the which the trade of lyfe may be fashioned in euerye condition.

Of the former kinde suche examples there be whether all duties be perfect, or no: whether one dutye be more than an other: and such as be of the same sorte.

But those ductieſ, whereof Preceptes bee geeuen, though they appertayne to

non vt interpretes, ſed (vt ſolemus) é fontib⁹ eorũ iudicio, arbitrioq; noſtro quantũ quoq; modo videbitur hauriem⁹. Placet igitur (quoniam diſputacio omnis de officio futura eſt) ante definire quid ſit officiũ qd' à Panũtio prætermiſſum eſſe miror. Omnis enim, quæ a ratione ſuſcipitur de aliqua re inſtitutio, debet à diſinicione ꝓficiſci: vt intelligatur quid ſit pe quo diſputetur. Omnis de officio duplex eſt q̃ſtio vnum genus eſt, qd' ꝓtinet ad finẽ bonorũ: alterũ qd' poſitũ eſt in præceptis, quibus in omnes ꝓtes vſus vitę confirmari poſſit. Superioris generis huiuſmodi exẽpla ſunt. Omnia nè officia perfecta ſint? nũquid officiũ aliud alio maius ſit: & quæ ſint generis eiuſdẽ. Quorũ autem officiorum præcepta traduntur: ea quamquã pertinent ad

finem bonorum, tamē id minus apparet, quia magis ad institutionem vitæ communis spectare videntur: de quibus est nobis his libris explicandum. Atque etiam alia diuisio est officij Nam et mediū quoddam officium dicitur, et perfectum. Perfectum officium rectum (opinor) vocemus quod Græci κατόρθωμα. Hoc autem commune officium καθῆκον vocant. Atque ea sic definiunt: vt rectum quod sit, id perfectum officium esse definiant. Medium autem officium id esse dicunt quod cur factū sit, ratio probabilis reddi possit. Triplex igitur est vt Panetio videtur, consilij capiendi deliberatio. Nam honestūnè factu sit an turpe dubitant, id quod in deliberationē cadit in quo considerando, sæpe animi in cōtrarias sententias distrahuntur.

the end of good, yet the same doeth lesse appeare, because they seeme rather to belonge to the framing of lyfe, of the which in these bookes, wee haue to open our minde. And also there is another diuision of ductie. For there is sayde to bee both a certaine meane ductie, and a perfect. I suppose, we may call the perfect, or the right, ductie, Rectum, which as the Greekes dooe tearme κατόρθωμα, and this meane or common ductie Cōmune, which they call καθῆκον. And those they dooe thus define, that the same which is Rectum, they define to bee the perfect ductie: and that, they saie is the meane ductie, for the which a probable reason maye bee rendered, why it is done

Aduisement then in counsell taking is three folde, as seemeth to Panetius. For first men doubte, whether it that falleth in aduisement bee honest to bee done, or dishoneſt: in weyghing whereof manye times mennes mindes are diuersly drawen into con-

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trarie opinions. Next, they ſarche and caſt whether it, wherevpon they take aduiſement, auayle or no, to commoditie, and pleaſauntneſſe of lyfe to riches, and plentye of goods, to power, and ſwaie of rule, whereby they may helpe both themſelues, and theirs, all which aduiſement falleth into the nature of profite. The third kinde of doubting is, when it that appeareth to be profitable, ſeemeth to ſtriue with honeſtye. For whereas profite dooth ſeeme to drawe to her honeſtie, contrarywiſe, to call backe to her: it commeth to paſſe, that the minde in aduiſing is haled to and fro, and it bringeth a perplexed ſtudie of imagination. Whereas in diuiding, it is a foule faulte to leaue out anie thing, two thinges bee ouerſlipped in this diuiſion. For not onelye whether the thing bee honeſt, or diſhoneſt, is vſed to bee aduiſed vpon: but alſo two honeſt thinges layde before vs, whether is the honeſter: and lykewiſe two

Tum autem, aut inquirunt aut conſultant ad vitę commoditatem iucunditatemque, ad facultates rerum, atque copias, ad opes, ad potétiã quibus & ſe poſſint iuuare & ſuos, cõducat id necnè, de quo deliberant, quæ deliberatio omnis in rationem vtilitatis cadit. Tertium dubitandi genus eſt, cũ pugnare videtur cũ honeſto id, quod videtur vtile. Cum enim vtilitas ad ſe rapere, honeſtas contra reuocare ad ſe videtur, fit vt diſtrahatur in deliberando animus, afferatq; ancipitem curam cogitandi. Hac diuiſione (cum prętterire aliquid maximũ vitium in diuidendo ſit) duo prætermiſſa ſunt. Nec enim ſolum vtrum honeſtũ an turpe ſit, deliberari ſolet: ſed etiam duobus propoſitis honeſtis vtrum honeſtius. Itemque duobus propoſitis

vtilibus, vtrũm vtilius. Ita quam ille triplicem putauit esse rationem: in quinque partes distribui debere reperitur. Primum igit' est de honesto, sed de honesto dupliciter, tum pari ratione de vtili: post de cõparatione eor' differendũ. Principio generi animatũ omni est à natura tributum, vt se vitam corpusque tueat', declinetque ea, q̃ ei noscitura videantur: omniaque quç sint ad viuendũ necessaria inquirat & paret, vt pastum, vt latibula, vt alia eiusdem generis. Cõmune autem onimãtium amnium est coniũctionis appetitus, ꝓcreandi causa, & cura q̃dam eorum q̃ ꝓcreata sunt. Sed inter hominẽ & beluam hoc maxime interest, quod hæc tantum quantũ sensu mouetur ad id solum quod adest, quodq́ue præsens est se accommodat, paululũ admodũ sentiẽs ꝑ-

profitable things sette before vs, whether is the more profitable. So the way which he tooke to be but threefolde, is found meete to be diuided into fiue partes. First then we haue to treate of honestie, but that in two sortes, next, as many wayes of profite, lastly, of the comparison of them both. From the beginning, to euerie kind of liuing creature, it is giuen by nature to defend himselfe, his life, and his body, and auoyde those thinges which may seeme lykely to be harmefull, and seeke and get all things that be necessary to liue withall, as feeding, as couertes, as other of the same sort. The appetite also of cõming together for ingenderung sake, and a certaine tenderues ouer them that be ingendered: is a common thing to all liuing creatures. But betweene man and beast, this chiefly is the difference, that a beast so farre as he is moued by sence, bendeth himself to that onely which is present and at hand, verie finally perceiuing ought past or to come,

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but man who is pertaker of reason, whereby he seeth sequeles, beholdeth grounds & causes of things, is not ignoraunt of theyr proceedinges, and as it were their foregoings, compareth semblances, and with things present, ioyneth and knitteth thinges to come, doeth soone espie the course of his whole lyfe, & to the leading thereof purueieth things necessarie. And ý sayd nature, through the power of reason, winneth man to man, to a fellowship both in talke & also of life, and ingendereth a certain speciall fauor, chiefly to themwarde that are of them begotten, & stirreth vp the companies of men that they be willing both to be assembled together, and also to be seruiceable one to another, and for those causes that they studye to puruay such things as maye furnishe them for theyr apparell, and for sustenaunce, not onelye for themselues, but for their wiues, children, & other, who they holde deare, and ought to defende, which care stur-

teritum, aut futurum. Homo autem quoniam rationis est particeps cõsequentia cernit, principia & causas rerum videt, earumque progressus: & quasi antecessiones non ignorat: similitudines comparat: rebusque præsentibus adiungit atque annectit futuras: facile totius vitę cursum videt, ad eam que degendam, præparat res necessarias. Eademque natura vi rationis hominem consiliat homini & ad orationis, & ad vitæ societatem. Ingeneratque in primis prę cipuum quendã amorem in eos, qui procreati sunt: impellitque vt hominum cœtus & celebrare inter se, & sibi obedire velit: ob easque causas studeat parare ea, qua suppeditẽt, & ad cultum & ad victũ, nec sibi solis, sed cõiungi, liberis, ceterisq; quos charos habeat, tueriq; debeat, q̃ cura ex-

exſuſcitat etiã animos, et maiores ad rem gerendam facit. In primiſq; hominum eſt propria veri inquiſitio atq; inueſtigatio. Itaque cum ſumus neceſſariis negotiis curiſq; vacui, tũ auemus aliquid videre, audire ac diſcere, cognitionẽq; rerũ aut occultarum, aut admirabiliũ ad bene beateq; viuendum neceſſariam ducimus. Ex quo intelligitur, quod verum, ſimplex, ſincerumq; ſit, id eſſe naturę hominis aptiſſimum. Huic veri videndi cupiditati adiuncta eſt appetitio quædã principatus: vt nemini parere animus bene a natura informat⁹ velit, niſi præcipienti, aut docenti, aut vtilitatis cauſa iuſte & legitime imperanti, ex quo animi magnitudo exiſtit, humanarumq; rerum cõtẽptio. Nec vero illa parva vis naturæ eſt rationiſq; quod vnũ hoc areth vp alſo mens ſpirits and makes them of more courage to doe their buſineſſe. Alſo ſearching and tracing out of trouth is chiefly mans propertie. Therefore when wee bee voyde of neceſſarie cares and buſineſſe, then wee couet to ſee, to heare, and to learne ſomewhat, and wee thinke the knowledge of things eyther hidden, or wonderous, verie neceſſarie to good and bliſſefull lyfe, whereof is gathered, that what ſo is true, ſimple, and pure, is fitteſt for the nature of man. There is ioyned to this loue of eſpying the trouth, a certaine deſire of ſoueraignetie, ſo as a well framed minde by nature is willing to obeie no man, but him that inſtructeth and teacheth: or him that for cauſe of his weale, iuſtlye and lawfullye gouerneth, wherein ſtandeth the greatneſſe of courage, and the contempt of worldlye vanities. And that truelye is no ſmall power of nature and reaſon, that this creature onelye perceiues what is order: what

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ſt is, that becõmeth in deeds, and wordes: and what is meaſure. And therfore of thoſe ſame things which be diſcerned by ſight, no other creature perceiueth the beautie, ỹ grace and the proportion of parts, which nature and reaſon conueying from the eyes to the minde, do ỹ more iudge a beautie, a ſtedfaſtneſſe, & an order in counſells, and deeds fit to be obſerued, and is heedfull, that it doe nothing vncomely or womanniſhly, and thereto both in all thoughtes and deedes, that nothing wantonly eyther it doe or imagine. Of which things is forged, and made that honeſtie, that we ſeeke: which though it bee not aduaunced, yet honeſtie it is, and we truely ſay, though of no man it bee commended, is yet commendable by nature. You ſee, ſonne Marke, ỹ verie forme doubtleſſe, and (as it were) the face of honeſtie: which in caſe it might bee beholden with the eyes, woulde ſtirre by, (as ſayth Plato) a meruaylous loue of wiſedome.

nimal ſentit quid ſit ordo, quid deceat in factis dictiſq;, qui ſit mod⁹. itaq; eorum ipſorum, quę aſpectu ſentiuntur, nullũ aliud animal pulchritudinẽ, venuſtatẽ, cõuenientiam partium ſentit. Quam ſimilitudinẽ natura ratioq; ab oculis ad animũ transferens multo etiã magis pulchritudinẽ, cõſtãtiã, ordinẽ in cõſilijs, factiſq; cõſeruãdũ putat: cauetq;, ne quid indecore, effeminatéue faciat: tũ in omnibus et opinioni b⁹ & factis nequid libidinoſe aut faciat aut cogitet. Quibus ex rebus conflatur, et efficitur id qd' querimus honeſtũ, qd' etiã ſi nobilitatum nõ ſit tamẽ honeſtũ ſit: quodq; vere dicimus, etiam ſi a nullo laudetur, laudabile eſſe natura. Formã quidẽ ipſam, Marce fili, et tãquã faciẽ honeſtatis vides quę ſi oculis cerneretur, mirabilem amorem (vt ait Plato)

Plato) excitatur ſapientię. Sed omne quod honeſtum eſt, id quatuor partium oritur ex aliqua. Aut enim in perſpicientia veri, ſolertiaque verſatur: aut in hominũ ſocietate tuenda, tribuendoq; quod ſuum eſt cuiq;, & rerum contractatum fide: aut in animi excelſi, atq; inuicti magnitudine ac robore, aut in omniũ quę fiunt quęq; dicuntur ordine & modo, in quo ineſt modeſtia & temperantia. Quæ quatuor quanquam inter ſe colligata, atq; implicita ſunt: tamen ex ſingulis certa officior' genera naſcũtur, velut ex ea parte q̃ primò deſcripta eſt (in qua ſapiẽtiã & prudẽtiã ponim⁹) ineſt indagatio atq; inuẽtio veri: eiuſq; virtutis hoc munus eſt propriũ, vt enim quiſq; maxime ꝓſpicit, quid in requaq;, veriſſimum ſit, quiq́ue & acutiſſime et celerime poteſt et vide-

But all that is honeſt, ſpringeth out of ſome one of the fower braunches. For it is occupyed eyther in the inſight of truth and ſkilfulneſſe, or in preſeruing the fellowſhip of men, and giuing euerie bodye his own, and keeping a faithfulneſſe in contracts, or in the greatneſſe and mightineſſe of haute and vnconquerable courage: or elſe in the order & meaſure of all things that are done and ſayd, wherein reſteth diſcreation & temperance, which foure, though they bee linked and tangled together, yet certaine ſeuerall kinds of duties doe grow out of euerie one of thẽ, as out of ỹ branch, the firſt was deſcribed (wherin we place wiſdome and prudence) iſſues the ſearching, & trying out of trouth: and this is the verie proper woorke of that vertue. For who ſo thorough ſeeth moſt, what in euerie caſe is trueſt: and who moſt wittely and readylye is able both to ſee and giue the reaſon: hee woorthelye is wont to be reputed the wyſeſt, and the wiſeſt, where-

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foꝛe to this vertue trouth is appoynted, as the matter wherevppon to woꝛke, and wherein to be occuppyed. But to the other thꝛee vertues are assigned necessities to get, and kepe those things, wherby the trade of mannes lyfe is maintayned: to the intent the fellowshippe and neighbourhoode of men be pꝛeserued: and the woꝛthinesse and greatnesse of courage maye shine abꝛoade, not onelye in augmenting of substance, and pꝛocuring of commodityes both to him and to his, but also much moꝛe in despising of the same. But oꝛder, and steadfastnesse, and measure keeping, and such lyke, haue to doe in that kinde: whereunto must bee toyned a certaine dooing, and not onelye an earnest occuppying of the wit. Foꝛ applying a certaine mean, & oꝛder to such things as be meddeled within mans lyfe, wee shall obserue both honestye and comelynesse. Now of those foure places, whereunto wee haue diuided the nature and strength

re & explicare rationē, is prudētissim⁹ & sapiē tissim⁹ rite haberi solet. Quo circa, huic quasi materia quā tractet, & in qua versetur, subiecta est veritas. Reliquis autē trib⁹ virtutibus necessitates ꝓpositę sūt ad eas res parādas, tuēdasque quib⁹ actio vitę cōtinet', vt & societas hominū, cōiunctioque seruetur, & animi excellētia magnitudoque, cū in augēdis opib⁹, vtilitatibusque, & sibi & suis cōparandis, tūm multo magis in his ipsis despiciēdis eluceat. Ordo autem & cōstantia & moderatio, & ea q̄ sunt ijs similia, versātur in eo genere, ad quod adhibenda est q̄dam actio nō solū mentis agitatio. His enim rebus quę tractantur in vīta modū quendam adhibentes & ordinem, honestatem, & decus cōseruabimus. Ex quatuor autem locis in quos honesti naturam,

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vimque diuiſimus primus ille qui in veri cognitione conſiſtit, maxime naturā aitingit humanam. Omnes, enim trahimur et ducimur ad cognitionis et ſcientiæ cupiditatem: inqua excellere pulcrum putamus: labi autem et errare, neſcire, et decepi, et malum, et turpe ducimus. In hoc genere et naturali, et honeſto, duo vitia vitanda ſunt: vnum ne incognita pro cognitis habeamus, iiſque temerè aſſẽtiamur, quod vitium effugere qui velit omnes autem velle debent) adhibebit ad conſiderandas res, et tempus, et diligentiam. Alterū eſt vitium, quòd quidā minis magnū ſtudiū, multamque operā in res obſcuras, atque difficiles cõferunt, eaſdemq; non neceſſarias. Quibus vitijs declinatis quod in rebus honeſtis et cognitione dignis operę curæque ponetur,

of honeſtie, the ſame firſt that conſiſteth in knowledge of trouth, toucheth mans kinde neereſt of all. For we bee all drawne and led to a deſire of knowledge, & ſcience, wherein to paſſe other, we thinke it a goodly matter: but to ſlide, to erre, to be ignorant, to bee deceiued, wee count it both euill and diſhoneſt. In this kind of vertue which is both natural, and honeſt: two faults muſt bee auoided: one, that we take not things we know not, as though wee knewe them, and raſhlye aſſent to them, which fault who ſo will eſchew (and although to bee willing) muſt emploie to the conſidering of matters both leaſure and diligence. Another fault there is, that ſome beſtow ouer great ſtudie, and too much trauaile, in darke and difficulte thinges, and the ſame nothing neceſſarie, which faultes auoided, whatſoeuer laboure and dilygence ſhall bee ſpente in honeſt thinges, and worthye of knowledge, the ſame of right ſhall be commended

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as in Astrologie, wee haue heard what Caius Sulpitius was in Geometrie, wee knewe what Sextus Pompeius could do, many in Logicke, moe in the ciuill lawe, which sciences bee all occupied in tracing out the truth, with the studie whereof to bee drawne from trauayling in matters, it is against duetie. For vertues whole praise consisteth in doing, from which yet often times ther is had a resting while, and there bee graunted manye recourses againe vnto studie, yea, and the musing of the minde, that neuer ceaseth, maye continue vs in the studies of cõtemplation, euen without our trauaile. But lette euerye thought and mouing of the minde be occupied, eyther in taking of aduisement aboute honest matters, and pertayning to the good and blissefull life, or else in studies of science and knowledge. And thus haue wee spoken of the first founctaine of duetie. But of the other three vertues remayning, that kinde

id iure laudabitur, vt in Astrologia, C. Sulpitiũ audiuimus: in Geometria, Sextum Pompeiũ ipsi cognouimus: multos in dialecticis, plures in iure ciuili: quę omnes artes in veri inuestigatione versantur, cuius studio a rebus agendis abduci, contra officium est. Virtutis enim laus omnis in actione consistit: a qua tamen sæpe fit intermissio, multique dantur ad studia reditus: tum agitatio mentis quæ nunquam acquiescit, potest nos in studijs cogitationis, etiam sine opera nostra continere. Omnis autem cogitatio, motusq; animi, aut in consilijs capiendis de rebus honestis, et pertinentibus ad bene, beateq; viuendũ, aut in studijs scientiæ, cognitionisque versatur. Ac de primo quidem officij fõte diximus. De tribus autẽ reliquis latissimè

patet ea ratio, qua ſocietas hominum inter ipſos, & vitæ quaſi communitas cõtinetur. Cuius partes duæ ſunt. Iuſtitia, in qua virtutis ſplẽdor eſt maximus, ex qua boni viri nominantur: & huic coniuncta beneficentia, quam eandem vel benignitatem, vel liberalitatem appellare licet. Sed iuſtitiæ primum munus eſt, vt ne cui quis noceat, niſi laceſſitus iniuria, deinde vt communibus pro communibus vtatur, priuatis autem vt ſuis. Sunt autem priuata nulla natura, ſed aut vetere occupatione, vt qui quondam in vacua venerunt: aut victoria, vt qui bello potiti ſunt: aut lege, pactione, conditione, ſorte.

Ex quo fit, vt ager Arpinas, Arpinatium dicatur: Tuſculanus, Tuſculanorum. Similiſque eſt priuaturam

extendeth fartheſt, wherein is contained the fellowſhippe of men among themſelues, and (as it were) the interpartning of mannes lyfe. Wherof there be two parts: Iuſtice is ons, in the which is the greateſt brightneſſe of vertue, whereof good men beare theyr name, and to this is ioyned bountifulneſſe, which ſame wee maye tearme eyther gentleneſſe, or liberalitie. But the principall duetie of iuſtice is, that no man hurt another, vnleſſe hee bee prouoked by wronge: the next, that he vſe things commen, as common, and things priuate, as his owne. Howbeit, by nature thinges priuate bee none, but eyther by auncient poſſeſſion, as of theyrs who in olde time came into waſte groundes, or by victorie, as of theirs who got thinges in warre, or by lawe, couenaunt, condition, or lot.

Whereof it comes to paſſe, that the grounde Arpinas is counted the Arpinatians: the

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ground Tuſculan the Tuſculanians. And after this ſort is the pointing out of priuate poſſeſſions. Wherupon ſeeing there is made a mans owne of euerie one of thoſe thinges which by nature were common, let euerie one inioy that to euery one is befalle. More then that, if anie man wil couet to himſelfe, he ſhal breake the lawe of mans fellowſhip. But becauſe (as it is notably written of Plato) we be born not for our ſelues alone, but ſome deale of our birth our countrie, ſome deale our parēts, ſome deale our frieds do claime, & (as liketh the Stoikes) whatſoeuer is bred vpon earth, all to the vſe of man is created, but man for mannes owne cauſe is begotten, that they among themſelues one maye helpe another: herein wee be bound to follow nature our leader: and to ſette abroade that maye ſerue for common commodities, by enterchaunge of dueties in giuing and taking, and alſo by artes, by tra-

poſſeſſionum deſcriptio.

Ex quo, quia ſuum cuiuſque fit eorum quę natura fuerant communia, quod cuique obtigit, id quiſque teneat. Eo ſi quis ſibi plus appetet, violabit ius humanæ ſocietatis. Sed quoniam (vt preclare ſcriptum eſt a Platone) non nobis ſolum nati ſumus: ortuſque noſtri partem patria vendicat, partem parentes, partem amici, atque (vt placet Stoicis) quæ in terris gignuntur, ad vſum hominum omnia creari. homines autem hominum cauſa eſſe generatos, vt ipſi inter ſe alij alijs prodeſſe poſſint: in hoc naturam ducem debemus ſequi, & communes vtilitates in medium afferre mutatione officiorum dando accipiendoque, tum artibus,

rum opera, tum facultatibus deuincere hominum inter homines societatem. Fundamentū autem iusticiæ est fides, id est dictorum, cōuentorumque constantia et veritas, ex quo, quāquā hoc videbitur fortasse cuipiam durius, tamen audeamus imitari Stoicos, qui studiose exquirunt vnde verba sint dicta, credamusque quia fiat quod dictum est, appellatam Fidem. Sed iniusticiæ duo genera sūt: vnum, eorum qui inferunt: alterum eorum ab ijs, quibus infertur, si possent, non propulsant iniuriam. Nam qui iniuste impetū in quēpiam facit, aut ira, aut aliqua perturbatione insitatus, is quasi manus violenter videtur afferre socio: qui autem non defendit nec obsistit, si potest iniuriæ, tam est in vitio, quam si parentes, aut amicos, aut patriam deserat.

uaile by riches, to knitte the fellowshippe of man with man.

But faithfulnesse is the foundation of iustice which is in worde and couenaunt, a truth & stedfastnesse, wherupon though this shall seeme to some perchance ouerheard: yet let vs bee bolde to follow the Stoikes, which heedfully search out from whence woordes bee fetched, and let vs thinke, that it is called faythfulnesse, because it is fulfilled, which was spoken.

Contrariwise, there bee two kindes of iniustice. One, of such as offer it: another, of those who though they bee able, do not defend wrong frō them to whom it is offered. For who so vniustlye doeth make assault vpon ane man, either stirred by cholar, or any passion, he seemeth as with violence, to kill his fellowe, & who so defendeth not, notwithstandeth iniurie if he bee able, is as farre in fault, as if he should forsake his parents, his friends, or his Countrie.

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And indeede thoſe iniuries that are doone of purpoſe to hurt, doe oftentimes ariſe of feare, when hee who intendeth to hurt another, is afraide that vnleſſe hee doe it to the other, hee may himſelfe bee touched with ſome diſcommoditie. And for the moſt part many men take occaſion to doe wrong, of intent to compaſſe thoſe things that they haue coueted: in which kinde of vice, couetouſneſſe moſt largelye ſheweth her ſelfe. Notwithſtanding ryches bee coueted both for neceſſarie vſes of the lyfe, and alſo to inioye pleaſure.

But in thoſe in whome there is a greater courage, couetting of moneye hath an eye to power, and ableneſſe of pleaſuring, as of late Marcus Craſſus demyed anye ſubſtance to be great inough for him, that in a common weale woulde bee a Prince: whyle hee were not able with his reuenue to maintayne an armie. Sumptuous furnitures doe alſo delyght, and countenaunce of lyfe, with

Atque illæ quidem iniuriæ, quæ nocendi cauſa de induſtria inferuntur, ſæpe a metu proficiſcuntur: cũ is qui alteri nocere cogitat, timet, ne niſi id alteri fecerit, ipſe aliquo afficiatur incommodo. Maximam autẽ partẽ ad iniuriam faciendam aggrediuntur nonnulli, vt adipiſcantur ea quę cõcupierunt: in quo vitio latiſſimè patet auaritia. Expetũtur autem diuitię, tum ad vſus vitæ neceſſarios, tum ad perfruẽdas voluptates. In quibus autem maior eſt animus, in his pecuniæ cupiditas ſpectat ad opes, et ad gratificandi facultatum vt nuper M. Craſſus negabat vllã ſatis magnam pecuniam eſſe ei, qui in repub. princeps vellet eſſe, cuius fructibus exercitum alere non poſſet. Delectant etiam magnifici apparatus, vitæque cultus, cum

elegantia & copia. Quibus rebus effectum est, vt infinita pecuniæ cupiditas esset. Nec vero rei familiaris amplificatio nemini nocens vituperanda est, sed fugienda semper iniuria. Maxime autem adducuntur pleriq;, vt eos iustitię capiat obliuio, cum in imperiorum, honorum, gloriæuè cupiditatem inciderint. Quod enim apud Ennium, *Nulla sancta societas, nec Fides Regni est*, id latius patet. Nam quicquid cuiusmodi est in quo non possint plures excellere, in eo plerumq; fit tanta contentio, vt difficillimum sit sanctam seruare societatẽ. Declarauit id modo temeritas C. Cęsaris qui omnia iura diuina & humana peruertit, ꝓpter eum quẽ sibi ipse opinionis errore finxerat principatũ. Est autẽ in hoc genere molestum, qd' in maximis animis, splendidissi-

fineneſſe & plentie. By which meanes it is come to paſſe, that endleſſe is the deſire of riches.

And truelye the enlargemẽt of a mans priuate goods hurtfull to no bodie, is not to be diſpraiſed, but euermore in iurie is to bee ſhunned. But the moſt part of men chiefly bee brought to forget iuſtice, when they fall into the deſire of rule, honour, or glorye For that which is in Ennius, In Empire is no godlye fellowſhippe nor Faith: reacheth farther. For whatſoeuer is of ſuch ſorte, wherein manye cannot bee chiefe, therein commonly happeneth ſo great contention, that verie harde it is to keepe a godlye ſocyetie. The ſtorme of Caius Ceſar declared that of late who tourned topſetturuye all the lawes of God and man, for that ſoueraignties ſake, which hee to himſelfe, by the erroꝛ of his owne conceit had imagined. And in this kind it is a grieſeful caſe that deſires of honour, rule, power, and glorie, bee com-

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monly in the greateſt courages, & goodlyeſt wits. Wherefore the more heede muſt be taken, that we offend nothing in that behalfe.

But there is a greate diuerſitie in all iniuſtice, whether the wrong bee doone of any ſtur of the minde, which commonly is but ſhort, and for a ſeaſon, or els of purpoſe & aduiſedly. For the harmes be eaſier, that befall of ſome ſodaine moode, then ſuch as be done beeing deuiſed & prepared for. And thus we haue ſayd inough of dooing iniurie. But there are wont to bee manye cauſes why wee refuſe to defend another, and doe leaue our duetie. For men be vnwilling to take vpon them eyther diſpleaſure, or trauaile, or charges, or elſe they bee ſo giuen to negligence, ſlouthfulneſſe, idleneſſe, priuate ſtudyes, or certaine buſineſſe, that they ſuffer them to bee helpeleſſe, whome they ought to ſaue harmeleſſe. Wherefore wee muſt looke leaſt it bee not ſufficient that is ſpoken of

miſq; ingenijs, plerumq; exiſtunt honoris, imperij, potentię, glorię cupiditates. Quo magis cauendum eſt, ne quid in eo genere peccetur. Sed in omni iniuſtitia ꝑ multum intereſt vtrum perturbatione aliqua animi, q̄ plerumq; breuis eſt, & ad temp⁹, an conſultò & cogitatò fiat iniuria. Leuiora enim ſũt ea, q̄ repentino aliquo motu accidunt, q̄ ea, q̄ meditata & preparata inferuntur. Ac de inferenda quidem iniuria ſatis eſt dictum. Prętermittendę autē defenſionis, deſerendiq; officij plures ſolēt eſſe cauſa. Nā aut inimicitias aut laborem, aut ſumptus ſuſcipere nolunt, aut etiā negligētia, pigritia, inertia, aut ſuis ſtudijs quibuſdāuè occupationib⁹ ſic impediuntur, vt eos quos tutari debeāt, deſertos eſſe patiantur. Itaq; videndum eſt, ne non ſatis ſit id, q̄ apud

Platonem est in Pphilo sophus dictum : quód in veri inuestigatione versentur, quódque ea, quæ plerique vehemen ter expetunt, de quibus inter se digladiari soleant, contemnant, & pro nihilo ducant, propterea iustos esse. Nam dum alterum iustitiæ genus assequuntur, in inferenda ne cui noceant iniuria, in alterum incidunt. Discēdi enim studio impediti, quos tueri debent deserunt. Itaque eos ad Rempub licam ne accessuros quidem putat, nisi coactos. Aequius autem erat id voluntate fieri, nam hoc ipsum ita iustum est, quod recte fit, si est voluntarium. Sunt etiam qui aut studio rei familiaris tuendæ, aut odio quodam hominum suum se negotium agere dicant ne facere cuiquam videantur iniuriam, qui dum altero iniustitiæ genere vacant,

Plato touching the Philosophers, that therefore they be iust, because they bee occupyed in tracing out trouth: and because they despise and sette at naught such thinges as the most parte of men greedely desire, and among themselues are wont to bee at daggers drawing for the same. For while they attayne one kind of iustice, that they hurt no man with doing of iniurie, they fall into the other. For beeing letted with the studie of learning, they forsake them, whom they ought to defend. And therefore hee thinkes they woulde not enter into the common weale, were they not compelled. But it were more reason, that voluntarilye it shoulde bee doone. For what so is ryghtlye doone, the same thereby is iust, if it bee voluntarye. There bee also who eyther for loue of sauing theyr substaunce, or a certayne hatred to men, doe saye, that they meddle onelye with theyr owne matters, least they maye seeme to doe

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anie bodie wrong, who while they bee voyde of one kinde of iniustice, dooe runne into the other. For they forsake the fellowshippe of lyfe, because they bestowe no studie, no labour, nor substance vpponit. Seeing then after the declaring of the two kindes of iniustice, wee haue thereto ioyned the causes of eyther kinde, and haue sette out those thinges afore wherein iustice is contained, we maye easilye iudge what is the dutie of euerie season, except we fauour our selues to farre. For it is hard to haue a carefulnesse ouer other mens matters, although ỳ same Chremes in Terence counteth nothing straunge to him of ought that pertaynes to man.

Neuertheless, because wee perceiue and feele those thinges more, that doo happen to oure selues, eyther luckelye or vnfortunatelye, than such as befall to other, which (as yee woulde saye) wee beholde a great way off, we iudge otherwise of them,

in alterum incurrunt. Deserunt enim vitæ societatem: quia nihil conferunt in eam studij, nihil operæ, nihil facultatum.

Quoniam igitur duobus generibus iniustitiæ propositis adiunximus causas vtriusque generis, easque res ante constituimus, quibus iustitia continetur: facile quod cuiusque temporis officium sit poterimus (nisi nosmet ipsos valde amabimus) iudicare. Est enim difficilis cura rerum alienarum, quanquam Terentianꝰ ille Chremes, humani nihil a se alienum putat.

Sed tamen quia magis ea precipimus atque sentimus, quæ nobis ipsis aut prospera, aut aduersa eueniunt, quàm illa quæ ceteris, quæ quasi longo interuallo interiecto videmus, aliter de illis, ac de nobis iudicamus.

Quo circa bene precipiunt qui vetant quicquam agere, ꝙ dubites æquum ſit an iniquum. Aequitas enim lucet ipſa per ſe, dubitatio autem cogitationem ſignificat iniurię. Sed incidũt ſępe tempora, cùm ea q̃ maxime videntur digna eſſe iuſto homine, eoq; quem virum bonum dicim⁹, cõmutantur, fiunt q; cõtraria, vt nõ reddere depoſitum, etiam ne furioſo promiſſum facere, quęq; pertinent ad veritatem, & ad fidem ea negare interdum, & non ſeruare ſit iuſtum. Referri enim decet ad ea, q̃ poſui in principio fundamenta iuſtitię: primum, vt ne cui noceatur: deinde, vt cõmuni vtilitati ſeruiatur. Ea cùm tempore commutantur, commutatur officium: vt non ſemper ſit idem. Poteſt enim accidere promiſſum aliquod, & conuentum, vt id effici ſit inutile,

then of our ſelues. Therefore they teach well, that forbidde to doe anye thing which yee doubt, whether it bee ryght or wrong. For the very right ſhineth of it ſelfe, but doubting declares an inmagination of wronge. But often there befal ſeaſons, that thoſe duetie which ſeeme to bee moſt meet for a iuſt man, and him whome wee call a good man, bee changed and become contrarious, ſo that ſometime it is iuſt not to reſtore that is layd to keepe, alſo not to performe promiſe with a madde man, and to denye thoſe thinges which concerne ones trouth and honeſtye. For it is meete they bee referred to thoſe foundations of iuſtice which I layde in the beginning: firſt, that no man bee hurte, next, that common profite bee ſerued, when theſe bee chaunged by time, chaunged is duetie, that it remaynes not alwayes a lyke. For there maye chaunce ſome promiſe and couenaunt, that maye bee vnprofitable to bee perfor-

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med eyther to him, to whome it is promised: or else to him that promised it. For (as it is in the Fables) if Neptunus had not done that to Theseus he promised, Theseus had not bene bereft of his sonne Hippolitus. For of the three boones (as is written) that was the thirde, which in his furie he asked for the death of Hippolitus: and when he had obtayned it, hee fell into heauie wailinges. Therefore neither those promises are to be fulfilled, which are vnprofitable to them, to whom you made them: nor if they hurt you more thē they profit him, whom you promised.

It is agaynst duetye, the greater harme to bee rather admitted then the lesse: as if you haue appoynted your selfe, with anie man to come as his counseller in his matter that is in hand: and in the meane season your sonne begins to fall sore sick, let it not bee reckoned agaynst duetie, not to performe that ye promised: yea, and he more should swarue from duty, to whom ẏ

vel ei cui promissum sit, vel ei qui promiserit. Nam si (vt in Fabulis est,) Neptunus quod Theseo promiserat non feciſſet, Theseus filio Hippolito non esset orbatus. Ex tribus enim optatis, (vti scribitur,) hoc erat tertium, qd' de Hippoliti interitu iratus optauit, quo impetrato, in maximos luctus incidit. Nec promissa igitur seruanda sunt ea, quæ sint iis quibus promiseris inutilia; nec si plus tibi noceant, quàm illi prosint, cui promiseris.

Contra officium est, magis damnum antepo nì minori: vt, si constitueris te cuipiam aduocatum: in rem præsentem, esse venturum: atque interim, grauiter ægrotare filius cœperit, non sit contra Officium, non facere quod dixeris.

Magisque ille, cui pro-

promissum sit, ab officio discedat, si se destitutum queratur. Iam illis promissis non standum esse quis nō videt quæ coactus quis metu, aut deceptus dolo promiserit. Quæ quidem pleraque iure Prætorio liberantur, nonnulla legibus.

Existunt etiam sæpe iniuriæ calumnia quadam, & nimis calida, et malitiosa iuris interpretatione. Ex quo illud, Summum ius, summa iniuria, factum est iam tritum sermone prouerbium. Quo in genere, etiam in Repub. multa peccantur: vt ille, qui cùm centum trigenta dierum essent cum hoste pactę inducię, noctu populabatur agros, qd' dierum essent pactæ nō noctium inducię. Nec noster quidem probandus est, si verum est, Quintum Fabium Labeonem, seu quem alium (nihil enim preter

promise was made, if he wold complaine himselfe to bee disappointed. Nowe who seeth not that it is not meete to stande to those promises, which a man hath promised, being constrained with feare, or deluded with guile, which things for the moste parte bee discharged by the Prætors court, and manye of them by statute.

Wrongs also often times doe rise vppon a certayne cauillation, and ouer traftie and subtile misconstruing of the lawe, whereupon that saying, Extreame lawe, extreame wrong, is nowe made a well worne Prouerbe in communication. In which kind many thinges bee doone amisse euen in ỹ cōmon weales matters, as hee, who when the truce was taken with the enimie for 30. dayes, ouerranne his lande in the night, because the truce was taken for dayes, and not for nights. Nonor yet our Countreyman is to be allowed (if it be true) that Quintus Fabius Labeo, or anye other man

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(foꝛe I haue nothing but by heare ſaie) beeing by the Senate appointed daiſman to the Nolones and Neopolitanes, aboute the boundes of theyꝛ landes, did commune with either of them a parte, when he came to the place that they ſhoulde not doe, noꝛ couet anie thing greedelye, and that rather they would ſet backe, then incroch vppon each other, which when eyther of them had ſo done, there was a parcell of ground left in the midſt. And ſo he cauſed theyꝛ bounds to be ſtaked out, euen as they had tolde him, the reſidue that was in the middeſt hee adiudged to the people of Rome. This plainely is to deceiue, and not to iudge: wherefoꝛe ſuch wylyneſſe in euerye caſe is to bee auoyded.

auditum habeo) arbitrum Nolanis & Neapolitanis de finibus agri a Senatu datum: cum ad locum veniſſet, cum vtriuſque ſeperatim loquutum, ne cupide quid agerent, nec appeterent, atque vt regredi quàm progredi mallent. Id cùm vtrique feciſſent, aliquantum agri in medio relictum eſt. Itaque illorum fine, ſicut ipſi dixerant, terminauit, in medio relictum quod erat populo Romano adiudicauit. Decipere hoc quidem, non iudicare eſt. Quo circa in omni re fugienda eſt talis ſolertia.

There bee certaine dueties alſo to be obſerued, euen towarde them of whome you haue receiued wꝛong. Foꝛ in reuenge and chaſtiſement, there is a meaſure to bee vſed. And I wote not whether it bee ſufficient foꝛ him

Sunt autem quedam officia etiam aduerſus eos ſeruanda, a quibus iniuriam acceperis. Eſt enim vlciſcendi & puniendi modus. Atque haud ſcio, an ſatis ſit eum qui laceſſierit, iniuriæ ſuæ penitere, vt & ipſe ne quid tal-

poſt-

posthac cõmittat, & cę teri sint ad iniuriã tardiores. Atq; in Repub. maxime conseruanda sunt iura belli. Nam cum sint duo genera decertandi: vnum per disceptationem, alterũ per vim, cùmque illud proprium sit hominis, hoc beluarum, confugiendũ est ad posterius, si vti non licet superiore. Quare suspicienda quidem bella sunt ob eam causam, vt sine iniuria in pace viuatur, parta autem victoria, conseruandi sunt ij qui non crudeles in bello, nec immanes fuerunt: vt maiores nostri Tusculanos, Auquos, Volscos, Sabinos, Hernicos, in ciuitatem etiã acceper': at Charthaginem & Numantiam funditas sustulerunt. Nollem Corinthum: sed credo illos secutor opportunitatem loci, maxime ne posset aliquãdo ad bellum faciendum locus

that began to repent him of the wrong: but that he be punished, that he commit not ỹ like offence againe: and that other also may be the slower to doe wrong.

And the law of armes must in any wise be kept, in ỹ common weale. For where as there be two kindes of contention, one by reasoning, another by violence: and the first is the propertie of man, the second of beast: we must flye to the latter, if we may not vse the former.

Wherefore to this end and purpose wee must enter in war: that without iniury we may liue in peace: and when ỹ victory is gottẽ, they must be saued, who haue not bene cruel, nor vnmerciful in fight as our auncesters euen into the citie receiued the Tusculanes, the Equianes, the Volscianes, the Sabines, & the Hernikes: but they vtterly razed Carthage & Numance, Corinth, I would they had not, but I beleue, they chiefly respected ỹ situatiõ: least ỹ veri place might encourage them,

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at any tyme to mone warre.

After my minde certesse, it is meete alwayes to giue counsell to peace, that shall haue in it no fraud, nor guile. wherein if men had agreed to mee, we should haue had, although not ỳ best, yet some common weale, which now is none. And not onely for them ye must prouide, whom by force you haue subdued, but they also, who come in with yelded weapon, vppon affiaunce in the Captaine (although the Ramme hath battered the wall) are to bee receiued.

In which pointe, Iustice hath bene so greatly regarded with our men, that they who had taken Cities to mercye, or Nations conquered in warre, should bee their patrones, by the custome of our auncesters.

And the Iustice of the warr is most sincerely descryued, in the fectall lawe of the people of Rome.

Whereby it maye bee perceyued, that no warre is iuste, but which eyther for

ipse adhortari. Mea quidem sententia, paci, quæ nihil habitura sit insidiarum semper est consulendum.

In quo si mihi obtemperatum esset: etsi non optimam, at aliquam Remp. (quæ nunc nulla est) haberemus. At cùm ijs, quos vi deuiceris, consulendum est: tum ij, qui armis positis ad imperatorum fidem confugiunt (quāuis murum Aries percusserit) recipiendi sunt.

In quo tanto pere apud nostros iustitia culta est, vt ij, qui Ciuitates aut nationes deuictas bello in fidem recipissent, earum patroni essent more maiorum.

Ac belli quidem æquitas sanctissime feciali Populi Romani iure perscripta est.

Ex quo intelligi potest, nullum bellū esse iustum, nisi quod aut

rebus

rebus repetitis geratur, aut denunciatum ante sit, & indictum. Pompilius imperator tenebat prouinciam, in cuius exercitu Catonis filius Tiro militabat. Cùm autem Pompilio videretur vnam dimittere legionem: Catonis quoque filium, qui in eadē legione militabat, dimisit. Sed cùm amore pugnandi in exercitu remansisset, Cato ad Pompiliū scripsit, vt si eum pateretur in exercitu remanere, secundo eum obligaret militiæ sacramento: quia priore amisso, iure pugnare cū hostibus non poterat. Adeo summa erat obseruatio in bello mouēdo. Marci quidem Catonis senis est epistola ad Marcum filium: in qua scripsit se audisse eum dimissum factum esse a Consule, cum in Macedonia bello Persico miles esset. Monet igitur, vt caueat ne

things in claime is moued or is proclaimed before, and bidden by defiaunce. Pompilius the Romanes generall kept a prouince, in whose armie, Catoes son went for a young souldier a warfare. And when it lyked Pompilius to discharge one legion, he discharged Catoes sonne also, who serued in that legion as a soldier. But when hee for loue of the warres, remained in the camp still, Cato did write to Pompilius, that if he wold suffer him to remaine in the armie, he shoulde sweare him souldier againe, because hee might not lawfullye fight with the enimie, the former oath beeing discharged. So passing greate regarde they had in making theyr warres. There is a Letter abroade of Marcus Cato the olde man, to Marcus his sonne, wherein hee wrote that hee hearde hee was discharged by the Consull, beeing a souldier in Macidonie, at the Persian warres. He warnes him therefore to beware, that hee enter not the battayle:

for

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for he denyeth that it is lawfull for him, that is no souldier, to fight with the enimie. And this also I note, that he which by his proper name was Perduellis, ỹ is to meane an open enimie, was called Hostis, the mildenesse of the word assuaging the haynousnesse of the thing. For he was called Hostis, with our auncesters, whome now wee name Peregrinus, A straunger.

That the twelue Tables declare, Aut status dies cum hoste: and againe, Aduersus hostem æterna auctoritas. What may there be added to this kinde of gentleneſſe? to call him by so faire a name, with whome you make war. Notwithstanding proceſſe of tyme maketh the name nowe more odious: for it is gone frō the signification of Peregrinus, that is to saye, a straunger, and properly it standes for him that beareth armour againste one, but when there is fighting for Empire, and glorye is sought by warre: yet it behoueth alwayes, that

prelium ineat. Negat enim ius esse, qui miles non sit, pugnare cum hoste.

Equidem illud etiam animaduerto, quòd qui proprio nomine perduellis esset, is hostis vocaretur, lenitate verbi tristitiam rei mitigate. Hostis enim apud maiores nostros is dicebat', quem nunc peregrinū dicimus Indicat. xii. tabule. *Aut ſtatus dies cum Hoſte* Itemque *Aduerſus hoſtem Aeterna authoritas*.

Quid ad hāc manſuetudinem addi potest? eum qui cum bellum geras, tam molli nomine appellare? quanquā id nomen durius iam effecit vetustas: a peregrino enim recessit, & proprie in eo, qui contra ferret arma, remansit.

Cùm vero de imperio decertatur, belloque

queritur gloria causas omnino subesse, tamen oportet easdem, quas dixi paulo ante iustas causas esse bellorum.

Sed ea bella, quibus imperij gloria proposita est minus acerbè gerenda sunt. Vt enim cũ ciuiliter contendimus, aliter si est inimicus aliter si competitor, cum altero certamen honoris, & dignitatis est: cum altero capitis, & famæ.

Sic cum Celtiberis, cum Cimbris bellum, vt cum inimicis gerebatur, vter esset, non vter imperaret. Cum Latinis, Sabinis, Samnitibus, Pœnis, Pyrrho, de imperio dimicabatur. Pœni fœdifragi, crudelis Annibal reliqui iustitiores, Pyrrhi quidem de captiuis reddendis illa præclara, sententia est.

the verye same causes bee therein, which I declared a lyttle before, to be the iust causes of warre.

But these warres are not so cruelly to be made, which bee purposed for the glorye of Empire.

For as, when wee strive in the Citie, wee do otherwise, if one bee our enimie, otherwise, if hee bee but suter against vs: for with the one the stryfe is for honour and dignitie, with the other for lyfe and honestie: euen so warre was holden with the Celtibers, and with the Cimbers, as with our enimies, whether shoulde liue, and not whether should rule, but with the Latines, the Sabines, the Samnites, the Penes, and with Pyrrhus, the fighte was about Empire and dominion. The Penes were leage breakers. Anniball was cruell, the rest were iuster men.

That is a noble sayinge doubtlesse of Pirrhus, about the restorynge of Prysoners.

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No golde doo I craue,
No price offer me:
No hucsters of vvarre,
Warre men as we be:
With dint for our life,
fight vve not with golde:
Whether you to raigne,
or me the Ladie would,
Chaunce trie we by force,
this answere eke bare:
Whose manhoode the hap,
of battell vvill spare.
Their freedome I purpose
to fauour also:
Them giue I, them take,
the Gods will it so.

Nec mî aurum posco:
Inec mi pretium dederitis,
Nec cauponantes bellum,
sed belligerantes.
Ferro non auro vitam
cernamus vtriq; (re hera
Vos ne velit, an me regna-
quidue ferat sors.
Virtute experiamur,
& hoc simul accipe dictũ
Quorum virtuti belli
fortuna pepercit,
Eorundem me libertati
parcere certum est.
Dono ducit, doq; volẽtib⁹
cum magnis dijs.

A princelye saying forsooth, and well beseeming the lygnage of the Aeacidans.

Lykewise if priuate men driuen by occasions, shall promise ought to the enimie, they must keepe theyr promise therein. As Regulus dyd, that was taken of the Carthagniens in the first Punike warres: who

Regalis sanê & digna Aeacidarum genere sententia.

Atque etiam si quid singuli temporibus adducti hosti promiserint, est in eo ipso fides conseruanda, vt primo punico bello Regulus captus à Pœnis:

cum de captiuis commutandis Romam missus esset, iurasset que se rediturum: primum vt venit, captiuos reddendos in Senatu non censuit. Deinde cum retineretur a propinquis & ab amicis: ad supplicium redire maluit, quam suam fidem hosti datã fallere. Secundo autem Punico bello, post Cannensem pugnam, quos decem Annibal Romã adstrictos misit iureiurando se redituras esse, nisi de redimendis ijs, qui capti erant, impetrassent: eos omnes, Censores (quoad quisque eorũ vixit) qui peierassent, in ærarijs reliquerunt nec minus illũ, qui iurisiurãdi fraudi culpam inuenerat.

Cùm enim Annibalis permissu exisset castris, redijt paulò post, quod se oblitum nescio quid diceret. Deinde, egressus é Castris, iure-

when he was sent to Rome, about the enterchaunging of prisoners, and hadde swore that hee woulde returne: first as soone as hee came, his aduice was in the Senate house, that the prisoners should not bee restored, afterward when hee shoulde haue bene stopped of his kinsfolke and friendes: hee was more willing to retourne to punishment, then to breake his promise giuen to the enimye. And in the seconde Punike warres, after Cannas fielde, the Censours ceased at a yearely fine all those tenn (as long as anie of them liued, & tarryed still, and were for sworne) which Annibal sent to Rome, vppon theyr oath, that they shoulde returne except they obtayned the raunsoming of those that wer prisoners there, and no lesse they ceased him, which for the deceiuing of his oath had deuised an excuse.

For when by Annibals licence, vppon his oath to retourne, hee was gone with-

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out the campe, hee retourned within a lyttle while after making his excuse, ỹ he had forgotten, I wot not what. Afterward being gone out of the campe, hee thought himselfe discharged of his oath, and in wordes he was, but not in deede. For alwaies in promise must be considered what yee meane, not what ye saye. But the greatest example of iustice towarde the enimye, was shewed by our ancestors, when a runaway traitour frō Pirhus, had promised ỹ Senate that hee woulde giue the king poison, and kill him, the Senate, and Caius Fabritius did deliuer the runawaye traitor to Pirrhus In such sorte, with trecherye they allowed not the death of their enimie, and such a one as was both mightie, and mooued war vnprouoked. Thus of warfaring dueties there is inough spoken.

Let vs remember also, that euen towarde the baseste sorte there is a iustice to bee kepte. The baseste degree iurando se solutum putabat: & erat verbis re non erat. Semper autem in fide quid sentiris, non quid dixeris, cogitandum.

Maximum autem exemplum est iustitiæ in hostem, à maioribus nostris cōstitutum. Cùm a Pirrho perfuga Senatui est policitus, se venenum Regi daturum, & eum necaturum: Senatus & Caius Fabricius perfugam Pyrrho dedit.

Ita, ne hostis quidem, & potentis, & bellum vltro inferentis, cum scelere interitum approbauit. Ac de, bellicis quidem Officijs, satis dictum est.

Meminerimus autem etiam aduersus infimos iustitiam esse seruandam. Est autem infima conditio & fortuna seruorum: quibus non male præcipiunt,

qui ita iubent vti, vt mercenarijs, ad operam exigendam, & iusta prębenda. Cùm autem duobus modis, id est aut vi aut fraude fiat iniuria: fraus quasi vulpeculæ, vis leonis videtur: vtrumque ab homine alienissimum: sed fraus odio digna maiore. Totius autem iniustitiæ, nulla capitalior est, quã eorũ, qui tum eũ maxime fallunt, id tamen agunt, vt viri boni esse videantur. De iustitia satis dictum est. Deinceps vt erat propositum, de benificentia ac liberalitate dicatur: qua quidem, nihil est naturæ Hominis accommodatus.

Sed habet multas causiones. Videndum est enim primum, ne obsit benignitas, & his ipsis, quibus benigne videbitur fieri & cæteris: deinde ne maior benignitas sit quàm fa-

and state is of slaues: whom they that wyll yee so to vse, as hyred men, in requyring theyr wooрke, and gyuing them theyr due, dooe teache you not amisse. But where as iniuryes maye bee doone two wayes, that is to say, either by force or by guile, guile seemes as of the Fore, force, as of the Lyon: both in trouth are verie vnfitte for man, yet guile deserueth the greater hatred. But of all iniustice, none is more pestilent then theyrs: which when they begule a man most, yet so handle the matter, that they will seeme to bee well meaning men. Of iustice heere is sayde inoughe. Let vs nowe speake as wee purposed, of bountifulnesse & liberalitie: for nothing without doubt is to the nature of man more agreeable.

Notwithstanding it hath diuers exceptions. For first we must see that our bountifulnesse hurt not both those to whome bountefullye it shall seeme to bee doone, and

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also other moe, next, that our lyberalitie bee not moze than our abilitie: thirdlye, that to euerie man bee giuen accoz=ding to his wozthynesse. For that is the foundation of iu=stice whereto all these must be applyed. For both they that pleasure anie bodie with that which maye hurt him, whom they woulde seeme willing to pzofite, ought to bee deemed not bounteous, noz lyberall, but pestilent flatterers, and they likewise who dooe hurt some, that they maye be libe=rall to other, doe fall into the same iniustice, as if they shuld tourne other mens goods in=to theyz owne. But there bee many, and namely the desi=rous of honour and glozye, who do catch from some, that they may lauishe to another, and these suppose that they shall seeme bountifull to their friendes, if they maye in=rich them anye manner way. But that is so farre off from duetie, that nothing may bee moze contrarious to duetye. Wee must see therefoze that

cultates tum vt pro dig nitate cuiq́ue tribua=tur.

Id enim est iustitiæ fundamẽtum, ad quam hæc omnia sunt referen da. Nam & q́ui gratifi=cãtur cuipiam quod ob sit illi, cui prodesse velle videantur, non benefici neque liberales, sed per=nicioſi assentatores iu=dicandi sunt. Et qui a=lijs nocent, vt in alios li=berales sint, in eadem sunt iniustitia, vt si in suam rem alienam con=uertant.

Sunt autem multi equi dem cupidi splendo=ris & gloriæ, qui eripi=unt alijs, quod alijs lar=giantur. Hiq́ue arbitrã=tur se beneficios in suos amicos visum iri, si lo=cupletent eos quacun=q́ue ratione.

Id autem tantum ab=est ab officio, vt nihil magis Officio possit es=se contrarium. Vi=dendum est igitur, vt

ea liberalitate vtamur, quæ prosit amicis, noceat nemini. Quare L. Scillæ & C. Cęsaris pecuniarum translatio à iustis dominis ad alienos, nō debet liberalis videri. Nihil ęst enim liberale, quod non idem sit iustum. Alter locus erat causionis, ne benignitas maior esset quam facultates: quòd qui benigniores esse volūt quā res patitur, primum in eo peccant, quod iniurioſi sunt in proximos. Quas enim copias his & suppeditarię qui eius est, & reliqui eas transferunt ad alienos. Inest autem in tale liberalitate, cupiditas rapiendi plerumque, & auferendi per iniuriam, vt ad largiendum suppetant copiæ, videre etiam licet plerosque non tam natura liberales, quàm quadam gloria inductos, vt benefici videantur, facere multa: quæ proficiſci ab ostentatio-

wee vse such lyberalitie, as may profite our frendes, and hinder no bodye. Wherefore Lucius Sillaes, and Caius Ceasars conueying of goods from ỹ iust owners to strangers, must not bee thought liberalitie. For nothing is lyberall, which same is not iust.

The second point of exception was, that our lyberalytie shoulde not be more then our abilitie, because who so will bee lauisher then their goods will beare, they chiefly offend in this, that they bee iniurious vnto theyr nexte akinne. For they conueye the same tyches to friend folke, which it were more reason both to bee dealt and lefte to theyr kinsfolke. And there is in such lyberalytie a greedinesse oftentimes of catching, and pulling awaye wyth iniurie, that there maye bee store to lash out.

A man maye see also some dooe much, not by nature so lyberall, as ledde wyth a certayne glorye, that they may seeme bountyfull, which

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thinges may bee thought to come rather of a brag, then of a free hert. Such a false fayning is a neerer neyghbour to vanity, then either to liberalitie, or to honestie.

The third restraint, wee spoke of, is, that in lyberality ther be a choice of worthinesse, wherein are to be considered both his manners, vppon whome the benefite shall bee bestowed, and also his good wyll towarde vs, and the interpartening and fellowshyp of lyfe, and friendly turnes done before to our commodityes, all which bee wishfull to meete together, if not, the more causes and the greatest, shall haue in them the more weight.

Howbeit, because wee leade not our lyfe with perfect men, and throughly wise, but with such as in whome it is a goodlye matter, if there bee resemblaunces of vertue, I recken this also meete to bee considered, that wee despise no manner man, in whome anye signe

ne magis quam a volũtate videntur. Talis autem simulatio vanitati est coniunctior quam aut liberalitati, aut honestati. Tertium est propositum, vt in beneficentia delectus esset dignitatis in quo & mores eius erunt spectandi in quem beneficium conferetur: & animus erga nos & communitas, & societas vitæ, & ad nostras vtilitates officia ante collata. Quæ vt concurrant omnia optabile est: sin minus, plures causæ maioresque, ponderis plus habebunt.

Quoniam autem viuimus non cum perfectis hominibus, plenèque sapientibus, sed cum ijs in quibus præclare agitur, si sint simulachra virtutis: etiam hoc intelligendum puto, neminem omnino esse negligendum, in quo aliqua significatio virtutis appareat. Colen-

dum autem esse ita quẽ quam maximè vt quisque maximè his virtutibus lenioribus erit ornatus modestia, temperantia, ac ipsa de qua iam multa dicta sunt iustitia. Nam fortis animus & magnus in homine non perfecto, nec sapiente, feruentior plerumq; est: illę vero virtutes bonum virum vidétur potius attingere. Atque hæc in moribus considerentur. De benevolentia autem, quam quisque habeat erga nos, primum illud est in officio, vt ei plurimum tribuamus, a quo plurimum diligimur. Sed beneuolentiam nõ adolescentulorum more, ardore quodam amoris, sed stabilitate potius & constantia iudicemus.

Sin erunt merita, vt non ineunda, sed referenda sit gratia: maior quædam cura adhiben-

of vertue doth appeare: and specially, that euerye man so bee regarded, as each man, chiefelye shall bee garnished with these gentler kindes of vertues, sober, moode, temperaunce, and this same iustice, whereof alreadie much hath beene spoken. For a manlye courage and a great, is commonly somewhat too feruent in a man, that wantes of perfection, and wisedome, but those other vertues seeme rather to pertayne to a good man: Thus much in maners may bee considered. But concerning loue that anye man beareth toward vs, this is ỹ chiefe poynt of duetie, that wee giue most to him of whõ wee are most beloued. But wee must measure good will, not after the guise of young men, by a certayne heate of loue, but rather by assurednesse and steadfastnesse.

But in case a mannes deseruing bee such, that wee haue not to seeke to creepe in fauour, but to requite his kindnesse: a certayne greater

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greater care is then to bee vsed. For there is no dutye more necessare then requiting of kindnesse: And if Hesiodus wills yee, with larger measure (if yee maye) to restore such thinges as ye haue borrowed to occupie: what then ought wee to doe prouoked by benefites? Must wee not dooe lyke the fruitfull fieldes, that yeeld much more then they receiued? For if we sticke not to bestowe pleasures vpon them, who wee hope, will profite vs hereafter: what manner men ought wee to bee towardes them, that haue done vs good alredie? For whereas there bee two kindes of liberalitie: one of dooing a benefite, an other of requiting: whether wee will dooe it or no, is in our owne choice: but to leaue ought vnrequited, is not lawfull for a good man: so hee maye doo it without iniurie. But there bee respects to bee had of benefites receyued: and there is no doubte, but most is due to the greatest,

da est. Nullum enim officium referenda gratia magis necessarium est. Quod si ea quæ accepe ris vtenda, maior mensura (si modo possit) iubet reddere Hesiodus: quidnam beneficio prouocati facere debemus. An non imitari agros fertiles, quia multo pl⁹ afferunt quam acceperunt? Etenim si in eos, quos speramus nobis profituros, non dubitamus Officia conferre: quales in eos esse debemus, qui iam profuerunt? Nam cum duo genera liberalitatis sint, vnum dandi beneficij, alterum reddendi, dem⁹ necne in nostra potestate est: non reddere bono viro non licet, modo id facere possit sine iniuria. Acceptorum autem beneficiorum sunt delectus habendi. Nec dubium quin maximo cuiq; plurimum debeatur.

In

In quo tamen inprimis quo quiſque animo, ſtudio, beneuolentia fecerit, ponderandum eſt. Multi enim multa faciunt temeritate quadam ſine iudicio vel modo, in omnes: vel repentino quodam quaſi vento, impetu animi incitati: q̄ beneficia æque magna non ſunt habēda, at q̄; ea quę iudicio conſiderate, conſtanterq̄; delata ſunt, ſed in collocā do beneficio, & in referenda gratia, ſi cętera paria ſint, hoc maximè officij eſt, vt quiſq̄; maximè opis indigeat, ita ei potiſſimum opitulari. Quod contra fit à pleriſq̄;. A quo enim plurimum ſperant, etiam ſi ille ijs non eget, tamen ei potiſſimum inſeruiunt. Optime autem ſocietas hominum, coniunctioque ſeruabitur, ſi vt quiſque erit coniunctiſſimus, ita in eum benignitatis plurimum conferetur. Sed quę

wherein ſpecially yet it is to bee weighed of what minde, affection, and good wil, a man hath done it. For many men dooe many thinges of a certaine headyneſſe, without diſcreation or meaſure towarde euerie man, or elſe with a certaine ſodaine braide of minde carryed as with the winde, which benefites are not to be counted a like great, as thoſe, that bee offered with iudgement aduiſedly and conſtantly. But in placing of benefite, and requiting kindneſſe, (if all other thinges be correſpondent) this is a principall poynt of duetie, that as euery man moſt needeth help, ſo him moſt of all wee ayde which contrariwiſe is doone of a great many, for of whom they hope moſt, although hee hath no neede of them, yet to him they are moſt ſeruiceable.

But the fellowſhippe and neighbourhoode of men ſhall beſt bee maintayned, if as euerye man ſhall bee neereſt vs, ſo on him wee beſtowe moſt lyberalitie. But

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what bee natures principalls of neyghbourhoode, and the fellowshippe of man, I think good to fetch somewhat farther off.

For the first is that which is to see in the fellowshippe of all mankinde. The bonde whereof is reason and speech, which by teachinge, learning, conferring, reasoning, and iudgeing, winneth one man to another, and ioyneth them in a certaine naturall fellowshippe. For by anie thing farther wee differ from the nature of sauage beastes, in whome wee saye oftentimes there is an hardinesse, as in horses and lyons, but wee neuer saye, they haue iustice, equitie, and goodnesse, for they bee voyde of reason, and of speech. And surelye this is the fellowshippe that spreadeth most largelye with men among themselues, and with all amonge all, in the which there must bee kepte a commoneſſe of all thinges, that nature hath bredde to the common vse of man, so as thee thinges, which bee

naturæ principia sunt communitatis & societatis humanæ, repetendum altius videtur. Est enim primum quod cernitur in vniuersi generis humani societate. Eius autem vinculum est ratio & oratio, quę docendo, discendo, communicando, disceptando, iudicando conſiliat inter se homines, coniungit que naturali quadam societate. Neque vllare longius absum⁹ à nutura ferarum, in quibus ineſſe fortidudinem sepe dicimus, vt in equis, in leonibus: iustitiam, æquitatem, bonitatem nō dicimus, sunt enim rationis & orationis expertes. Ac latiſſime quidem patens hominibus inter ipſos, omnibus inter omnes societas hæc est: in qua omnium rerum, quas ad communem vsum hominum natura genuit, est seruanda communitas, vt quę descripta sūt le-

legibus & iure ciuili, hæc ita teneantur, vt sit constitutum, é quibus ipsis cætera sic obseruẽtur, vt in grẽcorum prouerbio est: Amicorum esse communia omnia. Omnia autem communia hominum videntur ea, quæ sunt generis eiusdem, quod ab Ennio positum in vna re, trãsferri in multas potest:

Vt, homo qui erranti comiter monstrat viam.

Quasi lumen de suo lumine, accendat, facit.

Vt nihilominus ipsi luceat, cùm illi accenderit.

Vna enim ex re satis præcipitur, vt quicquid sine detrimento possit commodari, id tribuatur cuique vel ignoto. Ex quo sunt illa communia, Non prohibere aquam profluentem, pati ab igne, ignẽ capere.

appointed by statutes, and the ciuill lawe bee obserued in such sorte as it is ordayned, beside which, all other thinges are so to bee obserued, as is in the Greeke prouerbe: Among frendes all thinges bee common. But all those thinges seeme common to all men which bee of that kinde, as beeing put for example by Ennius in one thing, maye bee applyed to many. The man that gentlye shewes the waye vnto the wandering wight, doeth, as if hee a candle shoulde at his owne candle, light. That nethelesse it lyght himself when lighted is the other.

For inoughe is taught vs by one ensample: that whatsoeuer wee maye lende without hinderaunce, it bee graunted to euerye bodye, yea, to the vnknowen. Wherevppon these thinges bee common: Not to forbid one the running water: To suffer one that will, to take fire at our fire.

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To giue faithfull counsell to him that asketh aduise: which thinges bee profitable to those that receiue them, & nothing burdenous to ỹ geuer: wherfore we muste bothe vse these thinges, and somewhat alwayes must wee doe to further the common profit.

But sith eche priuate mans substaunce is small, and the multitude is endelesse, that neede it: Common liberalitie must bee referred to that ende of Ennius: That natheless it light himselfe: So as there may bee an abilitie, wherewith wee maye bee liberall to our owne.

There bee moze degrees of the felowshippe of men. For to leaue that endelesse number, there is a nyer degree, to bee of one Countrye, of one Nation, of one Language, by the whiche menne bee chiefelye knyt together.

A neerer also it is, to be of one Citie.

For there bee many thinges common to Citizens, among themselues: as lawe-

si quis velit, consilium fidele deliberanti dare: quæ sunt ijs vtilia, qui accipiunt, danti non molesta. Quare & ijs vtendum est, & semper aliquid ad communem vtilitatem afferendum. Sed quoniam copię paruæ singulorum sunt: eorum autem, qui his egeant, infinita est multitudo, vulgaris liberalitas referenda est ad illum Ennij finem, nihilominus vt ipsi luceat, vt facultas sit, qua in nostros simus liberales.

Gradus autem plures sunt societatis hominum. Vt enim ab illa discedatur infinitate, propior est eiusdem gentis, nationis, linguæ qua maximè homines coniungun-tur.

Interius etiam est eiusdem esse ciuitatis. Multa enim sunt ciuib⁹ inter

inter ſe communia, forum, fana, porticus, vię, leges, iura iudicia, ſuffragia, conſuetudines, prę terea, & familaritates, multaque cum multis res rationeſque contracte. Arctior verò colligatio eſt ſocietatis propinquorum. Ab illa enim immenſa ſocietate humani generis, in exiguum anguſtûque concluditur.

Nam cum ſit hoc natura commune omnium animantium, vt habeant libidinem procreandi: primo ſocietas in ipſo eſt coniugio: proxima in liberis: deinde vna domus, communia omnia.

Id autem eſt principium vrbis, & quaſi ſeminarium Reip. Sequntur fratrum coniunctiones, poſt conſobrinorum, ſobrinorumque: qui cùm vna domo iam capi non poſſunt, in alias domos tanquam in colonias execunt.

Courtes, Churches, Galeries, walkes, high wayes, ſtatutes, lawes, iudgements, voyces, cuſtome, and beſides theſe, familiarities, and hauing to doe in ſundrye matters, and bargains with ſundry folke.

But a faſter knitting of men to gether, is the felowſhip of kinſfolke. For out of the innumerable felowſhip of mankinde it is dryuen to a lyttle and narrow compaſſe.

For where as by nature this is common to all liuing creatures, to haue a luſt to engendering: the firſt fellowſhip is in very wedlocke: the next in Children, and after that, one houſe, and all things common And this is the original of a Citie, and as it were the Seedeplot of a common weale.

Then follow the kyndreds of bretheren, after of brothers and ſiſters Children, who, when they now cannot bee contained in one Houſe, get them abroade too other Houſes, as into new towns.

Then

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Then folow entermariages, and aliãces, of which also mo kinsfolke do arise. which multiplication, and succession of the roote of common weales. Surely ỹ matching of bluds, & good willes that riseth ther of, knitteth men in loue together. For it is a great matter to haue the lyke monuments of aunceters, to vse al one religion, & to haue the same burial places.

But of all felowships ther is none better, none more assured, than whan good men alyke in condicions be enfelowshipt in familiaritie, together.

For that honestie (which we haue often mencioned) although we see it in another, yet it moueth vs and maketh vs friendes to him in whome the same seemeth to dwell. And though all vertue alureth vs to hir, and causeth vs to loue them, in whome shee seemeth to harber: yet Iustice and liberalitie worketh that most of all.

But there is nothing that winneth more loue, nor suer-

Sequuntur connubia, & affinitates: ex quib⁹ etiam plures ꝓpinqui. Quæ ꝓgratio & sobo les, origo est rerum pub licarum, sanguinis autem coniunctio, & beneuolẽtia deuincit charitate homines. Magnum est enim eadem habere monumenta maiorum, eisdem vt sacris sepulchra habere communia.

Sed omnium societatum nulla præstantior est, nulla firmior, quam cũm viri boni moribus similes familiaritate coniuncti sunt. Illud enim honestum (quod sæpe diximus) etiam si in alio cernimus, tamen nos mouet, atque illi, in quo id inesse videtur, amicos facit. Et quanquã omnis virt⁹ nos ad se allicit, facitque vt eos diligamus, in quibus ipsa inesse videatur: tamẽ iusti tia & liberalitas id max imè efficit. Nihil autem

amabilius, nec copulatius quàm morum similitudo bonorum. In quibus enim eadem ſtudia ſunt, eedemque voluntatis in his ſit, vt æque quiſque altero delectetur, ac ſe ipſo: efficiturque id quod Pithagoras vult in amicitia, vt vnus fiat ex pluribus. Magna etiam illa communitas eſt ſocietatum, quæ conficitur ex beneficijs vltro citroque datis, acceptiſque. Quæ mutua & grata dum ſunt, inter quos ea ſunt, firma deuinciuntur ſocietate. Sed cùm omnia ratione, animoque luſtraueris, omnium ſocietatum nulla eſt gratior, nulla charior, quam ea, quæ cum republica eſt vnicuique noſtrum.

Chari ſunt parentes, chari liberi, propinqui, familiares: ſed omnes omnium charitates patria vna

lyer knitteth men together, then a likeneſſe in good condicions. For in whom be like deſires & like mindes: it happeneth among them, that eyther with other is as much delighted, as with himſelfe: and it is brought to paſſe, that Pithagoras requires in amitie, that manye become one.

That common felowſhyp alſo is greate, which groweth of benefites to and fro, giuen and taken. Whiche while they bee comen from one to an other, and pleaſurefull: they among whom thoſe happen, bee tyed in a faſt felowſhip.

But when ye haue peruſed all theſe thinges in your reaſon and mynde: of all felowſhippes there is none more acceptable, nor dearer, then ỹ ſame, which euery one of vs hath with the common weale.

Deere bee our parents, deere bee our children, deere bee our kinſfolke, and familiers: but our countrey conteynes in it alone all the

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deere loue of them all: for the which what good mã doubts to take his death, if he maye profite the same? Whereby theyr beastlye cruelty is the more to bee abhorred: who haue rent a sunder theyr Countrey with all manner of mischiefe, and both bee and haue beene occupyed in the vtter ouerthrowing thereof.

But if question or comparison bee made, to whome the greatest duetye ought to bee yeelded: our countrie and Parents bee the chiefe, by whose benefites wee are most bounde, our children and all our whole family be the next, which hang all vppon vs alone, and can haue none other refuge: then be our kinsfolke, ỳ agree well with vs, which commonlye stand in the lyke estate.

Wherefore the necessarye aides of lyfe bee due to them chiefly, whom I spake of before, but conuersation & commonnesse of table, counsellings, communications, exhortations, comfortinges, yea,

complexa est: pro qua quis bonꝰ dubitet mortem oppetere, si ei sit profuturus? Quo est detestabilior istorum immanitas, qui lacerarunt omni scelere patriam, & in ea funditus delenda occupati & sunt & fuerunt. Sed si contentio quædam, & comparatio fiat, quibus plurimum tribuendum sit officij, principes sint, patria, & parentes, quorum beneficijs maximis obligati sumus: proximi liberi, totaque domus, quæ spectat in nos solos, neque aliud vllũ potest habere refugiũ. Deinceps, bene conuenientes propinqui, quibuscum communis etiam fortuna plerumque est.

Quamobrem necessaria vitæ presidia debẽtur ijs maximè, quos ante dixi, vita autẽ, victusq; cõmunis, consilia, sermones, cohortatiões, cõsolation', interdũ etiã

obiurgationis, in amicitijs vigẽt maximè, eſtque ea iucundiſſima amicitia, quam ſimilitudo morum coniugauit. Sed in his omnibus officijs tribuendis, videndum erit quid cuique maximè neceſſe ſit & quid quiſque nobiſcum, vel ſine nobis, aut poſſit conſequi, aut non poſſit. Itaque non ijdem erunt neceſſitudinum gradus, qui & tẽporum. Sunt quædam officia, quæ alijs magis, quam alijs debeantur: vt vicinum citius adiueris in fructibus percipiendis, quam aut fratrem, aut familiarem. At ſi lis in iuditio ſit, propinquum potius & amicum, quàm vicinũ defenderis. Hæc igitur & talia circumſpicienda ſunt in omni officio: & conſuetudo, exercitatio q; capienda, vt boni rationatores officiorum eſſe poſſumus, & addẽdo deducẽdóq; videre,

and chidinges otherwhyle among friends bee moſt vſed, and that is the pleaſauneſt friendſhippe, which lykeneſſe of conditions hath podked in one.

But in doing all theſe duties, wee muſt marke what is moſt needfull for euerye man: and what euerie bodie is able, or vnable by vs, or without vs to attayne, So ẏ degrees of friendſhips ſhall not bee a lyke with the degrees of times: and there bee duties which are due to ſome, more then to other ſome: as you ſhall ſooner helpe your neighbour in inning his corne, then eyther your brother, or your familiar friend: but if there bee a trauers in lawe, you ſhall rather defende your kinſman, and friende, then your neyghbour. Theſe therefore and ſuch lyke muſt bee throughlye conſidered in euery duetie: and wee muſt ſo vſe, and practiſe our ſelues, that wee maye bee good count makers of duetyes, and ſee by adding and deducting.

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what sum riseth of the rest, wherevppon we may vnderstande howe much is due to euerye man. But as neyther Phisitions, nor Captaynes, nor Oratours, although they haue conceyued the rules of theyr science, canne attaine anye thing worthye greate prayse, without vse and practise: so those rules of keeping dutie are indeed taught vs, that wee our selues shoulde put them in vre: but the hardnesse of the matter also requyreth vse and exercise.

And howe honestye, from which duetye springeth, is fetched out of those thinges that bee within the lawe of mans fellowshippe: we haue in a manner sayde inough.

But wee must note, that where as there bee fower generall kindes of vertues poynted out, from the which honestie and duetye shoulde flowe, that seemes to shine brighteste, which is wrought with a greate and loftye courage, despising worldlye vanityes. And therefore in re-

quæ reliqui summa fiat: ex quo quantũ cuique debeatur intelligas. Sed vt nec medici, nec imperatores, nec oratores, quamuis artis præcepta perceperint, quicquam magne laude dignum sine vsu & exercitatione consequi possunt: sic officij conseruandi præcepta traduntur, illa quidem vt faciamus ipsi: sed rei magnitudo vsum quoque, exercitationemque desiderat.

Atque ab ijs reb⁹, quæ sunt in iure societatis humanem, quemadmodum ducatur honestũ, ex quo orutm est officium, satis ferè diximus.

Intelligendum est autem cùm proposita sint genera quatuor, é quibus honestas, officiumque manaret, splẽdidissimum videri, quod animo magno, elatoque humanasque res dispitiente factum sit, Itaq; in

probris maximè in promptu eſt, Si quid tale dici poteſt.

Vos etenim iuuenes animos geritis muliebres: illaq; virgo viri.

Et ſi quid eſt eiuſmodi.

Salmacida ſpolia, ſine ſudore & ſanguine.

Contraque in laudibus, quæ magno animo & fortiter excellenterq; geſta ſunt, ea neſcio quomodo quaſi pleniore ore laudamus. Hinc Rhetorum campus de Marathone, Salamine, Plateis, Thermopilis, Leuſtris, Stratocle: hinc noſter Cocles, hinc Decij, hinc Cneus & Publius Scipiones, hinc Marcus Marcellus, & innumerabiles alij, maximeq; ipſe populꝰ Romę animi magnitudine excellit. Declaratur autẽ ſtudium bellicæ gloriæ

proch it is commonly readie if anie ſuch thing may be ſaid, as this.

You young men iwis
carrie vvomens hearts,
That virgin a mans.

Likewiſe if ought be like to this.

A goodly great ſpoile,
at Salmacis vvonne:
Without anie bloud,
or ſweat was it done.

And on the other ſide, in praiſing thoſe deeds, that be done manfully, notablye, and wyth greate courage, I wotte not how as with open mouth wee commend. Heereof came the Rethoricians large field vpon Marathon, Salamis, Plateias, Thermopilanes, Leuetrians, and Stratocles, heereof our Cocles, heereof the Decians, heerof Gneus and Publius the Scipioes, heerof Marcus Marcellus, and other innumtable, & ſpecially the people of Rome did exceede in greatneſſe of courage. And theyr deſire of martiall glorye is declared

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in that wee see theyr images of honor bee set vp, for ỹ moſt parte in warlyke araie.

But if that hautyneſſe of courage which is seene in perills, and trauailes, be voyde of iuſtice, and doth not fight for a common safetie, but for a priuate profite, it is to bee reckoned faultie. For that not onely is not the propertie of vertue, but rather of brutiſhneſſe, setting all humanitie aſide.

Therefore manlyneſſe is well defined of the Stoikes, where they saye, it is a vertue that fighteth in defence of equitye. Wherefore no man that hath attayned the glorie of manlyneſſe, euer got prayſe by wylye traynes and craftineſſe. For nothing may bee honeſt, that is voide of iuſtice. A worthie saying therfore is that of Platoes, who sayth,

That not onely the knowledge which is seuered from iuſtice, is rather to bee called ſubtiltye then wiſedome, but alſo the courage

quod ſtatuas quoq; videmus, ornatu fere militari. Sed ea animi elatio, quæ cernitur in periculis & laboribus, ſi iuſtitia vacat, pugnatq; non pro ſalute communi, ſed pro ſuis commodis in vitio eſt. Non modo enim id virtutis non eſt: ſed potius immanitatis omnem humanitatem repellentis. Itaq; probè definitur a Stoicis fortitudo, cùm eam virtutem eſſe dicunt, propugnantem pro æquitate. Quo circa nemo qui fortitudinis gloriam conſequutus eſt, inſidijs & malitia laudem eſt adeptus. Nihil enim honeſtum eſſe poteſt, quod iuſtitia vacat. Præclarum igitur Platonis illud.

Non ſolum (inquit) *ſcientia quæ eſt remota ab iuſtitia, calliditas potius quàm ſapientia eſt appellanda: verũ etiam animus*

paratus ad periculum, ſi ſua cupiditate, non vtilitate communi interpellitur, audaciæ potius nomen habeat, quam fortitudinis.

Itaque viros fortes et magnanimos, eoſdem bonos & ſimplices veritatis amicos, minimeq; fallaces eſſe volumus: quæ ſunt ex media laude iuſtitiæ. Sed illud odioſum eſt, quod in hac elatione & magnitudine animi facillime pertinatia & nimia cupiditas principatus innaſcitur.

Vt enim apud Platonem eſt: omnem morem Lacedemoniorum inflamatum eſſe cupiditate vincendi, ſic vt quiſque animi magnitudine maximè excellit, ita maximè vvult princeps omnium, vel potius ſolus eſſe. Difficile autem eſt cùm præſtare omnibus concupieris, ſeruare æquitatem, quæ eſt

which is forvvarde to daunger, if it bee ſet on, for ones ovvne greedineſſe, and not for a common profite, maye rather beare the name of levvd hardines, then of manlineſſe.

Wherefore who bee manlye men, and ſtout hearted, thoſe ſame wee woulde haue alſo bee good, and plaine louers of trouth, and nothing at all deceitfull: which come out of the middeſt of all the praiſes of iuſtice, But this is odious, that in ſuch hautineſſe, & greatneſſe of courage, there groweth a wilfulneſſe verye ſoone, and an onerſeeking of rule.

For as it is in Plato, that it was all the manner of the Lacedemonians to bee inflamed with deſire of conquering: ſo as euerie man doth moſt excell other in greatneſſe of courage, he will lykewiſe bee the verye higheſt ouer all, or rather without peere. And when you couet to bee aboue all, it is harde to kepe an equitie which is moſt pro-

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proper to iustice. Whereof comes to passe, that they cannot abide to bee bridled, neyther with reasoning, nor with anie common and rightfull order of lawe: and they become in the common weale for the most part gift giuers, & partmakers, that they maye attaine to the greatest power, & be rather by might superior, then by iustice equal. But the harder it is to master the affection, the worthier is the mastrie.

For there is no season that ought to bee without iustice, They therefore bee counted manly, and of great courage, not who doe anie wrong, but who withstande it. But a true and wise stoute heart iudgeth that honestie, which nature chiefly followeth to stande in deedes, and not in glorie: and had rather bee, then seeme the chiefe. For who so hangeth vppon the wauering of the vnskilfull multitude, hee is not to bee counted among the number of manlye men. But as euerie man is of the highest

iustitiæ maximè propria. Ex quo fit, vt neque disceptatione vinci se, nec vllo publico ac legittimo iure patiantur. Existuntque in Repub. plerumque largitores & factiosi vt opes quàm maximas consequantur, & sint vi potius superiores, quàm iustitia pares. Sed quo id est difficilius hoc præclarius.

Nullum enim est tẽpus quod iustitia vacarì debeat. Fortis igitur & magnanimi sunt habendi, non qui faciunt, sed qui propulsant iniuriã: vera autẽ & sapiens animi magnitudo honestum illud, quod maximè natura sequitur, in factis positum, non in gloria iudicat, principemque se esse maluit, quam videri. Et enim qui ex errore imperitæ multitudinis pendet, hic in magnis viris non est habendus. Facillimé

autem ad res iniuſtas impellitur, vt quiſque altiſſimo eſt animo & gloriæ cupido. Qui locus eſt ſine lubricus: q̃ vix inuenitur, qui laborib⁹ ſuſceptis, periculiſq̃; aditis, non quaſi mercedem rerum geſtarum deſideret gloriam. Omnino fortis animus & magnus duabus rebus maxime cernitur: quarum vna in rerum externarum deſpitientia ponitur, cũ perſuaſum ſit nihil hominem niſi qd' honeſtum, decorũq; ſit, aut admirare, aut optare, aut expetere oportere: nulliq;, neq; homini, neq́ue perturbationi animi, nec fortunæ ſuccumbere. Altera eſt res, vt cum ita ſis animo affectus, vt ſupra dixi, res geras màgnas illas quidẽ & maximè vtiles, ſed vehemẽter arduas, plenaſq́; laborũ et periculorũ, tũ vitę cauſa, tũ multarũ rerũ, q̃ ad vitã pertinent. Harũ rerũ duarũ

courage, and deſirous of glorye, ſo is hee ſooneſt egged to vniuſt dooinges, which is indeede a verie ſlipper place, becauſe ſcarce there is anie man found, who when hee hath ſuſtayned trauailes, and aduentured daungers, doth not deſire glozie, as rewarde of his dooings.

A manlye courage and a greate, is alwayes by two thinges chiefelye diſcerned, whereof the one ſtandes in the contempte of outwarde thinges, when it is perſwaded, that a man ought not either to eſteeme eyther wiſhe, oz deſire anie thing, but that is honeſt and ſeemelye, to yeeld to none, neyther man, noz affection, noz chaunce of foztune. The other thing is, that when you bee ſo diſpoſed in courage as I ſayde befoze, yee doe greate enterpziſes, and thoſe ſame ryght pzofitable, but yet verie hard, and full of trauaile and danger, both foz lyfe, and foz manye thinges that to lyfe dooe belong. All the glozie and honour of theſe two thinges,

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(I adde thereto the profite) ſtandes in the latter, but the cauſe and meane, that makes manye men, is in the former. For in it is that which maketh excellent courages, and ſuch as deſpiſe the worldes vanities. But this ſame reſteth in two thinges, if both you iudge that onelye to bee good, which is honeſt, and alſo be free from all moodineſſe of mind. For it is to be counted the parte of a greate and manlye courage, both to ſette light by thoſe thinges which doe ſeeme precious and gorgeous to the greater number, and alſo to deſpyſe the ſame, with a ſteadfaſt and grounded iudgement: and likewiſe it is a ſigne of mightie courage, and greate ſteadfaſtneſſe, ſo to beare thoſe thinges, which ſeeme bitter, and bee much and ſundrye wayes toſt in mannes lyfe, and fortune, as nothing you ſwarue from the order of nature, nor the worthineſſe of a wiſe man. And it is not meete, that hee bee ſubdued with deſire, who is

ſplendor omnis & amplitudo (addo etiam vtilitatem in poſteriore eſt: cauſa autem & ratio efficiens magnos viros, eſt in priore. In eo enim eſt illud, quod excellentes animos & humana contemnentes facit. Id autem ipſum cernitur in duobus, ſi & ſolum id quod honeſtum ſit, bonum iudices & ab omni animi perturbatione liber ſis. Nam & ea quæ eximia pleriſque & præclara videntur parua ducere, eaque ratione ſtabili, firmaq; contemnere, fortis animi, magnique ducendum ſit. Et ea quæ videntur acerba, quę multa & varia in hominũ vita fortunaque verſantur, ita ferre, vt nihil a ſtatu naturæ diſcedas, nihil a dignitate ſapientis, hoc robuſti animi eſt, magneque conſtantiæ. Non eſt autem conſentaneum, qui metu non frangatur,

cum

eum frangi cupiditate: nec qui inuictum se a labore præstiterit, vinci a voluptate. Quamobrem hæc vitanda sunt: & pecunię fugienda cupiditas. Nihil enim est tam angusti animi tam que parui, quàm amare diuitias. Nihil honestius magnificétiusq;, quam pecuniam contemnere si non habeas: si habeas, ad benificentiam liberalitatemque conferre.

Cauenda est etiam gloriæ cupiditas, vt supra dixi. Eripit enim libertatem: pro qua, magnamis viris omnis debet esse contentio. Nec vero imperia expetenda ac potius aut non accipienda interdum, aut deponenda nonnunquam. Vacandum autem est omni animi perturbatione, tum cupiditate & metu, tum etiam ægritudine, & voluptate animi & iracundia, vt tranquilitas adsit & se-

not subdued with feare, nor that hee bee ouercome wyth pleasure, who hath shewed himselfe vnable to bee ouercome with trauayle, wherefore both these faultes are to bee auoyded, and also couetousnesse of moneye is to bee eschewed. For nothing is so much a signe of a small and slender courage, as to loue riches: nothing there is honester and nobler, then to dispyse money if you haue it not: and if you haue it, to bestowe it in bounteousnesse and lyberalitie.

We must also beware of desire of glorie, as I sayde before. For it pulles awaie the freedome of the minde: for the which al ỹ indeauour of stout hearted men should bee. And verily we ought not to seeke for rule, but rather not to receiue it sometime, or otherwhile to giue it ouer. And wee must bee free from all troublesome sturre of minde: from desire and feare, from heart sickenesse and voluptuousnesse, and angrinesse: that wee maye haue quietnesse of

minde,

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minde, and voidneſſe of care, ſ which may bring both ſtedfaſtneſſe, and alſo a worthye eſtimation.

But diuers there bee, and haue bene: who deſiring that ſame quietneſſe that I ſpeak of, haue withdrawne themſelues from common affairs, and haue got them to quietneſſe. Among theſe both the nobleſt Philoſophers, and the verie chiefe, and alſo certaine vpright and graue men, neither could abide the manners of the people, nor of the rulers: and manye of them haue liued in deſart places, as delighted onelye with theyr home matters.

Theſe ſhoote at the ſame markes that kings doo, that is, to haue need of nothing, to obey no man, and to vſe their owne libertie, whoſe property is, to liue as ye liſt. Wherefore ſith this is common both to the deſirous of power, and theſe whom I ſpeak of, that leade the quiet life: the one ſort do thinke themſelues able to compaſſe it, if they haue

curitas, quę afferat tum conſtantiam, tum etiam dignitatem,

Multi autem & ſunt & fuerunt, qui eam, quam dico, tranquilitatem expetentes, a negocijs publicis ſe remouerunt, ad otiumque profugerunt. In his, & nobiliſſimi Philoſophi, longeque principes, & quidem homines ſeueri & graues, nec populi, nec principium mores ferre potuerunt, vixeruntque nonnulli in agris, delectati re ſua familiari.

His idem propoſitum fuit quod & Regibus: vt ne qua re egerent, ne cui parerent, libertate vterentur: cuius proprium eſt, ſic viuere vt velis.

Quare cum hoc commune ſit potentię cupidorum, cum ijs, quos dixi otioſos: alteri ſe adipiſci id poſſe arbitrantur, ſi opes magnas habe-

habeant: alteri, si contenti sint suo & paruo. In quo quidem neutrorum omnino contemnenda est sententia. Sed & facilior, & tutior, & minus alijs grauis, aut molesta vita est otiosorum. Fructuosior autem hominum generi, & ad claritatem amplitudinẽque aptior eorum, qui se ad Rempub. & ad res magnas gerendas accõmodauerunt. Quapropter et ijs forsitan concedendum sit, Rempub. non capessentibus, qui excellenti ingenio, otio, doctrinæque sese dediderunt.

Et iis qui aut valitudinis imbecillitate, aut aliqua grauiore causa impediti, à Republica recesserunt, cum eius administrandi potestatem alijs, laudemque concederent. Quibus autem talis nulla sit causa,

greate wealth: the other, if they be contented with their owne, and a lyttle. Wherein verilye the opinion of neither of them is vtterlye to be despised: but the lyfe of the quiet liuers, is both easier and safer, and lesse greeuous or troublesome to other: and theyrs is the profitabler, for mankynde, and fitter for fame and honour: who haue applyed themselues to the common weale, and going thorough with greate matters. Wherfore peraduenture both they ere to bee borne withall, that take not in hand the common weale, who of an excellent wit haue applyed themselues to learning: and also they, who being letted either by sicklinesse, or some other more weightier cause, haue conuayed themselues away from the common weale: when they were well content to leaue to other the authoritie and prayse of ruling the same. But to whome there is no such occasion: if

they

they saye they set nought by those thinges, that most men haue in admiration, as rule, and office bearing, , to these I think it worthy to be comp ted not only no prayse, but also a fault, whose iudgement it were verye hardde to disalowe, in that they dispise glory, and esteeme it as nothing, but they seeme too feare the troubles and greeues both of geuing offence, and hauing repulses as a certaine reproche and defame.

For there bee, who doe lyttle agree with themselues in thinges that bee contrarie, as some most earnestly contempne pleasure, and in paine bee somewhat tenderer, some regarde not glory and be broken with slaunder: and these thinges they do not with sufficient stedfastnesse. But all lingeringe sette a syde, offices are too bee taken, and the common weale to be serued of those, who haue by nature the helppes of dispatch of matters. For otherwise can neyther the state bee

si despicere se dicant ea, quę plerią; admirẽtur, imperia, & magistratus: ijs non modo non laudi, verum etiam vitio dãdum puto: quorum iudiciũ in eo, quòd gloriam contempnant, & pro nihilo putent, difficile factu est non probare. Sed videntur, labores, & molestias, tum offensionum, tum repulsarum, quasi quandam ignominiam timere & infamiã. Sunt enim qui in rebus contrarijs parum sibi constent, voluptatem seueriſſimê contempnant in dolore sint molliores: gloriam negligant frangantur infamia: atque ea quidẽ non satis constanter. Sed ijs, qui habent a natura adiumẽta rerum gerendarũ, abiecta omni cunctatione adipiscendi magistratus sunt, & gerenda Resp. est.

Nec enim aliter aut regi ciuitas,

ciuitas,aut declarari animi magnitudo potest Capessentibus autem Rempub. nihil minus quã Philosophis, haud scio an magis etiam & magnificentia & dispicientia adhibenda sit rerum humanarum (quã sępe dico) & tranquilitas animi, atque securitas.

Si quidem nec anxij futuri sunt & cum grauitate, cõstantiaque victuri. Quæ eô faciliora sunt Philosophis, quô minus patét multa in eorũ vita, quę fortuna feriat: & quo minus multis rebus egent: & quia si quid aduersi eueniat, tam grauiter cadere non possunt.

Quocirca non sine causa maiores motus animorum concitantur, maioraque efficienda Rempub. gerentibus, quam quietis: quo magis his & magnitudine animi est adhibenda, & vacuitas ab

be gouerned, nor the greatnesse of courage be declared. And of suche as take vppon them the common weale, no lesse then of Philosophers, yea and I wote not whether more, must be vsed both a maiestie, & a contempt of worldly thinges, (which I often repeate) and also a quietnesse of mynde, and voydnesse of care: for so they shall not bee thoughtfull, and with grauitie, and stedfastnesse they shall leade their lyfe, which things be so much the easier to Philosophers, as ỹ fewer thinges lye open in their lyfe, that fortune may strike: & as the fewer thinges they stand in neede of and because they cannot take so sore a fall, if any aduersitie betyde.

Wherfore not without cause, greater mocions of mindes bee stirred vp in them: and greater enterpryses are meete to bee compassed, by the gouernoures of the common weale, than by the quiet lyuers, and therefore the more greatnesse of courage, and voydnesse of griefes ought

they

they to vse. But who so doth come to the doeing of matters, let him take heede that not onely this hee consider, how honest the matter is, but also that he haue an ableneſſe to discharge the same. In the which point must be considered: that neither ouer sone he dispaire for dastardyneſſe, nor ouer much haue affiance for grecdineſſe. And in all matters, before ye goe about them, ther must be vsed a diligent preparation.

But whereas most menne suppose martiall feates to be greater, than Citie causes: this opinion is to be abated. For many haue sought war oftentymes, vppon despyte of glory, and it commonly beefalleth in great wyttes, and courages, and so much the more if they be men fitte for Chiualrye, and desirous of warrfare.

But if we mynde to iudge truely: there haue beene many citie matters greater, & nobler thā martial. For though Themistocles bee rightfully commended, and his name is

angoribus. Ad rem gerendā autē qui accedit, caueat ne id modo cōsideret, quā illa res honesta sit, sed etiam vt habeat efficiēdi facultatē. In quo ipso considerandum est ne aut temerè desperet ꝓpter ignauiā: aut nimis confidat ꝓpter cupiditatē. In omnibus autē negotijs priusquā aggrediare, adhibēda est ꝑparatio diligēs. Sed cum pleriq; arbitrētur res bellicas maiores esse quā vrbanas, minuenda est hęc opinio.

Multi enim bella sępe quęsiuerūt propter glorię cupiditatem, atq; id in magnis animis, ingenijsq; plerūq;, contingit coq; magis si sint ad rē militarē apti, & cupidi bellorum gerendorum. Verè autem si volumus iudicare, multę res exiterunt vrbanę maiores clariores sque quam bellice

Quāuis enim Themistocles iure laudet' & sit ei'

nomẽ q̃ Solonis illustrius : citeturque Salamis clarissimæ testis victoriæ, quæ anteponatur consilio Solonis, ei, quo primum constituit Areopagitas : non minus præclarum hoc, quàm illud iudicandum est. Illud enim semel profuit, hoc semper proderit ciuitati. hoc consilio leges Athenienſium, hoc maiorum instituta seruantur. Et Themistocles quidem nihil dixit in quo ipse Areopagum adiuuerit? at ille vere adiuuit Themistoclẽ. Est enim bellũ gestum consilio senatus eius, qui â Solone erat constitutus. Licet eadem de Pausania, Lysandroque dicere quorum rebus gestis quanquam imperium Lacædemonijs dilatatum putatur : tamen ne minima quidem ex parte Lycurgi legibus & disciplinæ conferendi sunt, quin etiam ob has ipsas causas,

more famous than Solons: and Salamis is cited a witnesse of his most glorious victory, & it is preferre aboue the counsell of Solon, wherwith hee first ordeyned the Areopagites, yet no lesse prayse worthy is this, than that to bee adiudged. For that but once auayled, this shall for euer auaile the citie. By this counsell, the lawes of the Athenians, by this, the orders of theyr Elders bee preserued. And Themistocles canne alledge nothing, wherewith hee furdered the Areopage, but Solon furdered Themistocles. For the warre was mayntained by the aduise of that Senate, which by Solon was established.

Wee may saye as much of Pausanias, and Lysander: by whose deedes of armes though ỹ Empire of the Lacedemonians is thought to haue bene enlarged, yet verely they are not to bee cõpared in the least part with Lycurgus lawes, and order, yea more ouer by these occasyons, they

they hadde theyr armes both forwarder, and valyaunter. Neyther when I was a childe, mee thought Marcus Scaurus gaue place to Caius Marius: nor when I had a doee in the common weale, Quintus Catulus to Cneus Pompeius. For of small force is the warre abroad, vnlesse there bee good aduice at home.

Nor Africanus, both a singular man, and captaine also did more profite the common weale in racing of Numance, then at that time, Publius Nasica, a priuate man, dyd further it whē hee slewe Tiberius Gracchus. Howbeit this case indeede is not onely a Citie matter. For it belongeth also to the nature of martiall feates, sith it was wrought by force, and by strong hande. But yet that same was done by citie counsell, without an armie. And that is a goodlye saying, wherewith I heare, that I am woont to bee touched of the envyous and lewde persons.

et paratiores habuerunt exercitus & fortiores. Mihi quidem neque pueris nobis Marcus Scaurus Caio Mario: neque cum versaremur in Republica, Quintus Catulus Cneio Pompeio, cedere videbatur. Parua enim sunt foris arma, nisi est consilium domi.

Nec plus Africanus singularis & vir & imperator, in excidenda Numantia, Reipublicæ profuit, quàm eodem tempore Publius Nasica priuatus, cum Tiberium Gracchum interemit. Quanquam hæc quidē res non solum ex domestica est ratione, attingit enim & bellicam, quoniam vi, manuque confecta est: sed tamen id ipsum gestum est, consilio vrbano sine exercitu. Illud autem optimum est, in quo inuadi solere ab inuidis & improbis me audio.

Cedant armatoge,
concedat laurea lingua.

To the robe aboue armes
let glorie belong,
And the lavvrell giues place
to the Orators tong.

Vt enim alios omittam, nobis Rempub. gubernantibus, nonne togæ arma cesserent, neq; enim in Repub. periculum fuit grauius vnquã nec maius odium. Ita consiliis, diligentiaque nostra celeriter de manibus audacissimorum ciuium delapsa arma ipsa ceciderunt. Quæres igiter gesta est vnquam in bello tanta? quis triumphus conferẽdus. Licet enim mihi Marce fili, apud te gloriari, ad quẽ & hereditas huius gloriæ, & factorum imitatio pertinetur. Mihi quidem certe vir abundant bellicis laudibus Cneus Põpeius, multis audientibus hoc tribuit, vt diceret frustra se tertium triumphũ deportaturum fuisse, nisi meo in Rem pub. beneficio vbi triumpharet esse habitu-

For that I may passe ouer other, did not armes yeelde vnto the roabe, when I gouerned the common weale. For neyther in the common weale was euer a sorer peryll, nor yet a greater hatred. So by our counsayle and dilygence, the verye weapons full soone slyding out of the boldest Citizens handes, did fall to the grounde: What enterprise I praye you in warre, was euer doone so greate? What triumphe is there with it to bee compared. For I maye, Sonne Marke, glorie before you, to whome both the inheritaunce of this glorye, and the immitation of my deeds doth pertaine. Cneus Pompeyus a man flowing full of martiall praises, gaue me this commendation in the hearing of many, that he sayd, he should in vayne haue borne awaye the third triumph, except by my furderance in the commõ

weale,

weale, hee ſhoulde haue had a place, where hee might haue triumphed. Home manhoode then is not inferior to martiall, in which alſo we muſt beſtowe more labour and ſtudie thē in this. For alwaies that honeſtie which wee ſeeke in a hauty and a princely courage, is wrought by the ſtrength of the minde, and not of the bodie. Yet the bodie muſt be exerciſed, and brought in ſuche plight, as it may be able to folowe counſayle and reaſon, in executing matters, and ſuſtaining trauaile. But that honeſtie, where after we ſearch, all wholy conſiſteth in the care, and caſting of the mind, wher in they bring no leſſe commoditie, who roabed do gouerne the common weale, then they dooe, who armed dooe make the warres. And therefore by theyr aduice oftentimes warres bee eyther not begun or ended, and manye tymes attempted, as by Marcus Catoes counſaile, was the third Punike warre, wherein the authoritie of the dead man auayled, wherefore rarus. Sunt ergo domeſticę fortitudines nō inferiores militarib⁹, in quibus plus etiam quam in his operę, ſtudijque ponendum eſt. Omnino enim illud honeſtum, q̄ ex animo excelſo, magnificoq; quęrimus, animi efficitur, non corporis viribus. Exercendum tamen corpus, & ita afficiendum eſt vt obedire conſilio rationique poſſit in exequendis negotijs, & in labore tollerando. Honeſtum autē id, quod exquirimus, totum eſt poſitum in animi cura & cogitatione. In quo non minorem vtilitatem afferunt, qui togati Reipub. pręſunt, quàm qui bella gerunt. Itaque eorum conſilio ſæpe aut non ſuſcepta, aut confecta bella ſunt, nonnunquam etiam illata, vt Marci Catonis conſilio, bellum tertium Punicum, in quo etiam mortui valuit authoritas. Quare expe-

tenda quidem magis eſt decernendi ratio, quam decertandi fortitudo. Sed cauendū ne id bellandi magis fuga, quam vtilitatis ratione faciamus. Bellum autem ita ſuſcipiatur, vt nihíl aliud niſi pax quæſita videatur. Fortis vero animi & conſtantis eſt, nō perturbari in reb⁹ aſperis, nec tumultuantem de gradu deijci, vt dicitur: ſed præſentis animi vti conſilio, nec a ratione diſcedere. Quanquam hoc animi, illud eciam ingenij magni eſt percipere cogitatione futura: & aliquanto ante conſtituere quid accidere poſſit in vtramque partem: & quid agendum ſit, cum quid euenerit, nec committere aliquid, vt aliquando dicendum ſit, Non putaram, Hæc ſunt opera magni animi & excelſi, & prudentia, conſiloq; fidentis.

Temere autem in a-

their wiſedome in determining, then manlines in fighting is to bee deſired: but wee muſt beware that wee take not vp the matter by aduice, moze to auoyde warre, then foz cauſe of profite. And ſo let warre bee taken in hande, as no other thing may ſeeme but peace to haue ben ſought. And it is verily a token of a manly courage, and a conſtant not, to be diſquieted in rough frozmes, noz in making a churle to bee thzuſt from his place, as they ſay, but to follow the counſell of a preſent courage, noz yet to ſwarue from reſon. Notwithſtanding the one come of courage, the other proceedes of a greate wit, moze conceiue in minde things to come, and ſomwhat before to appoynte vppon what maye befall on both ſides, and what is to be done, when any thing ſhall happen, noz to commit ought that at ante time one ſhouide haue cauſe to ſaye, had I wiſte. These be ỳ wozks of a great and loftie courage, & leaning vpon pzudence and counſell.

But

But for a man to vse himselfe rashly in field, and so to buckle with the enimie hande to hande, it is a certaine brutish & beastly thing, but when time is, & necessitie requires, a man must fight hande to hand, and prefer death before slauerie and shame. But touching the rasing and sacking of cities, this greatly is to be considered, that nothing rashly, nothing cruelly bee doone, And it is the condition of a stout hearted man, in the ende of broiles, to punish the offenders, to saue the multitude, in euerye estate to maintayne right and honestie. For lyke as there bee (as I sayde tofore) who do preferre martial feates before Citie causes: so manye yee finde many to whom daungerous, and hot brayned deuises seeme gloriouser and greater then quyet counsells. We must neuer by seeking to escape perills, deserue to seeme cowardes and dastardes, but this wee must take heede off, that wee put not our selues, in daunger without cause:

cie versari, & manu cũ hoste confligere immane quiddam, & belluarum simile est. Sed cum tempus, necessitasq; postulat, decertandum manu est, & mors seruituti turpitudineque antepo nenda. De euertendis autem, diripiendisque vrbibus, valde illud considerandum est: ne quid temere, ne quid crudeliter fiat. Idque est viri magnanimi rebus agitatis punire sontes, multitudinẽ conseruare, in omni fortuna, recta atque honesta retinere, Vt enim sunt (quemadmodum supra dixi) qui vrbanis rebus bellicas anteponunt: sic reperies multos quibus periculosa & callida consilia quietis cogitationibus splẽdidiora et maiora videãtur Nuquã omnino periculi fuga cõmittẽdũ est, vt imbelles, timidiq; videamur, sed fugiendũ etiam illud ne offeramꝰ nos periculis sine causa:

quo nihil .poteſt eſſe ſtultius. Qua propter in adeundis periculis conſuetudo imitanda medicorum eſt, qui leuiter ægrotantes, leuiter curãt, grauioribus autem morbis periculoſas curationes & ancipites adhibere cogũtur. Quare in tranquillo, tempeſtatẽ aduerſam optare demẽtis eſt, ſubuenire autem tempeſtati quauis ratione, ſapientis: eoque magis, ſi plus adipiſcare re explicata boni, quam addubitata mali. Periculoſæ autem rerum actiones partim ijs ſunt, qui eas ſuſcipiant, partim Reipub. Itemque alij de vita, alij de gloria, & beneuolentia ciuium in diſcrimen vocantur. Promptiores igitur debemus eſſe ad noſtra pericula, quàm ad communia: dimicareque paratius de honore & gloria, quàm de cęteris cõmodis. Inuenti autem multi ſunt, qui non mo

for there can bee nothing fooliſher, then ſo to doe. Wherefore in aduenturing dangers, the guiſe of the phiſitions is, to be followed, who doe lightly cure the lightlye diſeaſed, but to ſore ſickneſſe they bee driuen to miniſter daungerous & doubtfull medicines. Therefore in calme to wiſh a ſore tempeſt, it is a mad mans part, but to make ſhifte in a tempeſt by al manner meanes, it is a wiſe mannes property, and ſo much the more, if ye attaine more good when the thing is paſt, then harme whẽ it was in doubt. But the doinge of matters bee daungerous, partlye to thoſe which take them in hand, and partly to the common weale. And alſo ſome be brought in hazarde of theyr lyfe, ſome of theyr glorie, ſome of the peoples fauour, wee ought therefore to bee readyer to aduenture our owne, then common perills, and to fight ſooner for honour and glorie, then for other commodities.

But there haue beene found many, who for their countrie

were

were readie to ſpend, not one-ly their ſubſtaunce, but alſo theyr lyfe, and thoſe ſame yet woulde not bee content to looſe one iotte of theyr glozie, no not though the common weale woulde require it, as Callicratides, who when hee was captaine of the Lacedemonians, in the Peloponneſian warre, and hadde doone many thinges wozthely, in the ende ouertourned all, when hee dyd not followe theyr aduiſe, who thought good to tranſpozt the Nauie from Arginuſes, and not to figh twith ẏ Athenians. To whome hee made aunſwere, how the Lacedemonians, the Nauie beeing loſt, myght make fozth another: he could not flye without his diſhonoz. And this was no doubte, to the Lacedemonians a meetly ſoze plague, but that was a peſtilent plague, whereby the Lacedemonians power fiell flatte to the grounde, when Cleombzotus, fearing enuie, had raſhly encountered with Epaminondas.

do pecuniam ſed vitam etiam profundere pro patria parati eſſent: ijdem glorię iacturam ne minimã quidem facere vellent, ne Repu. quidẽ poſtulante: vt Callicratidas, qui cum Lacedemoniorum dux eſſet Peloponeſiaco bello, multaque feciſſet egregiẽ, vertit ad extremum omnia, cum conſilio non paruit eorum, qui claſſem ab Arginuſis remouendam, nec cum Atheniẽſibus dimicandum putabant: quib⁹ ille reſpondit, Lacedemonios claſſe illa amiſſa, aliã parere poſſe, ſe fugere ſine ſuo dedecore non poſſe. Atque hæc quidem Lacedemoniis plaga mediocris fuit: illa peſtifera, qua cùm Cleombrotus inuidiam timens, temere cum Epaminonda conflixiſſei, Lacedemoniorum opes corruerunt.

How

Quanto Quintus Maximus melius, de quo Ennius.

Vnus homo nobis cunctando reſtituit rem.
Non ponebat enim
rumores ante ſalutem.
Ergo poſtq; magisq;
Vſi nunc gloria claret.

How much better did Quintus Fabius Maximus: of whome quoth Ennius.

One wight there is, that hath our wealth reſtored by delaies.
For hee before all rumours did our ſafetie ſet alwaies:
Wherefore in longer courſe of time the greater is his praiſe.

Quod genus peccandi, vitandum eſt etiam in rebus vrbanis. Sunt enim qui conſentiunt, etiam ſi optimum ſit, tamen inuidiæ metu non audent dicere. Omnino qui Reipublicæ præfuturi ſunt, duo Platonis præcepta teneant. Vnum vt vtilitatem ciuium ſic tueantur, vt quicquid agunt ad eam referant, obliti commodorum ſuorum. Alterum, vt totum corpus Reipublicæ curent: ne dum partem aliquam tueantur, reliquas deſerant. Vt enim tutela, ſic procreatio Reip. ad vti-

Which kinde of miſdooing muſt bee alſo auoyded in Citie matters. For there bee men who be it neuer ſo good that they thinke, yet for feare of enuye they dare not vtter it, who ſo ſhall bee gouernours of the common weale, let them obſerue two preceptes of Platoes, one is, that they ſo mainetaine the profit of the commons, that whatſoeuer they doe, they referre it thereto, alwayes forgetting their owne commodities, the other is, that they haue care ouer the whole bodie of ỹ common weale, leaſt while they vpholde ſome one part, the reſt they leaue deſtitute. For like as gardenſhip,

cuca

euen ſo gouernement of the common weale ought to bee vſed to the profite of them who are committed, and not of them to whome it is committed. But who ſo prouide for parte of the people, and of parte be retchleſſe, they bring in ſedition and diſcord, the thing moſt hurtfull to the cõmon weale: whereby it befalleth that ſome doue ſeeme people pleaſers, ſome affectionate to nobilitie, but fewe to the whole. Heereof ſprang great diſcention amonge the Athenians: and in our commone weale, not onelye ſedition, but alſo ſore ciuil warre: the which a graue and ſtoute Citizen, and worthye of rule in the common weale, wyll flye and hate: and giue himſelfe whole to the common weale, and neyther hunt after riches nor power: but wyll ſo defende the whole ſtate, as hee maye prouide for all men, nor by falſe accuſation wyll hee bringe anye manne into hatered or enuye: but alwayes wyll ſo cleaue to iuſtyce,

litatem eorum qui commiſſi ſunt, non ad eorũ quibus commiſſa eſt gerenda eſt. Qui autem parti ciuium conſulunt, partem negligunt, rem perniciociſſimam in ciuitatem inducunt, ſeditionem atq; diſcordiam Ex quo euenit vt alij populares, alij ſtudioſi optimi cuiuſque videantur, pauci vniuerſorum. Hinc apud Athenienſes magnæ diſcordiæ ortæ & in noſtra Reip. nõ ſolum ſeditiones, ſed peſtifera etiàm bella ciuilia, quæ grauis & fortis ciuis in Republica dignus principatu fugiet atque oderit, tradetque ſe totum Reipublicæ, neque opes aut potentiã conſectabitur totamque eam ſic tuebitur vt omnibus conſulat.
Nec vero criminibus falſis in odium aut inuidiam quenquam vocabit: omninoq; ita iuſtitiæ, honeſtatiq; adhereſcet,

vt

vt dum eam conſeruet, quamuis grauiter offendat, mortemque oppetat potius, quàm deſerat illa, quæ dixi.

Miſerima eſt omnino ambitio, bonorumque contentia. De qua preclarè apud eundem eſt Platonem ſimiliter facere eos, qui inter ſe cõtenderent, vter potius Rempublicam adminiſtret, vt ſi nautæ certarent quis eorùm potiſſimum gubernaret. Idemque præcepit, vt eos aduerſarios exiſtimem⁹, qui arma contraferant, non eos, qui ſuo iudicio tueri Rempublicam velint: qualis fuit inter Publium Africanũ, & Quintum Metellum ſine acerbitate diſſentio.

Nec vero audiendi ſunt, qui grauiter iraſcendum inimicis putabunt, idque magnanimi & fortis viri eſſe cẽſent.

and honeſtie ẏ while he maye maintaine it, although he ſore offend other, hee woulde deſire death, rather then forſake thoſe thinges ẏ I haue ſpokẽ of: Ambitiõ no doubt, and ſtriuing for promotion is a verie miſerble thing, wherof it is notablie ſayde in the ſame Plato, that ſemblablye fare they, who woulde ſtriue together, whether of them ſhoulde rather rule the common weale, as if the Marryners ſhoulde bee at variaunce which of them ſhould chiefely gouerne the helme. And the ſame man hath taught vs, ẏ thoſe we take as enimies, which woulde beare armour againſt vs, and not thoſe who by their diſcreation meane to preſerue the common weale, as the diſcention betweene Publius Africanus, and Quintus Metellus, was without all bitterneſſe of malice. Neither are they worthie to be heard, which holde opinion that we ſhoulde bee throughlye angrye with our enimyes, and dooe thinke

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it is the propertie of a stoute hearted and manly man. For there is nothing more commendable, nothing more seemly for a great and noble man, then pleasableness and mercie. But in free Cities, and where there is an equalitie of lawe there must bee vsed also a mildnesse and noble courage, as they call it: least if we be angry either with commers out of time, or crauers without shame, wee fall into a testinesse of minde, both vnprofitable and hatefull. And yet meekenesse and mercye is so to bee allowed, that for the common weales sake, a seueritie bee vsed: without which, a Citie cannot be gouerned. But all punishment and chastisement must bee voyde of malyce, and not be applyed to serue his turne, who punisheth or rebuketh anye man, but to the common weales behalfe. Wee must also beware, that the punishment bee not greater than the faulte, and least all for one matter, some bee corrected, some not once spoken

Nihil enim laudabilius, nihil magno & præclaro viro dignius placabilitate atque clementia. In liberis vero populis, & in iuris æquabilitate, exercenda etiam est facilitas, & altitudo animique dicitur: ne si irascamur, aut intempestiûe accedentib', aut imprudenter rogantibus, in morositatem in vtilem & odiosam incidamus. Et tamen ita ꝓbanda est mansuetudo atque clementia, vt adhibeatur reipublicę causa seueritas, sine qua ad ministrari ciuitas non potest. Omnis autem & animaduersio & castigatio contumelia vacare debet: neque ad eius qui punit aliquem, aut verbis castigat, sed ad Reipublicæ vtilitatem referri.

Cauendum etiam ne maior pœna quem culpa sit, & ne eisdem de causis alij plectãtur, alij ne appellentur quidẽ.

Pro-

Prohibenda autem maxime eſt ira in puniendo. Nunquam enim iratus qui accedet ad pœnam, mediocritatem illam tenebit, quæ eſt inter nimium & parum: quę placet Peripateticis et recte placet, modo ne laudarent iracundiam, & dicerent vtiliter à natura dàtam. Illa vero omnibus in rebus repudianda eſt: optandumque vt ij, qui præſunt Reipublicæ legum ſimiles ſint, quæ ad puniendum non iracundia, ſed æquitate ducuntur.

Atque etiam in rebus proſperis, & ad voluntatem noſtram fluentibus ſuperbiam, faſtidium, arrogantiam q; magnopere fugiamus. Nam vt aduerſas res, ſic ſecundas immoderatè ferre leuitatis eſt, præclaraque eſt æquabilitas in omni vita, & idem ſemper vultus, eademque frons

vnto. And in punishing wee muſt chiefly refraine from anger. For ỹ angrie man that goeth about punishment ſhall neuer keepe that meſure, that is betweene too micle and too little: the which meaſure lyketh the Peripatetikes: and of good cauſe it liketh them, were it ſo, they would not cõmend angrineſſe, and ſay, that it is profitably giuen of nature. But in all caſes, the affection is to be refuſed: and it is to be wiſhed, that ſuch as gouerne the common weale be like the lawes: which be moued to punish offenders, not vpon anie wrath, but vpon equitie.

Moreouer, in proſperitye, and when thinges flowe euen at our will, lette vs earneſtly flie pride, diſdainefulneſſe, and arrogancie. For as it is a point of lyghtneſſe, vnmeaſurablie to beare aduerſitie: ſo it is no leſſe, vnmeaſurablie to vſe proſperitie: & a continuall euenneſſe in all a mannes life, and one cheere euermore, and one manner of face is commendable,

as

as wee haue hard of Socrates, and also of Caius Lelyus.

Certes I see, how Philip kinge of the Macedonians was excelled of his sonne in prowesse, and glorie, yet in mildenesse, and gentlenesse, he was far aboue him. Wherefore the one was alwayes noble, the other oftentimes full beastly, so that they seeme rightly to teach, which warne vs, that how much the higher we be in degree, so much the lowlyer we bear our selues. Panetius reporteth, how Africanꝰ his scolar, & familiar friēd, was wōt to saye, lyke as Horses by reason of the dyuers fightes of warres waxing ouerhot, and courageous memꝫ vse to put to ryders that they may haue them the redyer, euen so men vnbrideled with prosperitie & ouertrusting to themselues shoulo be brought as it were within the compasse of reason and learning, that they might thorowsee the fraitnes of the worlde, and the wauering of fortune.

vt de Socrate, intemque de C. Lelio accepimus. Phillippū quidem Macedonum regem, rebus gestis & gloria superat filio facilitate & humanitate video superiorem fuisse. Itaque alter semper magnus, alter sępe turpissimus fuit. Vt recte pręcipere videantur qui monent, vt quātō superiores simus, tantò nos summissius geramus. Panetius quidem Africanum auditorem, & familiarem suū solitum ait dicere: vt equos propter crebras contētiones pręliorum ferocitate exultantes domitoribus tradere soleant, vt his facilioribus possint vti: sic homines secundis rebus effrenatos, sibique præsidentes, tanquam in girum rationis, & doctrinæ duci oportere, vt perspicerent rerum humanarum imbecillitatem, varietatemq; Fortunæ.

Atq; etiã in ſecundiſſimis rebus maxime eſt vtendũ cõſilio amicorũ: iiſq; maior etiam quàm antè tribuenda eſt authoritas: iiſdemq; tẽporibus cauendum eſt, ne aſſentatoribus patefaciamus aures, nec adulari nos ſinamus: in quo falli facilè eſt. Tales enim nos tunc eſſe putam⁹, vt iure laudemur, ex quo naſcuntur innumerabilia peccata: cum homines inflati opinionibus turpiter irridentur, & in maximis verſantur erroribus.

Sed hec quidem hactenus. Illud autem ſic eſt iudicandum: maximas geri res, & maximi animi ab iis, qui Rempub. regant, quôd eorum adminiſtratio latiſſime pateat, ad plurimoſq; pertineat.

Eſſe autem magni animi, & fuiſſe multos etiam in vita otioſa, qui aut inueſtigarẽt, aut conarentur magna

Moreouer in our higheſt propertie, wee muſt moſte of all take the aduiſe of our friends and wee muſt giue them alſo a greater aucthoritie, than we dyd before, & in thoſe ſeaſons, we muſt take heed, that we open not our eares to flatterers, nor ſuffer our ſelues to bee clawed with flattery, wherein it is an eaſie thing to be begiled,

For wee thinke our ſelues ſuch, that of right we may be prayſed, wherof do ſpringe innumerable faults, whẽ men puft vp with opiniõ be ſhamfully ſcorned, and be wrapt in fooliſh errours. But of theſe matters thus far we treate.

This then is to bee taken thus, that the greateſt deedes & of the greateſt courage, bee done by them, which gouerne the common weale, becauſe theyr miniſtration reacheth fardeſt, and to moſte men apperteineth.

And that there be, and haue been manye, euer in the quiet life, of great courage, which eyther woulde trye oute, or take in hande certaine great enter-

enterpzises:and would keepe themselues within the boũds of their owne matters : or els, placed betweene Philosophers , and those that rule the common weale, would be delighted with theyr home goods : not heaping vp the same,by al maner of meanes, nor barring theyrs from the vse thereof : but rather emparting them bothe too theyr friende , and to the common weale , if at any tyme there should be neede. Which good, first lette it bee well gotten, and with no dishoneſt or hate full gayne: next , let it bee readye to doe good , to manye , so they be worthy: lastlye,lette it be encreased with discrecion , diligence , and thryft : and not lye open rather to lust and ryot , than to liberalitie , and bountyfulnesse These foresaid lessõs who so obserueth : may liue both honorablye,grauely,and stoutly , and also playnelye, faythfully , and friendely for the trade of mans lyfe.

It followes , that we speake of the other part of honestie, quędam seseq; suarum rerum finibus continerent:aut interiecti inter philosophos & eos qui Rempub. administrarent , delectarẽtur re sua familiari non eam quidem omni ratione exaggerantes , neque excludentes ab eius vsu suos , potiusque & amicis impartientes, & Reipub. si quando vsus esset . Quæ primum bene parta sit, nullo neque turpi questu neque odioso, tum quam plurimis(modo dignis) se vtilem prębeat , deinde augeatur ratione, diligentia, parsimonia:nec libidini potius, luxurięque. Quâm liberalitati, & beneficentiæ pateat.

Hęc prescripta seruanti licet magnificẽ, grauiter,animosèque viuere : atque etiam simpliciter , fideliter , vitæque hominũ amicè. Sequit' vt de illa reliqua pte honestat' dicẽdũ sit:

in qua verecundia, & quasi quidem ornatus vitæ, temperantia & modestia, omnis què sedatio perturbationū animi, et rerum modus cernitur.

Hoc loco continetur id quod dici latine decorem potest: grece enim πρεπον dicitur huius vis est, vt ab honesto non queat seperari. Nam & quod decet honestum est & quod honestum est, decet.

Qualis autem differentia sit honesti, & decori, facilius intelligi, quâm explanari potest.

Quicquid enim est quod deceat, id tum apparet, cum antegressa est honestas.

Itaquè non solum in hac parte honestatis, de qua hoc loco disserendum est, sed etiam in tribus superioribꝰ, quid deceat apparet. Nam & ratione vti atque oratione prudenter,

which remayneth, wherein shamefastnesse, and temperance, as it were the certaine ornament of mans lyfe, and sober moode, and all appeasement of passions of the minde, and the measure of thinges is seene.

In this place also comelynesse is conteyned, the which may be named Decorum in latine, for in Greeke it is called πρεπον. The nature hereof is such, ỹ from honesty it cannot be sundred.

For both what becommeth is honest and also what is honest, becommeth. But what difference there is betweene honestie and comelynesse, it may sooner be conceiued then expressed.

For whatsoeuer it is, that becommeth, it then appeareth, when honestie is gone before. And therefore not onely in this part of honesty, whereof in this place wee haue to dispute, but also in the three former parts it doth apeare what becommeth. For as it becommeth one to vse reason, and speach discretely,

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to dooe that hee ſhould dooe, aduiſedly: to eſpie and maintaine whatſoeuer is in euerie thing the troth: ſo contrariwiſe to bee beguiled, to erre, to fall, to bee deceiued, as much it miſbecommeth: as to dote, and bee diſtraught in minde.

Thereto all iuſt things be comely: all vniuſt things againe as they be diſhoneſt, ſo are they vncomely. Like is the nature of manlineſſe. For what ſo is done manfully, and with a greate courage, that doeth ſeeme meete for a man, and comelye, what ſo goeth contrarie: that as it is diſhoneſt, euen ſo it is vncomelye. Wherefore this comelyneſſe whereof I ſpeake, doeth pertaine to all honeſtie indeede: and ſo pertaines, that not after a certaine hidden ſort it is ſeene, but ſtãds in open ſight. For a certaine thing there is that becommeth, and ſ̃ ſame is perceiued in euery vertue: which more by imagination, then in deede, may be ſeuered from vertue.

& agere quod agas conſiderate: omniq; in re quid ſit veri videre & tueri decet contraq; falli, errare, labi, decipi, tam dedecet, quàm delirare, & mente captum eſſe.

Et iuſta omnia decora ſunt iniuſta contra, vt turpia, ſic indecora. Similis eſt ratio fortitudinis. Quod enim viriliter animoque magno fit, id dignum viro & decorum videtur, quod contra, id vt turpe, ſic indecorum. Quare pertinet quidem ad omnem honeſtatem hoc, quod dico decorum & ita pertinet, vt non recõdita quadam ratione cernatur, ſed ſit in promptis. Eſt enim quiddam, (idque intelligitur in omni virtute) quod deceat: qd' cogitatione magis a virtute poteſt, quam re ſeparari.

& vt venuſtas, & pulchritudo corporis ſeceerni non poteſt a valitudine : ſic hoc, de quo loquimur decorum, totum illud eſt quidem cum virtute confuſum, ſed mente & cogitatione diſtinguitur. Eſt autem eius deſcriptio duplex, nam & generale quoddam decorum intelligimus, quod in omni honeſtate verſatur, & aliud huic ſubiectum, quod pertinet ad ſingulas partes honeſtatis. Atque illud ſuperius, ſic fere definire ſolet. Decorum id eſſe quod conſentaneum ſit hominis excellentię in eo, in quo natura eius a reliquis animantibus differat.

Quæ autem pars ſubiecta generi eſt, eam ſic definiunt vt id decorum eſſe velint, quod ita naturæ conſentaneum ſit, vt in eo moderatio & temperantia appareat, cum ſpecie quadam li-

For as goodlineſſe and beautie of bodie cannot bee parted from health, ſo this comelyneſſe, whereof wee treate, is altogether blended with vertue, but yet in ones mind and thought, it may bee deuided But the deſcription thereof is on two ſorts. For both we conceiue a generall comelyneſſe to bee, which in all honeſtie hath to doe, and another ſpeciall comlyneſſe vnder this, which belongeth to euerie perticular parte of honeſtie. And the former thus in a manner is woont to bee defined, that it is comely, which is agreeable to mannes excellencie, in that, wherin his nature is different from other liuing creatures. But they define the parte, which is vnder the generall, in ſuch wiſe, that yet they wil haue it to be counted comelye, which is ſo to nature agreeable, as it may appeare both in meaſurableneſſe, and temperaunce, with a certaine honeſt ſhewe. That theſe be thus meant, of the Philoſophers, wee maye

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geſſe by ꝯ comelyneſſe, which the Poets followe, whereof in another place we are wont to ſaye moze. But then, wee ſaie, the Poets keepe that grace, which becommeth: when it that to each perſon is fitting, both is done and ſaid: as if either Eacus oz Minos ſhould ſay.

Well let them hate, a while they ſtande in feare: oz this,

His childrens graue the parent ſelfe novv is.

Uncomely it ſhould ſeeme, becauſe wee haue heard, that they were iuſt men. But Atreus ſaying ſo, it is lyked of the hearers, becauſe the ſpeech is fitte foz the perſon.

But Poets will iudge by the perſon what is comely foz euery bodie: howbeit nature her ſelfe hath put vpon vs a perſonage of great excellency, and preheminence aboue all other liuing creatures. Wherfoze poets in ꝯ gret diuerſity of perſons, will eſpie what is fit, euen foz the wicked ſoꝛt, & what becommeth them.

berali. Hæc ita eſſe, intelligere poſſum⁹ ex eo decore, quod Poetæ ſequũtur: de quo alio loco plura dici ſolent. Sed tum ſeruare illud Poetas quod deceat dicim⁹, cum id quod quaq; perſona dignum eſt, & fit & dicitur, vt ſi Aecus aut Minos diceret. *Oderint dum metuant*, aut, *Natis ſepulchrum ipſe eſt parens*. Indecorum videretur ꝙ eos fuiſſe iuſtos accepimus. At Atreo dicente plauſus exitant', eſt nam digna perſona oratio. Sed Poetæ quid quemque deceat, ex perſone iudicabunt. Nobis autem perſonam impoſuit ipſa Natura magna, cum excellentia, præſtantiaque animantium reliquorum.

Quo circa Poetæ in magna veritate perſonarum, etiam vitioſis quid conueniat & quid deceat, videbunt.

Nobis autem cûma natura conſtantiæ, moderationis, temperanciæ, verecundiæ partes datæ ſint, cumq; eadem natura doceat non negligere quemadmodum nos ad uerſos homines geram⁹. efficit', vt & illud quod ad omnem honeſtatem pertinet, decorum quã late ſuſum ſit, appareat: & hoc quod ſpectatur, in vno quoque genere virtutis. Vt enim pulcritudo corporis, apta compoſitione membrorum mouet oculos, & delectat hoc ipſo, qd' inter ſe omnes partes quodam lepore conſentiunt: ſic hoc decorum, quod elucit in vita, mouet approbationem eorum, quibus cum viuitur ordine, & conſtantia, & moderatione, dictorum omnium atque factorũ. Adhibenda eſt igitur quædam reuerentia adueꝛſus homines & optimi cuiuſque, & reliquorum.

But ſeeing the partes of ſtedfaſtneſſe, meaſurableneſs, temperaunce, and ſhamefaſtneſſe, be appointed vs by nature, and ſeeing the ſame nature teacheth vs, not to bee retcheleſſe, after what ſoꝛt wee behaue our ſelues to euerie man: it comes to paſſe, that both it appeareth, howe farre the comelyneſſe which appertaines to all honeſtye, doth reach, & this alſo, which is marked in euerye kinde of vertue. Foꝛ as the beautifulneſſe of the bodie with pꝛopoꝛtionable making of the limmes mooueth a mans eies and delighteth them euẽ with this, that all the parts with a certaine grace agree together: right ſo this comelyneſſe that ſhineth abꝛoade in our lyfe, winneth theyꝛ lyking wyth whome wee liue by an oꝛder, ſteadfaſtneſſe, and meaſurableneſſe in all our wooꝛdes and deedes. There muſt bee vſed theꝛefoꝛe a certaine reuerence towarde men, both to euerie one of the beſt ſoꝛt, and alſo to the reſt of meaner degree.

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for it is not onelye a signe of an arrogant bodie, but also of one altogether lawlesse, to bee retchlesse, what euerye man thinketh of him.

But there is a difference betweene iustice and shamefastnesse, in euery respect that is to be had. It is the part of iustice, to offer men no violence: of shamefastnesse, to offend no bodie: wherein the nature of comelynesse is most throughly seen. These things then declared, I think it sufficiētly conceiued, what thing that is, which we saie becommeth. But the ductie that proceedeth of comelynesse, chiefflye taketh this waye, which leadeth to the agreeableneſse, and preseruation of nature, whome if wee wil followe as guide, we shall neuer goe amisse, and shall followe both that which hath in it witnesse, and through sight by nature, and that which is agreeable for the fellowship of men, & that which is earnest, and manly. But the greatest effect of comelynesse standeth in this parte of vertue,

Nam negligere quid de se quisque sentiat, non solum arrogantis est, sed etiam omnino dissoluti.

Est autem quod differat in hominum ratione habenda, inter iustitiam & verecūdiam. Iustitię partes sunt, non violare hominēs: verecūdię, nō offēdere, in quo maximè perspicitur vis decori. His igitur expositis quale sit id, qd' dicere dicimus, intellectū puto, officium autē qd' ab eo ducit, hanc primū habet viam, quæ deducit ad conuenientiam, conseruationemque naturæ, quam si sequemur ducem, nunquam aberrabimus, sequemurque & id, quod acutum & perspicax natūra est, & id quod ad hominū cōsotiationem accommodatum est, & id quod vehemens atque forte. Sed maxima vis decori in hac inest parte,

de qua disputamus. Neque non solum corporis qui ad naturam apti sunt, sed multo etiam magis animi motus probandi, qui item ad naturam accommodati sunt. Duplex est enim vis animorum, atque naturæ. Vna pars in appetitu posita est, quæ est ὁρμὴ græcæ, quæ hominem huc & illuc rapit. Altera in ratione, quæ docet & explanat, quid faciendum fugiendumue sit. Ita fit vt oratio præsit, appetitus obtemperet. Omnis autē actio vacare debet temeritate & negligentia. Nec vero agere quicquam cuius non possit causam probabilem reddere. Hæc est enim fere descriptio officii. Efficiendum autem est, vt appetitus rationi obediāt: camque neque precurrant propter temeritatem, nec propter pigritiā aut ignauiam deserant: sintque tranquilli

whereof wee now treate. For not onely the mouings of the bodie, which agree to nature, are to be allowed: but much more the motions of ỹ minde, that likewise be agreeable to nature, are to bee commended.

For the power of the minde and of nature standes in two partes. The one is placed in appetite, which in Greeke is ὁρμὴ, and this hether and thether haleth a man: that other hath place in reason: which teacheth and sheweth plainely what is to be done, and what to bee refused. So falleth it that reason ruleth, and appetite obeyeth. But all our doings must be without rashnesse, and negligence: neyther ought a man to doe anye thing, whereof hee is not able to render a prooueable cause. For this in a manner is the definition of ductie. But wee must bring to passe that our appetites obeye reason: and neither runne before it, neither for slouth, or dastardlynesse, drag behinde it: & that

that they bee quiet and voyde of all stur, & trouble of mind, whereby all steadfastnesse and measurablenesse shall appeare in sight. For appetites which goe ouer farre astray, and (as it were) ouer hot, eyther in longing after thinges, or flying from thinges, be not staied inoughe by reason: these without doubt exceede theyr boundes and measure. For they forsake & set aside obedience: nor yet do yeeld to reson whervnto they bee made subiect by the law of nature. But with such motions, not onely mennes mindes be troubled, but also their bodies. We may see in the verie faces of the angrie: or of them, who eyther with anie lust, or with feare be sturred, or in ouermuch pleasure do reioyce: for therewith the countenaunce, voice, mouing, and resting of them all is chaunged. Of which thinges this is gathered (to the intent we may retourne to the forme of duetie) that all appetites are to bee pulled in and assuaged:

atque omni animi perturbatione careant, ex quo elucebit omnis cõstantia, omnisque moderatio. Nam qui appetitus longius euagãtur, & tanquam exultantes siue cupiendo, siue fugiendo, non satis a ratione retinentur, hi sine dubio finem & modũ transeunt. Relinquunt enim & abiiciunt obedientiam, nec rationi parent, cui sunt subiecti lege naturæ. A quibus, non modo animi perturbantur sed etiam corpora. Licet ora ipsa cernere iratorum, aut eorum, qui aut libidine sunt, aut voluptate nimia aliqua, aut metu cõmoti gestiunt: quorum omniũ vultus, voces, motus, statusque mutantur. Ex quibus illud intelligitur (vt ad officii formam reuertamur) appetitus omnes contrahendos, sedandosque esse: excitandamq;

damq́; animaduersionē & diligentiā, vt nequid temerè, ac fortuito, inconsideratè, negligenterque agamus. Neque non ita generati à natura sumus, vt ad ludum & iocum facti esse videamur, sed ad seueritatē potius, & ad quędam studia grauiora, atque maiora. Ludo autem & ioco vti illis quidē licet sed sicut somno, & quietibus cęteris, tum cum grauibus serijsque reb⁹ satis fecerimus. Ipsumque genus iocandi non profusum, nec immodestum sed ingenuum & facetū esse debet. Vt enim pueris nō omnē licētiā ludēdi dam⁹, sed eā q̄ ab honestatis actionibus nō sit aliena, sic in ipso ioco, aliqd' ꝑbi ingenij lumē eluceat. Duplex omnino est iocandi genus, vnū illiberale, petulans, flagitiosum, obscœnum, alterum elegās, vrbanū, ingeniosū, facetum, quo genere,

and that wee must take good heede and dilygence, that we doo nothing rashly and venturously, nor vnaduisedlye, and neglygently. For we bee not to this ende ingendered of uature, that we should seeme to bee created for plaie, and iest, but we bee rather borne to sageneſſe, & to certain grauer and greater studies. Yet we may lawfullye vse iesting and pastime, but euen as wee doe sleepe, and other restings, at such time as we haue sufficiently ended graue and earnest causes. And the verye maner of our iesting must not be too large, nor vnsober, but honest, and pleasant. For as we giue not children all manner libertie of playing, but such as swarueth not from honest exercises: so in our verie iesting, let there appeare some light of honest wit. To bee short, after two sortes is the manner of iesting: the one vnhonest, rauling, hurtfull, bawdye: the other, fine, ciuill, wittie, pleasaunt.

With the which kinde, not oncly oure Plautus, and

and the olde Comedie of the Attikes, but also the bookes of Socraticall Philosophers bee well stozed: and there bee of many men manye merrye layd sawes, as those that of olde Cato be gathered, which be called ἀποφθέγματα. Easie therefoze is the difference betweene honest and vnhonest iesting. The one is meete foz an honest man, if it bee done in season, and with a lyght heart: the other meete foz no man, if the vncleannes of ỹ matter be increased with filthinesse of wozdes.

Also in pastime, there is a certaine measure to be kepte, that wee bee not therein altogether excessiue, and puffed vp with pleasure, fall into some dishonestie. But both our martiall fielde, and also our exercises of hunting, doo finde vs honest examples of pastime.

But it belongs to the whole discourse of duetye, euermoze to haue in minde, howe farre mannes nature exceedeth the nature of beasts.

nō modō Plaut⁹ noster & Atticorum antiqua comedia, sed etiam Philosophorum Socraticorum libri referti sunt, multaque multorum facete dicta, vt ea quæ à sene Catone sunt collecta, quæ vocantur ἀποφθέγματα. Facilis igitur est distinctio ingenui & illiberalis ioci. Alter est, si tempore fit, ac remisso animo, homine libero dignus. Alter ne homine quidem, si rerum turpitudini adhibetur verborum obscœnitas.

Ludendi etiam, est quidam modus retinēdus, vt ne nimis omnia profundamus, elatique voluptatem in aliquam turpitudinē dilabamur. Suppeditāt autem & cāpus noster, & studia venandi, honesta exempla ludēdi. Sed pertinet ad omnem officij quæstionē, semper in promptu habere, quantum natura hominis pecudibus reliquisq; bestijs antecedat

Ille

Illi enim nihil sentiant nisi voluptatem, ad eamque feruntur omni impetu. Hominis autē mens discendo aliter, & cogitando semper aliquid aut inquirit, aut agit: videndiq;, & audiendi delectatione ducitur. Quin etiam si quis est paulo ad voluptates propēsior: modo ne sit ex pecudū genere (sunt enim quidam homines nō re sed nomine) sed si quis est paulò erectior, quamuis voluptate capiatur, occultat & dissimulat appetitum voluptatis, propter verecundiam. Ex quo intelligitur corporis voluptatem, non satis esse dignum hominis præstantia, eamque contemni & reiici oportere. Sin sit quispiam qui aliquid tribuat voluptati, diligenter ei tenendum esse eius fruendæ modum.

Itaque victus, cul-

For they feele nothing but pleasure, and thereunto bee carried wt their whole swaie: but mannes wit is fedde with learning: and by studying either searcheth, or doth alwaies somewhat: and is ledde with the delight of seeing and hearing: yea, moreouer, if ther be anie somewhat with the most enclined to pleasures: so hee bee not of the beastly kinde: (for some there bee, not men in deede, but in name) but if there bee anye man that is somwhat more greedely minded, though with pleasure he bee caught, he hideth and dissembleth his appetite of pleasure for verie shamefastnesse. Whereof it is soone perceyued, the pleasure of the bodie is not worthie to be matched with the excellencie of man, and that it ought to bee despised and reiected. But if there be anie man, who somedeale yeeldeth vnto pleasure, hee must verie warely keepe a measure, in enioying the same.

And therfore let the feeding,

and

and apparelling of the bodye bee referred to health and ſtrength, not to voluptuouſneſſe. And thereto if we will conſider what an excellence, and a dignitie there is in nature, wee ſhall vnderſtande howfowle it is to ouerflowe in ryot, and liue diſcipliouſlye and wantonly, and how honeſt it is to leade our lyfe ſauingly, chaſtlye, ſagely, and ſoberly.

Wee muſt vnderſtande alſo that we bee cladde by nature (as it were) with two perſons, whereof the one is common, becauſe we all bee partakers of reaſon, and the preheminence, whereby wee ſurmount beaſts, from which reaſon, all honeſtie and comelyneſſe is deriued, & out of the which, the waie of finding dutie is ſought, the other is that which properlye to each man is aſſigned.

For as in bodies there bee greate differences, (for ſome wee ſee paſſe other in ſwiftneſſe to runne, ſome in ſtrength to wraſtle, and lyke-

tuſque corporis ad valetudinem referantur, & ad vires non ad voluptatem. Atq; etiam ſi cõſiderare volumus, quę ſit in natura hominis excellentia, & dignitas, intelligimus quam ſit turpe diffluere luxuria, & delicatè ac molliter viuere: quamq; honeſtũ, parcè, continenter, ſeuere, ſobrieq;.

Intelligendum etiam eſt duabus quaſi nos à natura indutos eſſe perſonis. Quarum vna eſt communis, ex eo quod omnes participes ſumus rationis, præſtantiæq; eius, quæ antecellimus beſtijs, à qua omne honeſtũ decorumq; trahitur, & ex qua ratio inueniendi officij exquiritur. Altera autem, q̃ ꝓprie ſingulis eſt attributa. Vt nam in corporib⁹ magnæ diſſimilitudines ſũt, (alios enim videm⁹ velocitate ad curſũ, alios virib⁹ ad luctãdũ valere itemq;

iteḿque in formis alijs dignitatem ineſſe, in alijs venuſtatem) ſic in animis exiſtũt etiam maiores varietates. Erat in Lucio Craſſo, & in Lucio Philippo multus lepos: maior etiam, magiſque de induſtria, in Caio Cæſare Lucij filio. At ijſdem temporibus in Marco Scauro, & in Marco Druſio adoleſcente ſingularis ſeueritas: in Caio Lælio multa hilaritas: in eius familiari, Scipione, ambitio maior, vita triſtior.

De Græcis autem, dulcem & facetũ, feſtiuiq́; ſermonis atq́; in omni oratione ſimulatorem, quem εἴρωνα græci nominauerunt Socratẽ accepimꝰ. Contra, Pithagoram & Periclem ſummã auctoritatem cõſequutos ſine vlla hilaritate. Callidũ Hanniablẽ ex Pœnorum: ex noſtris ducibus, Q. Maximum accepimus, facile cælare, tacere, diſſimulare,

wiſe in faces, ſome haue a portly looke, ſome an amiableneſſe (ſo alſo in mindes, there be farre greater diuerſities.

There was in Lucius Craſſus, and Lucius Philippus much pleaſantneſſe: but greater and more of ſet purpoſe in Caius Ceſar, Lucius ſonne. And at thoſe daies in Marcus Scaurus, & in Marcus Druſus the young man, ther was a ſingular grauitie: in Caius Lelius, much mirth: in Scipio his familiar, both graater honour ſeeking, and a ſadder life.

But of the Grecians, Socrates, wee haue heard, was pleaſaunt, and feat conceited, a merrie talker, and in all his words a mocker, whō ỹ Greekes named εἴρωνα, contrarywiſe Pythagoras and Pericles attained verie high authority, without any mirth at al. Of the Penes, Annibal was craftie: of our captaines Quintꝰ Maximus, we haue herd ſay, he had a meruailous cunning in cloaking, in keeping in, in diſſembling, in making

king a stale, in preuenting the deuises of the enimie.
In which kinde, the Grekes before all other doe preferre Themistocles the Athenian, and Iason the Pharaian.
And chiefely the subtile and crafty deede of Solon, who that bothe his lyfe should bee the safer, and somewhat the more he might furder the cõmon weale, fained himselfe to bee madde. There bee other farre vnlike to these, plaine and open, which doe thinke nothing in secrete, nothing with guyle meete to bee wrought, and bee louers of trouth, and enimies to dysceyte. And againe, ther be other, who would any thing endure & do seruice to any man, so they might obtaine ỳ they desire, as wee dyd see Sulla, and Marcus Crassus vse themselues. Of which sort, we haue harde Lysander the Lacedemonion was the subtelest and could most abyde.
And contrarywise, of Callicratides, who was Admirall of the nauie, next after Lisander.

And

insidiari, præcipere hostium consilia. In quo genere Græci Themistoclem Athenienſem, & Phæreum Iaſonem cæteris anteponunt in primisque verſutum & calidum factum. Solonis: qui quo tutior vita eius eſſet, & plus aliquanto Reip. prodeſſe furere ſe ſimulauit.
Sunt his alij multum diſpares, ſimplices & aperti, qui nihil exoculto, nihil ex inſidijs agendum putant, veritatis vltores, fraudis inimici.

Itemque alij, qui quiduis per petiantur, cuius deſeruiant dum quod velint, conſequãtur: vt Syllam, & M. Craſſum videbamus.
Quo in genere verſutiſſimum & patientiſſimum Lacedemonium Liſandrum accepimus: contraque Callicratidem, qui præfectus claſſis proximus poſt Lyſandrum fuit.

Itemq;

Itemq; in ſermonibus alium quidē videmus, quamuis prępotens ſit, efficere, vt vnus de multis eſſe videatur quod in Catulo & in patre & in filio, itemque & in Q. Mutio Mancino vidimus. Audiui ex maioribus natu hoc quidem fuiſſe in P. Scipione Naſica: contraque patrem eius, illum qui Tiberij Gracchi conatus perditos vindicauit, nullam comitatem habuiſſe ſermonis, nec Xenocratem quidem ſeueriſſimum philoſophorum: ob eamque rem ipſam & magnum & clarum fuiſſe. Innumerabiles alię diſſimilitudines ſunt naturæ morumque minime tamen vituperandorū admodū autē tu ēda ſunt ſua cuique nō vitioſa, ſed tamen propria, quo facilius decorum illud, quod quērimus retineatur.

Sic enim eſt faciendum, vt contra natu-

And likewiſe wee ſee an other manne in talke, though he bee of great aucthoritie, ſo order the matter, that hee ſeemes one of the common ſort. Which in Catulus, both the father and the ſonne and the ſame in Quintus Mutius Mancinus, we haue ſene. I haue heard more ouer of myne elders, the ſame too haue beene in Publius Scipio Naſica. And contrarywiſe, his father, euen hym ỹ aucnged Tiberius Gracchus wicked enterpriſes, to haue had no gentle grace of ſpeache.

No nor Xenocrates, who was the ſageſt of the Philoſphers, and for the ſelfe ſame thing became great, and fameus. Innumerable other dyuerſities there bee of nature and of manners, no deal yet diſprayſeable. But euery mans owne giftes, not ſuch as be faultie, but natural are carneſtlye to bee maintained, where by the ſoner maye the comlineſſe be kept which wee doe ſeeke. For in ſuch wyſe wee muſt worke, as againſte

all

al nature wee neuer ſtriue: which thing auoyded, lette vs follow our owne proper nature. So that though there bee other ſtudies grauer, and better, yet lett vs meaſure our owne, by natures rule. For neither it is to any purpoſe to fighte againſt nature, nor to enſue anye thinge that ye cannot attaine.

Wherupon it more appeares what manner of thinge this comlineſſe is: becauſe nothing becommeth, Mawger minerua, as they ſaye, that is, nature withſtandinge, and reſiſting it. In briefe, if ought bee comely, of trouth there is nothing more ſeemely, thã an euenneſſe in all mans lyfe, and euerye of his doeinges: which you cannot keepe, if you counterfaite anothers nature, and lette paſſe your owne. For as wee ought to vſe that ſpeache, which is knowen to vs, leaſt as ſome menne choppinge in Greeke woordes, wee bee worthely mockt at: ſo in our doeinges and all our lyfe, wee ought to ſhewe no contrarietie.

ram vniuerſam nihil contendamus. Eatamé conſeruata propriã naturam ſequamur, vt etiam ſi ſint alia grauiora, atq; meliora, tamen nos ſtudia noſtra naturæ regula metiamur. Neque enim naturę attinet repugnare, nec quicquam ſequi, quod aſſequi nequeas. Ex quo magis emergit quale ſit decorum illud, ideo quia nihil decet inuita (vt aiunt) Minerua, id eſt aduerſante & repugnante natura Omnino ſi quicquam eſt decorum, nihil eſt profecto magis quàm ęquabilitas vniuerſæ vitæ, tum ſingularum actionum, quam conſeruare non poſſis, ſi aliorum naturã imiteris, omittas tuã. Vt enim ſermone eo debemus vti, qui notus eſt nobis, ne (vt quidam) græca verba inculcãtes, iure optimo irrideamur, ſic in actiones omnẽq; vitã nullã diſcrepantiã

conferre debemus.

Atque hec differentia naturarum tantam habet vim, vt nonnunquam mortem sibi ipse cõsciscere alius debeat, alius in eadẽ causa nõ debeat. Non enim alia in causa M. Cato fuit, alia cęteri, qui se in Africa Cęsari tradiderũt. At qui cęteris forsitan, vitio datũ esset si se interemissent, propterea quòd lenior eorum vita, & mores fuerunt faciliores: Catoni autem cum incredibilem tribuisset natura grauitatem, eamque ipse perpetua cõstantia roborauisset, semper in proposito, susceptoq; consilio permansisset, moriendũ potius quã tirãni vultus aspiciendus fuit. Quàm multa passus est Vlisses in illo errore diuturno, cũ & mulierib⁹ (si Circe & Calipso mulieres appellãdę sũt) inseruiret, & in õni sermõe õnib⁹ affabilem & iucũdum se esse vellet

And this difference of nature hath so greate a power, that other while some one manne ought to kill himselfe, some other in the same quarell ought not. For Marcus Cato was not in one quarell, and the rest in another, who yelded themselues vnto Cesar in Africa. Yet to the rest perchaunce it should haue bene compted a reproch, if they had slaine themselues: because their lyfe hadde bene daintier, and theyr manners milder: but when nature had geeuen Cato an vncredible grauitie, and the same hee had strengthened with a continuall stedfastnesse: and alwaies had remayned in his intent, and determined purpose, it was meete for him rather to dye than to looke vpon the tyrants face.

How many paines susteyned Vlisses, in that longe wandering? when both to women hee dyd seruice (yf Circe, and Calipso are to bee named women) and to all men in all his talke hee woulde bee sayde spoken:

and

and also at home dydde beare the spight of the slaues, and mefes: that hee might once attaine to the thing, which hee desired. But Aiax with the courage, that he is repor-ted of, had rather die a thou-sande deathes, then to suffer those things of another man. which diuersities when wee beholde, it shall be necessarie to weigh what each man hath of his owne: and to order those giftes, and not to haue a minde to try, how other mens graces woulde become him. For that becommeth eache man, which is most of al each mans owne. Let euerie man therefore know his owne dis-position: and lette him make himselfe a sharpe iudge both of his vices and of his ver-tues: least players may seeme to haue more discreation then wee. For they doe choose not the best Enterludes, but the fittest for themselues, For who vppon their voyces bee bolde, they take Epigo-nes, and Medea: who vppon gesture, doo take Menalippa

domi vero etiam con-tumelias seruorum, an-cillarumque pertulit: vt ad id aliquando, quod cupiebat, perueniret.

At Aiax, quo animo tra ditur, millies oppetere mortem, quam illa per-peti ab alio maluisset. Quæ contemplantes ex pẽdere oportebit, quid quisq; habu. fuiit, eaque moderari, nec velle ex-periri quam se aliena de ceant. Id enim quem-que decet, quod est cu-iusque suum maximé. Suum igitur quisque noscat ingenium: a-cremque se & bono-rum & vitiorum suo-rum iudicem præbeat: ne scenici plus quã nos videantur habere pru-dentiæ.

Illi enim non opti-mas, sed sibi accommo-datissimas fabulas eli-gunt. Qui enim voce freti sunt, Epigonos, Medeamque.

Qui gestu Menalippã,

vel Clitemneſtram. Sẽper Rutilius, quem ego memini, Antiopam: nõ ſæpe Aeſopus Aiacem. Ergo hiſtrio hoc videbit in ſcena, quod non videbit ſapiens vir in vita? Ad quas igitur res aptiſſimi erimus, in iis potiſſimum elaborabimus. Sin aliquando neceſſitas nos ad ea detruſerit, quæ noſtri ingenii non erunt, omnis adhibenda erit cura, meditatio, diligentia, vt ea ſi non decorè, at quàm minime indecore facere poſſimus. Nec tam eſt intendum, vt bona quæ nobis data non ſunt, ſequamur, quam vt vitia fugiamus. Ac duabus his perſonis, quas ſupra dixi, tertia adiungitur, quam caſus aliquis vel tempus imponit. Quarta etiam, quam nobiſmet ipſis iudicio noſtro accõmodabimus. Nam regna, imperia, nobilitates, honores, diuitiæ, opes, eaque quæ ſunt his

and Clytemneſtra: Euermore Rupilius, whome I remember, tooke Antiopia: not often Esopus toke Aiax. Shal a plaier then ſee this in the ſtage, that a wiſe man ſhal not ſee in his life? We ſhall chiefly therfore labor in thoſe things, wherevnto wee ſhall be moſt apt. But in caſe neceſſitie ſhal driue vs ſomtime to thoſe thinges which ſhall not be for our diſpoſition: all care, ſtudie, & dilligence, muſt be employed: that if we doe them not comely, yet wyth as little vncomlyneſſe as may be, neyther ought we ſo much to endeauour our ſelues to followe the vertues which be not giuen vs as to flye vyces.

And vnto theſe two perſons, which before I named, there is a third perſon ioyned: which ſome chaunce, or time caſteth on vs. The fourth alſo is that which we ſhall faſhion to our ſelues, after our owne minde. For kingdomes, Empires, nobilitie, honour, riches, power, and thoſe, which bee contra-

trarie to these, beeing placed in fortunes hande, bee ordered accordyng to the times: but what persõ we our selues list to beare, proceedeth of our owne free will. And therfore some to Philosophy, some to ỹ ciuill lawe, some to eloquence dooe applye themselues: and for the vertues, some haue a more minde to excell in one, and some in another: and whose Fathers or auncestours in anie commenation haue beene notable: the most part of theirs doe study in the same kinde of praise to excell: as Quintus Mutius Publius sonne, did in the ciuill lawe: Africanus, Paulus sonne in feates of armes. But diuers dooe adde some of theyr owne vnto those prayses, that they receyued of their fathers: as this same Africanus, with eloquence encreased the heape of his martiall glorie: which selfe same Timotheus, Conosus sonn, did also: who, when in praises of warre, to his Father hee was not inferiour, dyd ioyne to that commen-

contraria in casu sita, temporibus gubernantur. Ipse autem quam personam gerere velimus, à nostra voluntate proficiscitur. Itaque se alij ad philosophiam, alij ad ius ciuile, alij ad eloquentiam applicant: ipsarũq; virtutũ in alia alius mauult excellere. Quorũ vero patres aut maiores in aliqua gloria pręstiterunt, studẽt eorũ pleriq; eodem in genere laudis excellere: vt Quintus Mutius Publij filius in iure ciuili: Pauli filius Africanus in re militari. Quidam autem ad eas laudes, quas à patribus acceperunt, addunt aliquam suam. Vt hic idem Africanus eloquentiæ cumulauit bellicam gloriam.

Quod idem fecit Timotheus Cononis filius, qui, cum belli laude non inferior fuisset quam pater, ad eam laudem doctrinæ & in-

genij gloriam adiecit, Fit autem interdum, vt nonnulli omissa imitatione maiorum, suum quoddam institutum cõ sequantur: maximeque in eo plerumq; elaborãt ij, qui magna sibi proponunt obscuris orti maioribus. Hæc igitur omnia cum quærimus quid deceat, complecti animo, & cogitatione debemus, Inprimis autẽ constituendũ est, quos nos & quales esse velimus, & in quo genere vitę, quę deliberatio est omnium difficilima. Inuente enim adolescentia, cui inest maxima imbecilitas consilij tunc id sibi quisque genus ætatis degende constituit. quod maximè adamauit. Itaque ante implicatur aliquo certo genere, cursuque viuendi, quam potuit, quod optimum esset iudicare. Nam quod Herculem Prodicus dicit, vt est apud Xenophontem, cũ

dation the glorie of witte, and learning. But it so falleth now and then, that some letting goe the imitation of their ancestors, do follow a certain trade of their owne: and therin for ỹ most part they chefly trauaile: who appointe themselues great enterprises, beeing borne of scarce knowen parents. In our mind and thought, then wee must cast all these things, whẽ we serch to knowe, what becommeth. But first of all wee must determine whom and what maner men we woulde haue our selues, and of what kinde of lyfe. Which aduisement is the hardest of all. For at the entering into the yeares of discreation, when there is most slenderneſſe of counsell, euery man doeth appoint himselfe the trade of leading his lyfe, which hee hath loued most of all: and so he is entangled with some certaine kinde, and course of lyfe, before he was able to iudge, what shoulde bee best. For whereas Prodicus sayth, that Hercules, (as is in Xenephon) as soon

as

as he waxed wheye bearded, which time is granted of nature, to chooſe what way of liuing each man will enter, wēt forth into deſart, and there ſitting, much, and a long while doubted wyth himſelfe when he beheld two wayes, the one of pleaſure, the other of vertue: whether of them it were better to enter: this myght peraduenture happen to Hercules, that was borne of Iupiters ſeed: but not ſo to vs, who doe follow thoſe, that euerie one of vs liſt to folow, and bee allured to theyr ſtudyes, and faſhions. And for the moſt part, beeing traded with our parēts precepts, we incline to their guiſe and manner. Other bee carried after the iudgement of the multitude, and long after thoſe things moſt, which to ỹ greater part ſeeme goodlyeſt. Many neuertheleſſe, whether of a certaine lucke, or of a goodneſſe of nature, or by the inſtruction of theyr parents, haue followed the right trade of life.

primum pubeſceret (qd tempus à natura ad diligendum quam quiſq; viam viuendi ſit ingreſſurus datum eſt exiſſe in ſolitudinem, atque ibi ſedentem diu ſecum, multumque dubitaſſe, cum duas cerneret vias, vnam voluptatis, alteram virtutis, vtram ingredi melius eſſet. Hoc Herculi Iouis ſatu ædito potuit fortaſſe cōtingere, nobis non idem, qui imitamur quos cuiq; viſum eſt atque ad eorum ſtudia inſtitutaq; impellimur. Plerumque autem parentum præceptis imbuti ad eorum conſuetudinem, morem que deducimur. Alij multitudinis iudicio feruntur, quæque maiori parti pulcherrima vidētur, ea maxime exoptāt Nonnulli tamē ſiue fœlicitate quadam ſiue bonitate naturæ, ſiue parentum diſciplina rectā vitæ ſecuti ſunt viam.

Illud autem maximé rarum genus eſt eorum, q̃ aut excellentes ingenij magnitudine, aut præclara eruditione, atque doctrina, aut vtraq; re ornati, ſpacium etiã deliberandi habuerũt, quẽ potiſſimum vitę curſum ſequi vellent, in qua deliberatione ad ſuam cuiuſque naturam, conſilium eſt omne reuocandum. Nam cum in omnibus quæ aguntur, ex eo modo quoquiſq; natus eſt (vt ſupra dictum eſt) quid deceat exquirimus, tum in tota vita conſtituenda, multo eſt eius rei cura maior adhibenda vt conſtare in vitæ perpetuitate poſſim⁹ nobiſmet ipſis, nec in vllo officio claudicare. Ad hanc autem rationem, quoniam maximã vim natura habet, fortuna proximam, vtriuſq; omnino ratio habenda eſt in deligendo genere vitæ, ſed naturæ mãgis. Multo enim & firmior

But that kinde of men is ſeldome founde: who after they bee eyther of excellent profoundneſſe of wit, or of a famous learning and knowledge, or with both theſe adorned, haue gotte a time to take aduiſement, what race of lyfe they would the rathereſt run: in ỹ which aduice, all a mans counſell is to bee applyed to each mannes proper nature. For ſithens in all thinges, that be done, out of the nature, wherewith euerye man is borne (as before is ſayde) we ſearch what becommeth: then, in poynting out the whole life, much more regard thereof muſt bee hadde: that in the continuing of our life we may agree ẅ our ſelues, and neuer hault in anye duetie.

But to this choice, ſeeing Nature hath the greateſt power, and fortune the next: there muſt conſideration bee had of them both alwayes, in choſing the kinde of ones lyfe; but of nature, more. For nature is much the ſurer and the ſtedfaſter, ſo that fortune

foꝛtune many times, as moꝛtall her ſelfe, ſeemeth with immoꝛtall nature to fight. Who ſo then wil applie all the purpoſe of his lyfe accoꝛding to the kinde of his nature not coꝛrupted, let him kepe a ſtedfaſtneſſe: foꝛ that becommeth moſt of all: except perchance he ſhall perceiue that he hath gone amiſſe, in chooſing his kinde of lyfe. Which if it befall (as it maye befall) there muſt be made a chaunge of manners, and purpoſes.

That chaunge then if time ſhall further, we ſhal the ſooner and moꝛe conuenientlye bꝛing to paſſe: if not, faire and ſoftly, and by little and little it muſt be done: like as friend ſhippes which do not delight vs, and are not well lyked, wiſe men do iudge moꝛe conuenient, ſtitch after ſtitch to rippe, then ſodainly to cut aſunder. And when we haue once chaunged our kinde of lyfe: we muſt by all meanes take heed, that we be thought to haue done it vpon good aduiſement.

But foꝛaſmuch as a lyttle

eſt & conſtantior, vt fortuna nonnunquam tanquã ipſa mortalis cum immortali natura pugnare videatur, qui igitur ad naturæ ſuæ, non vitioſæ genus, conſilium viuẽdi omne cõtulerit: iis conſtantiam teneat. Id enim maxime decet, niſi forte ſe erraſſe intelexerit in deligendo genere vitæ. Quod ſi acciderit, (poteſt autem accidere) facienda morũ, inſtitutorumque mutatio eſt. Eam mutationẽ ſi tempora adiuuabũt, facilius, commodiuſque faciemus: ſin minus, ſenſim erit, pedetentim que facienda: vt amicitias quę minus delectent & minus probentur, magis decere cenſent ſapientes, ſenſim diſſuere quam repente percidere. Commutato autem genere vitæ, omni ratione curandum eſt, vt id bono conſilio feciſſe videamur.

Sed quoniam paulo

ante dictum eſt imitandos eſſe maiores, primū illud exceptum ſit, ne vitia ſint imitanda: deinde ſi natura non feret vt quædam imitari poſſint, vt ſuperioris Africani filius, qui hūc Paulo Aemilio natum adoptauerat, propter infirmitatem valetudinis, non tam potuit patri ſimilis eſſe, quam ille, qui fuerat ſui. Si igitur non poterit ſtue cauſas defenſitare, ſiue populum cōcionibus tenere, ſiue bella gerere: illa tamen prę ſtare debebit, quæ ernnt in ipſius poteſtate, iuſtitiam fidem, liberalitatem, modeſtiam, temperantiam: quo minus ab eo id quod deſit, requiratur. Optima autē hereditas à patribus traditur liberis, omnique patrimonio præſtantior gloria virtutis, rerumq́; geſtarum: cui dedecori eſſe, nefas & vitium iudicandum eſt. Et quoniam officia non eadē

before it is ſayd, that we muſt followe our anceſtours: firſt, be this excepted, that their vices are not to bee followed: nert, that we follow them not in ſome thinges that our nature will not beare, as the elder Africanus ſonne, Who adopted this our Paulus ſon, could not be ſo lyke his Father, becauſe of ſicklye weakneſſe, as the other was lyke his. In caſe therefore one be not able either to pleade cauſes, or to retaine the people with Orations, or to followe the warres: thoſe things yet he ought to perfourme, which ſhall be in his power, as iuſtice, faythfulneſſe, liberality, ſober moode, and temperance: to the intent the thing which he lackes, maye bee the leſſe miſſed in him. Truelye the beſt inheritance that fathers leaue to theyr children, and more worth then all liuelode is the glorie of vertue, and worthy deedes, wherevnto to be a ſtaine, it is to be accounted both vice and ſhame.

And becauſe not alyke duetyes are aſſigned to vnlyke

ages:

ages: and some there bee for young men, and some for the elder sort: somewhat also we haue to say of this diuersitie. It is therfore a young mans part to reuerence his elders, and of these to choose out the best and most commended: whose counsell and authoritie he may leane vnto. For the vnskilfulfulnesse of tender yeares, must by olde mennes experience be ordered and gouerned.

And this age specially from lustes is to bee wayned: and to be brought vp in labour, & paines taking both of minde and bodie, that both in martiall and ciuil duetics, their diligence may appeare. Also when they will refresh theyr wits, and giue themselues to pastime, lette them beware of intemperance, and remember shamefastnesse, which shall be done ỹ easier, if at such things also their elders wil be in presence.

But for olde men labours in of the bodie to be diminished, and exercises of the mind seeme meete to bee increased:

disparibus ætatibus tribuuntur, alia quæ sunt iuuenum, alia seniorũ, aliquid etiam de hac distinctione dicendũ est. Est igitur adolescentis, maiores natu reuereri, ex ijsque eligere optimos & probatissimos: quorum consilio atque authoritati nitatur. Ineuntis enim ætatis inscitia, senum cõstituenda & regenda prudentia est. Maxime autem hæc ætas à libidinibus arcenda est, exercendaq; in labore, patientiaq; & animi & corporis, vt corũ & in bellicis & ciuilib⁹ officijs vigeat industria. Atq; etiam cum relaxare animos & dare se iucunditati volent, caueant intemperantiã, meminerint verecundię, ꝙ erit facilius, si in eiusmodi quoq; reb⁹ maiores natu interesse velint. Senibus autem labores corporis minuendi, exercitationes animi etiam augendæ videntur.

Danda

Danda vero opera, vt & amicos & iuuentutem & maxime Rempub. cõsilio et prudentia quam plurimum adiuuent: Nihil autem magis cauendum est senectuti quam ne languori se, desidiæque dedat. Luxuria vero cum omni ætati turpis, tum senectuti, fœdissima est. Sin autem libidinum etiam intemperantia accesserit, duplex malum est: quod & ipsa senectus concipit dedecus, & facit adolescentum impudentiorem, intemperantiam, Ac ne illud quidem alienum est, de magistratuum, de priuatorum, de ciuium, de peregrinorum officiis dicere.

Est igitur proprium munus magistratus intelligere: se gerere personam ciuitatis, debereque eius dignitatem & decus sustinere: seruare leges, iura describere, & ea fidei suæ commissa meminisse.

and they must giue their diligence, that much they ayde their friends and youth, and specially the common weale with counsell and wisedome. But nothing more of age is to be taken heed of, then that it giue not it selfe to lytherneſſe and idleneſſe. As for riot, to cuerie age it is reprochfull: and for olde age most shamefull. But if the intemperaunce of lust bee ioyned with it, there is a double inconuenience, because both age it selfe taketh shame by it, and it causeth young mens intemperance to be more shameles. And this truelye is not out of the matter, to speake somewhat touching the duetyes of Magistrates, of priuate men, of Citizens, and of strangers. It is therefore the proper office of a Magistrate, to consider, hee representes the person of the Citie: and that hee ought to maintaine the honour and reputation thereof: and to keepe the orders of the same, & to set out lawes fit therefore, and to remember, they bee committed

to

to his his charge.

A priuate man it behoues to liue in an equalitie, & likenesse of lawe with the Cityzens: neither as an vnderling and abiect, nor bearing himselfe too high: and also in the common weale to seeke those things that be quiet and honest. For such a one wee are wont both to call & count a good citizen.

But it is the duetie of a straunger and alien inhabytant, to meddle with nothing beside his owne businesse: nor to inquire any thing touching another man: and no whit in a straunge common weale to be curious.

Thus for the most parte, duties shal be found out: whē it shall bee sought what becommeth, and what is agreeable for persons, times, and ages. And there is nothing, that becomes a man so much, as in euery doing & taking of aduice to keepe a stedfastnes. But because the same comelinesse appeareth in all deedes and words, and in ỹ mouing

Priuatum autem oportet æquo & pari cū ciuibus iure viuire, neque summissum & abiectum, neque se efferentem, tum in Republica ea velle, quæ tranquilla & honesta sunt. Talem enim & sentire bonum ciuem & dicere solemus.

Peregrini autem & incolæ officium est, nihil præter suum negotium agere, nihil de alieno inquirere, minimeq; in aliena esse Repub. curiosum.

Ita fere officia reperientur, cum quæritur quid deceat, & quid aptum sit, personis, temporibus, ætatibus. Nihil est autem quod tam deceat, quam in omni re gerenda, consilioque capiendo seruare constantiam.

Sed quoniam decorum illud in omnibus factis et dictis, in corporis denique motu,

et

& ſtatu cernitur: idq; poſitum eſt in tribus rebus, formoſotitate, ordine, ornatu ad actionē apto (difficilius ad eloquendum, ſed ſatis erit facile intelligi. In his autem tribus continetur cura etiam illa, vt probemur ijs quibuſcū & apud quos viuamus. His quoque de rebus pauca dicantur.

Principio, corporis noſtri magnam natura ipſa videtur habuiſſe rationem quæ formam noſtram, reliquamq; figuram, in qua eſſet ſpecies honeſta, eam poſuit in promptu: quæ autem partes corporis ad naturæ neceſſitatem data eſſent deformen habituræ atque turpē formam eas contexit atq; abdidit. Hanc naturę tam diligentem fabricam imitata eſt hominū verecundia. Quæ enim natura occultauit eadē ōnes qui ſana mēte ſunt, remouēt ab oculis

and ſtaying of the bodie, and the ſame conſiſteth in three thinges, well fauouredneſſe, order, and furniture meet for ones doings, (ſomwhat hard it is to expreſſe: but it ſhall ſuffice, ſo it bee conceiued) and in theſe three conteined, is that care alſo, that we be alowed of thoſe, with whome, and among whom we liue. Of theſe matters likewiſe a fewe words let vs ſay.

Firſt, verie nature ſeemeth to haue hadde a greate reſpect of our bodie, which hath ſette moſt in ſight our Phiſnompye, and the reſt of our ſhape, wherein there is an honeſt ſhewe: but ſhee hath couered and kept cloſe the parts of the bodie gyuen for natures neceſſitie: which elſe ſhuld haue an euil fauoured and foule ſight.

Mens ſhamefaſtneſſe hath followed this ſo cunning a frame of nature.

For what ſo Nature hath hidden: the ſame all men, who bee well in their wits: do keepe from the eie:

and

and they do theyr endeuoure to serue verye necessitye, as closely as they maye: and of what partes of the bodie the vse is seruile, neyther those partes, nor their seruice by their names they do call: and so, that, which to do it is noe shame if it be secretly, to tell it is vnclenly.

And therefore neyther the open doing of those things is void of vnshamefastnes, nor the talke without filthines.

Neyther truly are the Cinikes worthye to bee heard nor any of the Stoiks which are almost Cinike, who do reprove vs, and mocke at vs, because we call those thinges in wordes shamefull to bee spoken vpon, which bee in deede not dishoneſt: and yet those thinges that bee vnhoneſt, wee terme by theyr names. As to go a theeuing to beguyle one, to commit adultery, is a thing in deede dishoneſt, but it is told without dishoneſtye, likewise to get children in deede is honeſt, but to bee vttered in talke it were vnclenlye.

ipsique necessitati dant operam, vt quàm occultissime pareant quarumque partium corporis vsus sunt necessarij eas neque partes, neque earum vsus suis nominibus appellant: quodque facere turpe non est, modo occultè, id dicere obscœnum est, Itaq; nec actio rerum illarum aperta petulantia vacat, nec orationis obscœnitate.

Nec vero audiendi sunt Cynici, aut si qui fuerunt Stoici penè Cinici, qui reprehendunt & irrident, quòd ea quæ re turpia non sint, verbis flagitiosa dicamus: illa autem quæ turpia sunt, nominibus appellemus suis. Latrocinari, fraudare, adulterari re turpe est, sed dicitur non obscœne: liberis dare operam re honestum est, nomine obscœnum Pluraq; in eam sentẽtiã ab

eisdem

eiſdem contra verecundiam diſputantur: Nos autem naturam ſequamur, et ab omni, quod abhorret abipſa oculorum auriumq́, approbatione, fugiamus. Status, inceſſ⁹, ſeſſio, accubatio vultus, oculi, manuum motus taneant illud de eorum.

Quibus in rebus duo ſunt maximè fugienda, ne quid effeminatũ aut molle, & ne quid durum aut ruſticum ſit. Nec vero hiſtrionibus, oratoribuſque cõceden dum eſt, vt his hæc apta ſint, nohis diſſoluta. Scenicorum quidé mos tantam habet â vetere diſciplina verecũdiam, vt in ſcenam ſine ſubligaculo prodeat nemo: verentur enim ne ſi quo caſu euenerit, vt corporis partes quædam aperiantur aſpiciantur non decore. Noſtro quidem more cum parentibus puberes filij cum

And mo thinges, for that purpoſe be reaſoned by the Philoſophers againſt ſhame faſtneſſe. But let vs follow nature and ſhunne al thinges that abhorre the verye pleaſing of our eye, and eare. Let our ſtanding, going, ſitting, lying, cheere, eyes, and mouing of handes keepe the ſame comelineſſe. In which thinges, two faultes we muſt ſpecially take heede of, that nothing womãniſhly, or daintily, and nothing blockiſhly, or carterly wee doe. Neither muſte wee agree, that theſe thinges ſhould bee ſeemely in players, and orators, and left looſely in our ſelues.

The cuſtome of the ſtage players, euen of an olde order, hath ſo great regarde to ſhamefaſtneſſe, that no man commeth on the ſtage without breeches. For they are afearde, leaſt if it chaunce by any miſhap, that ſome partes of the bodie bee diſcouered, they ſhould be ſeene vncomelye. And as the faſhion is with vs, Children growinge to mannes ſtate be not bathed

bathed with their parentes, noꝛ ſonnes in law, with their fathers in lawe.

Therefoꝛe this kynde of ſhamefaſtneſſe is meete to bee obſerued, namely whē nature hir ſelfe is guide and maiſtreſſe.

But whereas there be two kindes of duetie: and in one of them there is a louelineſſe, in the other a maieſtie: louelineſſe, we muſt think belongs to the woman, and maieſtie to the man. Therfoꝛe all maner trimming, that is vnfitting foꝛ man, muſt bee kept from his outwarde fourme, and the like fault to this muſt be taken heede of in ones geſtures, and mouing.

Foꝛ both the ſturring lyke wꝛaſtlers is oftentimes miſliked: and alſo many geſtures lyke players are not without fooliſhe toyes, and in bothe theſe kindes, thoſe thinges which be right and natural, be commended.

But the maieſtie of the fauour is preſerued by goodneſſe of coulour, and colour by exerciſe of bodye.

cum ſoceris quidem generi non lauantur.

Retinenda eſt igitur huius generis verecundia, præſertim natura ipſa magiſtra & duce.

Cùm autem pulchritudinis duo genera ſint, quorum in altero venuſtas ſit, in altero dignitas: venuſtatem muliebrem ducere debemus, dignitatem virilem.

Ergo & a forma remoueatur omnis viro non dignus ornatus: & huic ſimile vitium in geſtu motuqûe caueat'. Nam & paleſtrici motus ſæpe ſunt odioſiores & hiſtrionum non nulli geſtus ineptijs non vacant: & in vtroque genere, quæ ſunt recta & ſimplicia laudantur.

Formæ autem dignitas coloris bonitate, tuenda eſt, color exercitationibus corporis.

Adhibenda

Adhibenda est præterea munditia no odiosa neque exquisita nimis, tamē quæ fugiat agrestē & inhumana negligentiā. Eadē ratio est habēda vestitus: in quo sicut in pleriſq; rebus mediocritas optima est. Cauēdum est autem, ne aut tarditatibus vtamur in gressu mollioribus vt similes pompaꝝ ferculis esse videamur: aut in festinationibus suscipiamus nimias celeritates: quæ cum fiunt, anhelitus mouentur, vultus mutantur, ora torquentur: ex quibus magna significatio sit nō ad esse constantiā. Sed multò etiā magis elaborandum est, ne animi motus a natura recedāt, qd' assequemur, si cauebim⁹ ne in perturbationes atque exanimationes incidamus & si attētos animos ad decori cōseruationē tenebim⁹ Motꝰ autē animorum duplices sunt, alteri cogitac.

There must a cleanlineſſe be vſed beſides: that is not odious nor curious, but onely eſcheweth carterly, and vnnaturall ſlouenry. The like regard wee muſt haue of apparaile: wherein a meane, as in moſte parte of thinges is beſt, wee muſt take heede alſo, we vſe neither to nice a ſlowneſſe in our pace lyke Pageaunts in triumphes: neyther to much haſte in ſpeede making, lyke wildebraines. For when it happens, that men do ſo: ther folowes ſhort breathing, the countenaunce is changed, and the face diſfigured, whereof comes a greate preſumption that they haue no ſtayednesſe.

But wee muſt much more ſtudie, that the effecions of our minde ſwarue not from nature: which wee ſhall attaine, if we will beware, that wee fall not into moodes, and mazes: and if we will continue in hauing hedeful minds to the keping of comlyneſſe.

But the motions of mindes bee of two ſortes, ſome proceede of intellygence,

ſome

some of appetite. Intelligence is chiefly occupyed in searching out of trouth, appetite stirreth a mā to be doing. We must prouide therefore, ỹ we vse intelligence about the best matters, & that we make our appetite obedient to reason.

And because the power of speech is greate, and the same is in two sortes, the one of vehement speache, the other of common talke: let the vehement speech serue for pleadinges in iudgementes, Orations in assemblies, and debating in the Senate house, let talke bee vsed in companyes, in disputations, in meetings of familiares, and let it also be at feastings. Of vehement speech, ỹ Rethoritians haue rules, of talke, none at all: notwithstanding I wot not whether such also maye bee, &c.

Howbeit, for theyr studyes that wyll learne, there be teachers founde, but none there be that studie this, with the route of Rethoritians all places be replenished.

alteri appetitus. Cogitatio in vero exquirendo maxime versatur: appetitus impellit ad agēdum. Curandum est igitur, vt cogitatione ad res quam optimas vtamur: appetitum rationi obedientem prebeamus.

Et quoniam magna vis orationis est, eaque duplex, altera contentionis, altera sermonis, contentio disceptationibus tribuatur iudiciorum, concionum, senatur: sermo in circulis, disputationibus, congressionibus familiarium versetur: persequatur etiā conuiuia.

Contentionis precepta Rhetorū sunt multa, nulla sermonis: quanquam haud scio an possint hæc quoque esse. Sed discentium studijs, inueniuntur magistri, Huic autem qui studeant sunt nulli: Rhetorū turba referta omnia,

quanquam quæ verborum, sententiarumque præcepta sunt, eadem ad sermonem pertinebunt. Sed cum orationis indicem vocem habeamus: in voce autem duo sequamur, vt clara sit vt suauis: vtrumque omnino a natura petendum est, verum alterum exercitatio augebit, alterum imitatio presse loquentium & leniter: quid fuit aliud in Catulis, vt eos exquisito iudicio putares vti literarum (quanquam erant literati: sed & alij) hi autem optimè vti lingua latina putabantur: sonus erat dulcis: literæ neque expressæ, neq; oppresse, ne aut obscurum esset, aut pudicum, sine contentione vox, nec languēs, nec canora. Vberior oratio Lucij Crassi, nēc minus faceta. Sed bene loquendi de Catulis opinio non minor.

Sale vero conditus &

Neuertheleſſe the ſame preceptes which bee of wordes and ſentences, ſhall appertaine to talke. But ſithens we haue our voyce to vtter ſpeech: & in voice we ſeek two things, that it bee cleere and ſweete: they both are to bee fetched from nature euermore: but exerciſe wyll increaſe that one: imitation of tretable & ſoft ſpeakers will helpe the other. What was in the Catulli, that yee ſhoulde ſuppoſe them to vſe a perfect iudgement in pronouncing of letters. Howbeit they were learned, but ſo were other to: yet theſe were thought to vſe the Latine tongue beſt.

Their ſounding was ſweete, their Letters neyther too much mouthed, nor drowned, leaſt eyther it ſhoulde bee vnherd, or ouer harſh. Their voyce was without ſtrayning, neyther faint nor ſhrill. The ſpeech of Lucius Craſſus was more plentiful, & no leſſe feate conceited, but for well ſpeaking, the Catuli were in as much eſtimation.

Ceſar

Cesar was sawced wyth mirth and mirrie conceites, Catullus vncle exceed all: so that in ỹ lawyerly kind of pleading, hee with familyar speech passed the vehemence of other. In all these therefore wee must labour, if in all wee searche what becommeth.

Let then this familiar talke (in which the Socratians most excell,) bee gentle, and nothing obstinate, let there be therein a pleasauntnesse. No nor let a man keepe out other as though hee were entered into his owne possession: but as in other matters, so in common talke, hee must thinke an enterchaunged course ofientimes meete to bee vsed. And lette him see first of all, of what matters hee speake: if they bee earnest, lette him vse a sageneſſe, if they bee merrie, a pleasauntnesse. Specially let him foresee, that his talke bewraye not some vice in his manners, which then chiefelye is wont to befall, when eyther in mockage, or earnest, men

facetijs Cæsar, Catulli patris frater vicit omnes: vt in illo ipso forensi genere dicendi cõtentiones aliorum sermone vinceret. In omnibus igitur his elaborandum est, si in omnibus quod decent exquirimus. Sit igitur hic sermo, in quo Socratici maximè excellunt lenis, minimèque pertinax, in sit in eo lepos, nec vero tanquam in possessionem suam venerit, excludat alios: sed cum reliquis in rebus, tum etiam in sermone communi, vicissitudine non nunquam vtendum putet Ac videat in primis, quibus de rebus loquatur: si serijs, seueritatem adhibeat: si iocosis, leporem. In primisque prouideat ne sermo vitiũ aliqd' indicet inesse in moribus, quod maximè tum solet euenire, cũ studiose de absentib⁹ detrahẽdi causa

aut per ridiculum, aut seuerè, aut maledicè, contumelioseque dicitur.

Habentur autem plerumque sermones, aut de domesticis negotijs, aut de Reipublicæ aut de artium studijs & doctrina. Danda igitur opera est, vt etiam si aberrare ad alia cęperit, ad hæc reuocetur oratio. Sed vtcunque aderunt res (neq; enim eijsdem rebus, nec omni tempore, nec similiter delectamur) animaduertendū est etiam quatenus sermo delectationem habeat: & vt incipiendi ratio fuerit, ita sit definēdi modus. Sed quoniam in omni vita rectissimè præcipitur, vt perturbationes fugiamus, id est motus animi nimios rationi non obtemperātes: sic eiusmodi motibus sermo debet vacare, ne aut ira existat, aut cupiditas aliqua: aut pigritia, aut ignauia,

do busie themselues to speake railingly and spitefully of the absent, to theyr slaunder.

But this common talke for the most parte, is had eyther of household matters, or of ỹ common weale, or of learning and teaching artes, we must therfore giue good heed, that when the communication begins so straie to other things to these it bee retourned, yea, howe so euer the matter falles out, that is in hande. For neyther all wyth one matter, nor at euerie season, nor alyke wee are delighted. Wee must marke also, howe farre our talke hath in it a lyking, and as there was a waie to beginne it, so let there bee a measurable meane to end it.

But because it is verye well taught, that in all our lyfe we flie passions, that is to say, vnmeasurable moodes of minde, not ruled by reason, likewise our talke must bee voyde of such moodes, least eyther anger aryse or some greedinesse, or slouthfulnesse, or cowardlynesse, or some

ſome ſuch thing appeare. And moſt of all, wee muſt haue regarde, that thoſe wyth whome wee keepe talke, wee ſeeme both to reuerence and to loue.

Chiding alſo manye times comes in place as neceſſarie: in which one muſt vſe peraduenture both a greater ſtraynning of voyce, and a ſharper grauitie of wordes. It muſt alſo bee prouided, that wee ſeeme not to doe thoſe things as irefull, but as Phiſitions do come to ſearing & cutting: ſo let vs ſeldome and vnwillingly fall to ſuch manner of rebuking: and not at all, vnleſſe it bee of neceſſitie, when ther will be found none other remedie.

But yet let it bee cleerely without anger, wherewith nothing rightly, nothing diſcreetly can be done.

And for the moſt part wee maye vſe a gentle manner of rebuking, yet temperate with a grauitie, ſo as both a ſowerneſſe be ſhewed, and al ſpite refrained.

Yea, and that ſome bitterneſſe

aut aliquid tale appareat. Maximèque curandũ eſt, vt eos quibuſcũ ſermonem conferimus, & vereri & diligere videamur.

Obiurgationes etiam nonnunquam incidunt neceſſariæ, in quibus vtendum eſt fortaſſe & vocis contentione maiore, & verborum grauitate acriore. Id agendum etiam eſt, vt ne ea facere videamur irati: ſed vt ad vrendum & cicandũ medici veniunt, ſic ad hoc genus caſtandi raro inuitique veniamus, nec vnquam niſi neceſſario, ſi nulla raperietur alia medicina. Sed tamẽ ira procul abſit, cũ qua nihil rectè fieri nihil cõſideratè poteſt.

Magna autem ex parte clementi caſtigatione licet vti grauitate tamen adiuncta vt & ſeueritas adhibeatur, & contumelia repellatur.

Atque etiam illud ipſum, quod acerbitatis

habet obiurgatio, significandum est ipsius causa qui obiurgetur, susceptum esse. Rectū est autem etiam in illis contentionibus, quem cum inimicissimis fiunt, etiam si nobis indigna audiamus, tamen grauitatem retinere, iracundiam repellere. Quæ enim cum aliqua perturbatione fiunt, ea nec cōstanter fieri possunt, nec ijs qui absunt approbari. Deforme etiam est, de seipso prædicare, falsa præsertim, & cum irrisione audientium, imitari militem gloriosum.

Et quoniam omnia persequimur (volumus quidem certè dicēdum est etiam qualem hominis honorati & principis domum placeat esse cuius finis est vsus, ad quem accommodanda est edificandi descriptio & tamen adhibenda dignitatis, commoditatisque diligentia.

which chiding hath in it, must bee declared to be vsed for his sake, who is chidden. It is good also, euē in these brauls, which bee made with our vtterest enimyes, although wee take woordes vnmeete to bee spoken to vs, to keepe yet a grauitie, and to suppresse the angrye moode. For those things that be wrought with anie passion, neyther can bee constantly doone, nor allowed of those ẏ are present. Euill fauoured also it is to tel praises of a mannes selfe, specially if they bee vntrue, and wyth the making of the hearers, to resemble the glorious souldier.

And because we goe thorough all matters, or at the least bee minded so to doo, we must tell also what manner of house, it lyketh vs, an honourable man & a prince shoulde haue. Whose ende is the occupying thereof, accordīng to the which, the platte of the building must bee made: and neuertheless there must respect bee hadde to a statelynesse & handsomenesse,

in

in the same. Wee haue heard sate, it was an honoure to Gneus Octauius, who the first of the familie was made Consull, because in the Pallaice, hee had buylded a gorgeous house, and full of statelynesse, which when people resorting thether had seene, was thought to further the maister, a man newlye come vp, to the attayning of the Consulshyp. This did Scaurus pull downe and inlarge the roome of his houses. And so Octauius into his house first brought the Consulshyp: this other a noble and famous mannes sonne, into his inlarged house, not onelye brought repulse, but also a stayne and miserie. For a mannes honour must bee set out by his house, and not all his honour sought by his honse: nor by the house the maister, but by the mayster the house must bee honested. And as in all thinges else, regarde is to bee hadde, not of a mannes selfe onely, but of other also: lykewise in a noble mannes house,

Cneo Octauio, qui primus ex illa familia Cōsul factus est, honori fuisse accepimus, quod præclarum ædificasset in palatio & plenā dignitatis domum: quæ cum vulgo viseretur, suffragata domino nouo homini ad consulatum putabatur.

Hanc Scaurus demolitus accessionem adiunxit ædibus. Itaque ille in suam domum consulatum primus attulit: hic, summi & clarissimi viri filius in domū multiplicatam non repulsam solum retulit, sed ignominiam etiam & calamitatem.

Ornanda enim est dignitas domo, non ex domo dignitas tota querenda, nec domo dominus, sed domino domus honestanda est. Et vt in cæteris habenda ratio, non sui solum sed etiam aliorum: sic in domo clari hominis,

in quã & hoſpites multi recipiendi ſunt, & admittenda hominum cuiuſque generis multitudo, adhibenda eſt cura laxitatis.

Aliter ampla domus dedecori domino ſæpe fit, ſi eſt in ea ſolitudo, & maxime ſi aliquando alio domino ſolita eſt frequentari. Odioſum eſt enim cùm a præteriuntibus dicitur.

O domus antiqua!
Heu, quam diſpari dominare domino.

Quod quidem his temporibus in multis licet dicere. Cauendum eſt autem præſertim ſi ipſe ædifices, ne extra modũ ſumptu & magnificentia prodeas. Quo in genere multum mali etiam exemplo eſt.

Studioſe enim plerique præſertim in hanc partem, facta principium imitantur.

into the which both manye gueſts are to be receiued, and a number of men of euery ſoꝛt is to bee admitted, there muſt be made a pꝛouiſiõ foꝛ roomethineſſe.

Otherwiſe the large houſe pꝛooueth to the maſter ofttimes a ſhame: if there bee in it a ſolitarineſſe, and ſpecially if once wyth another maſter it was woont to bee well filled Foꝛ an odious thing it is, when of the by goers it is ſayd

O auncient houſe, alas,
we may ſe:
How vnlyke a Loꝛd hath
Loꝛdſhip on thee.

Which a man may truelye ſaie nowe a dayes of manye. ye muſt beware alſo, namely, if your ſelfe be a builder, ẏ be yond meaſure in ſumptuouſneſſe and great coſt you dooe not exceed, in the which kind, euen of the enſample much harme ariſeth.

Foꝛ diligentlye moſt men, ſpecially in this point, do follow the doings of pꝛinces, as

of

of Lucius Lucullus, a singular man, who ensueth the vertue? How many yet haue followed the great costlynesse of his manor places? In which things there must doubtlesse bee vsed a measure, that to a meane keeping must be reduced, and the same meane keeping must bee referred to the common vse, and countenance of the life. But of these hetherto.

Now in euerie deede, we take in hande, three pointes are to be kept. First, that appetite obey reson: for nothing is meeter then that, for the maintaining of dueties.

Next, that it be considered, how great a thing it is which we minde to bring to passe, ẏ neyther lesse, neither more care and paine be taken then the case requireth.

The third point is, that we haue an eie to vse a measure in those things which pertain to an honest shew, and seemely grace.

The best measure is to keepe the verie seemelynesse,

Vt Lucij Luculli summi viri virtutem quis? at quam multi villarum magnificentiam imitati sunt? Quarum quidé certé est adhibend⁹ modus ad mediocritatemque reuocandus: eademque mediocritas ad omnem vsum, cultumque vitæ referenda est. Sed hæc hactenus.

In omni autem actione suscipienda, tria sunt tenenda.

Primum, vt appetitus rationi pareat: quo nihil est ad officia conseruanda accommodatius. Deinde vt animaduertatur quanta illa res sit, quam efficere velimus, vt neue maior, neue minor, cura & opera suscipiatur, quam causa postulet.

Tercium est, vt caue amus, vt ea quæ pertinent ad liberalitatis spe ciẽ dignitate moderata sint. Mod⁹ autem est optimus, dec⁹ ipsũ tenere,

de

de quo ante dixim⁹, nec progredi longius. Horū autem trium prę̄stantissimum est appetitum obtemperare rationi.

Deinceps de ordine rerum & temporum opportunitate dicendum est. Hæc autem scientia continetur ea, quā græci εὐταξίαν nominant, nō hęc, quā interpretamur modestiam, quo in verbo modis inest: sed illa est εὐταξία in qua intelligitur ordinis cōseruatio. Itaq; vt eādē nos modestiam appellemus sic definitur a Stoicis. Vt modestia sit scientia earum rerum, quæ agūtur aut dicuntur loco suo collocandarum. Itaque videtur eadem vis ordinis & collocationis fore. Nam & ordinem sic definiunt: cōpositionem rerum aptis & accommodatis locis.

Locum autem actionis,

whereof wee speake before, and not to passe those bondes. But of these three, the chiefest is, that appetite obey reson.

Heereafter touching order of thinges, and opportunitie of times, wee haue to saye. And this knowledge contayneth that which the Greekes doe name εὐταξίαν, not this which wee interprete Modestia: in the which word Modus is comprehended. But that is εὐταξία wherein is meant a keping of order. And therefore that wee maye call the same Modestia, thus it is defined of the Stoikes, that Modestia (that is to saye) discreation is the knowledge of settinge those thinges which are doone or sayde, in their proper places. And so of order and placing there seemes to be all one propertie. For thus also they define order to bee a framing of things in apt and conuenient places.

And place they say, concerneth

neth the doing, opportunitie the time. And time conuenient for the doing, in Greeke εὐκαιρία, in Latine is called Occasio. So falleth it, that this discreation which wee interprete, euen as I sayde, is the knowledge of opportunitie of fitte season to doo a thing.

But the same definition may be of prudence, wherupon we treated in the beginning. But in this place wee search after measure keeping, and temperaunce, and other like vertues. Therfore what were the properties of prudence, in their place wee haue spokē. But what properly belongs to these vertues, whereof heere we haue begunne to speake, which pertaine to shamefastnes, and to their liking, with whome we liue we must now declare.

Such an order therefore in our doings is to be vsed, that as an in oration wel builded, so in a mans life all things be accordaunt and agreeable together.

opportunitatem temporis esse dicunt. Tempus autem actionis opportunum græce εὐκαιρία, latinè appellatur occasio. Sic fit vt modestia hæc quā interpretamur (ita vt dixi) scientia sit opportunitatis idoneorū, ad agendum temporū.

Sed potest eadem esse prudentiæ definitio, de qua principio diximus. Hoc autem loco de moderatione & temperantia, & harum similibus virtutibus quærimus. Itaque quæ erant prudentiæ propria, suo loco dicta sunt. Quæ autem harum virtutum de quibus iamdudū loquimur, quę pertinent ad verecundiā & ad eorū approbationem, quib' cum viuim', nūc dicēda sunt. Talis est igit' ordo actionum adhibendus: vt quemadmodum in ratione constanti, sic in vita omnia sint apta inter se & conuenientia,

Tur-

Turpe eſt nam valdeq́; vitioſum, in re ſeuera, conuiuio dignum aut delicatum aliquem inferre ſermonem. Bene Pericles cū haberet collegam in prętura Sophoclem poetam, ijq́; decō muni officio conueniſſent, & caſu formoſus puer prętereiret, dixiſſetq́; Sophocles, O puerū pulchrum Pericle. Pericles ait, At enim prętorem Sophocle decet nō ſolum manº, ſed etiam oculos abſtinentes habere. Atq́; hoc idē Sophocles ſi in Athletarū ap,p batione dixiſſet, iuſta reprehenſione caruiſſet Tāta vis eſt & loci, & tē poris, vt ſi quis cū cauſā ſit acturº, in itinere, aut in ābulatione ſecū ipſe meditet', aut ſi quid aliud attentius cogitet, nō reprehendatur, at hoc idem ſi in conuiuio faciat, inhumanus videatur, inſcitia temporis. Sed ea, quæ multum ab humanitate diſcrepant,

For a fowle hearing it is, and verie faultie in a ſage matter, to bring in anie table talke, or wanton woordes, Pericles ſayde well, when hee hadde Sophocles ioyned Prætor wyth him, and they wer communing aboute theyr office, and as by chaunce a well fauoured childe paſſed by. Sophocles ſayde, Oh there is a fayre Boy, Pericles, he aunſwered. It becomes a Prætor, Sophocles, to haue not onely forbearing handes, but eyes alſo. If Sophocles had ſayd this ſame, where wraſtlers bee allowed, hee hadde bene free from iuſt reproofe. So great a force ther is both of place and time. As for example, if a man that ſhall pleade a cauſe, bee muſing to himſelfe in his iourneye, or in his walke, or anye other thing, he mindeth heedfullye, hee is not reproued, but if he do the like at a feaſt, hee may be thonght vnciuill, for hauing no regarde to the time.

Howbeit thoſe thinges which farre diſagree from all

Iuſtia-

humanitie, as if anye man ſing in the ſtreete, or if anye other great diſcorde there bee: by and by they appeare and they greatlye neede not our admonicion, or rules: but from theſe, whych ſeeme to bee ſmall faultes, and of manye can not be perceaued, we muſt the more diligentlye refraine. As in Inſtruments ſounding by ſtringes or blaſt, though neuer ſo little they iar, yet that of a cunning manne is wont to bee founde: ſo muſt wee liue in this life that nothing chaunce to iar, yea and ſo much the more, as the concord of dedes is greater, and better than of tunes. Wherefore as in Inſtruments, muſicians eares do feele euen the leaſt diſcord, ſo if we will be ſharpe, and quicke iudges and markers of faultes, we ſhall vnderſtand often times great things by ſmall.

We ſhal ſoon iudge by the ſetting of the eie, by vnooth looking, or bending of ỹ browes by ſadnes, mirth, laughter, ſpeaking, ſilence, ſtrayning,

vt ſi quis in foro cantet, aut ſi qua eſt alia magna puerſitas, facile appa rent, nec magnoperè ad monitionem & præcepta deſiderant.

Quæ autē parua vidēt' eſſe delicta, neq; a multis intelligi poſſunt, ab his eſt diligentius declinandum: vt in fidibus aut in tibijs, quāuis paulū diſcrepēt, tamen id a ſciente animaduerti ſolet: Sic viuend' eſt in vita, ne forte quid diſcrepet, vel multo etiā magis quô maior & melior actionū, quā ſonorū cōcentus eſt. Itaq; vt in fidibus muſicorū, aures vel minima ſentiunt: ſic nos ſi acres ac diligentes iudices eſſe volumus animaduerſoreſque vitiorum, magna intelligemus ſæpe ex paruis. Ex oculorum obtutu, ex ſuperciliorum aut remiſſione, aut contraction', ex mœſtitia, ex hilaritate, ex riſu, ex locutione, ex reticentia

ex

ex contentione vocis, ex sũ missione, ex ceteris similibus facile iudicabim⁹, quid eorũ apte fiat quid ab officio naturaq́; discrepet. Quo in genere non est incommodũ quale quodq́; eorum sit ex alijs iudicare, vt si quid dedeceat in illis, vitemus & ipsi. Fit. nã nescio quo modo, vt magis in alijs cernam⁹ quã in nobismet ipsis si quid delinquitur. Itaq́; facilli mẽ corriguntur in discẽdo, quorũ vitia imitãt' emendandi causa magistri. Nec vero alienũ est, ad ea eliganda, quæ dubitationem afferunt, ad hibere doctos homines, vel etiam vsis peritos, & quid his de vnoquoque genere officij placet exquirere. Maior enim pars eó ferè deferri solet quó a natura ipsa deducit', in quibus videndũ est non modo quid quisque loquatur, sed etiam quid quisque sentiat, atque etiam qua de

and fallinge of the voice, and other such like, what is sittingly done: and what from dutie, and nature swarueth. In which kinde of thinges, it is not vnconuenient to iudge by other, of what sort ech of them is, that if oughte misbecommeth an other, wee shonne it also in our selues. For it comes to passe, I wot not howe, that wee see more in other, than in our selues, if ought bee done amisse. And therefore verye soone those scholiers bee corrected, whose faultes theyr maisters doe counterfaite, for to make them amend.

Nor truely out of the waye it is, in choosing of thinges, which bringe a doubtfulnesse to take learned mens aduise, or skilful by experiẽce: & so to search what lyketh them, concerning euery kinde of dutie. For the greater part is commonly wont thether to be caried whither of verye nature they bee led. In which we muste see not onely what eche man saith, but also, what eche man thinketh, and for what

cause

cauſe eche man ſo thinketh. For as Painters, and they that graue Images, and the right Poets alſo, bee wyllyng to haue theyr woorkes ſeene of all ſortes of men, that in caſe ought bee reproued of manye, it maye bee corrected, and therein bothe with themſelues and with other they examine, what is done amiſſe: So after the iudgement of other, manye thinges of vs both muſt bee done, and left vndone, and alſo chaunged and amended.

As for thinges, which are done after cuſtome, and ciuil ordinaunces, there is no precept to bee geuen of them, For they be precepts of them ſelues, neither it behoueth any man to bee ledde with this errour, if Socrates, or Ariſtippus haue done, or ſpoken anye thinge againſt ciuill order, and cuſtome: that he ſhould thinke the ſame lawfull for him to doe.

They obtayned ſuch a large lybertie of faulte finding, by their greate and heauenlye giftes. But the whole faſhion of

cauſa quiſq; ſentiat. Vt enim pictores, & ij qui ſigna fabricant, & veri etiam poetę ſuum quiſque opus â vulgo conſiderari vult vt ſi quid reprehẽſum ſit a pluribus id corrigatur, hiq; & ſecũ & cũ alijs, quid in eo peccatum ſit, exquirũt: ſic aliorum iudicio permulta nobis & facienda, & non facienda, & mutanda & corrigenda ſunt.

Quæ vero more aguntur, & inſtitutis ciuilibus, de his nihil eſt precipendum, illa enim ipſa præcepta ſunt. Nec quenquam hoc errore duci oportet: vt ſi quid Socrates aut Ariſtippus contra morem conſuetudinemque ciuilem fecerint locutiuè ſint, idem ſibi arbitretur licere, magnis enim illi, & diuinis bonis hanc licentiam aſſequebantur.

Cynicorum vero ratio

tota eſt eijcienda : eſt enim inimica verecundiæ : ſine qua nihil rectum eſſe poteſt , nihil honeſtum .

Eos autem quorum vita perſpecta in rebus honeſtis , atque magnis eſt bene de Repub. ſentientes ac bene meritos, aut merentes , aliquo honore , aut imperio affectos obſeruare & colere debemus .

Tribuere etiam multum ſenectuti , cedere ijs , qui magiſtratum habebunt : habere delectum ciuis & peregrini : in ipſo quoque peregrino , priuatimue an publicè venerit .

Ad ſummam , ne agam de ſingulis , communem totius generis hominum conſiliationem & conſotiationem colere , tu eri , ſeruare debemus .

Iam de artificijs & queſtibus qui liberales habendi , qui ſordidi ſint, hęc

of the Cinikes is vtterly to be refuſed . For it is enemie to ſhamefaſtneſſe : with out which , there can bee nothing vpright , nor nothing honeſt. But thoſe we ought to reuerence, and giue attendance vpon them : whoſe lyfe hath bene tryed in honeſt and worthy matters : who do meane well to the common weale , & haue well deſerued or do deſerue well thereof , and to any honour or rule be aduaunced , alſo we muſt haue olde age in great eſtimation : and muſt giue place to thoſe, that beare office , and make difference betwene a Citizen and a ſtraunger : and in the very ſtaunger alſo wee ought too conſider , whether hee came of priuate buſineſſe , or for the Common weales affayres .

In ſumme (that I treat not of euery particular) wee are bound to loue, maintain, & preſerue ỹ common attonmēt & fellowſhip of all mankinde. Now concerning occupactons and gaineful ſciens which are to bee compted honeſte

and

and which are of baſe reputation, thus commonly we haue learned. Firſt, thoſe gainings be diſallowed, that runne in hatred with all men, as the gaine of tolfarmers and vſurers. Out of eſtimation alſo and baſe bee the gaines that men in wages do take, whoſe labour is bought, and not their cunning. For in them the verye hyre is as it were the obligation of theyr bondage.

They moreouer are to bee counted of the baſer ſort, who buye of merchaunts, that out of hande they retaile againe. For nothing they profit vnleeſſe they lie a pace, and truly diſhoneſter thing is there none, then a vaine tongue. And all kind of handy craftſmen ſerue in meane occupations. Neither can ỹ work ſhop truly haue in it anye gentlemanly dooing, and no deale to be praiſed are theſe occupations, which be ſeruers of pleaſures, as Drinkermen, Butchers, Cookes, Puddingmakers, Fiſhermen, which Terence ſpeaketh of, put to theſe

hæc ferè accepimus.

Primum improbantur ij quęſtus, qui in odio hominum incurrunt, vt portitorum, & fœneratorum. Illiberales autem, & ſordidi quæſtus mercenariorum omnium, quorum operæ non quorum artes emuntur. Eſt enim in illis ipſa merces auctoramentum ſeruitutis,

Sordidi etiam putandi, qui mercantur à mercatoribus quod ſtatim vendant. Nihil enim proficiunt, niſi admodum mentiantur. Nec vero quicquam eſt turpi⁹ vanitate.

Opificeſque omnes, in ſordida arte verſant⁹. Nec enim quicquam in genuum poteſt habere officina: minimèque artes eæ probandæ, quæ miniſtræ ſunt voluptatum: cætarij, lanij, coqui, fartores, piſcatores, vt ait Terenti⁹: adde his

si placet, vnguentarios, saltatores, totumq; ludum talarium. Quibus autem artibus, aut prudentia maior inest: aut non mediocris vtilitas quæritur, vt medicina, vt architectura, vt doctrina rerum honestarum, hæ sunt ijs, quorum ordini conueniũt honestæ. Mercatura autem si tenuis est, sordida putanda est: in magna & copiosa, multa vndique apportans, multisque sine vanitate impartiens, non est admodum vituperanda. Atq; etiam si satiata quęstu, vel contenta potius, vt sæpe ex alto in portũ, sic ex ipso portu se in agros possessioneſque contulerit, videtur iure optimo posse laudari. Omnium autem rerũ, ex quibus aliquid acquiritur, nihil est agri cultura melius, nil vberius, nil dulcius, nil homine libero dignius. De qua quoniã in Catone maiore satis

if ye list, perfumers, dancers, and all hazarders.

But those sciences, wherein is greater wisedome, and no mean profit sought, as physick, casting of buildings, and learning of worthie knowledge, be honest for them, with whose estate they agree. And merchaundise, if it be small, is to bee counted of little estimation: but if it bee great and well stored, conueying many commodities rounde aboute, and dispearsing those same into many mens handes, without baine woordes, it is not much to bee dispraised, and further more, if beeing satisfied with gaine, or contented rather, as it hath often come, from the sea to the hauen, so it chaunge from the hauen into landes and possessions, it seemeth of verie good right it maye bee commended. For of all thinges, whereout anye gayne is sought, nothing is better then grounde, tilth, and trimming, nothing yeeldinger, nothing sweeter, nothing meeter for a free borne man, whereof because

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in Cato ỹ elder we haue ſpoken inoughe, thence ſhall you take, what ſo to this place ſhall appertaine. But how duties doo proceede from thoſe parts, which belong to honeſtie, I think it ſufficiently declared. Nowe in thoſe ſame things which be honeſt, there may befall oft times a queſtion and compariſon of two honeſt things, whether is ỹ honeſter, which pointe is paſſed ouer of Panetius.

For whereas all honeſtye ſpringeth out of foure braunches, wherof one is of knowledge, another of common fellowſhippe, the third of greate courage, the fourth of, of meaſure keeping, it muſt needes bee, that in chooſing of duetie, theſe bee often compared together. Wee thinke therfore thoſe duetie bee more agreeable with nature, which bee borrowed from common fellowſhippe, than thoſe which be fetched from knowledge, and that may bee prooued by this argument: becauſe if a wiſe man happen on ſuch a lyfe, that hee be en-

multa diximus, illinc aſſumes, quæ ad hunc locum pertinebunt. Sed ob ijs partibus quę ſunt honeſtatis, quemadmodum officia ducerentur, ſatis expoſitum videtur Eorum autem ipſorum, quę honeſta ſunt, poteſt incidere ſæpe contentio & comparatio de duob' honeſtis, vtrum honeſtius, qui locus à Panętio eſt pretermiſſus.

Nam cum omnis honeſtas manet à partibus quatuor, quarum vna ſit cognitionis, altera cõmunitatis, tertia magnanimitatis, quarta moderationis: hæ in deligendo officio, ſæpe inter ſe comparentur, neceſſe eſt Placet igitur aptiora eſſe naturæ ea officia, quæ ex communitate, quam ea, quę ex cognitione ducantur. Idque hoc argumento confirmari poteſt. Quód ſi contigerit ea vita ſapienti, vt omnium rerum

affluentibus copijs dicetur : quamuis ea, quę cognitione digna ſunt, ſummo otio ſecum ipſe conſideret & contempletur : tamen ſi ſolitudo tanta ſit vt hominẽ videre non poſſit, excedat é vita , Princepſq; omnium virtutum eſt illa ſapientia, quam σοφίαν Græci vocant. Prudentia enim , quam Græci φρόνησιν dicunt, aliam quandam intelligimus: quæ eſt rerum expetendarum, fugiendarumque ſcientia. Illa autem ſapientia, quam principem dixi, rerum eſt diuinarum, atq; humanarum ſcientia : in qua continetur deorum & hominum communitas & ſocietas ipſorum inter ipſos.

Ea ſi maxima eſt, (vt eſt certe) neceſſe eſt, quod à communitate ducatur officium, id eſſe maximum.

riched with a flowing plentie of all manner ſubſtaunce, thoughe with verie greate leaſure hee conſider, and all to behold with himſelfe thoſe thinges which are worthye of knowledge, yet if his ſolitarineſſe be ſo greate, that he cannot haue the ſight of a man, he would wiſh to be out of the world. And that wiſedome which the Greekes doo tearme σοφίαν, is the Princeſſe of all vertues. For prudence, which the Greekes dooe call φρόνησιν, we take to bee of another nature, which is the knowledge of thinges to bee deſired, & thinges meete to be eſchewed. But that wiſdome which I named the princeſſe, is the ſcience of heauenly and worldly thinges, wherein is contayned the commonneſſe of Goos and men, and theyr ſocietie together. Which vertue, in caſe it be the greateſt, as it is indeede, it muſt needs followe, that the dutie which is borowed of commonnneſſe alſo is the greateſt.

For the knowledge and consideration of naturall causes, should after a certaine sort be maimed and vnperfecte, if no performance of deeds shoulde follow. And deedes must appeare in defending o f mennes commodities. They belonge therefore to the fellowshippe of men, and for that cause are to be preferred before knowledge.

And this euerie best disposed man, when it comes to the point, doth shew and declare. For who is so desirefull of throughseeing, and learning the nature of things, but in case while hee were treating, and viewing of matters most worthie of knowledge, in the meane season hee shoulde sodainly heare tidings of the hazard and danger of his countrie, which hee is able to succour and withstande, hee woulde leaue and set aside all those studyes: yea, though he thought, hee were able to number the starres or to mesure the huge compasse of ỹ world, and the same man also would dooe as much in his parents

Etenim cognitio, cõtemplatioque naturæ, manca quodammodo, atque inchoata sit, si nulla actio rerum consequatur. Ea vero actio in hominum commodis tuendis maxime cernitur. Partinet igitur ad societatem generis humani. Ergo hæc cognitioni anteponenda est.

Atque id optimus quisque re ipsa ostendit & indicat. Quis est enim tam cupidus in prespicienda, cognoscenda que rerum natura, vt si ei tractanti, contemplãtique res cognitione dignissimas, subito sit allatum pariculum discrimenque patriæ, cui subuenire, opitularique possit, non illa omnia relinquat atque abijciat, etiam si denumerare se stellas, aut metiri mũdi magnitudinem posse arbitretur. Atque hoc idem in parentis,

in amici re aut periculo fecerit? Quibus reb⁹ intelligitur, ſtudijs, officijſque ſcientiæ preponẽda eſſe officia iuſtitiæ, quæ pertinent ad homi num vtilitatem : qua, nihil homini eſſe debet antiquius. Atque illi ipſi quorum ſtudia vitaq́; omnis, in rerum cognitione verſata eſt, tamen ab augendis hominum vtilitatibus & commodis non receſſerũt. Nam & erudiere multos, quò meliores ciues, vtilioreſque in rebus ſuis publicis eſſent : vt Thebanũ Epaminondam Lyſias Pythagoræus, Syracuſium Dionem Plato, multique multos, Noſque ipſi quicquid ad Rempublicam attulimus (ſi modo aliquid attulimus) à doctoribus atque doctrina inſtructi ad eam & ornati acceſſimus.

Neque ſolum viui atq; præſens ſtudioſos diſcendi erudiunt atque

and in his friendes cauſe and perill. By which things it is gathered, that before the ſtudies, and dueties of knowledge, the ſtudies of iuſtice are to bee preferred, which dooe belong to the profite of men, then the which a man ought to hold nothing direct. Alſo they who haue ſpent theyr whole life and ſtudie in knowledge of thinges, haue not yet withdrawen themſelues frõ helping to increaſe mennes profites and commodities. For they alſo haue inſtructed manye, to make them the better Citizens, and the more profitable in theyr common weales, as Lyſis the Pythagorian, ſchooled the Thebane Epaminondas: Plato taught Dion the Siracuſion, and manye other moe, and whatſoeuer wee our ſelues brought to the common weale, (if anye thing we haue brought) we came to it enformed by teachers, and furniſhed wyth learning. And they not onelye whyle they lyue and bee preſent, doo ſchoole and teache the ſtudents

dents of learning, but after theyr death also, by their monumentes of learning, they dooe the same. For they haue not ouerpassed one point that concerneth lawes, custome, and the common wealthes knowledge, so as they maye seeme to haue employed theyr quiet studies to our common affaires.

Thus they beeing themselues giuen to the studyes of learning and wisedome, dooe chiefly bestow their wisdome, prudence, and vnderstanding, to mens commodities. For ý same cause also it is better to vtter plentifully, so it bee discreetlye, then without eloquence to conceiue neuer so wittily, because ones conceite serueth onely within it selfe. Whereas eloquence getteth within her reach those, with whom we are ioyned in common fellowshippe. And as swarmes of Bees doe cluster together, not to this ende, to make combes, but being swarming by kinde, they woorke theyr combes, so men much more,

docent: sed hoc idem etiam post mortem monumentis literarum, assequuntur. Nec enim locus vllus prætermissus est ab ijs, qui ad leges, qui ad mores, qui ad disciplinam Reipu. pertineret: it vt otium suum ad nostrum negotium contulisse videantur. Ita illi ipsi doctrinæ studijs & sapientiæ dediti ad hominum vtilitatẽ suam sapientiam, prudentiam, intelligentiãque potissimum conferunt. Ob eam etiã causam eloqui copiose (modo prudenter) melius est, quam vel acutissimè sine eloquẽtia cogitare: quod cogitatio in se ipsa vertitur: eloquentia vero complectitur eos, quibuscum communitate iuncti sumus. Atq; vt apum examina non fingendorum fauorũ causa congregantur: sed cum cõgregabilia natura sint fingũt fauos: sic homines ac multo etiam magis,

gis natura congregati, adhibent augendi, congregandique solertiam. Itaque nisi ea virtus quę constat ex hominibus tuendis, id est ex societate generis humani, attingat rerum cognitionem, soliuaga cognitio, & ieiunia videatur. Itemq; magnitudo animi remota à communitate, coniunctioneque humana, feritas sit quędam & immanitas. Ita fit, vt vincat cognitionis studium, consociatio hominum, atque communitas.

Nec verum est quod dicit' à quibusdam, ꝓpter necessitatē vitę, ꝙ ea quę natura desideraret, & consequi sine alijs, atque efficere non possemus, idcirco istam esse cum hominibus communitatem & societatem. Quod si omnia nobis, quę ad victum, cultumq; pertinent, quasi virgula diuina (vt aiūt)

more then they, by nature swarming, doo vse their cunning of dooing and deuising. Therefore vnlesse the same vertue which consisteth in defending men, that is to saye, the fellowshippe of mankinde doeth meete with the knowledge of things: it may seeme a verie bare and alone wandering knowledge, and lykewise greatnesse of courage seuered from common fellowshippe, and neighbourhoode of men must needs be a certaine sauagenesse and beastlye crueltie. So it falles out, that the accompanying and common fellowship of men farre surmountes ỹ study of knowledge.

Neither is it true, which is sayd of some, that this common knot and fellowshippe is had amonge men, euen for necessitie of life, because without other, wee might not get and bring to passe those thinges that nature doeth desire: and that if all thinges were found vs, euen by the grace of GOD, as (they saie)

which

which appertayne to food and furniture of life, then would euerie one of a good wit, all businesse laid aside, settle him selfe wholy in knowledge and science. But that is not so. For he would both flie solitarinesse, and chose a companiõ of studie, both teach, & learne, both heare and speake wherfore all dutye which auayleth to maintaine neighbourhood, and fellowship of men, is to bee preferred aboue the duetie, which consisteth in knowledge and science. This question peraduenture maye bee well mooued, whether this common fellowshippe which is most of all agreeable to nature, bee also alwayes to bee preferred before meane, and measure keeping. I thinke not so.

For there be some things, partly so filthie, partly so hainous, that a wise man would not dooe them, no not to saue his coũtry. Very many such, Possidonius hath gathered together, but some of them so fowle and so filthye,

suppeditarentur: tum optimo quisque ingenio negotijs omnib⁹ omissis, totum se in cognitione & scientia collocaret. Non est ita, Nã & solitudinem fugeret, & socium studij quereret: tum docere, tũ discere vellet, tum audire, tum dicere. Ergo omne officium quod ad coniunctionem hominum, & ad societatem tuendam valet, anteponendũ est illi officio, quod cognitione & scientia continetur. Illud forsitan quęrendum sit, nũ hæc communitas, quæ maxime est apta naturæ, sit etiam moderationi, modestiæque semper anteponenda, non placet. Sunt enim quędã partim ita fœda, partim ita flagitiosa, vt ea ne conseruãdę quidẽ patrię causa sapiens facturus sit. Ea Possidonius collegit permulta, sed ita tetra quędam, ita obscęna

vt

vt dictu quoque videan tur turpia. Hæc igit' nõ ſuſcipiet quiſquam Reipub. cauſa nec Reſpub. quidem pro ſe ſuſcipi volet. Sed hæc commodius ſe res habet, quód non poteſt accidere tempus, vt interſit Reipub. quicquam illorum facere ſaqientem. Quare hoc quidem effectum ſit in officijs delegendis: hoc genus officiorum excellere, quod teneatur hominum ſocietate. Etenim cognitionem prudentiamque ſequit' cõſiderata actio. Ita fit, vt conſideratè agere pluris ſit quam cogitate prudenter, atque hæc quidem hactenus. Patefactus eſt enim locus ipſe, vt non ſit difficile in exquirendo officio, quid cuiq; ſit præponendum videre.

In ipſa autem communitate ſunt gradus officiorum, ex quibus quid cuique præſtet, intelligi poſſit: vt pri-

that euen to bee ſpoken they ſeeme ſhamefull.

Thoſe therefore ought no man to take in hande, for the common weals cauſe, neither would the common weale for her ſake haue them enterpriſed. But this matter ſtandes in better caſe, for that ther can befall no time that the commõ weale ſhoulde neede to haue a wiſe man doe any of them.

Wherefore let this be concluded, in choyce of duetyes that ſuch kinde of duetyes moſt excell, as concerne the fellowſhippe of men. For aduiſed dooing wyll followe knowledge and wiſedome. So it comes to paſſe, that to doe aduyſedlye is more worth, then wiſelye to deuiſe. And thereof thus farre. For this place is plainelye inough ſet out, that it is not hard in ſearching out of duetie, to perceiue, amonge them all which afore other is to be preferred.

Yet euen in common fellowſhip there bee degrees of duties, wherby may bee knowen what one is aboue the other,

ſo

so as the first dueties bee due to the Gods immortal, the second to our countrie, the third to our parents, & so forth by degrees, the rest to the rest.

Of the which matters briefly debated, may bee gathered, how men are wont, not onely to doubt whether a thing bee honest or dishonest: but also two honest things laid before them whether is ỹ honester. This point (as I sayde before) is ouerslipped by Panetius. But nowe to the residue let vs proceede.

ma Dijs immortalibus, secunda patriæ, tertia parentibus: deinceps, gradatim reliqua reliquis debeantur.

Quibus ex rebus, breuiter disputatis, intelligi potest, non solum id homines solere dubitare honestum ne, an turpe sit, sed etiam duobus propositis honestis vtrũ honestius. Hic locus à Panetio est (vt supra dixi) prętermissus, Sed iam ad reliqua pergamus.

¶M. TVLLII CICERONIS De officijs. Liber secundus.

MARCVS TVLLVS CICEROS second booke of Dueties to Marcus his sonne.

QVemadmodum officia ducerentur ab honestate Marce fili, atque ab omni genere virtutis, satis explicatum arbitror libro superiore, sequitur vt hæc officiorum genera prosequamur, quæ pertinent ad vitæ cultum, & ad earum rerum quibus vtuntur homines facultatem ad opes, ad copias in quo tum queri, dixiquid vtile, quid inutile, tum ex vtilibus, quid vtilius, aut quid maxime vtile, de quibus dicere aggrediar, si pauca prius de instituto, ac de iudicio meo dixero.

Quanquam enim libri nostri, complures non modo ad legẽdi, sed

AFter what sorte dueties shuld be taken out of honestie, son Marke, and from euerye kinde of vertue: I suppose it sufficientlye declared in my former booke. It followes, that we go forward with these kindes of dueties which belong to power, to riches, to the furniture of manslyte, and to the plentye of those thinges that men dooe occuppe, wherein I sayde, it is sought: both what is profitable: what vnprofitable: and also of profitable things, which is the more profitable, or which the most vnprofitable. Of the which I wyll enter to speake, if I shall saye a woord or two before of my purpose and meaning.

For though our Bookes haue stirred vp many men to the

the ſtudie not onely of a reading, but alſo of wryting? yet otherwiſe I feare, leaſte the name of philoſophie be hatefull to ſome good men: & that they maruayle, I beſtow in it ſo much trauaile, and time.

In deede as long as the common weale was gouerned by them, to whome ſhe had committed her ſelfe, I did employ all my care & ſtudie vpon it. But when one man kept all in thraldome, & there was no place at all for counſel and authoritie: and I beſides had forgon my companions: of preſeruing the ſtate, who had beene ſinguler men, neither I gaue my ſelfe to greues, wherwith I ſhould haue beene waſted, vnleſſe I had reſiſted them, nor againe, to pleaſures vnſeemely for a learned man. And would god ỹ the common weale, had ſtod in the ſtate where it began: & had not light vpon men, who were not ſo deſirous of alteringe, as ouerthrowinge of things. For firſte, as we were wont too doe, when the common weale was ſtandinge:

etiã ad ſcribẽdi ſtudiũ excitauerint: tamẽ interdũ vereor, ne quibuſdã bonis viris philoſophię nomẽ ſit inuiſũ: mirẽturq́; in ea tantũ me operæ & tẽporis ponere.

Ego autem quamdiu Reſp. per eos gerebatur, quibus ſe ipſa commiſerat, omnes meas curas cogitationeſq́ue in eam conferebã. Cùm autem dominatu vnius omnia tenerentur, neq́; eſſet vſquã conſilio aut authoritati locus: ſocios deniq́; tuẽdæ Reip. ſommos viros amiſiſſẽ: nec me angoribus dedi quibus eſſem confectus niſi his reſtitiſſem: nec rurſum indignis homine docto voluptatibus. Atqûe vtinam Reſpub. ſtetiſſet quo cæperat ſtatu, nec in homines nõ tam communitandarum rerum quâm euertendarum cupidos incidiſſet.

Primum enim, vt ſtante Repub. facere ſolebam',

in agendo plus quàm in ſcribendo operę ponerimus : Deinde ipſis ſcriptis non ea quæ nunc, ſed actiones noſtras mandemus, vt ſæpe fecimus. Cùm autem Reſp. in qua omnis mea cura, cogitatio, opera poniſo lebat, nulla eſſet omnino : illæ ſcilicet literæ omnino conticuèrunt forenſes, & ſenatoriæ. Nihil autem agere cùm animus non poſſet, in ijs ſtudijs ab initio ver-tatus ætatis: exiſtimaui honeſtiſſimè moleſtias deponi poſſe, ſi me ad philoſophiam retuliſſem.

Cui cum multum adoleſcens diſcendi cauſa temporis tribuiſſem poſtea quám honoribus in ſeruire cœpi, meque totum Reipublicæ tradidi, tantum erat philoſophiæ loci quantum ſuperfuerat amicorum & Reipublicæ temporis. Id autem omne cõſumebatur in legẽdo

we would take moze labour in pleading, that in wziting: afterward, in very wziting we would not put ỹ thinges that we do now, but our pleadings as we haue don diuers times.

But when the common weale in which all my care, ſtudie and trauaile was wont to be beſtowed, was none at all, verely thoſe lawierly, and Senatehowſe learnings wer huſht.

But ſeing my mynde could not chooſe, but bee doeing: hauing bene occupied in thoſe ſtudies, from the beginning of my young age: I thought ſozowes might bee put awaye moſt honeſtly if I returned my ſelfe to Philoſophie. whervnto when beeing yong I had geuen much tyme, to learne it, after that I began to attend honours, and beetooke my ſelfe whole to the common weale, ſo much leaſures was left foz Philoſophie, as remayned of the tymes ſpente about my friends and the Common weales cauſes. And that was all beeſtowed in readynge.

foz

for writing I had no tyme. In our most miseries therefore, we seeme to haue gotten this so greate a commoditie, that we might put those matters in writinge: which were not sufficiently known to our men, and yet were most worthie of knowledge. For what is there in faith more wishfull, than wisedome: what more excellent? what too a manne more worthy? what for a man more honorable? They than, who doe desire this be named Philosophers: neither is philosophie ought els, if ye will tell the meaning of the woord, but the study of wisedome. And wisdome (as it is defined of auncient Philosophers) is the science of heauenly & worldly things, & of the cãuses wherby these things bee vpholden.

And who so dispraiseth ỹ study therof: I wot not verely, what ther may be ỹ he would deeme praise worthy, for wher ỹ delighting of ỹ mind be sought & quietig of care? what may bee compared with theyr

scribendi ocium nõ erat.

Maximis igitur in malis hoc tantum boni asse cuti videmur: vt ea literis manderemus, quæ nec satis erant nota nostris, & erant cognitatione dignissima.

Quid est enim, per deos, optabilius sapientia? quid prestantius? quid homini melius? quid homine dignius? Hanc igitur qui expetunt, philosophi nominant: nec quicquam aliud est philosophia (si interpretari velis) quâm studium sapientiæ.

Sapientia autem est (vt a veteribus philosophis definitum est (rerum diuinarum & humanarum, causarum qùe quibus hęres continentur, scientia: eius studium qui vituperat, haud sanè intelligo, quidnam sit, quod laudandum putet.

Nã siue oblectat' quęrit' animi, requieśq; curarũ quæ conferri cum eorũ

ſtudijs poteſt, qui ſemp aliquid inquirut, qd' ſpectet, & valeat ad benè beateq; viuendum: Siue ratio conſtantię, virtutiſq, queritur, aut hæc ars eſt, aut nulla omnino per quã eas aſſequamur.

Nullá vero dicere maximarum rerum artem eſſe, cum minimarũ ſiñ arte nulla ſit hominum eſt parum conſideratê loquentium atque in maximis rebus errantium. Si autê eſt aliqua diciplina virtutis: vbi ea queretur, cum ab hoc diſcendi genere diſcefferis? Sed hæc cũ ad philoſophiam cohortamur, accuratius ſolent diſputari: qd' alio quidam libro fecimus. Hoc autê tẽpore tãtũ nobis declarandum fuit, cur orbati Reipu muneríb ad hoc nos ſtudiũ potiſſimum contuliſſemus. Occurritur autê nobis & quidê a doctis & eruditis, querentibus ſatis ne con-

ſtudies, who alwayes gather ſomewhat that tendeth and auayleth well, and wealfully to lyue, or if the way of ſtedfaſtnes and vertue be ſought either this is the arte or there is none at all, whereby wee may attaine them.

To vphold there is no art of the greateſt thinges, ſeeinge none of the leaſte bee without art, it is a token of men ſpeaking with ſmall aduiſement & erring in the greateſt matters. But if ther be any ſcience of vertue, where ſhall it be ſought, when you be gone from this kinde of learning.

But theſe things are wont too bee more exactelye diſcourſed, when wee exhorte menne to philoſophie, which in deede wee haue done, in another booke.

But at this preſent, onely it was to bee declared of vs, why wee got vs chiefely to this ſtudy when we wer bereft of our common welth offices. But it is gainſaid vs, and that of ſkilfull and learned men, demanding whether we ſeme to do cõſtãtly inough

who

who although wee holde, that nothing can be surely knowen: yet both we are wont to dispute of other matters, and at this same time wee prosecute precepts of duetie.

To whom I would our opinions wer well knowen. For we are not they whose minde wandreth in errour, and hath not at all what to follow. For what a minde shoulde this bee, or rather a lyke: Where the meane not onely of disputing, but also of liuing, is taken cleane awaie. But as other, who do say, some things be certaine, some vncertaine: so wee dissenting from them, do say againe some things be prouable, some vnprouable.

What is there then, that should let me to followe those thinges which to mee dooe seeme prouable: which contrarywise, to disproue, and to voyde the presumption of affirming: and to flye rashnesse, which disagreeth from wisdome most of all.

But by our men there is disputing against all things:

stãter facere videamur: qui cum percipi nihil posse dicamus tamen & alijs de rebus disserere soluamus, & hoc ipso tempore paecepta officij persequamur. Quibus vellem satis cognita esset nostra sententia. Non enim sumus ij quorum vagetur animus errore, nec habeat vnquã quid sequat'. Quę enim esset ista mens, vel quæ vita potius, non solum disputandi, sed etiam viuendi ratione sublata? Nos autẽ vt cæteri, qui alia certa, alia incerta esse dicũt, sic ab his dissentientes, alia probabilia, cõtra alia nõ probilia esse dicimus.

Quid est ergo, quod me impediat, ea quę mihi propabilia videantur sequi? quæ contra improbare atque affirmandi arrogantiam vitantẽ, fugere temeritatem, quę à sapientia dissidet plurimum. Cõtrà autẽ omnia disputantur à nostris,

quôd hoc ipſum probabile elucere non poſſit, niſi ex vtraq; parte cauſarum eſſet facta contentio. Sed hæc explanata ſunt in Academicis noſtris ſatis (vt arbitror) diligenter.

Tibi autem mì Cicero quanquam in antiquiſſima, nobiliſſimaque Philoſophia, Cratippo authore verſaris, his ſimillimo, qui iſta præclara pepererunt: tamen hæc noſtra finitima veſtris, ignota eſſe nolui. Sed iam ad inſtituta pergamus.

Quinque igitur rationibus propoſitis offitij perſequendi, quarum duæ ad decus, honeſtatemque pertinent, duæ ad commoda vitæ copias opes, facultates: quinta, ad eligendi iudicium, ſi quando ea, quæ dixi, pugnare inter ſe viderent: honeſtatis pars perfecta eſt: quam quidem tibi cupio eſſe

becauſe this ſame thing that is profitable, cannot ſhine forth, except there ſhould be a conference of reaſons expreſſed vpõ both ſides. But theſe matters as I ſuppoſe, be diligently inough made plain in our Academikes.

But although, my Cicero, you bee exerciſed in the moſt auncient & moſt noble philoſophie, Cratippus beeing your author, a man full like vnto thoſe, who haue made theſe notable things, yet I woulde not theſe of ours, verie neere vnto yours, to you ſhoulde bee vnknowen. But nowe let vs goe on to our purpoſe.

Seeing then fiue waies bee ſet out of treating vppon dutie: whereof two doo pertaine vnto comelyneſſe and honeſtie: other two belong to the commodities of a mannes lyfe, to abundaunce, power, riches: the fifte doth ſerue to the iudgement of chooſing, if euer thoſe which I ſpake of ſhauld ſeeme to ſtriue together: the part touching hone-

ſtie

ſtie is made an ende of, which truly I deſire to be verie wel knowen to you. But this whereof we treate now, is the verie ſame that is called profitable.

In ỹ which tearme, cuſtome failing, hath ſwarued out of the waie, and by little and little is brought to this point, ỹ it wold ſeuer profitable from honeſt, and would make ſome thing honeſt, which ſhuld not be profitable, and ſome thing profitable, which ſhoulde not be honeſt: then the which, no greater daunger coulde bee brought to mans life. Philoſophers ſurely of verie greate authoritie dooe, graueiye no doubt, and honeſtly, in imagination ſunder theſe three confuſed kinds. For whatſoeuer is iuſt, they alſo iudge ỹ ſame to be profitable: and likewiſe what ſo is honeſt, they take ỹ ſame to be iuſt, wherof is concluded, ỹ whatſoeuer is honeſt, ỹ ſame is profitable. The which thing, who ſmally fore ſee, they oftentimes hauing in admiration ſuttle witted

notiſſimam. Hoc autem de quo nunc agimus, id ipſum eſt, quod vtile appellatur.

In quo verbo lapſa conſuetudo deflexit de via, ſenſimque eo deducta eſt, vt ab honeſto vtile ſecerneret: & conſtitueret honeſtum eſſe aliquid, quod vtile non eſſet, & vtile quod non honeſtum: qua nulla pernicies maior hominum vitæ potuit afferri.

Summa quidem authoritate Philoſophi, ſeuere ſanè, atque honeſtè, hæc tria genera confuſa cogitatione diſtinguunt. Quicquid enim iuſtum ſit, id vtile etiam eſſe cenſent, itemque, quod honeſtum, idem eſſe iuſtum. Ex quo efficit' vt quicquid honeſtum ſit, idem ſit vtile. Quod qui parũ perſpiciunt, hi ſępe verſutos homines & callidos admirantes eorum malitiam

ſapientiam iudicant.

Quorum error eripiendus eſt : omniſque opinio ad eâ ſpeciem traducenda, vt honeſtis cõ ſilijs iuſtiſque factis, nõ fraude & malitioſe intelligãt ea, quæ velit cõ ſequi poſſe.

Quæ ergo ad vitam hominum tuendam pertinent, partim ſunt inanimata, vt aurum, argenteum, vt ea quæ gignuntur é terra, & alia eiuſdem generis: partim animata, quæ habent ſuos impetu, & rerum appetitus. Eorum autem alia, rationis expertia ſunt, alia ratione vtentia. Expertes rationis, ſunt equi, boues, & reliqui pecudes, & apes, quorũ opera efficit', aliquid ad hominũ vſum, atq; vitã. Ratione autẽ vtentiũ duo genera ponunt', vnũ deorũ, alterũ hominũ. Deos placatos, pietas efficit & ſanctitas Proximè autẽ & ſecundũ deos, homines homi

and craftie, doe repute their wilineſſe for wiſdome. Whoſe errour muſt bee taken awaie, and their whole opinion is from that to be brought vnto this heep: that by honeſt counſell, and good deedes, not by guile and craftineſſe, they vnderſtand themſelues in poſſibilitie to attaine ſuch things, as they would.

Some thinges then which appertain to the maintenance of mans life, bee liueleſſe: as gold and ſiluer, as theſe which are gotten out of the earth, as other of the ſame ſort: ſome be liuing, and feeling which haue their motions, and appetites to things. And ſome of them be voide of reaſon, ſome haue the vſe of reaſon. Voide of reaſon, be horſes, oxen, and other cattell, & Bees, by whoſe woorke ſomewhat is made for mans vſe and lyfe. But of thoſe ẏ haue vſe of reaſon, two kindes there bee put: one of Gods, another of men. Deuotion & holineſſe will make the Gods fauourable. But next of al, & after the gods, men to men may be moſt profitable.

And

And againe there is the same diuision of those thinges, which annoy and hurt. And because men dooe not thinke, the Gods do harme, these excepted, they suppose men to men to doo most hurt, or profite.

For the most part of those same, which wee called liuelesse bee the effects of mannes woorke, neither wee shoulde haue them, except hande, and craft had beene put thereto? neyther without mennes seruice, wee shoulde vse them. For neyther preseruation of health, nor sailing, nor ground tilth, and trimming, nor the inning, and sauing of corne, and other fruites, without labour of men, coulde haue beene amie at all. Nowe, moreouer, both carryage out of those thinges wherewith we were stored, and conueyaunce in of those which we should need, there coulde bee doubtlesse none, except men shoulde doo those offices. And in lyke manner, neither stones shuld bee hewed out of Marries, necessarye to our vse, nibus, maxime, vtiles esse possunt. Earumq; iterū rerum q̄ noceāt & obsint, eadē deuisio est. Sed quia deos nocere nō putant: his exceptis homines hominib⁹ plurimū obesse vel prodesse arbitrāt'. Ea enim ipsa q̄ inanimata dixim⁹, pleraq; sunt hominum effecta opere, quæ nec haberemus, nisi manus & ars accessisset, nec his sine hominum administratione vteremur. Neq; enim valitudinis curatio, neque nauigatio, neque agricultura, neque frugum, fructuūq; reliquorū pceptio & cō seruatio sine opera hominū vlla esse potuisset. Iam vero & earum rerū quibus abundaremus, exportatio & earum, quibus egeremus inuectio certe nulla esset, nisi his muneribus homines fungerentur, Eadēque ratione, nec lapides exiderentur é terra, ad vsum nostrū necessarij,

nec ferrum, æs, aurum, argentū effoderetur penitus abditum, sine hominum labore et manu Tecta vero quibus & frigorū vis pelleretur, & calorum moleſtiæ ſedarentur, vnde aut initio generi humano dari potuiſſent, aut poſtea ſubuenire, ſi aut vi tempeſtatis, aut terræmotis, aut vetuſtate cecidiſſent niſi communis vita ab homiuibus harum rerū auxilia petere didiciſſet.

Adde ductus aquarum deriuationes fluuium, agrorum irrigationes, moles appoſitas fluctibus, portus manu factos, quæ non ſine hominum opere habere poſſemus. Ex quibus omnibus multiſq; alijs perſpicuum eſt, qui fructus quæq; vtilitates ex reb⁹ ijs, quæ ſunt inanimata percipiātur, eas nos nullo modo ſine hominum manu atq; opera capere potuiſſe. Qui deniq; ex

neither yron, Golde, Braſſe, Siluer deepe hidden, coulde be digged vp without the labour and hand of man. Houſes alſo wherby both ỹ ſharpneſſe of colde might be defended, and the anoiance of heate might bee aſſwaged, from whence either at ỹ beginning, might they haue beene giuen to mankinde, or after do eaſe, if either by violence of tempeſt, or by earthquaks, or oldneſſe they had gone to wrack, except common lyfe had learned of men to aſke the ayde for theſe things.

Adde heervnto conduits of water, turning of riuers, letting in water ouer grounds, wharffes made agaynſte ſtreames, hauens caſt by hand: which without mennes woorke wee might not haue. By al which, and many other things, it is euident, that by no meanes, without mannes hande and trauayle, we could haue receiued the fruites and profites which bee gotten of thoſe thinges, that bee lyueleſſe.

What fruits alſo of beaſts,

or

or what commoditie coulde there bee taken? but if men should helpe thereto. For euen they doubtlesse wer men: who were the chiefe in deuising, what vse we might haue of each beast, nor at this season, without mennes seruice, might we either keepe horses or breake them, or saue them, or of them take reasonable commodities: and by men also both those beastes bee killed, which dooe hurt, and those be taken which maye dooe seruice.

what should I number vp a heape of artes? without which, mannes lyfe coulde haue beene none at all. For who shoulde ease the sicke? what delyght shoulde there bee amonge the healthfull? what dyet? what apparell? vnlesse so many artes should serue vs, with which things mannes life being furnished, is become so farre different from the feeding, and coote of beasts.

Cities also, without the assembly of men, could neither bee buylded nor peopled.

bestijs, fructibus, aut q̄ commoditas, nisi homines adiuuarent, percipi posset? Nam & qui principes inueniendi fuerunt quam ex quaque bellua vsu habere posse mus, homines certè fuerunt. Nec hoc tempore sine hominum opera, aut pascere eas, aut domare, aut tueri, aut tē pestiuos fructus ex his capere possem⁹. Ab eisdemque & ea, quæ nocent interficiuntur, & quæ vsus possunt esse capiuntur. Quid enumerē artium multitudinem? sine quibus, vita hominis omnino nulla esse potuisiet. Quis nam ægris subueniisset? quę essent oblectatio valentium? qui victus aut cultus nisi tā multę nobis artes ministrarent⁹. Qui bus rebus exculta homi num vita tantum distat à victu & cultu bestiarū. Vrbas vero sine hominū cętu nō potuissēt, nec ædificari, nec frequē

tari,

tari. Ex quo leges moresque constitui, tum iuris æqua descriptio, certaque viuendi disciplina, per quas bene beateque viuit', quas res & mansuetudo animorũ, consecuta, & verecundia est: effectumq; est, vt esset vita munitior, atque vt dando & accipiendo, permutandisque facultatibus & commodis nulla re egeremus. Longiores hoc loco sumus, quam necesse est. Quis est enim cui non perspicua sunt illa, quæ pluribus verbis a Panetio commemorantur? neminem neq; ducem in bello, nec principem domi, magnas res & salutares sine hominum studiis gerere potuisse. Cõmemorantur ab eo, Themistocles, Pericles, Cyrus, Agesilaus, Alexander, quos negat sine adiumentis hominum tantas res efficere potuisse.

Vtitur in re non du-

Wheeevppon ordinaunces, and customes were made: also an indifferent setting out of lawe, and a sure rule to liue after: by which the life is led well and wealfully. Which things both the mildnesse of mindes, and shamefastnesse hath followed, and it is brought to passe, that our life shoulde bee the more safegarded: and that by giuing and taking, and enterchaunging of goods and pleasures, wee shoulde want nothing.

We be longer in this place then neede requirs. For who is hee, to whome those things are not manifest, which in more wordes bee recited of Panetius? & neither any captaine in warre, nor Prince at home, coulde haue atchieued great feates, and auailable without mennes indeauour. Rehearsed of him is Themistocles, Pericles, Cyrus, Agesilaus, Alexander: whome he denyed to haue bene able to compasse so greate thinges wythout the ayde of men. In a matter no whitte doubtfull,

he

hee vseth witnesses no whitte necessarie.

And as we obtaine greate commodities; by the lyke minde and consent of men: so there is none so loathsome a pestilence, which doth not growe to man by man.

There is a booke of Dicearchus vpon ỳ death of men: who was a greate Peripatetike, and plentifull: and after the other causes gathered together, as of water brakes, of pestilence, of destructiõ, yea & of the sodaine flocking together of beasts, by whose violence hee sheweth howe certaine kindes of men wer consumed: afterward he makes comparison, howe many moe men haue beene destroyed by mennes violence (that is) by war or rebellion, then by all other miserie.

Seeing then this place hath no manner of doubt, but that men both profit and hurt men verie much: I pointe this to bee a propertie of vertue to winne mens hearts to her, and binde them to her vse.

bia, testibus non necessariis.

Atque vt magnas vtilitates adipiscimur cõspiratione hominum, atque consensu, sic nulla tam detestabilis pestis est, quæ non homini ab homine nascat'. Est Dicæarchi liber de interitu hominum, Perepatetici magni, & copiosi: qui collectis cęteris causis eluuionis, pestilẽtię, vastitatis, belluarum etiã repẽtinæ multitudinis, quarum impetu docet quædam hominum genera esse consumpta. Deinde comparat quantô plures deleti sunt homines hominũ impetis, id est bellis aut seditionib⁹, quã omni reliqua calamitate. Cum igitur hic locus nihil habeat dubitationis, quin homines plurimum homi nibus & prosint & obsint, proprium hoc statuo esse virtutis, cõsiliare sibi animos hominũ et ad vsus suos adiũgere

Itaq;

Itaque quæ in rebus inanimis quæq; in vſu & tractatione belluarum fiunt vtiliter ad hominū vitam artibus ea tribuuntur operoſis. Hominū autem ſtudia, ad amplificationem noſtrarum rerum, prompta ac parata virorum præſtantium ſapiẽtia & virtute excitantur. Etenim virt⁹ omnis tribus in rebus ferẽ vertitur, quarum vna eſt in percipiendo quid in quaq; re verum ſincerumq; ſit, quid conſentaneũ, cuique quid conſequens, ex quo quęque gignantur: quę cuiuſque rei ſit cauſa. Altarum cohibere motus animi turbatos, quos Gręci *Paphe*, nominant: appetitioneſque, quas illi *Ormas* obedientes efficere rationi.

Tercium ijs quibus cum congremur vti moderatè & ſcienter: quorum ſtudijs ea quæ natura deſiderat, expleta,

Therefore what ſo in things liueleſſe, and what ſo in the vſe and occupying of beaſts, is done profitably to mannes life, it is all appointed to the labourſome trades.

But mennes good wylls, that be preſt and readie to the aduauncement of our eſtate, bee ſturred vp by the wiſedome and vertue of excellent men.

For all vertue in a manner conſiſteth in three pointes. Wherof one is in throughſeeing what in euerie thing is true and perfect, what agreeable to each thing, what is the ſequeale, whereof all thinges grow, what is the cauſe of euerie thing. The other, to kepe in ỹ troubleſome moods of the minde, which ỹ Greeke name Paphe, and to make the appetites, which they call Ormas, obedient vnto reaſon.

The third, to vſe them ſoberlye and ſkilfullye, with whome we be conuerſaunt, by whoſe good willes, we may, haue thoſe thinges at fill:

and

and heaped, which nature desires, yea, and by them, if anie harme be brought vppon vs, we may it auoide, and may be wreaked of those, which haue gone about to hurt vs, & may pay them so much punishment, as equitie and mannes gentleneſſe doth beare.

But by what meanes wee may attayne this power, that we may compaſſe mens good wilis, and retaine the ſame: wee ſhall ſaie, and that, not long hereafter. But a fewe wordes are to bee ſayde before.

That a great power ther is in fortune, on eyther ſide, eyther for welfare, or euill fare, who is ignorant? For both when wee inioye her proſperous blaſt, we are carryed to our deſired ends, and whē her winde is turned, wee are afflicted. This ſame fortune then hath other chaunces, which be ſeldomer, firſt, that come from things liueleſſe: as ſea ſtormes, tempeſtes, ſhipwrackes, downefalles, burninges: then from beaſtes, as ſtripes, bitynges, ouercumulataq́; habeamus, per eoſdemque ſi quid importet nobis incommodi propulſemus, vlciſcamurq́; eos qui nocere nobis conati ſunt, tāta que pœna afficiamus, quanta æquitas, humanitaſq; patitur.

Quibus autem rationibus hanc facultatē aſſe qui poſſimus, vt hominum ſtudia complectamur eaq́; teneamus dicem⁹, neque ita multo poſt: ſed pauca ante dicenda ſunt.

Magnam vim eſſe in fortuna in vtramque partem, vel ad ſecundas res vel aduerſas quis ignorat? Nam & cum proſpero flatu eius, vtim' ad exit? peruehimur optatos: & cū reflauit, affligimur. Hæc igit' ipſa fortuna cæteros caſus rariores habet: primū ab inanimis, procellas, tēpeſtates, naufragia, ruinas, incēdia, deinde a beſtijs ictus, morſus, impetus.

Hęc

Hæc igitur vt dixi rariora. At verò interitus exercituum, vt proximè trium: sępe multorum clades imperatorum, vt nuper summi ac singularis viri, inuidię prętera multitudinis, atque ob eas, benemeritorum sępe ciuium expulsiones, calamitates, fugæ. Rursusque secundę res, honores, imperia, victorię, quanquam fortuita sunt tamen sine hominum operibus & studiis neutrā in partē effici possunt. Hoc igit' cognito dicendū est, quoniā modo hominum studia ad vtilitates nostras allicere atq; excitare possimus.

Quæ si longior fuerit oratio, cum magnitudine vtilitatis comparetur. Ita fortasse etiam breuior videbitur. Quæ cunq; igitur homines homini tribuunt, ad eū augēdū atq' honestādū

runninges. These therefore (as I sayde) bee seldomer. But the destruction of armyes, as a late of three, often of mannes slaughter of captaines, as lately of a noble & singular man: the enuyings moreouer of the multitude: & by reason of the same, oftentimes the banishmentes, the miseries, the flyinges awaye of the well deseruing Citizens: and againe, prosperitie, honour, Empire, victory, although they bee in fortunes hande: yet without mennes trauails, & studies on neither side, they cannot be brought to passe. This then knowen: wee must declare by what meanes wee maye allure and stirre vp mens good wills to our profites. The which processe, if it be somewhat long, let it bee compared with the greatnesse of the profite: so perhappes euen somewhat too short it shall seeme. Whatsoeuer then men gyue to a man, to inrich, and aduaunce hym: eyther

ther they do it for good will, when for some cause they bear affection to any or els for honours sake, if they reuerence any mans vertue, and thinke him worthy of most fortunate estate: or in whome they haue a trust, and doe suppose them to prouide well for theyr matters or els whose power they feare, or contrarywise, of whome they looke after somewhat, as when vsurpers and people pleasing men lay large guiftes before them, or at last they bee ledde by meede, and rewarde. Which in deede is the vilest waye, and the fowlest, bothe to them, who are caughte with the same, and to those, who doe seeke to haue refuge therevnto. For ỹ matter goeth not well, when the same that should be wrought by vertue is attempted by money.

But because many tymes this helpe is necessary, wee will tell how it ought too bee vsed, if first wee shall haue spoken of those things which bee neerer to vertue.

aut beneuolentię gratia faciunt, cum aliqua de causa quempiã diligũt: aut honoris si cuius virtuté suspiciũt, & si quẽ dignum fortuna quàm amplissima putant: aut cui fidẽ habent, & bene rebus suis consulere arbitrantur: aut cuius opes metuunt: aut contra a quibus aliquid expectant: aut cum reges populare sue homines largitiones aliquas proponant: aut postremô pretio ac mercede ducuntur.

Quæ sordidissima quidem est ratio & inquinatissima, & ijs, qui ea tenentur & illis qui ad eam confugere conantur. Malè enim se res habet cũ qd' virtute effici debet id tentatur pecunia. Sed quoniã non nunquã subsidiũ hoc necessariũ est, quemadmodũ sit vtẽdũ eo dicem', si prius ijs de rebus, quæ virtuti propriores sunt dixerimus.

And

Atque

Atque etiam ſubijciunt ſe homines imperio alterius & poteſtati plurib⁹ de cauſis. Ducuntur enim aut beneuolentia, aut beneficiorum magnitudine, aut dignitatis præſtantia, aut ſpe ſibi id vtile futurū, aut metu, ne vi parere cogā tur, aut ſpe largitionis, promiſſioniſque capti, aut proſtremo. vt ſępe in noſtra Repub. videmus mercede conducti. Rerum autem omnium nec aptius eſt quicquam ad opes tuendas ac tenendas quâm diligi, nec alienius, quâm timeri.

Pręclare enim Ennius. Quem metuunt oderunt.

Quem quiſque odit petiſſe expetit.

Multorum autem odijs nullas opes poſſe obſiſtere: ſi antea fuit ignotum, nuper eſt cognitum.

Nec vero huius tiranni ſolū, quē armis oppreſſa

And likewiſe menne make themſelues ſubiect to the rule and auctozitie of another foz diuers cauſes.

Foz they be led eyther with good will oz greatneſſe of benefites, oz excellencie of honour, oz hope, it ſhall be pzofitable to them, oz feare leaſt by power they bee dziuen to yelde: oz as taken with hope of large guiftes and pzomiſes: oz at leaſt, as wee ſee often in our common weale, euen hyered foz meede.

And certes of all thinges neither is there any fitter to mayntaine a power then to bee loued, neyther any vnfitter then to bee feared.

Notably ſayth Ennius. whome they feare, him they hate alwaye the moſt: whome any man hateth, hee wiſheth him loſt.

But if afoze it was vnknowne, ſince alate it is wel knowen, that no power can withſtand the hatered of manye.

And truely not onely ſ̄ death of this tyzant, whom ẏ citie being oppzeſſed with fozce of armes

armes dyd ſuffer, dothe declare how muche the hatred of men preuailes to deſtruction: but the like endes of other tyrauntes dooe ſhewe as much, of whome ſcarſely any hath eſcaped the lyke death. For feare is an euill keeper of continuance: and contrariwiſe, good will is faithfull, yea for euer. But let a roghneſſe hardely be vſed of them: who by rule do keepe ſtraight ſuch as be brought vnder, by force, as of maſters ouer ſeruauntes, if they cannot otherwyſe bee ſtayed.

But who in a free Citie ſo order them ſelues, that they bee feared, there canne nothinge poſſible bee madder then they bee. For although the lawes bee ſonke by ſome mannes mighte: although libertie bee all too ſhaken, yet at lengthe theye ſwimme out againe, eyther by ſecret iudgements, or by priuie voices in auauncinge to honour: & certeſſe the ſtinges of ceaſſed libertie bee ſharper, than of libertie continued. Lette vs thenne

pertulit ciuitas, interitus declarat, quantum odium hominum valet ad peſtem: ſed reliquorum ſimiles exitus tirannorum, quorum haud ferêquiſquã talem interitũ effugit malus enim cuſtos diuturnitatis metus: contraque beneuolentia fidelis eſt, vel ad perpetuitatem. Sed ijs, qui vi oppreſſos imperio coercent, ſit ſanè adhibenda ſæuitia, vt heris in famulos, ſi aliter teneri non poſſunt. Qui verô in libera ciuitate ita ſe inſtruunt, vt metuantur his nihil poteſt eſſe dementius. Quamuis enim demerſę ſint leges alicuius opibus, quamuis tremefacta libertas: emergunt tamen hæc aliquando aut iudicijs tacitis, aut occultis de honore ſuffragijs.

Acriores autem morſus ſunt intermiſſæ libertatis, quâm retentæ. Quod igitur la-

tissimè patet neq; ad incolumitatē solum, sed etiã ad opes & potẽtiam valet plurimum, id amplectamur, vt metus absit, charitas retineatur.

Ita facillimè quæ volumus & priuatis in rebus & in Repub consequemur. Etenim qui se metui volent a quibus metuuntur, eosdẽ metuant ipsi necesse est. Quid enim censemus superiorẽ illum dionisiũ, quo cruciatu timoris angi solitum, qui cultros metuẽs tonsorios candente carbone sibi adurebat capillum?

Quid Alexandrũ Phereum, quo animo vixisse arbitremur? qui (vt scriptum legimus) cũm vxorem Theben admodum diligeret: tamen ad eam ex epulis in cubiculum veniens, barbarum & eum quidem (vt scriptum est) compunctum notis Threicijs districto gladio iubebat ante ire:

embrace that, which moste largely spreadeth, and most auayleth, not onely to safety, but also to welth and power: that feare bee banished, and loue retained. So most easely wee shall obtaine what wee desire, bothe in priuate matters, & in the common welth. For who so will themselues to bee hadde in feare, it must needes bee, that they themselues feare those same, of whome they bee feared. For what thinke wee of the first Dionisius? with what torment of feare was he wont to bee troubled? who fearing the barbars razars, with a redde hotte cole singed of his owne beard. What of Alexander the Pheraian: with what an hart, doe wee suppose, hee lyued: who (as wee reede wrytten) when exceedingly hee loued his wife Thebe: yet comminge too hir from banketting into the Chamber, he commaunded a kerne, and him also (as it is written) being printed with Thracean markes, too gee beefore with a drawne Swoorde, and

and hee sent of his garde afore to raunsacke the womens coffers, and seeke that no weapon were hidden in their garmentes. O miserable man, who thought both a kearne, and an yron branded slaue, faythfuller then his wyfe. And his opinion dyd not deceyue him. for by her hee was slaine for a iealousie of spouse breach. And truelye there is no strength of Empire so greate, which wyth suppressing by feare, canne bee longe continuing. Witnesse is Phaleris, whose crueltie is famed aboue others, who peryshed not by treson as this Alexander did, whome euen nowe I spake off, nor by a fewe, as this our man, but agaynst him the whole commons of the Agregentines rose with violence. What the Macedonians, dyd they not forsake Demetrius, and all whole got them to Pyrrhus, what the Lacedemonians rulynge vnryghtfullye? Didde not welnighe all theyr leaguefriends sodeinly forsake them

premittebatq; de stipatoribus suis, qui perscrutarentur arculas muliebres, et ne quid in vestimentis occultaretur telum, exquirerent. O miserum, qui fideliorem, & barbarum & stigmaticum puteret quam cõiugem, nec eum fefellit opinio ab ea est enim ipse ꝓpter pellicatus suspitionem interfectus. Nec vero vlla vis imperij tanta est, quę premẽt metu, possit esse diuturna. Testis est Phalaris, cuius est præter cęteros nobilitata crudelitas: qui non ex insidis interiit, vt is quẽ modo dixi Alexander, non a paucis vt hic noster, sed in quẽ, vniuersa Agrigẽtinorũ multitudo imperũ fecit. Quid Macedones? nonne Demetriũ reliquerunt, vniuersiq; se ad Pyrrhum contulerunt? Quid Lacedemonios iniustẽ imperantes nonne repentè omnes ferè socij deseruerunt,

ſpectatoreſque ſe otioſos prebuerũt Leuctrice calamitatis. Externa libentius in tali re quam domeſtica recordor. Veruntamen quamdiu imperium, populi Romanæ, beneficijs tenebatur, non iniurijs, bella aut pro ſocijs, aut de imperio gerebantur, exitus erant bellorum, aut mites, aut neceſſarij. Regum, populorum, nationum, portus erat & refugium, Senatus: noſtri autem magiſtratus, imperatoreſq;, ex vna hac re maximam laudem capere ſtudebant, ſi prouincias, ſi ſocios æquitate, & fide defendiſſent. Itaq; illud patrocinium orbis terræ verſus quam imperium poterat nominari. Senſim hanc conſuetitudinem & diſciplinam iam antea minuebam⁹, poſt vero Syllæ victoriam penitus amiſimus. Deſitum eſt enim videri quicquam in ſocios iniquum, cum

and ſhewed themſelues idle lookers on of the ouerthrow of Leuctra? Forreine examples gladyer thẽ home deeds I reherſe, in ſuch a caſe. Neuertheleſſe as long as the Empire of ỹ people of Rome was vpholden by worthye actes, not by wrong doings, and warres wer made, either for defence of league friends, or for Empyre, then were the endes of warres, either mercifull, or neceſſarie, the Senate was the hauen and refuge of kings, of peoples, of nations. And our magiſtrats and Captaynes indeauoured to gette greate praiſe, by this onely meane if Prouinces, if league friendes, in right and truth, they had defended. Therefore it might haue ben named the protection more truly then the Empire of the worlde. By lyttle and lyttle we abated this cuſtome, and order, ſomewhat afore, but after Sillaes victorie, vtterly wee loſt it. For men ceaſed to account anie thing vnreaſonable towarde league friends, when ſo great cruel-

tie was shewed euen against citizens. Therefore there followed in him of an honest quarrell an vnhonest victory. For when the salestaffe was pight, and in the market place hee solde the goodes both of good men and rich, and those, euen citizens, he was so bold, to say that he made sale of his lawfull bootie. One succeeded, who in a wicked cause and a more shamefull victory not onelye put the goodes of euerie one of the Citizens to open sale, but in one state of misery inwrapped whole prouinces and regions, & so forrein nations being vexed and vndõe, we saw Massylia borne about in triumph for a shewe of our Empire lost, and triumph made ouer the citie, without which our Captaines of wars neuer got any triumph, beyond the Alpes. I could rehearse manye more cursed deeds beside, done against our league friendes, if the sonne hadde seene ought more haynous then this one. Justly therefore are we scourged: for had we not suffred ỹ wicked-

extitisset etiam in ciues tanta crudelitas. Ergo in illo secuta est honestã causam non honesta victoria. Est enim ausus dicere hasta posita cum bona in foro venderet, & bonorum virorũ & locupletum, & certè ciuium prædam se suam vendere. Sequutus est, qui in causa impia, victoria etiam fœdiore, non solum singulorum ciuium bona publicaret, sed vniuersas quoque prouincias, regionesque vno calamitatis genere comprehenderet. Itaq; vexatis, ac proditis exteris nationibus, ad exemplũ amissi imperij, portare in triumpho Massiliam vidimꝰ, & ex ea vrbe triumphari, sine qua nunquam nostri imperatores, trans Alpinis, bellis triumpharũt. Multa præterea commemorarem nefaria in socios: si hoc vno Sol quicquã vidisset indignius. Iure igitur plectimur. Nisi e-

nim multorum impuni ta ſcelera tuliſſemus, nunquam ad vnum tan ta peruenisſet licentia: a quo quidem rei familiaris ad paucos, cupiditatum, ad multos improbos venit hereditas. Nec verò vnquam bello rum ciuilium ſemen & cauſa deerit, dum homini perditi haſtam illam cruentam, & memineri nt & ſperabunt, quam P. Sylla cum vibraſſet dictatore propinquo ſuo, idem ſexto & triceſimo anno poſt, á ſceleratiore haſta eadem non receſſit. Alter autẽ, qui in illa dictatura ſcriba fuerat, in hæc fuit queſtor vrbanus. Ex quo debet intelligi, talib⁹ prę̃mijs propoſitis, nunquam defutura bella ciuilia. Itaque parietes vrbis modo ſtant & manent, ijque ipſi iam extrema ſcelera metuentes, Rem vero publicam penitus amiſimus.

of many to bee vnpuniſhed, ſuch a lawleſſe lybertie had neuer come to the handes of one, from whome ſoothly the inheritaunce of his goodes came to fewe, but of his greedie deſires to many naughtie men. For truly, the ſeede and cauſe of ciuill warres ſhall euer faile, as long as miſchieuous men ſhall both remember, and hope after that bloudie ſale ſtaffe, which when Publius Sylla hadde ſhaken, his nigh kinſman being Dictator, the ſame ſtept not once backe from the ſhaking of a lyke more miſchieuous ſtaffe, the ſixte and thirtieth yeare after. But the other who in the Dictator had bene Secretarie, in this was Treaſurer for the citie, wher vpon ought to be vnderſtood, that while ſuch booties bee laide afore men, ciuill warres ſhall neuer want. And ſo, oncly the walles of the Citie doo ſtand and remaine, yea, & thoſe ſame euen now dreading their laſt miſchiefe, but ſ common weale wee haue vtterlye loſt,

loſt. And into theſe deſtructions we are faine (for we muſt returne to our purpoſe) while we hadde rather to be feared, then to be deare, and welbeloued. If all this could befall to the people of Rome, ruling vnrighfully, what ought euerie free man to thinke? which thing ſith it is euident, that the power of good will is great, of feare, ſlender, it followes, that we make diſcourſe by what meanes we may ſooneſt with honour & vprightneſſe attaine the loue, which we deſire.

But all wee doo not alyke ſtande in neede of the ſame. For to the trading of eache mannes lyfe, it muſt bee applyed whether it bee needfull, of many, or ſufficient of fewe to be beloued. Let this therefore be certaine, as the thing which is both principall and moſt neceſſarie to haue faithfull familiarities of friendes, loning vs, and highlye eſteeming our vertues. For this is the only meane indeed, that there be not much difference betweene great & meane men,

Atque in has clades incidim⁹ (redeundum eſt enì ad propoſitũ) dum metui, quam chari eſſe, & diligi maluim⁹. Quæ ſi populo Romano iniuſtè imperanti accidere potuerunt, quid debent putare ſinguli? Quod cûm perſpicuum ſit beneuolentiæ vim eſſe magnam, met⁹ imbecillem, ſequit' vt diſſeramus, quibus rebus facillimè poſſimus eam quam volumus, adipiſcī cum honore & fide charitatem. Sed ea non pariter omnes egemus. Nam ad cuiuſq; vitam inſtituendam accõmodandum eſt à multis ne op⁹ ſit, an ſatis ſit à paucis diligi. Certum igitur hoc ſit. idque & primũ & maximè neceſſarium familiaritates habere fidas amantium nos amicorum, & noſtra mirantium. Hæc enim eſt vna res prorſus, vt non differat multum inter ſummos & mediocres viros

eaque eſt vtrique prope modum cõparanda. Honore, & gloria, & benevolentia ciuium fortaſſe nõ æque omnes egẽt: ſed tamẽ ſi cui hæc ſuppetunt, adiuuãt aliquãtum cum ad cętera, tum ad amicitias comparandas. Sed de amicitia alio libro dictum eſt, qui inſcribitur Lælius. Nunc dicam⁹ de gloria, quanquam ea quoque de re noſtri libri duo ſunt. Sed attingamus, quandoquidem ea in rebus maioribus adminiſtrandis adiuuat plurimum.

Summa igitur & perfecto gloria conſtat ex tribus his. Si diligit multitudo, ſi fidem habet, ſi cũ admiratione quadam honore nos dignos putat. Hæc autem (ſi eſt ſimpliciter breuiterque dicendum) quibus rebus pariuntur à ſingulis eiſdem ferè à multitudine. Sed eſt alius quoque quidam aditus ad multitudinem, vt in v-

and it muſt be procured, in a manner of them both. Not all perchaunce doo ſtand in lyke need of honour and glory, and citizens good wills: but yet who ſo hath them, they further ſomwhat both to other things, and alſo to the purchaſing of friendſhips. But of friendſhip we haue ſpoken in the booke which is intituled Lelius. Now let vs ſpeak of glorie, though of that matter alſo there be two bookes of ours, yet let vs touch it, becauſe the ſame auaileth much in executing of greater matters.

The higheſt therefore and perfect glorie ſtãdeth of theſe three, if the multitude fauour vs, if they haue a truſt in vs, if with a certaine admiration they compt vs worthy of honour. And if wee muſt ſpeake it plainly & briefly as theſe be gotten at the handes of euery free man, by ſ ſame meanes in a manner they bee obtayned of the multitude. But there is alſo a certayne other enteraunce into the multitude, that wee maye

(as yee would saie) flowe into the heartes of the whole. And first let vs see touching those three, which before I called the preceptes of good wil, the which no doubt is caught most of all by benefits. And secondarily, good will is allured by a well wylling minde, although perhaps abilitie sufficeth not. But wonderously ye the loue of the multitude is all to stirred with the fame, and opinion of liberalytie, bounteousnesse, iustice, faithfulnesse, and of al those vertues, which appertaine to the mildnesse of maners and gentlenesse. For the verie fame, which wee name comely and honest, because of it selfe it lyketh vs, and with his owne nature and beautie mooueth all our mindes, and principally shineth (as it wer) out of those vertues, which I haue rehearsed, therefore by verye nature wee are inforced to fauour them, in whome wee thinke those vertues to bee. And these verelye bee, the weyghtyest causes of fauouryng,

niuersorum animos tã-quam influere possim⁹. At primum de illis tribus, quæ ante dixi, beneuolentiæ pręcepta videamus, quæ quidem beneficijs capitur maximè. Secundo autem loco beneficia, voluntate beneuolentiæ mouetur, etiam si res forte nõ suppetit. Vehementer autem amor multitudines cõmouetur ipsa fama & opinione liberalitatis, beneficentiæ, iustitiæ, fidei, omniumq́; earum virtutum, q̃ pertinent ad mansuetudinem morum, ac facilitatẽ. Etenim illud ipsum, qꝑ decorũ, honestumq́; dicim⁹, quia per se nobis placet, animosq; omnium natura & specie sua cõmouet, maximeq́; quasi perlucet ex ijs, quas commemoraui virtutibus: idcirco illis, in quibus eas virtutes esse remur, à natura ipsa diligere cogimur. Atque hæ quidem causæ sunt

diligen-

diligẽdi grauiſſimę. Poſ ſunt enim preterea non nullę eſſe leuiores. Fides autem vt habeatur, duabus rebus effici poteſt: ſi exiſtimabimur adepti coniunctam cum iuſtitia prudentiam. Nam et ijs fidem habem⁹, quos plus intelligere quam nos arbitramur: quoſque & futura proſpicere credimus & cùm res agatur, in diſcrimenque ventum ſit, expedire rẽ, & conſilium ex tempore capere poſſe. Hanc enim omnes exiſtimant, vtilem veramq́; prudentiam. Iuſtis autem & fidis hominibus, id eſt viris bonis ita fides habetur, vt nulla ſit in his, fraudis, iniuriæq́; ſuſpitio. Itaq́; his ſalutẽ noſtrã, his fortunas, his liberos rectiſſime cõmitti arbitramur. Harũ igitur duarũ, ad fidem faciendã, iuſtitia plus pollet. Quippe cum ea ſine prudẽtia ſatis habeat authoritatis: prudẽtia ſine iu

there may be beſide. But that a truſt may bee had in vs, by two things it may be brought to paſſe: if we ſhall be thought to haue attained prudence ioyned with iuſtice. For both to them we haue a truſt, whome wee ſuppoſe to vnderſtande more then our ſelues: and alſo to them who we beleeue, bee able both to foreſee thinges to come, and alſo to diſpatch thy buſineſſe, and forthwyth to take counſayle when the matter is in hand, and ſtands in hazard. For all men doee iudge this the profitable, and true prudence. But in ſuch wiſe credite is gyuen to iuſt and truſtie men (that is) to good men: that in them there is no ſuſpition of deceit end iniurie. Therefore to theſe our lyfe, to theſe our goodes, to theſe our children, we ſuppoſe verye well to be committed. Of theſe two then iuſtice is of more power to winne a credite, becauſe it without prudence hath ſufficient authoritie, prudence without iuſtice is nothinge worthy to get credit. For the

ſub=

subtiller and the craftier that a man is, so much the more he is hated and suspected, when the opinion of his honestie is pulled awaie. Wherefore iustice ioyned with vnderstanding, shall haue as much power as it lyst to purchase credit, iustice without prudence shall be of much power, prudence without iustice shall be nothing worth. But least some man haue meruaile, seeing amongst all Philosophers it is plain, and by my selfe disputed often: him that should haue one vertue, to haue all ỹ vertues: why I do now sunder them so, as though there may anie man bee iust, which same is not prudent, of one sort is that subtleneſſe, when verie trouth is leuelled in disputation, and of another sort, is that talke, when it is al applied to the common opinion, wherefore wee speake so in this place as the common sort dooe, ỹ we call some one sort manly, some other good men, some other prudent. For with the peopies wordes and vsuall tearmes, we must treat

stitia nihil valet ad faciendam fidē. Quo enim quis versutior & callidior est, hoc inuisior, & suspectior detracta opinione ꝓbitatis. Quāobrē intelligentię iustitia cōiuncta quantū volet habebit ad faciendā fidē viriū. Iustitia sine prudentia multum poterit, sine iustitia nihil valebit prudentia. Sed ne quis sit admirat', cur cū inter omnes philosophos cōstet, â meq; ipso sępe disputatum sit, qui vnā haberet, omnes habere virtutes: nunc ita seiūgā quasi possit quis quā qui nō idē prudēs sit, iustus esse. Alia est illa, cū veritas ipsa limat', in disputatione subtilitas, alia cū ad opinionē cōmunē omnis accōmodat' oratio. Quāobrem vt vulgus, ita nos hoc loco loquim', vt alios fortes, alios bonos viros alios prudētes esse dicam'. Popularib' enim verbis est agendū & vsitatis,

cum

cum loquamur de opinione populari: idq; eo dē modo fecit Panetius Sed ad ꝓpositū reuertamur. Erat igit' ex tribus quæ ad gloriam pertinerent hoc tertium, vt cū admiratione hominum honore ab his digni iudicaremur. Admirantur igit' cōmuniter illi quidē omnia, q̄ magna & prēter opinionem ſuam animaduertūt, ſeparatim autē in ſingulis ſi perſpiciunt, nec opinata quidem bona. Itaq; eos viros ſuſpiciāt, maximiſq́ue efferūt laudibus in quibus exiſtimāt ſe excellētes quaſdā & ſingulares virtutes perſpicere Deſpiciunt autē eos & cōtēnunt, in quibus nihil virtutis, nihil animi nihil neruorum putant Nō enim omnes eos cō tēmnunt, de quibus male exiſtimant. Nā quos improbos, maledicos, fraudulentos putant, & ad faciendā iniuriā inſtructos. eos haud cōtē-

when we ſpeake of ꝧ common peoples opinion, and that did Panetius after the ſame ſort. But to the purpoſe let vs retourne.

Of the three therefore which ſhoulde appertaine to glorie, this was the third, ꝧ with admiration of men wee might by them bee thought worthie of honour. Generally then they haue in admiration doubtleſſe all thinges, which they haue noted to bee great, and beyonde their weening, and ſeuerallye in euerye free man, if they perfectly ſee good things vnlooked for. Therefore they honour theſe men, and with higheſt praiſes ſet them aloft: in whō they think themſelues to behold certaine paſſing and ſingular vertues. But thoſe they deſpiſe and ſet at naught: in whome no vertue, no courage, no ſtrēgth they iudge. For all men doo not deſpiſe them of whome they thinke euill. For whom they deeme diſhoneſt, miſerepoztes, guilefull, and readie framed to dooe wzong, thoſe they deſpiſe not certes, but

but of them they thinke euill, wherefore (as I sayd afore) they bee despised, who neyther to themselues nor to other doe good, as they saie, in whom there is no painfulnesse, no diligence, no caring, but they be reuerenced with a certaine admiration, who are thought to goe before others in vertue, and to bee without both all vnseemelynesse, and also those vices, which other cannot easily withstand, for both pleasures, full flattering dames, doo oftentimes wrest the greater part of the minde from vertue, and also when the brandes of paines be laide vnto them, most men beyond measure be all to fraide Life, death, riches, pouertie, most mightelye mooue all men. Which thinges who so on eyther side, with a loftie and great courage doe despise, and when before them is offered any goodlye, and honest thing, it turneth and haleth them whole to it selfe, then who doth not meruaile at the brightnesse and beautye of vertue: Therefore both this

nunt quidem, sed de his male existimẽt, Quãob rẽ (vt ante dixi cõtemnũt' ij, qui nec sibi, nec alteri ꝓsunt (vt dicit') in quibus nullus labor, nulla industria, nulla cura est. Admiratione quadã verò afficiunt' ij qui anteire cæteris virtute putant': & cum omni carere dedecore, tum verò ijs vitijs quibus alij non facile possunt obsistere. Nam & voluptates blandissimę dominę sępe maiores partes animi à virtute detorquent & dolorum cum admouentur faces ptæter modum pleriq; exterrentur. Vita, mors, diuitiæ, paupertas omnes homines vehementissimè permouent. Quæ qui in vtranque partem excelso animo, magnoq; despiciunt, cumque aliqua his ampla & honesta res obiecta est, totos ad se conuertit, & rapit: tum quis non admiretur splendorem, pulchri-

critudinēq; virtutis? Ergo & hęc animi deſpicientia, admirabilitatem magnam facit, & maximé iuſtitia, ex qua vna virtute, viri boni appellātur, mirifica quædam res multitudini videtur nec iniuria. Nemo enim iuſtus eſſe poteſt, qui mortem, qui dolorem, qui exilium, qui egeſtatem timet, aut qui ea, quæ his ſunt contraria, æquitati anteponit. Maximèq; admirantur eum, qui pecunia non mouet': ꝙ in quo viro proſpectū ſit, hunc dignū ſpectatu arbitrantur Itaq; illa tria, q̄ ꝓpoſita ſūt ad gloriā, ōnia iuſtitia cōficit & beneuolētia, ꝙ ꝓdeſſe vult pluribus: & ob eandē cauſā fidē & admirationē habet, ꝙ eas res, ſpernit & negligit, ad quas pleriq; inflāmati auiditate rapiunt'. Ac mea quidē ſentētia, omnis ratio & inſtitutio vitę adiumenta hominū deſiderat. Inprimiſq; vt habeas, quibus

deſpiſing minde cauſeth a great wondering, and ſpecially iuſtice, of which vertue alone good men be named, ſeemeth to the multitude a wonderfull thing, and not without cauſe. For none can bee iuſt who dreadeth death, paine, banniſhment, or pouertie, nor ania that before equitie preferreth the contraries. And moſt of al they wonder at him who is not tempted with money, and in what man that is well tryed, him thinke they worthie to bee regarded. Therefore iuſtice doth worke all theſe three, which be pointed out for glorie, and gettes good wyll alſo, beeauſe it meanes to profit verie many, and for the ſame cauſe it worketh credit lykewiſe, and admiration, becauſe it deſpiſeth and naught regardeth thoſe thinges, whervnto moſt men inkindled, with greedineſſe be haled. And ſurely after my iudgement, euerie trade and order of lyfe requyreth the aids of men: and chiefly, that ye haue ſome, with whom you may debate in familiar talke:

which

which is harde vnleſſe yee beare vpon you the ſhew of an honeſt manne. Therefore opinion of iuſtice is neceſſarye euen to the alone lyuer and one that leades his lyfe in the fieldes, yea and ſo much the more, becauſe if they haue it not, vniuſt they ſhall bee compted, and beeing garded with no defence, ſhalbe vexed with many iniuries. And to theſe alſo, who doe ſell, buy, hyre, lette, and bee entangled in bargaining buſineſſe, iuſtice too goe thorow with theyr matters, is neceſſary whoſe power is ſo greate: that euen they, who bee fed with euill doinge, and myſchiefe, canne not poſſible lieue without ſome parcell of Iuſtice.

For who ſtealeth, or priuily picketh anye thing from any of them, with whome hee goeth a theeuing, he leaueth not himſelfe a place, no not in robberie. And vnleſſe hee, whoe is named the archepirate, deuyde the pryſe equallye, eyther hee ſhall be ſlaine of his mates, or elſe forſaken.

cum poſſis familiares cõ ferre ſermones: quod eſt difficile, niſi ſpeciem prę te boni viri feras. Ergo etiam ſolitario homini, atque in agro vitam agenti opinio iuſtitię neceſſaria eſt, eòque etiam magis, qd' ſi eam non habebunt, iniuſti habebuntur: & nullis pręſidijs ſepti multis afficientur iniurijs. Atque his etiam qui vendunt emunt, conducunt, locãt contrahendiſque negotijs implicantur, iuſticia ad rem gerendam neceſſaria eſt. Cuius tanta vis eſt, vt nec illi quidem qui maleficio & ſcelere paſcuntur, poſſint ſine vlla particula iuſticię viuere. Nam qui eorum cuipiam qui vnà latrocinantur, furatur aliquid aut eripit, is ſibi ne in latrocinio qui dẽ relinquit locũ. Ille autẽ, qui archipirata dicit' niſi ęquabilit' prędã diſpartiat, aut occiditur â ſocijs, aut relinquitur.

Quin

Quam etiã leges latroñ esse dicuntur quibus pareant, quas obseruent. Itaq; propter æquabilẽ prædæ partitionem & Bargulus Illiricus latro (de quo est apud Theopompum) magnas opes habuit: & multo maiores Viriatus Lusitanus, cui quidẽ etiã exercitus nostri, imperatoresque cesserunt: quem C. Lęlius, is qui sapiens vsurpatur, prętor fregit, & comminuit, fœrocitatemq; eius ita repressit, vt facile bellum reliquis traderet. Cũm igitur tanta vis iustitiæ sit, vt ea etiam latronum opes firmet, atque ageat: quantum eius vim inter leges, & iuditia, & instituta Reipub. fore putamus? Mihi quidem non apud Medos solum (vt ait Herodotus) sed etiam apud maiores nostros iustitiæ seruandæ causa videntur olim bene morari reges constituti:

Yea and it is sayd there are lawes among theeues, whereto they obeye, and doe obserue them. And so by reason of the euen portioning of the prise, both Bargulus, the Illirian robber, of whome mencion is made in Theopompus had greate rychesse: and much greater had Viriatus the Lusitane, to whome of trouth euen our armyes, and Captaynes gaue place, whome Caius Lelius, hee that was commonly called the wise, beeing Pretor, did dyscomfite, and abate, & so alayd his fiersenesse, that he left an easye warre to other. Seing then the strength of Justice is so great: that it also stablisheth and encreased robbers riches, how great suppose we the power therof to be among lawes and iudgementes, and ordinaunces of a Common weale? Certesse me thinke, not onely among the Medes (as telleth Herodotus) but also among our auncesters, in olde tyme, well condicioned Kinges haue beene ordeyned, for ỹ end of enioying iustice.

For

For at the beginninge, when the multitude was oppressed by them, who had the greater power: for refuge they fledde to some one excellinge in vertue, who when hee saued the weaker from iniury, by paintinge out an equitie, kepte the highest with the lowest in difference of law.

And the like cause there was of makinge lawes, as of kinges: for euermore an egall right hath beene sought for otherwyse it were not a right.

If they obtayned the same at the handes of one iuste, and good manne, with him they were contented: when that chaunced not, lawes were deuised: which with all men alwayes in one, and a like voyce should speake.

Wherefore this is doubtlesse a cleare case: that they were wont to bee chosen to gouerne: of whose iustice the oppinion of the multytude was great.

And this thereto adioyned, that they also might bee compted wyse? there

Nam cũm premeretur initio multitudo ab ijs q̃ maiores opes habebant, ad vnum aliquem confugiebant virtute præstantem, qui cum prohiberet iniuria tenuiores, æquitate constituenda, summos cum infimis pari iure retinebat.

Eademque constituendarum legũ fuit causa, quæ regum. Ius enim sẽper est quęsitũ æquabile neque enim aliter esset ius.

Id si abvno bono & iusto viro cõsequebantur: eo erant contenti: Cũm id minus contingeret: leges sunt inuentæ, quæ cum omnibus semper vna atque eadem voce loquerentur. Ergo hoc quidem perspicuum est, eos ad imperandum deligi solitos, quorum de iustitia magna esset opinio multitudinis.

Adiuncto vero hoc, vt ijdem etiam prudentes

tes haberentur : nihil erat qd' homines his autoribus non posse consequi se arbitrarentur Omni igitur ratione colenda & retinenda iustitia est, tum ipsa propter se (nam aliter iustitia non esset) tum propter amplificationem honoris & gloriæ. Sed vt pecunię non quæ rendæ solum ratio est, verum etiam collocandę, quæ perpetuos sumptus suppeditat, nec solũ necessarios, sed etiam liberales: sic gloria & querenda & collocanda ratione est. Quanquã pręclarè Socrates, hanc viam ad gloriam proximã & quasi compendiariam dicebat esse si quis id ageret, vt qualis haberi vellet talis esset. Quod si quis simulatione, & inani ostentatione & ficto non modó sermone sed etiam vultu stabilem se gloriam consequi possent, vehementer errant.

was nothing, that men vnder those guydes should weene themselues vnable too attayne.

Justice therefore is by all manner meanes to bee regarded, and maintained: both it for it selfe sake (for els it wer not Justice) and also for the enlargement of honour and glory.

But as there is a way not onely of getting money, but also of bestowing it, which may suffice for continual charges, not onely such as be necessarie, but also liberal, so glorie must bee both gotten, and ordered by a meane.

Notwithstanding notably Socrates dyd saye, this to bee the neareſt, and (as it were) the gaine waye to glorye, if a man would endeuour this, to bee in deede suche as he would be compted.

And if any doe deeme themselues able to attayne stedfast glorye, by false pretence, and vaine outshew, both with fained speach and countenaunce, they be farre out of the way.

The

The true glorie taketh deepe roote, and also shootes abroad: all counterfait things doe soone shedde, as doe the lyttle flowers, neyther canne there anie forged thing bee durable. Witnesses verie many there be on both sides: but for shortnesse sake, wee will be contented with one family.

For Tiberius Gracchus, Publius sonne, so long shall be praised, as remembraunce of the Romane state shall stand.

But his sonnes neyther lyuing were lyked of good men, and dyd goe in the number of men ryghtfully put to death. Let them then who so the true glorie will attaine, performe the duties of iustice. what those were, it was told in the former booke. But to the end, that soone you maye seeme such manner men as wee be, although the greatest effect is euen in this pointe that wee bee such, as wee woulde bee counted: yet certayne preceptes are to bee giuen.

Vera gloria radices aget, atque etiam propagatur, ficta omnia celeriter, tanquam floſculi decidunt: nec ſimulatū poteſt quicquā eſſe diuturnū. Teſtes ſunt permulti in vtranque partem, ſed breuitatis cauſa, familia cōtenti erimus vna.

Tiberius enim Gracchus Publij filius, tamdiu laudabit', dum memoria rerum Romanorum manebit. At eius filij nec viui probabantur à bonis & mortuī numerum obtinent iure cæſorum. Qui igit' a dipiſci verā iuſtitiæ gloriam volet, iuſtitię fungatur officijs: ea quæ eſſent, dictum eſt in ſuperiore lib. Sed vt facilī mè quales ſimus, tales eſſe videamur (& ſi in eo ipſo vis maxima eſt, vt ſimus ij, qui haberī velimus) tamen quædam præcepta danda ſunt.

Nam ſi quis ab ineunte ætate habet cauſã celibritatis et nominis aut a patre acceptã (qd'tibi mi Cicero arbitror cõtigiſſe)aut aliquo caſu atq; fortuna in hunc oculi omnium conijciuntur,atq; in eum quid agat, quemadmodũ viuat in quiritur & tanquam in clariſſima luce verſetur, ita vt nullum obſcurũ poteſt nec dictum eius eſſe, nec factũ. Quorum autem prima ætas propter humilitatem & odſcuritatem,in hominum ignoratione verſatur:hi ſimul ac iuuenes eſſe cœperunt, magna ſpectare, & ad ea rectis ſtudijs debent contẽdere, quod eo firmiore animo facient, quia non modo non inuidetur illi ætati, verũ etiam fauetur. Prima igitur eſt adoloſcenti cõmendatio ad gloriam, ſi qua ex bellicis rebus cõparari poteſt, in qua multi apud maiores no

For if anie from his firſt entered age hath cauſe of name and fame, either receiued of his father, which to you, my Cicero, I ſuppoſe to haue happened, or by anie chaunce and fortune:on him all mens eyes are caſt,and of him there is ſearching what hee doth,& how hee liueth: and ſo as though hee ſhoulde leade his life in moſt open light,neither word nor deede of his can bee vnknowen.

But whoſe firſt age is paſſed without mens knowledge by reaſon of baſeneſſe and vnknowen name: theſe,as ſoone as they beginne to bee young men,ought to loke after great things,and to preaſe vnto the ſame wyth direct ſtudyes. Which they ſhall dooe wyth ſo much the better courage, becauſe age is not onelye not enuyed, but alſe fauoured. The chiefe ſetting forth then for a young man to glory is, if anie praiſe maye bee gotten by feates of armes: wherein manye haue ſhewed themſelues among our auncеſtors, for warres were almoſt contin-

maily kept . But your age chaunced vppon that warre: where the one side hadde too much mischiefe, the other luttle good fortune . In which warre yet, when Pompeius had made you captaine of the one wing: both of a man most noble, and of the armie, you got greate praise with riding, with throwing the dart, and susteyning all things wyth a souldieriyke painefulnesse . And verilye that your praise and the common weale fel together. But of me this treatise is not taken in hand, touching you, but touching the whole generalitie. Wherefore let vs goe forwarde to such thinges as dooe remaine.

And then in other matters, the workes of the minde bee much more, then of the bodie: so those thinges which with wit and reason wee goe through, bee of more grace, then those which we doe with strength.

The first commendation then proceedeth of sober moode: the next, of naturall

stros extiterunt. Semper nam ferè bella gerebantur. Tua autem ætas incidit in id bellum, cuius altera pars sceleris nimium habuit, altera fœlicitatis parum. Quo tamen in bello cum te Põpeius alæ alteri præfecisset, magnam laudem et à summo viro & ab exercitu consequebare equitando, iaculando, omniaq; militari labore tolerando. Atque ea quidem tua laus pariter cum Repub, cecidit. Mihi autem hęc oratio suscepta non de te est, sed de genere toto. Quamobrem ad ea quæ restãt pergamus.

Vt igitur in reliquis reb⁹ multa maiora sunt opera animi quàm corporis, sic hæres quas persequimur ingenio ac ratione, gratiores sunt quam illę, quas viribus. Prima igitur commendatio, proficiscitur à modestia, tum pietate

in parentes, tum in suos beneuolentia.

Facillimè autem & in optimam partem cognoscuntur adolescentes qui se ad claros & sapientes viros bene consulentes reip. contulerūt: quibus cum si frequentes sunt, opinionem afferunt populo eorum, fore se similes, quos sibi ipsi delegerunt ad imitandum. Publij Rutilij adolescētiā ad opinionem, & innocentię, & iuris scientiæ. P. Mutij commendauit domus.

Nam Lucius quidem Crassus, cum esset admodum adolescens, nō aliunde mutuatus est: sed sibi ipse peperit maximam laudem ex illa accusatione nobili & gloriosa.

Ex qua ætate qui exercentur, laudibus affici solent, vt Demosthenem accepimus: ea ætate Lucius Crassus ostendit, id se in foro

duetie towarde parents: the third of good will towarde theyrs.

But to the best commendation young men be knowen sooneſt of all, who haue bestowed themselues with noble and wise men, well counsayling the common weale: on whom if they bee attendaunt, they bring the people in beleeue, that they wyll prooue lyke them, whome they haue chosen themselues to followe. Publius Mutius house dyd set out Publius Rutilius youth state, for opinion both of harmeleſſe lyfe, and of knowledge in the lawe.

For as for Lucius Crassus, when he was a verie younge man, hee borrowed not from anie other place, but wanne himselfe a verye great praise by that noble and glorious accusation.

And in which age they, who haue exercises, are wont to be aduaunced with praise, as we haue heard by Demosthenes: in the same age Lucius Crassus did shew himselfe in

open

open court, to doo that verye well, hauing forestudyed: which euen then at home with praise hee might haue exercised.

But whereas there be two sortes of speach, whereof in the one is familiar talke, in the other vehemence: it is no doubte, but the vehemence of speach may dooe most, and hath the greater furtherance to glorye.

For that is the thing which wee doo call eloquence: but yet it is hard to tel how much a gentlenesse and familiarnes of speech winneth mennes mindes.

There be letters abroad of Philippus to Alexander, and of Antipater to Cassander, and of Antigonus to Philippus, three verie wise men) for so wee haue hearde, in which they giue rules, that with gentle speach they allure the heartes of the multitude, to owe their good will, and that they please their souldiers, by speaking to them with faire words.

optime iam præmeditatum facere, quod eti am tum poterat domi cum laude meditari.

Sed cum duplex ratio sit orationis, quarum in altera sit sermo, in altera contentio, non est id quidem dubium, quin contentio orationis plurimum possit, & maiorem vim habeat ad gloriam. Ea est enim, quã eloquentiam dicimus. Sed tamen difficile dictu est, quantopere conciliet animos hominũ comitas, affabilitasque sermonis.

Extant epistolæ & Philippi ad Alexandrũ, & Antipatri ad Cassandrum, & Antigoni ad Philippum filium, trium prudentissimorum, (sic enim accepimus) quibus præcipiunt vt oratione benigna multitudinis animos ad beneuolentiam alliciant: militesq; blando appellando sermone deliniãt.

Quæ autem in multitudine cum contentione habetur oratio, ea sæpe vniuersam excitat gloriã. Magna est enim admiratio copiosè sapienterque dicentis, quem qui audiunt, intelligere etiã & sapere plus quã cæteros arbitrantur. Si vero inest in oratione mixta modestiæ grauitas, nil admirabilius fieri potest, eoque magis, si ea sunt in adolescente. Sed cum sint plurima causarum genera, q̃ eloquentiam desiderãt, multiq́ue in nostra Republica adolescẽtes, & apud iudices & apud Senatum dicendo, laudem assequuti sunt: maxima est admiratio in iudicijs. Quorum ratio duplex est. Nã ex accusatione & defensione constat, quarum etsi laudabilior est defensio, tamen etiam accusatio probata persæpe est Dixi paulò ante de Crasso. Idem fecit ado-

But that Oration which is made among the multitude, with vehemence, often times rayseth an vniuersall glorie. For greate is the wonderment at him that plentifully and wisely speaketh: whom the hearers doe iudge also to vnderstand more, and to bee wiser then other. And if in the Oration there bee grauenes mingled with sober moode: nothing there can be done more wonderfull, and so much the more, if those be in a young man. But whereas there be very many kindes of causes which doo require eloquence, and many younge men in our common weale, both before the Iudges, and before the Senate, haue attained praise by speaking in matters: the greatest admiration is in iudiciall causes, the nature whereof is in two partes. For it standeth in accusation, & defence: of which albeit defence is the more commendable, yet also accusation is oftentimes allowed. I spake of Crassus a lyttle before: the leke did

Mar-

Marcus Antonius beeing a young man: an accusation also brought Publius Sulpitius eloquence to lyght, when into iudgement he called the seditious and vnprofitable Citizen, Caius Norbanus. But this soothly is not often to be doone, nor at anie time, vnlesse either for the common weales cause: as did the two Luculli: or for protection sake: as we did for the Silicians, and for the Sardines: Julius Cesar, for Marcus Albutius dyd the lyke. Also Lucius Fucius diligẽce was knowen in the accusing of Marcus Aquilius. Once thẽ it may bee doone, not often certesse. But in case a man must needes doo it often, let him ascribe this office to the common weale: whose enimyes to reuenge often, is not to be reprooued: yet lette there bee a measure present. For of a harde hearted man or rather scarce a man, it seemes vpon manye to bring the daunger of lyfe: for that both is daungerous to himselfe, and also a shamefull

lescens Marcus Antonius: Publij Sulpitij eloquentiam accusatio illustrauit cûm seditiosum & inutilem ciuem Caium Norbanum in iudicium vocauit. Sed hoc quidem non est sæpe faciendum, nec vnquam, nisi aut Reipublicæ causa, vt duo Luculli: aut patrocinio, vt nos pro Siculis, pro Sardis. Pro Marco Albutio, Iulius Cæsar. In accusando etiam Aquilio L. Fusii cognita industria est.

Semel igitur aut non sæpe certe. Sin erit cur faciendum sit sæpius Reipublicę tribuat hoc muneris, cuius inimicos vlcisci sæpe, non est reprehendendum: modus tamen adsit. Duri enim hominis, vel potius vix hominis videtur periculum capitis inferre multis.

Id enim cûm periculosum ipsi est, tum etiam sordidum ad fa-

mam committere, vt ac cusator nominetur.

Quod contigit Marco Bruto, summo genere nato illius filio, qui iuris ciuilis inprimis peritus fuit. Atque etiam hoc præceptum officij diligenter tenendū est, ne quem vnquam innocentem in iudicium capitis accersas, id enim sine scelere fieri nullo pacto potest.

Nam quid est tam inhumanum, quam eloquentiam à natura ad salutem hominū & ad conseruationem datam ad bonorū pestem perniciemque conuertere. Nec tamen vt hoc fugiendum est, ita habendū est religioni, nocentem aliquando, & nefarium, impiumque defendere.

Vult hoc multitudo paritur consuetudo: fert etiam humanitas. Iudicis est sæpe in causis verum sequi: patroni

blot in his name to giue cause that he be named a Promotour.

Which chaunced to Marcus Brutus, borne of a noble stocke, hes sonne, who was verie well skilled in the ciuill lawe. And therto this rule of dutie must be diligently kept: that ye bring no innocent, at anie time in iudgement vpon life: for that can in no wise be doone without hainous wickednesse.

For what is there so vnnaturall, as to turne eloquence, being giuen of nature for the sauegarde and preseruation of men, to the harme and destruction of good men. And yet, as this is to bee eschewed, so it is not to bee accounted contrarie to godlynesse, to defend the guilty otherwhile, and mischieuous, and wycked.

This the multitude desireth, custome beareth, humanitye also worketh.

The iudges part is, euermore in causes to followe the trouth: the counsellers parte,

many

many times to defende the trouth lyke, though it bee not so true: which to write, I would not bee bolde, namely, seeing I treate of Philosophie, but that the same lyked Panetius, the graueſt of the Stoikes.

But moſt of all by defending, both glorie and fauour is gotten: and so much the more: if euer it befall that hee be defended, who doth seeme to be beſet, and preſſed with the riches of anie man of power: as our ſelfe did both often at other times, and also being young, for Sextus Roſius the Amerine, agaynſt the myght of Lucius Sylla, bearing swaye: which Oration (as yee wot) is abroade.

But now we haue ſet forth young mens duties, which auaile to the attaining of glorie: hereafter we muſt ſpeake of bountifulneſſe and liberalitie. Wherof two maner waies there be.

For lyberall dealing is ſhewed to ſuch as need, either by trauaile, or with money,

nonnunquam veriſimile, etiam ſi minus ſit verum defendere.

Quod ſcribere (præſertim cũ de philoſophia ſcriberẽ) non auderem, niſi idem placeret grauiſſimo Stoicorum Panætio.

Maximè autem & gloria paritur & grãtia, defenſionibus: eoq; maior, ſi quando accidit, vt ei ſubueniatur, qui potentis alicuius opibus, circumueniri, vrgeriq́ue videatur: vt nos et ſæpealias: & adoleſcentes contra L. Syllæ dominantis opes, pro Sexto Roſcio Amerino fecimus, quę (vt ſcis extat oratio. Sed expoſitis adoleſcentũ officijs, quæ valeant ad gloriam adipiſcendam, deinceps de beneficentia ac liberalitate dicennum eſt, cuius eſt ratio duplex.

Nam aut opera benignè fit indigentibus, aut pecunia.

Fa-

Facilior est hæc posterior locupleti præsertim: sed illa lautior ac splendidior & viro forti claroque dignior. Quanquam enim in vtroque inest gratificandi libera lis voluntas, tamen altera ex arca, altera ex virtute depromitur. Largitoque, quæ fit ex re familiari, fontem ipsum benignitatis exhaurit. Ita benignitate benignitas tollit: qua quo in plures vsus sis, eò minus in multos vti possis At qui opera, id est virtute & industria benefici & liberales erunt: primum quo pluribus profuerint, eò plures ad benignè faciendum adiutores habebunt, deinde consuetudine beneficentiæ paratiores erunt, & tanquam exercitatiores ad bene de multis promerendum.

Præclare in epistola quadam, Alexandrum filium Philippus accusat, quòd largitione be-

This latter is the easier, specially to the possessioner, but that other is the goodlier and more glorypous, and meeter for a manly and noble man. For though there is a liberal wyll of pleasuring in both, yet the one out of the coffer, the other out of vertue is taken: and the lauishing which is made of a mans house goods, draweth drie the verie fountayne of lyberalitie: so lyberalitie is by liberalitie wasted: and toward ȳ more that you do vse it, the lesse yee can bee able to vse it towarde many.

But who so shall be bountifull and liberall of trauaile, (that is) of vertue and dilygence: first, the more they haue profited, the more furtherers they shall haue toward dealing liberally: afterward by customable vsing of bounteousnesse, the readyer they shall be, and (as it were) the more practised, to deserue well of many.

Princely doeth Philippus in a certaine Epistle, accuse Alexander his sonne: that

that by lauishnesse he hunteth after the good will of ỹ Macedonians.

What reason, in mischiefe, quoth hee, hath brought you into this hope? that ye should thinke, those would be to you faythfull, whome you hadde corrupted with money. Why goe ye about this, that the Macedonians maye thinke you not theyr king, but theyr seruant and briber? Well, he sayd, seruaunt and briber, because it is vile for a king. Better also he said, in that he called large giuing corruption. For hee that receiueth is made the worse thereby, and the readier alwaies to looke for the lyke. This sayd he to his sonne: but let vs thinke it giuen in precept to vs all, wherefore this certainlye is no doubte, but the same liberalytie which standeth in trauaile and dilygence, both is honester, and also spreadeth farther, and is able to profit mo.

Oftentimes yet a man must giue largely: and this kinde of liberality is not to be

neuolentiam, Macedonum consectetur. Quæ te malū inquit ratio in istam spem induxit: vt eos tibi fideles putares fore, quos pecunia corrupisses. An tu id agis, vt Macedones non te Regem suum, sed ministrum, & prebitorem putent: bene ministrū & prebitorem, quia sordidum Regi: melius etiam, quod largitionē corrupteiam dixit esse. Fit enim deterior qui accipit, atque ad id idē semper expectandū paratior. Hoc ille filio, sed preceptum putem⁹ omnibus.

Quamobrem id quidem non est dubium, quin illa benignitas, quæ constat ex opera et industria, & honestior sit, & latius pateat & possit prodesse pluribus.

Nonnunquam tamen est largiendum: nec hoc benignitatis genus omnino repudiandum

dum est: & sæpe idoneis hominibus indigentibus de re familiari impartiendum: sed diligenter atque moderate.

Multi nam patrimonia effuderunt inconsulte largiendo. Quid autem est stultius quam quod libenter facias, curare vt id diutiꝰ facere non possis? Atq; etiam sequuntur largitionem rapinę. Cûm enim dando egere cœperint, allienis bonis manus afferre coguntur. Ita cum beneuolentiæ comparandæ causa benefici esse velint: non tãta studia assequuntur eorũ, quibus dederunt, quanta odia eorũ, quibus ademerunt. Quamobrem nec ita claudenda est res familiaris, vt eam benignitas aperire nõ possit: nec ita reserãda, vt pateat omnibus. Modus adhibeatur, isq; referatur ad facultates Omnino meminisse de-

vtterly cast of: and we must many times giue parte of our substaunce to meete men, that haue neede: but wee must dooe it heedfullye and measurably.

For diuerse haue spoild out their liueloodo, by lauishing it vnaduisedly. But what is foolisher, then to cause that you canne no longer dooe the thing which ye loue to dooe? And also spoile followeth of lauishnesse. For when by giuing they begin to be needie, they be driuen to lay hand on other mens goods: so when they wouide bee beneficiall, for cause of good wil getting, they purchase not so greate loue of theyrs, to whome they gaue: as of them they gette hatred, from whome they tooke.

Wherefore neyther a mans substaunce is so to bee shutte vp, that lyberalytie cannot open it, nor so to bee vnlocked, that it lye abroade for euerye bodie. A measure is to be kept, and let it be referred to abilitie. In ante wyse wee must remember that,

which

which with our menne is very oft in vſage, and nowe is come into the cuſtome of a prouerbe, that lauiſhneſſe findes no bottome.

For what ſtaye can there bee when both they, who are wont to it, and other doe deſire one thinge? In all there bee two ſortes of large geeuers, of which the one bee called foole-large, the other liberall.

Foole-large wee call them who with open feaſtes, and fleſhgiftes, and fenſeſhowes, and furniture of ſightes, and huntings, power out theyre money on thoſe things wherof they ſhall leaue a memorye eyther ſhort, or none at all.

But liberal they be named who with theyr riches doth raunſome men taken by pray ſeekers, or for theyr friendes ſakes, doe become ſuertie for debte, or doe ayde them in theyr daughters preferment of mariage, or els doe helpe them eyther in getting or encreaſing theyr goods.

And therefore I maruaile

bemus id, qd' a noſtris hominibus ſæpiſſimè vſurpatum, iamque in prouerbij conſuetudinem venit: Largitionē Fundum nom Habere.

Etenim quis poteſt eſſe modus, cùm idem & qui conſueuerunt, & idem illud alij deſiderent? Omnino duo ſunt genera largorum, quorum alteri prodigi qui epulis & viſcerationibus, & gladiatorum muneribus, ludorum venationumque apparatu pecunias profundunt in eas res, quarum memoriam, aut breuem, aut nullam omnino ſint relicturi.

Liberales autem, qui ſuis facultatibus, aut captos a prædonibus redimunt aut æs alienum ſuſcipiunt amicorum cauſa, aut in filiarum collocatione adiuuant, aut opitulantur, vel in re querenda vel augenda. Itaque miror quid in mētem venerit

Theophrasto in eo, libro, quem de diuicijs scripsit: in quo multa pręclare, illud absurdè. Est enim multus in laudanda magnificentia & apparatione popularium munerum: taliumque sumptuum facultatem, fructum diuitiarum putat. Mihi autem ille fructus liberalitatis, cuius exempla pauca posui, multò & maior videtur, & certior. Quanto Aristoteles grauius & verius nos reprehendit: qui has effusiones pecuniarum non admiremur, quę fiunt admultiudinem delinicndā: aut ij qui ab hostibus obsidentur si emere aquę sectarium mina cogerentur, hoc primo auditu incredible nobis videri, omnesque mirari, sed cum attenderimus, veniam necessitati dare: in his immanibus iacturis, infinitisque sumptibus nihil nos magnopę mirari

what came in Theophrastus minde, in that booke, which he wrote of ritches, wherein he spake many thinges notably but this out of course. For hee is much in prayling great sumptuousnesse, and furnishment of people pleasing shewes: and he deemeth the ableneſſe of such charges to be the fruit of riches. But me thinketh that fruite of liberalitie, whereof I haue put a few examples is both greater and more certaine.

How much more grauely and trewlie dothe Aristotle reproue vs: who are not in a wondermente at these lasshynges oute of moneye, whiche be done to clawe the multitude: but in case theye whoe are besieged of enemies, shoulde be driuen too buye a quarte of water for tenne crownes: that thys at firste hearing, seemeth to vs vncredible, and all make a maruaile at it: but when wee haue geuen good heede thereto we hold with necessity yet wee make no great marnaul at these exceeding losses

and

and endeleſſe charges, when ſpecially neither neceſſitie is relieued, nor worſhippe encreaſed, and that ſelfe ſame clawing of the multitude ſhal endure for a ſhort, and a ſmall while: yea and that with euerye of the lighteſt mindes, and yet in the very ſame, euen together with the fulneſſe, the remembrance alſo of the pleaſure dyeth.

It is alſo well gathered, that theſe ſhowes be well lyked of children, and women, and ſlaues, and freemen moſt like vnto ſlaues, but that no wayes they can be allowed of a ſage man, and one that with a grounded iudgement weieth thoſe thinges, that bee done.

Neuertheleſſe I perceiue in our Citie, it hath growen into vſe, nowe in this good world: that the gaye ſhewes of the Ediles office is looked for, euen of the beſt menne. Therefore Publius craſſus both by ſurname riche, and alſo in ſubſtaunce, kepte his Edile Office marueilous, ſumptuouſly, and ſoone af-

cûm pręſertim neque neceſſitati ſubueniatur, neque dignitas augeatur: ipſaque illa dilinitio multitudinis ad breue, exiguumque duratura ſit tempus: eaque a leuiſſimo quoque animo, in quo tamen ipſo vnâ cum ſatietate memoria quoquê moriatur voluptatis.

Bene etiam colligitur, hęc pueris, & mulierculis, & ſeruis, & ſeruorum ſimilimis liberis eſſe grata, graui vero homini, & ea quę fiunt, iuditio certo ponderanti probari poſſe nullo modo.

Quanquam intelligo in noſtra ciuitate inueteraſſe iam bonis temporibus, vt ſpendor ædilitatum ab optimis viris poſtuletur.

Itaquê P. Craſſus cûm cognomine diues, tum etiam copijs, functus eſt ædilitio maximo munere. Et paulô poſt I. Craſſus cum omnium

hominum moderatiſſimo Quinto Mutio magnificentiſſima ædilitate functus eſt. Deinde C. Claudius Appij filius.

Multi poſt vt: Lucullis, Hortenſius, Sylanus Omes autem P. Lentulus me conſule vicit ſuperiores. Hunc eſt Scaurus imitatus.

Magnificentiſſima vero noſtri Pompeij munera ſecundo conſulatu: in quibus omnibus, quid mihi placeat, vides. Vitanda tamen eſt ſuſpicio auaritiæ. Nam Mamerco homini ditiſſimo prætermiſſio ædilitatis conſulatus repulſam attulit. Quare & ſi poſtulatur a populo, bonis viris ſi non deſiderantibus, attamen approbantibus, faciendum eſt modô pro facultatibus, nos ipſi vt fecimus.

Et ſi quando aliqua res maior, aut vtilior populari largitione acquirit'

ter Lucius Craſſus, with Quintus Mucius the greateſt meanekeper of all menne, kept the tyme of their Edile office moſt royally. Thē came Caius Claudius, Appius ſonne. Afterward ſucceded many as Lucullus Hortenſius, Sillanus. But Publius Lentulus, when I was Conſul, paſſed all his predeceſſours, Scaurus followed him. But our Pompeius ſhewes, in his ſeconde Conſulſhippe, were the coſtlyer of all, in euery deale wherof you ſee what lyketh me, wee muſt yet auoyde ſuſpicion of couetouſneſſe. For the refuſall of the Edileſhippe brought to Mamercus, a very rich man, a fall for the Conſulſhippe, wherefore the thinge is to be done both if it bee called for of the people, and good men, though they doe not require it, doe yet allow it, ſo it bee according to ones abilitie, as we our ſelfe haue done: and alſo, if any greater and more profitable thinge is wonne at anye tyme, by people pleaſinge largeſſe, as of late,

a great

a greate honour to Orestes were the dinings in open wayes, in name of his tenths. No nor it was not counted a reproch to Marcus Scius: that in a dearth of corne, hee gaue to the people for foure pence a bushell. For from a greate and a long festered enuie, he deliuered himselfe, neither by a dishoneſt losse, seeing he was Edile, nor yet verie great. But alate it was passing high honour to our Milo, because for the common weales sake, which in our safetie consisteth, with hired fence men he suppressed al Publius Clodius attempts and rages. There is therefore cause of largesse, if either it be necessarie or profitable. And yet in the same the rule of meane-keeping is best. Certes Lucius Philippus, Quintus sonne, a man of great wit, and most famous, was woont to glorie, that hee without anye gifte giuing, had attained all manner dignityes, which wer counted most honourable. The lyke sayd Cotta Curia,

vt Oresti nuper prandia in semitis, decimæ nomine, magno honori fuerunt. Nec Marco quidé Scio vitio datum est, q̃ in caritate annonæ asse modium populo dedit. Magna enim se & inueterata inuidia, nec turpi iactura, quando erat Aedilis nec maxima liberauit. Sed honori sũmo nuper nostro Milõni fuit, quod gladiatoribus emptis Reipublicæ causa, quę salute nostra continebatur, omnes Publij Clodij conatus furoresque compressit. Causa igitur largitionis est, si aut necesse est aut vtile. In his autem ipsis, mediocritatis regula optima est. L. quidem Philippus Q. Fabij filius magno vir ingenio, inprimisq; clarus gloriari solebat: se sine vllo munere adeptum esse omnia, quę habere tur amplissima. Dicebat idem Cotta Curia.

Nobis quoque licet in hoc quodam modo gloriari. Nam pro amplitudine honorū, quos cunctis suffragijs adepti sumus, nostro quidem anno (quod contigit eorum nemini, quos modo nominaui) sanè exiguus, sumptus Aedilitatis fuit. Atque etiam illę impēsę meliores sunt: muri, naualia, portus sa quarum ductus, omnia q; quæ ad vsum Reip. pertinent. Quanquam quod præsens tanquam in manu datur iucundius est: tamen hæc in posterum gratiora. Theatra, porticus, noua templa, verecundius reprehendo propter Pompeium: sed doctissimi non probant, vt & hic ipse Panætius, qué multum in his libris sequutus sum, non interpretat⁹: & Phaleri⁹ Demetri⁹ qui Periclem principem Græcię vituperat, q tantā pecuniā in prçclara illa propilæa coniecerit.

wee also in this maye glorie, after a certaine sorte. For doubtlesse small was the cost of our Edileship: in respect of such large honours, as by all mens voyces we attained, euen in our yeare, which hath befaln to none of them whom I named erewhile. And also these expēces be better, which are bestowed vpon citie wals, shippedockes, hauens, conduits, and all that appertaine to the vse of ȳ common wele. Although that is more pleasaunt, which presently is giuen (as it were) in hande, yet for time to come these be more acceptable. Sight courtes, Gallerie walkes, and newe Churches, the more reuerently I finde faulte with, for Pompeius sake: but the best lerned men do not allow thē: as both this same Panetius, whom I haue folowed much in these bookes, and yet not translated him: and also Phalerius Demetrius: who dispraised Pericles, the Prince of Greece, because he layed so much money vpon those goodly Porches.

But

But of this kinde vniuerſallye, it is diligentlye diſputed in thoſe bookes which I wrote of a common weale. The whole manner then of ſuch largeneſſe generallye is faultie, yet for certaine times it is neceſſarie: and then the ſame is both to bee referred to ones abilitie, and to bee tempered wyth a meane keeping.

But in that other kinde of large gyuing, which proceeds of liberalitie, not all alyke in cauſes vnlyke, wee ought to bee diſpoſed. Otherwiſe is his caſe, who is preſſed with miſerie: & otherwiſe his who ſeeketh more wealth hauinge no aduerſitie. Toward the miſerable, liberality ought to bee forwarde: except peraduenture they ſhall be worthie of miſerie. Wee ought yet in no wiſe to be altogether pinchinge towarde thoſe: who woulde haue themſelues to bee holpen, not that they may feele no affliction, but that they maye ryſe to higher degree: neuertheleſſe in chooſinge

Sed de hoc genere toto in his libris quos de Re publica ſcripſi, diligenter eſt diſputatum. Tota igitur ratio taliũ largitionum genere vitioſa eſt, temporibus neceſſaria: & tamẽ ipſa et ad facultates accommodanda, & mediocritate moderanda eſt. In illo autem altero genere largiendi, quod à liberalitate proficiſcitur, non vno modo in diſparibus cauſis, affecti eſſe debemus. Alia cauſa eſt eius, qui calamitate premit', & eius qui res meliores quærit, nullis ſuis rebus aduerſis.

Propenſior benignitas eſſe debebit in calamitoſos, niſi forte erunt digni calamitate. In ijs tamen qui ſe adiuuari volent, non ſolum vt ne affligantur, ſed etiam, vt altiorem gradum aſcendant, reſtricti omnino nullo modo eſſe debem⁹: ſed in diligẽdis

idoneis iudicium, & diligentiã adhibere. Nam præclarè Ennius.

Benefacta male locata,
Malefacta arbitror.

Quod autem tributum est bono viro & grato, in eo cum ex ipso fructus est, tum etiam ex cæteris. Temeritate enim remota, gratissima est liberalitas, eoq; eam studiosius plerique laudant, quod summi cuiusque bonitas commune profugium est omnium. Danda igitur opera est, vt hos beneficijs quam plurimis afficiamus, quorum memoria liberis, posterisque prodatur, vt his ingratis esse non liceat.

Omnes enim immemorem beneficij oderunt, eamque iniuriam in deterenda liberalitate sibi etiam fieri: eumque qui faciat,

out meete men, wee ought to vse a discreation and a dilligence. For notably saith Ennius.

Good deeds, in case they
be euill placed,
Euill deeds I count,
and cleane disgraced.

But what so is giuen to a good man, and a thankfull: therby both there comes fruit from him, & also from other. For so rashnesse bee auoided, liberalitie is verie pleasurful: and so much the more earnestly most men praise it, because euerie greate mans goodnesse is the common refuge of all. Our indeauour therefore is to be doone, that we rewarde them with verie manye benefits: to whose children & ofspring a memorie may be left: so that of good right they can not be vnthankfull. For all men do hate the forgetter of a good tourne, and dooe deeme that wrong euẽ to themselues to be done, in fraying awaye ones liberalitie: and they take him, who causeth it to bee a com-

common enimie of the poore. And this liberalitie also is profitable to the common weale, to haue prisoners redeemed out of captiuitie, and thee poore inriched. Which we see written at large in the Oration of Crassus. that it was wont to be done abroade by vs of the Equestriall order. I place therefore this vsage of liberality before lauishnesse in shewes. This is for graue men and great, that other, (as it were) for flatterers of the people, tickeling, as ye would saie, the lightnes of the multitude with pleasure. But it is meet for a man both to be liberall in giuing, and nothing eager in requyring: and also in euerie matter of bargaining, selling, bueing, hiring, letting, nigh dwellings, and partie boundes, to be iust and gentle, and to remit much of his due to many: but from trauers in lawe to refraine as much as he may: and I wotte not, whether somewhat more also then hee may.

communem hostem, tenuiorum putant. Atque hæc benignitas etiã Reip. vtilis est redim é seruitute captos, locupletari tenuiores: qd' quidem vulgo solitum fieri ab ordine nostro in oratione Crassi scriptum copiose videmus. Hanc ergo consuetudinem benignitatis largitioni munerum longé antepono Hæc est grauium hominum atque magnorum illa quasi assentatorum populi, multitudinis leuitatem voluptate quasi titillantium. Conuenit autem tum in dando munificum esse, tum in exigendo non acerbum, In omniq, re contrahenda vendendo, emendo, conducendo, locando in vicinitatib⁹ & cõfinijs æquũ & facilé multa multis de iure suo cedentẽ: à litib⁹ vero quantũ liceat (& nescio an paulo pl⁹ etiam quã liceat) abhorrentem.

Est enim non modo liberale, paulum nonnũquam de suo iure decedere, sed interdum etiam fructuosum. Habenda autem est ratio rei familiaris, quam quidem delabi sinere, flagitiosũ est: sed ita, vt illiberalitatis, auaritiæque absit suspitio. Posse enim liberalitate vti, non spoliantem se patrimonio, nimirum est pecuniæ fructus maximus. Recte etiam á Theophrasto, est laudata hospitalitas. Est enim (vt mihi quidem videtur) valdè decorũ, patere domos hominum illustriũ illustrib⁹ hospitib⁹. Idq; etiam Reip, est ornamento homines externos hoc liberalitatis genere in vrbe nostra nõ egere. Est etiã vehemẽter vtile ijs, qui honeste multum posse volũt per hospites apud externos populos valere opib⁹ & gratia. Theophrast⁹ scribit quidẽ Cimonem Athenis etiam

For it is not onelye a liberall point, to forgoe somewhat of his right otherwhile, but sometime also profitable. But regarde of a mannes wealth must be hadde, which verilye to suffer to decaie, is a fowle fault, but so, as suspition of niggardlyneſſe and couetousnes be auoided. For no doubt it is the greateſt fruit of money, that a man be able to vſe liberalitie, not making spoyle of his liuelood. Well also is hospitalitie praised of Theophrastus.

For it is (as mee thinketh) verye seemelye noble mennes houses to bee open for noble gueſtes. And that also is an honour to the state, that outlandyſhe men in our Citie do not want this kinde of lyberalytie. It is also exceeding profitable to them, who honestly desire to be able to doo much: to preuaile in power, and fauour by their gueſts, among forreine nations. Theophrastus indeede writeth, ♀ Cimon at Athens also was a good Houſekeeper, for the Laciadans

of

of his ward. Because he toke order so, and commanded his Baylifes, all thinges shoulde bee offered, to whatsoeuer Laciadan tourned into his mannour.

But these benefits which be bestowed by trauaile, and not by large giftes, are employed both vpon the whole common weale, and vpon euerie citizen a part. For in lawe to gyue aduise, with counsaile to helpe and to further verie manye with this kinde of science: it auaileth verie much, both to the encrease of riches, and also to fauor. Therfore as ther were manie worthy things of our auncestors, so alwaies in greate prise was the knowledge, and the opening of the right well ordained ciuill law: which truly before this turmoile of times, rulers receyued in ỹ due estimation: now as honour, and as euerie degree of worship, so the glorie of this science is blotted out. And that is so much the shamefuller, because this happened at that time: when he reigned, who in knowledge

in suos curiales Laciadas hospitalē fuisse. Ita enim instituisse, & villicis imperauisse, vt omnia prębereť, quicunq; Laciades in villā suā diuertisset. Quæ autē opera nō largitione, beneficia dātur: hęc tū in vniuersā Rēp. tū in singulos ciues cōferūť. Nā in iure cauere. cōsilio iuuare atq; hoc scientię genere ꝑdesse quā plurimis vehemēter, & ad opes augendas pertinet, & ad gratiā. Itaq; cum multa præclara maiorū, tum quā optimē cōstituti iuris ciuilis sūmo sēper in honore fuit cognitio, atq; interpretatio: q̄ quidē ante hanc cōfusionē tēporum in possessione sua principes retinuer'. Nūc vt honores, vt omnes dignitatis gradus, sic huius scientiæ splendor delectus est.

Idque eo indignius, quod eo tempore hoc contigit, cum is esset, qui omnes superiores, qui-

quib⁹ honore par esset, scientia facile vicisset. Hæc igitur opera grata multis, & ad beneficijs obstringendos homines accommodata. Atque huic arti finitima est dicendi grauior facultas, & gratior, & ornatior. Quid enim eloquentia laudabilius, & præstabilius, vel admiratione audientium, vel spe indigentiũ, vel eorum qui defensi sunt gratia?

Huic quoq; ergo à maioribus nostris est in tota dignitate principat⁹ datus, Deserti igirur hominis, & facile laborantes quodque in patrijs est moribus multorum causas & non grauatè & gratuitô defendentis, beneficia & patrocinia latè patent.

Admonebat ne res, vt hoc quoque loco in termissionem eloquentiæ, ne dicam interitum deplorarem: nisi vererer ne de me ipso aliquid

cleerely exceeded all his foregoers, to whom hee had beene peere in honour. This trauaile therefore is pleasurefull to manye, and verye fitte, to binde men with benefites. And the grauer, and gracefuller, and trimmer feate of oratorie is neere cosin to this science.

For what is more prayse worthie and better then eloquence? either for the admiration of the hearers, or the hope of the needers, or for their cause, who haue beene defended. Therefore to this likewise a preheminence in all honour was giuen of our elders. The benefits then, and the pleading of a fine spoken man, and gladly taking paines, and (as it is in his Countrie fashion) both not vnwillingly, and also frely defending many mens causes, be farre spred abroad.

The matter hath put me in minde, that in this place also I shoulde bewaile the discontinuaunce, I will not saye the destruction of eloquence: but that I feared, least touching

thing my ſelfe ſomewhat I ſhoulde ſeeme to complaine. Notwithſtandinge wee ſee what notable Orators haue bene put out of the waie: and how in a few a hope, in fewer a ſkill, in many a boldneſſe there remaines. But ſeeing neither al, nor yet many cā be either cunning in the lawe, or wel ſpoken men: one yet with trauaile maye further many, that ſheweth for their cōmodityes, that ſpeaketh in their fauor to the iudges, and magiſtrates: that ſleepeth not out anothers cauſe, that intreateth thoſe ſame, who either bee counſellers or defenders: which who ſo doo, they attaine verie much fauour, & theyr painfulneſſe floweth all abroad.

Now they are not to be admoniſhed of this (for it is wel knowen) that they take heed: when they will helpe other, ẏ they offēd none: for oftētimes either they hurt them, whom they ſhuld not: or them whō it is not behoueable: if vnwarily they do it, of negligence it is: viderer quæri. Sed tamē videmus quibus extinctis oratoribus quàm in paucis ſpes, quanto in paucioribus facultas, quàm in multis ſit audacia. Cum autem omnes non poſſint, ne multi quidē, aut iuris periti eſſe aut diſerti: licet tamen opera prodeſſe multis, beneficia petentem, commendantem iudicibus, aut magiſtratibus: vigilantem pro re alterius, eoſque ipſos qui aut conſulunt, aut defendunt rogantem, quod qui faciunt plurimum gratiæ conſequū tur latiſſimeque eorum manat induſtria.

Iam illud non ſunt admonendi (eſt enim in promptu) vt animaduertant, cum iuuare alios velint, ne quos offendant, Sępe enim, aut eos lædunt quos non debent, aut eos quos non expedit. Si imprudentes negligentiæ eſt: ſi

si scientes, temeritatis. Vtendum enim est excusatione aduersos eos, quos inuitus offendas quacunque possis, quare id quod feceris necesse fuerit, nec aliter facere potueris, certisque operis & officijs erit id, quod violatum est, compensandum. Sed cum in hominibus iuuandis aut mores spectari, aut fortuna soleat, dictu quidē est procliue: itaque vulgo loquuntur, sese in beneficijs collocandis mores hominum non fortunam sequi honesta oratio est. Sed quis est tandem, qui in opis & optimi viri causæ, non anteponat in opera danda gratiam fortunati & potentis: A quo enim expeditior & celerior remuneratio fere videtur, in eum ferē est voluntas nostra propensior.

Sed animaduertendum est diligentius,

if wittingly, of rashnesse it comes. You must vse also to them, whome you offende against your wyll, such an excuse as yee maye: for what cause the same that you haue done was necessarie, and you could not doe otherwise: and that which was doone offensiuely, shall bee recompensed with other trauails, & friendly doings.

But whereas in helping men, eyther theyr conditions are wont to be considered, or theyr estate: indeed it is soone sayd, and so they do commonly speake: that in bestowing their benefites, they regarde mens manners, and not theyr estate. An honest saying it is, but who is there at all, which in bestowing his trauaile, doth not preferre the fauour of a rich man, and one of power, before the poore, & a right good mans cause? For from whome, wee thinke a speedyer, and readier recompence wyll come: to himwardes commonlye our good wyll is the more inclined. But wee must marke more diligentlye what

what is the nature of things. For verely though the poore man cānot rēder due thanks, yet if he be a good man, owe them forsooth he maye. This surely was in place, whosoeuer sayd it. Money who haueth in hand, hath not paide: and who hath paide, haueth in minde: but thanks both who hath paide, haueth in minde, & who haueth in minde, hath rendered. But these, who count themselues rich, honorable, and wealfull, wil not be once bounde to a man for a pleasure: but they thinke rather that they haue doone a pleasure: when, yea, although they baue taken some greate thing, they suspect somewhat lykewise of them, either to be craued, or looked for, but they recken it euen like a death: that they shuld seeme to haue vsed ones furtheraunce, or should be called hangers on. But the other poore man, thinking himselfe regarded, & not his state, when any thing is done vnto him: desires that he may be thought thankfull

quæ natura rerum sit. Nimirum enim inops ille, si bonus est vir, etiam si referre gratiā non potest: habere certe potest. Commodè autē quicunque dixit, pecuniam qui habeat, non reddidisse: & qui reddiderit non habere: gratiam autem & qui retulerit habere, & qui habeat retulisse. At qui se locupletes, honoratos, beatos putant, hi ne obligari quidem beneficio volunt: quin etiam beneficium se dedisse arbitrantur, cum ipsi quamuis aliquid magnum acceperint, atque etiam à se aut postulari, aut expectari aliquid suspicātur. Patrocinio verose vsos, aut clientes appellari, mortis instar putant.

At vero ille tenuis cum quicquid factum sit, sese spectatum, non fortunam putat: non modo illi qui est meritus, sed etiā illis a quibus

bus ſpectat (eget enim multis) gratum ſe videri ſtudet. Neque vero verbis auget ſuum munus, ſi quo forte fungitur: ſed etiam extenuat videndumque illud idem, quod ſi opulentum, fortunatumq; defenderis: in vno illo, aut forte in liberis eius manet gratia. Sin autē inopem, probū tamen & modeſtum, omnes non improbi humiles, (quæ magna in populo multitudo eſt) præſidium ſibi paratum vident.

Quamobrem melius apud bonos, quā apud fortunatos beneficium collocari puto. Danda tamē omnino opera eſt vt omni generi ſatisfacere poſſimus. Sed ſi res in contentionem venient, nimirum Themiſtocles eſt author adhibendus: qui cū conſuleret' vtrū bono viro pauperi, aut minus probato diuiti filiam collocaret,

onely to him, who haue deſerued it, but alſo to them (for he ſtandes in neede of many) of whome hee lookes for ought. Not yet with wordes he ſets out his ſeruice, if perhaps he doe anie, but alſo abateth it. And this ſame poynt is to be conſidered, that if you defend a rich and a wealthie man, the thanke remaynes to him alone, or perchance in his children: but if you dooe it for him that is poore, and yet honeſt and diſcreete, all ỹ meane degree, beeing not diſhoneſt, (which is a greate multitude among the people) do ſee ſuccour prepared for them. Wherfore I thinke a benefite better to be beſtowed vpon good men, then vppon riche. Yet alwayes wee muſt giue our endeauour, that we may content all manner of men: but if the matter ſhall come into compariſon, verelye Themiſtocles is to bee taken for an Author: who, when he was aſked counſaile, whether one ſhould beſtowe his daughter vppon a good poore man, or a riche man not ſo honeſt:

I (quod he) doe rather like a man, who lacketh money, than money which wanteth a man.

But maners be corrupted and marred, by ouer regarding riches, what doth the great store thereof perteyne to euery one of vs: perauenture it helpeth him, that hath it: and that was not alwaies. But graunt it helps, in deede he may bee the mightier but which way may he be the honester man? And if the rich man be also a good man, lette not his riches hynder him, and cause him to finde the lesse helpe, so they further him not: and lette a manner whole iudgement be, not how rich, but what manner man eche one is. And in bestowing benefites, and trauaile the last lesson is that you labour nothing against equitie, and nothing with wrong. For iustice is the ground of a continual cõmendation & fame, without which, nothīg cã be praisable. But seeing we haue spoken of such kind of benefites, as belong to eche seueral man

ego verô inquit, malo vitum qui pecunia egeat, quam pecuniam, q̃ viro. Sed córrupti mores, deprauatiq́, sunt ad miratione diuitiarum: quarum magnitudo, quid ad vnũ quemq́; nostrũ pertinet: illum fortasse adiuuat, qui habet ne id quidem semper. Sed fac iuuare, potentior sane sit, honestior vero quomodo? Quod si etiam bonus erit vir: ne impediant diuitiæ quo minus iuuetur, modô ne adiuuent, sitq́; omne iudicium non quâm locuples, sed qualis quisque sit. Extremum autẽ preceptum in beneficijs operaque danda est, ne quid contra æquitatem contendas, ne quid pro iniuria.

Fundamentum enim perpetuæ commendationis & famę est iustitia, sine qua nihil potest esse laudabile, sed quoniam de eo genere beneficiorum dictum est, qd'

ad

ad ſingulos ſpectant, de inceps de ijs, quæ ad vniuerſos, quæque ad Remp. pertinent diſputandum eſt. Eorum autē ipſorum partim eiuſmodi ſunt, vt ad vniuerſos ciues pertineant, partim ſingulos vt attingāt, quę ſont etiā gratiora. Danda eſt opera omnino ſi poſſit vtriſque, nec minus vt etiam ſingulis cō ſulatur: ſed ita vt ea res aut pro ſit, aut certè ne obſit Reipub. C. Helij, & T. Gracchi frumentaria magna largitio fuit, exhauriebat igitur ærarium, modica M. Octauij, & Reipub. tolerabilis, & plebi neceſſaria: ergo & ciuibus & Reipub. ſalutaris.

Inprimis autem videndum erit ei, qui Rempub. adminiſtrabit: vt ſuum quiſque teneat: neque de bonis priuatorum publicè diminutio fiat.

Pernitioſè enim Phillippus in tribunatu,

hereafter wee muſt treate of thoſe which pertaine too all men, and to a common weale. And ſome of thoſe ſame be of ſuch ſort, ỹ they pertein to the whole number of Citizens, ſome that they concerne euery free man, which bee alſo more fauourable. A diligens doubtleſſe ther muſt be geuen, if it may, that it bee prouided for both, and no leſſe alſo, for euery one, but ſo, as the thing either may furder or at leaſt not hinder the commō weale. Caius Gracchus corndole was great, he waſted therfore the treaſurie. Marcus Octauius made ſuch a one, as was meaſurable, and as the common weale might beare, and neceſſarie for the people, and therefore wealfull both to the citizens, and alſo to the ſtate. But ſpecially it muſt be ſeene to of him, who ſhall gouerne the common weale, that euery man keepe his owne: and that there bee no impairing of priuate mennes goods for common charges.

For Phillippus did daungerouſly in his Tribuneſhippe, when

when he made the law concerninge landes, which yet hee soone suffered to be repealed, and therein marueylosly hee shewed himselfe a sober man, but as he dyd euill, in setting forth manye thinges people pleasinglye, so this hee spake euill, that there were not in the Citie two thousand men, who had any substaunce.

It is surely a mischeuous saying, and sounding to the makinge of goodes common and what greater pestilence can there bee then that: For common wealthes, and countries are ordeined to this ende specially, that men may keepe theyr owne.

For although men assemble together, nature beeinge guyde, yet they sought the defences of Cities, for hope of safe keepinge of theyr goods.

There muste also good heede bee geuen, that (as often it happened among our auncetors) for the poorenesse of the treasurie, and continuance of the warres, a tribute bee needefull to bee payde

cùm legem agrariam ferret quam tamen antiquari facilè passus est, & in eo vehementer se moderatum prębuit, sed cum in agendo multa populariter, tum illud malè dixit: non esse in ciuitate duo millia hominum, qui rem haberent.

Capitalis oratio est ad æquationem bonorum pertinens.

Qua peste quæ potest esse maior? Hanc enim ob causam maximè vt sua tuerentur, Resp. ciuitatesque constitutæ sunt.

Nam etsi duce natura congregabantur homines, tamen, spe custodiæ rerum suarum, vrbium præsidia querebant.

Danda etiam opera est, ne (qd' apud maiores nostros sæpe fiebat) propter erarij tenuitatem, assiduitatemqûe bellorum tributum sit conferen-

dum. Id qûe ne eueniat, multô antê erit prouidendum.

Sin quę neceſſitas huius muneris alicui Repub. obuenerit (malo enim alteri quâm noſtræ ominari, neque tantum de noſtra, ſed de omni Repub. diſputo) danda erit opera, vt omnes intelligant ſi ſalui eſſe velint, neceſſitati eſſe parendum.

Atqùe etiam omnes qui Rempub. gubernabunt, conſulere debebunt, vt earum rerum copia ſit, quæ ſunt neceſſariæ.

Quarum qualis comparatio fieri ſoleat, & debeat, non eſt neceſſe diſputare, eſt enim in promptu: tantum locus attingendus fuit.

Caput autem eſt in omni procuratione negotij & muneris publici, vt auariciæ pellatur etiam minima ſuſpicio,

payde. And longe beefore it muſt bee prouided, that it may not fall.

But if anye neceſſitie of this dutie ſhall happen vpon any common weale (for I hadde rather prophecie to ſome others, then to ours, and yet I reaſon not of ours, but of euery common weale) ther muſte bee geuen a diligence, that all men may vnderſtande, that if they will be in ſafety they muſte obey neceſſitie.

And moreouer, all ſuch as ſhall rule the common weale, ought to prouyde, that there be ſtore of theſe things which are neceſſary.

Of which it is not needefull to diſpute, what a prouiſion, is wont and oughte to bee made, for the matter is manifeſte, this place was no more but to bee touched.

But the chiefe point is in all adminiſtration of matters, and Common weale offices, that euen the leaſte ſuſpicion of couetouſneſſe bee auoyded, woulde GOD quoth Caiuus Pontius the Sam-

Samnite, fortune had reserued me to those dayes, and I had then beene borne, when the Romanes begunne once to take bribes, I woulde not suffer them anye longer to rule. Hee needed not twise, to haue tarryed for manye worlds.

For of late this mischiefe entered into this common weale. Therefore I am well content that Pontius rather liued then, if ther was in him so much manhoode indeede.

Not yet a hundered and tenne yeares be past, since the lawe of pyllage was made, by Lucius Piso, whereas none before had ben. But afterward followed so manye lawes, and euery of the later, the harder, so manye accused, so many condempned, so great an Italian warre, raised for feare of iudgements: when lawes and iudgements were taken awaie, so great pouling and robbing of large friends,

vtinam inquit, Caius Pontius Samnis, ad illa tempora fortuna me seruasset, & tunc essem natus, quando Romani dona accepere cœpissent, non essem passus eos diuti° imperare. Ne illi quidem multa sæcula expectanda fuerunt, modo enim hoc malũ, in hanc Rempublicam inuasit.

Itaque facile patior, tunc potius Pontium fuisse siquidem in illo tantum fuit roboris. Nondum centum & de cẽ anni sũt, cũ de pecuniis reputundis à L. Pisone lata est lex, nulla antea cũm fuisset.

At vero postea tot leges & proximæ quæq; duriores, tot rei, tot dãnati, tantum Italicum bellum propter iudiciorum metum excitatũ, tanta sublatis legibus, & iudiciis, expilatio, direptioque sociorum,

vt imbecillitate aliorū, non noſtra virtute valeamus. Laudat Africanum Panætius quod fuerit abſtinens, quid ni laudet? ſed in illo alia maiora. Laus enim abſtinentiæ, non hominis eſt ſolum, ſed etiam temporum illorum.

Omni Macedonum gaza, quæ fuit maxima potitus eſt Paulus, tantum in ærarium pecuniæ inuexit, vnius imperatoris præda, finem attulerit tributorum. At hic nihil in domum ſuam intulit, præter memoriam nominis ſempiternam.

Imitatus patrem Africanus nihilo locupletior Carthagine euerſa. Quid, (qui eius collega in Cenſura fuit) Lucius Mummi⁹? nūquid copioſior, cùm copioſiſſimam vrbem funditus ſuſtuliſſet? Italiam ornare, quàm domum ſuam maluit. Quanquā Italia

that by the weakneſs of other, not by our proweſſe, we dooe preuaile. Panetius praiſeth Africanus, becauſe he was no taker. Why ſhoulde hee not be praiſed? But other greater thinges there were in him. For the praiſe of reſtraining from taking, is not onely the mannes, but alſo that times. Paulus got all the Macedonians treaſure, which was exceeding great, hee brought ſo much riches into the Treſurie, that one Captaines bootie made an ende of Tributes: but hee boze nothing into his houſe, ſaue an euerlaſtinge memoze of his name.

Africanus followed his father, no whit the moze enriched, by Carthage razed. What of Lucius Mummius, who was his office fellowe in the Cenſorſhippe? was hee anye deale the richer, when by the ground hee had ouerthrowen the moſt rich citie.

Hee was willing rather to beautifie Italye, then his owne houſe, although Italy

ly being beautified, his verye house seemeth to me the beautifuller. No vice then is there fowler (that thether my talke may return, frō whence it is strayed) then couetousnesse, specially in Princes and common weale rulers.

For it is not onely dishonest, but wicked also & shamefull, to make a gayne of the common wealth. Therefore whereas Apollo Pithius, gaue out by Oracle, that Sparta no other waie, but by couetousnesse should come to destruction, the same hee seemeth to haue prophesied, not onely to the Lacedemonians, but also to all wealthye peoples. For they who rule ouer the common weale, may by no meanes sooner winne the good will of the multytude, then by a refraining hād and staiednesse.

But who so will be people pleasers, and for that cause doo either attempt the matters of lands, that ỹ owners maye be driuen from theyr holds, or else do thinke meete

ornata, domus ipsa videtur mihi ornatior. Nullum igit' vitium est tetri⁹ (vt eo, vnde egressa est, referat se oratio) quā auaritia, presertim in principibus, & Reip. gubernantibus.

Habere enim questui Remp. non modo turpe est, sed sceleratum etiā & nefarium. Itaque ꝙ Appollo Pythius oraculo ædidit, Spartam nulla re alia, nisi auaritia esse perituram, id videtur non solum Lacedemonijs, sed etiam omnibus opulentis populis prædixisse. Nulla autem re conciliare facilius beneuolentiam multitudinis possunt ij, qui Rei publicæ præsunt quam abstinentia & continentia.

Qui verō se populares volunt esse, ob eam que causam aut agrariam rem tentant, vt possessores suis sedibus pellantur: aut pecunias creditas debitoribus cō

donandas putant, ij labefactant fundamenta Reipublicæ, concordiam primum quæ esse non potest, quam alis adimunt', aliis cõdonantur pecunię, deinde æquitatem q; tollitur omnis si habere suum, cuique non licet.

Id enim est proprium vt supra dixi, ciuitatis atque vrbis, vt sit libera, & nõ solicita suę rei cuiusque custodia.

Atque in hac pernicię Reipublicę, ne illam quidem consequuntur, quam putant gratiam.

Nam cui res erepta est, est inimicus, cui data est etiam, dissimulat se accipere voluisse, & maximè in pecuniis creditis, occultat suum gaudium, ne videatur non fuisse soluendo.

At

that loued money bee remitted to the debters, they shake the foundations of the cõmon weale, first they take awaye concorde, which cannot bee when money is pulled from some, and forgiuen to other some, next, they bannyshe equitie, which is wholy rooted out, if it bee not lawfull for euerie man to haue hys owne.

For that is the proper end, as I said before, of a citie and Borough, that there bee a free, and no troublesome keeping of euerie mannes owne good.

And in this mischiefe of the common wealth, they doo not attaine such fauour as they suppose they doo. For hee from whom goods be taken, is become an enimie, hee also to whõ they are gyuen, maks as though he is not willing to take them, and most of all, he hides his ioy in loued money forgiuen, least hee maye seeme to haue bene vnable to paie it.

But

But surely hee that receyueth the wrong, both beareth his griefe in remembraunce, & sheweth it in sight, neither if they be more, to whom wickedly it hath bene giuen, then they from whome vniustlye it hath bene taken, it followeth that therefore they bee also more in power.

For these things be iudged, not by number, but by weight. And what equytye is in this, that hee shoulde haue land who hath had none, and he shuld forgoe land who hath hadde it manye yeares, yea or hundreds of yeares, before continued in possession.

But for this kinde of iniurie, ỹ Lacedemonians draue out Lysander, the Ephorian, and they slew Agis the king, which had neuer happened among them before, whereof followed at that time so great discentions, that there arose tyrants, and their noble men were exiled, and a verie well ordered common weale went to ruine.

At vero ille qui accipit iniuriam, & meminit & præse fert dolorem suum, nec si plures sunt ij quibus improbè datum est, quàm illi quibus iniustè ademptum est, idcircò plus etiam valent.

Non enim numero hæc iudicantur, sed pōdere. Quam autem habet æquitatem, vt agrū multis annis, aut etiam sæculis ante possessum, qui nullum habuit habeat, qui autem habuit amittat?.

At propter hoc iniuriæ genus Lacedemonij Lisandrū Ephorum expuleruut: Agin regem (quod nunquam antea apud eos acciderat) necauerunt. Ex quo tempore, tantæ discordiæ secutæ sunt, vt tyranni existerent, & optimates exterminarentur, & præclarissimè constituta Respublica dilaberetur.

Nec verô ſolum ipſa ce cidit, ſed etiam reliquã Græciam euertit contagionibus malorum, quę à Lacedemonijs profectæ, manarunt latius. Quid noſtros Gracchos Tiberij Gracchi ſummi viri filios, Africani nepotes, nonne agrariæ contentiones perdiderunt? At vero Aratus Sicyonius iure laudat': qui cum eius ciuitas L. annos â tirannis teneratur profectus Argis Sicyonem, clandeſtino introitu vrbe eſt potitus, cũque tyrannum Nicoclẽ improuiſo oppreſſiſſet, ſexcentos exules qui fuerant eius ciuitatis locupletiſſimi reſtituit, Remque publicam, aduentu ſuo liberauit.

Sed cùm magnam animaduerteret in bonis & poſſeſſionibus difficultatem quod & eos, quos & ipſe reſtituerat, quorum bona alij poſſiderant

Nor truely their ſtate onelye hadde a fall, but alſo it ouerthrew the reſt of Greece with the infections of miſchiefes, which ſpringing frõ ỹ Lacedemonians, did flowe farther abroad? what of our Gracchus, Tiberius Gracchus, ỹ noble mannes ſonnes, Africanus childzens childzen: dyd not landſtriues bring them to deſtruction?

But indeede Aratus the Sicionian is rightfully commended? who, when his Citie was fiftie yeares withholden by tyrannts: beeing departed from Argos to Sicion, with a priuie ſtolne entrie, got poſſeſſion of the Citie: and when vppon a ſodayne, hee had ouerthrowen the tyrant Nicocles: he reſtored home agayne ſixe hundred bannisht men, who had bene the greateſt poſſeſſioners of the Citie: and by his comming ſet the common wele at libertie'.

But when hee perceiued the greate inconuenience in the goods and poſſeſſions, be-

cauſe

cause both he thought it) erie vnreasonable, that they l hould lacke whome he himselfe had restored, whose goodes o ther had possessed, and again e to remoove fiftie yeares po ssession, he iudged it not very) indifferent: because that in so long a space, much by inh eritance, much by sale, much by dower, was holden with out wrong. he thought it was necessarie: neither the goods to be taken from them, nor th ose to bee vnsatisfied, whose th at had ben before. When hee had then determined, that he should need money, for the ordering of the matter, he sayd he wold make a voyage to Alexandria: and commaunded the matter to remaine vntouched vntill his returne.

And he with speed went to Ptolomeus, who had ben his intertainer, which then raigned the second after the building of Alexandria: to whom when he had declared that he was minnded to set his countrie at libertie: and had informed him of the case: the noble

siderant, egere iniquissimum arbitrabatur: & L. annorum possessiones mouere, non nimis æquum putabat, propterea, quod tam longo spacio multa hæreditatibus, multa emptionibus, multa dotibus tenebatur, sine iniuria iudicauit, neque illis adimi, neque his non satisfieri, quorũ illa fuerant oportere.

Cûm igitur statuisset opus esse ad eam rem constituendam pecunia Alexandriam se proficisci veile dixit, remque integram ad reditum suum iussit esse.

Isque celeriter ad Ptolomeum suum hospitẽ venit, qui tum regnabat alter post Alexandriam conditam, cui cum exposuisset, patriam se liberare velle, causamque docuisset: a rege opulento vir summus facile impetrauit, vt

grandi pecunia adiuuaretur.

Quam cûm Sicyonem attulisset, adhibuit sibi in consiliũ quindecim principes: cum quibus causas cognouit, & eorum qui aliena tenebant, & eorum qui sua amiserant, perfeceitq; æstimandis possessionibus, vt persuaderet alijs vt pecuniam accipere mallent, & possessionibus cederent: alijs vt commodius putarent numerari sibi quod tanti esset, quam suum recuperare.

Ita perfectum est, vt omnes constituta concordia, sine querela discederent.

O virum magnum, dignumque, qui in nostra Republica natus esset. Sic par est agere cum ciuibus, non (vt bis tam vidimus) haman soone obtayned of ỹ rich king, to be aided with a masse of money.

Which when he had brought into Sicion, hee tooke to him in counsaile fifteene of his nobles, with whom he examined the cases both of them who did withholde other mens, & of theyrs, who had loste their owne, & did put these fifteene in commission for the valuing of possessions, and to perswade some, that they would be willinger to take money, & to release theyr possession, & other some to thinke, that to haue as much payde them in value, it were more profit, then to recouer theyr owne. So it came to passe, that they all departed without complaint by a well ordered concord.

O man of much honour, & worthie to haue ben borne in our common weale.

Thus it is meete to deale with Citizens, and not (as twice alreadie wee haue seene to

to pitch sale staffe in the market place, & to put the goods of the Citizens in the cryers mouth. But that Greeke thought meete to prouide for all, which was the parte of a wise and a worthie man. And that is the greatest discretion & wisdome of an honourable Citizen to defend, not to pull awaie the citizens commodities, and to conteine them all within one manner of equity. But some will say, men may dwell rent free in anothers house, why so? That when I haue bought it, haue builded it, doo repaire it doe laye charges vpon it, thou shouldest haue the vse of mine against my will? What is this else, but from some to take theyr owne, and to some to giue other mennes. And as for the newe Tables, what reson haue they, but that you may buy lande with my money, and possesse it your selfe, and yet I maye not haue my money.

stam in foro ponere, & bona ciuium voci subijcere præconis.

At ille Græcus, illud quod fuit sapientis & præstãtis viri, omnibus consulendum putauit.

Eaque est summa ratio, & sapientia boni ciuis, commoda ciuium defendere non diuellere: atque omnes æquitate eadem continere.

Habitant gratis in alieno. Quid ita? Vt cum ego emerim, ædificauerim, tuear, impendã, tu me inuito furare meo quid est, aliud, aliis sua eripere, aliis dare aliena?

Tabulæ vero nouæ, quid habent argumenti, nisi vt æmas mea pecunia fundum, & eum tu habeas, ego non habeam pecuniam.

Quam-

Quamobrem ne ſit æs alienum, quod Reipub. noceat prouidendū eſt, quod multis rationibus caueri poteſt hoc ſi non fuerit, vt locupletes ſuum perdant, debitores lucrentur alienum. Nec enim vlla res vehementius Rempublicam continet quam fides: quæ eſſe nulla poteſt niſi erit neceſſaria ſolutio rerum creditarum. Nunquam vehementius actum eſt, quàm me Conſule, ne ſolueretur. Armis & caſtris tētata res eſt ab omni genere hominum & ordine, quibus ſic reſtiti, vt totum hoc malum de Republica tolleretur. Nunquā nec maius æs alienum fuit, nec melius nec facilius diſſolutum eſt. Fraudendi enim ſpe ſublata, ſoluendi neceſſitas, conſequuta eſt.

At vero, hic noſter victor, nunc quidem vi-

wherefore it muſt bee prouided, that there bee no debte which maye hinder the common weale, which thing may bee looked to many wayes, if this bee not ſuffered, that poſſeſſioners looſe not theyr owne, nor debters gaine other mens.

For nothing more ſtrongly preſerueth a common wealth then faythfulneſſe, which can be none at all, except there bee of neceſſitie a payment of things loned. For neuer more earneſtly it was gone about, then when I was Conſull, that there ſhoulde be no payments. The matter was attempted with Speare and ſheeld, by euerie ſorte and degree of men, whome in ſuche wiſe I withſtoode, that this ſo great a miſchiefe was rooted out of the common welth. Neuer was there more debt, neyther better nor eaſier paide. For when hope of defrauding was token away, neceſſitie of payment followed.

But this our conquerour nowe

nowe verelye conquered, hath compaſſed thoſe things which he purpoſed, whereas now he is neuer a whit the better.

So greate was his deſire to doo naughtely, that euen ỹ verie dooing of naughtineſſe delyghted him, although hee had no occaſion. They then who ſhal vphold the common weale, muſt keepe them away from this manner of large gifts, that to ſome they be giuen, and from other they bee taken, and ſpecially muſt giue their diligence, that by equytie, lawe, and iudgement, euerie man may holde his owne, and neither the poozer ſozte, foz theyz ſmall abilitie bee deceiued by couin, noz enuy may hinder the rich, eyther to kepe oz recouer theyz own. Moreouer, by what meanes ſo euer they can, either in warre oz peace, let them inlarge the common weale with dominion, land, and cuſtome.

Theſe bee the deedes of noble men, theſe were practiſed among our auncestours.

ctus quæ cogitarat, cum ipſius intererat, ea perficit, cum eius iam nihil intereſſet.

Tanta in eo peccandi libido fuit, vt hoc ipſum eum delectaret peccare, etiam ſi cauſa non eſſet. Ab hoc igitur genere largitionis, vt alijs detur, alijs auferatur, aberunt ij, qui Rempublicam tuebuntur. Inprimiſque operam dabũt, vt iuris & iudiciorum æquitate ſuum quiſque teneat: & neque tenuiores, propter imbecilitatem circumueniantur: neque locupletibus ad ſua vel tenenda, vel recuperanda obſit inuidia. Prẽterea quiquſcunque rebus, vel bello,, vel domi poterunt, Rempublicam augeant, imperio, agris vectigalibus.

Hæc magnorum hominum ſunt, hæc apud maiores noſtros factitata.

Hæc

Hæc genera officiorum qui perſequuntur, cum ſumma vtilitate Reipublicæ, magnũ ipſi adipiſcentur, & gratiam & gloriam.

In his autem vtilitatum præceptis, Antipater Tyrius Stoicus, qui Athenis nuper eſt mortuus, duo prętерita cenſet eſſe à Panætio valetudinis curationem & pecunię.

Quas res à ſummo philoſopho prętеritas arbitror, quod eſſent faciles, ſunt tamen certè vtiles.

Sed valetudo ſuſtentatur notitia ſui corporis, & obſeruatione, quę res aut prodeſſe ſoleant aut obeſſe: & continẽtia in victu omni atque cultu, corporis tuendi cauſa, & prętermittendis voluptatib⁹: poſtremò arte eorũ, quorũ ad ſcientiam hęc pertinent Res autẽ familiaris quę

These kinds of duetyes who ſo followe, ſhall wyth verye great profite to the common weale, get themſelues both greate fauour and glorye. But in theſe preceptes of profite, Antipater of Tyre, the Stoike, who a late dyed at Athens, thinkes, that two preceptes bee ouer leaped of Panetius, tendering of health, and prouiſion of money.

Which thinges I ſuppoſe to haue bene ouerpaſſed by the noble Philoſopher, becauſe they were light matters, yet without doubt they be profitable.

But health is preſerued by knowledge of ones owne body, and marking thoſe things which are wont either to doo good or harme, & by a ſtaydneſſe both in all a mans dyet, and apparell, for cheriſhing of the bodie, and alſo forbearing pleaſures, and laſtly, by their cunning, to whoſe ſciẽce theſe things pertaine.

But a mannes ſubſtaunce muſt

muſte bee gotten, by thoſe thinges which bee farre from diſhoneſty, and muſt bee ſaued by diligence, and honeſt, ſparinge, and by thoſe ſame meanes alſo, it muſte bee encreaſed.

Xenophon the Socratian hathe gonne through theſe thinges verye handſomelye, in that booke which is intituled Economicus, the which wee tourned out of Greeke into latine, when we were at ỹ ſame age in a maner as you are nowe.

But comparing of profits (becauſe this fowerth place was ouer paſſed by Panetius,) is oftentimes neceſſarie. For both the guiftes of the bodie, are wont to bee cõpared with fortunes gifts, and alſo fortunes giftes with the bodies giftes, and thoſe of the bodie one with an other, and thoſe that fortune geues, likewiſe one with an other. The bodies giftes be compared with fortunes, after this ſort, that he had rather bee in helth, thã bee rich. Fortunes gifts be cõparid with ỹ bodies

ri debet iis rebus a quibus abeſt turpitudo, conſeruari autem diligentia & per ſimonia, eiſdem etiam rebus augeri.

Has res commodiſſi mê Xenophon Socraticus perſecutus eſt in eo libro, qui Economicus inſcribitur: quem nos iſta ferè ætate cûm eſſemus, qua es tu nũc, e grẽcis in latinum conuertimus.

Sed vtilitatum comparatio (quoniam hic locus erat quartus a Panẽtio prætermiſſus) ſæpe eſt neceſſaria.

Nam & corporis commoda cum externis & externa cũ corporis: & ipſæ inter ſe corporis: & externa cum externis comparari ſolent.

Cum externis corporis, hoc modo comparantur, valere vt malis, quam diues eſſe. Cum corporis externa,

hoc

hoc modo, diues esse po tius quàm maximis corporis viribus.

Ipsa inter se corporis, sic: vt bona valetudo voluptati anteponatur, vires celeritati. Externorum autem, vt gloria diuitijs, vectigalia vrbana rusticis.

Ex quo genere comparationis illud est Catonis senis a quo cùm quæreretur quid maximè in re familiari expediret: respondit, bene pascere. Quid secundum? satis bene pascere: Quid tertium? bene vestire. Quid quartum? arare.

Et cùm ille qui quæsierat dixisset: quid fœnerari. Tum Cato, quid hominem, inquit, occidere?

Ex quo, & multis alijs intelligi debet, vtilitatum comparationes soleri fieri: & rectè hoc adiunctum esse quartum exquirendorum,

in t' his wyse, that you had rathe r bee riche, than of very gr' eat strength.

Those of the body be compared one with an other, thus that good health be preferred b efore pleasure, and strength b efore swiftnesse.

But fortunes giftes be compared to gether, this way that g ozy bee estemed before ryches, and Citie tribute beef ore the countries.

Of the which kinde of comparison is that saying of Cato the olde manne, of whome when it was demaũded, what was most profitable for a mãs substance, he made aunswer, to feede wel, what the second, To feede sufficiently well, what the thirde, To clothe well, what the fourth, to plowe. And when he, who had moued the question had seyde, what to lende vppon vsurie: then what is it, quoth Cato to kill a man?

Wherevppon, and of many other thinges it ought to bee gathered, that comparisons of profytes are wont to bee made, and that this is verye

well

well adioyned for the fouth point of searching out of duties.

But of this whole matter of getting money, of bestowing the same, and also of vsing it, farre better it is disputed by certaine honest men, sitting at the middle Iane, than of any Philosophers in any schoole, yet are they to bee knowne, and of them in this booke wee haue treated. The rest will we prosecute hereafter.

officiorum genus.

Sed toto hoc de genere, de querenda de collocanda pecunia, etiam de vtenda, commodius à quibusdam optimis viris ad Ianum medium sedentibus, quam ab vllis philosophis vlla in schola disputatur.

Sunt tamen ea cognoscenda. Pertinent enim ad vtilitatem, de qua hoc libro disputatum est. Reliqua deinceps persequemur.

P.i. M.



M.TVLLII CICERONIS, de officijs Liber tertius.

MARCVS TVLLIVS Ciceroes third booke of duties to Marcus his sonne.

PVBLIVM Scipionem, Marce fili, cum qui primus Africanus appellatus est, dicere solitum scripsit Cato, qui fuit fere eius æqualis, nunquam se minus otiosum esse, quâm cûm otiosus: nec minꝰ solum, quâm cûm solus esset.

Magnifica verô vox & magno viro ac sapiente digna quæ declarat illum, & in otio de negotijs cogitare, & in solitudine secum loqui solitum, vt neque cessaret vnquam, & interdum colloquio alterius non egeret. Itaque duę res, quæ languorem efferunt cæteris, illum

THE same Publius Scipio, sonne Marke, who the first Africanus was named, would commonly say, as Cato hath writ ten, who was in a maner his lyke in yeares: That he was neuer moze leasureless than when he was leasurefull: and neuer lesse alone, than when he was all alone. A noble saying surely, and meete for a wozthy and wise man: which declareth, that he both in his leasure was wont to muse of matters to be done, and also in his solitarinesse, too debate them with himselfe, so as he was nothing idle at any time, and sometyme needed not the communication of other. And so these two thinges, leasure, and solitarynesse, whiche bzinge a dulnesse vpon other, made

made him the quicker. I would wish, that we lykewise might truely say ý very same. But although by imitation, wee are not able to attaine so great excellence of witte, yet doubtlesse in desire wee come verie neere.

For both by wicked warre and power, being put of from common weale matters and iudiciall causes, wee take our quyet leasure, and for that cause leauing the Citie, and walking abroade in the countrie, often times we be alone. But neither this leasure is to be compared with Africanus leasure: nor this solytaryneſſe wyth that of hys. For hee ceasing from the goodlye ministration of the common weale, toke himselfe leasure otherwhile, and from the preasse and resorte of men, nowe and then into a solitarie place, as into a hauen, withdrew himselfe, but our leasure comes not of desire of rest, but for lacke of businesse. For seeing the Senate is deposed, and iudgementes abolyshed:

acuebant otium & solitudo. Vellem & nobis hoc idem veré dicere liceret. Sed si minus imitatione tantã ingenij prȩstatiam consequi possumus: voluntate certe proximè accedim⁹: Nam & à Rep. forensibusque negotijs, armis impijs, vique prohibiti, otium persequimur, & ob eam causam vrbe relicta ruræ peregrantes, sæpe soli sumus. Sed nec otium hoc cum Africani otio, nec solitudo hæc, cum illa comparanda est. Ille enim requiescẽs à Reip. pulcherimis munerib⁹ otium sibi sumebat aliquando, & à cœtu hominum, frequentiaque interdum tanquam in portum se in solitudinẽ recipiebat. Nostrum autem otium negotij inopia, non requiescendi stupio constitutum est.

Extincto enim senatu deletisquè iudicijs:

quid eſt quod dignũ no bis, aut in curia, aut in foro agere poſſimus? Itaque in maxima celebritate, atque in oculis ciuium quondam viximus, nunc fugientes cõſpectum ſceleratorum, quibus omnia redundant, abdimus nos quãtum licet, & ſepe ſoli ſumus. Sed quia ſic ab hominibus doctis accepimus, non ſolum ex malis eligere minima oportere: ſed etiam excerpere ex his ipſis, ſi quid in eſſet boni: propterea et otio fruor, non illo quidem, quo debeat, vt ijs, qui quõdam peperiſſet otium ciuitati. Nec eam ſolitudinẽ languere pateor, quam mihi affert neceſſitas non voluntas Quanquam Africanus maiorem laudem meo iudicio aſſequebatur, nulla tamen eius ingenii monumenta mandata literis, nullum opus otii, nullum ſolitudinis munus extat,

what is there, that eyther in court, or in place of plea, meet for vs, we may doo.

Therefore wee, who in the greateſt aſſemblie, and in the eyes of the Citizens ſomtime haue lyued, nowe flying the ſight of the wycked, wyth whom all places ſwarme, doo withdraw our ſelues as much as we may, & are often times alone.

But becauſe thus wee haue hearde of learned men, that not onelye of euylls wee ought to chooſe the leaſt, but alſo if there were anie goodneſſe in them, to picke it out, therefore both I inioye quyetneſſe, not ſuch iwis, as hee ought to haue, who once procured quietneſſe to the whole Citie, and alſo doo not ſuffer that ſolitarineſſe to waxe idle, which neceſſitie bringes vpon me, and not mine owne deſire. Although Africanus did gette greater praiſe, euen in my iudgement, yet no monumentes of his witte put in writing, no woorke of his quiet lyfe, no fruit of his ſolytarineſſe remaines abroad, whereof

whereof it muſt needes bee gathered, that hee by earneſt occupying of his minde, and by beating out thoſe thinges, which by muſing hee attayned: was neither idle, nor at anie time alone, but wee who haue not ſo great deepneſſe of wit, that by ſecrete muſing wee bee drawen from ſolitarineſſe: doe tourne all our ſtudye and indeauour to this trauayle of writing. And therefore wee haue written more in a ſhort ſpace, ſince the ſtate was ouerthrowen, then in many yeres, when it ſtood. But whereas all Philoſophie my Cicero, is very good and fruitfull, nor anie parte thereof is barraine and waſt, yet no place therein is more yeelding, nor more plentifull, then the place touching dueties, from which bee borrowed the precepts of liuing conſtaently and honeſtly. Wherfore although I truſt you dayly heare, and receiue this ſame of our Cratyppus, Prince of Philſophers in theſe dayes, neuertheleſſe I

Ex quo intelligi debet, illũ, mentis agitatione, inueſtigationeq; earũ rerum, quas cogitando conſequebatur, nec otioſum, nec ſolum vnquã fuiſſe. Nos autem, qui non tantum roboris habem⁹, vt cogitatione tacita â ſolitudine abſtrahamur, ad hanc ſcribendi operam, omne ſtudium curamq; conuertimus. Itaque plura breui tempore euerſa, quam multis annis ſtãte Rep. ſcripſimus. Sed cũ tota philoſophia mi Cicero, frugifera, & fructuoſa, nec vlla pars eius inculta ac deſerta ſit: tamen nullus feracior in ea locus eſt, nec vberior, quã de officijs, à quibus conſtanter, honeſtèque viuendi præcepta ducuntur. Quare quanquam à Cratippo noſtro principe huius memoriæ Philoſophorum hęc te aſſiduè audire, atque accipere confido: tamen

conducere arbitror talibus aures tuas vocibus vndique circumsonare, nec eas si fieri possit, quicquam aliud audire Quod cûm omnibus est faciendum, qui vitam honestam ingredi cogitant: tamen haud scio an nemini potius quam tibi. Sustines enim non paruam expectationem imitandæ industriæ nostræ magnam honorũ, nonnullam fortasse nominis. Suscepisti onus præterea graue & Athenarum, & Cratippi, ad quos cûm tanquam, ad mercaturam bonarum artium sis profectus, inanem redire turpissimũ est, dedecorantem & vrbis authoritatem & magistri.

Quare quantum conniti animo potes, quantum labore contendere (si discendi labor est potius, quam voluptas) tantum

holde it profitable, that I ring about your eares wyth such soundes on euery side, & that they if possibly it maye bee doone, heare none other thing, which both is to bee done of all those that minde to enter the honest life, and I wotte not whether of anye man more then of your selfe. For you carrie an expectation, not small of following our trade, greate of comming to our honour, some peraduenture of attaining to our fame. You haue taken vppon you moreouer a greate charge, both by reason of Athens, and also of Cratippus, to the which seeing, as to ỹ mart of good sciences, you haue trauailed: to retourne emptye, a greate reproche it is, stayning the worshyppe both of the citie, and also of your master. Wherfore as much as by wit you are able to compasse, as much as by paine you can indeauour (if to studie bee rather a pain then a pleasure) so much see, that you doe in deede,

seede, and giue no occasion, that seeing all things are sufficed by vs, you should seeme to haue disappointed your selfe. But of these matters hetherto. For wee haue oftentimes written much vnto you in waie of exhortation. Now to the part remayning of the foresayde diuision let vs returne.

Panetius therefore, who without doubt of duties hath most diligently disputed, and whome wee vsing a certaine correction haue chiefelye followed, when he had set foorth three kindes, in which menne were woont to counsaile and aduise themselues of duetie, the one, when they shoulde doubt whether it, wherewith they were in hande, were honest or dishonest, the other, whether it were profitable or vnprofitable, the third, if that which shoulde haue the shewe of honestye, shoulde striue with it, that seemed profitable: howe it shoulde bee necessarye,

tantum fac vt efficias, neue committas, vt cùm ōnia suppeditata sint à nobis, tute tibi defuisse videare. Sed hæc hactenus. Multa enim sæpè ad te cohortandi gratia scripsimus. Nunc ad relī quam partem propositæ diuisionis reuertamur.

Panætius igitur, qui sine controuersia de officijs accuratissimè disputauit, quemque nos, correctione quadam adhibita, potissimum sequuti sumus: tribus generibus propositis, in quibus deliberare homī nes & consultare de officio solerent: vno cum dubitarent honestumnè id esset de quo ageretur an turpè: altero vtile ne an inutile: tertio, si id quod speciem haberet honesti, pugnare t cum eo, quod vtile videret: quomodo ea discernī

oporteret: de duobus generibus primis tribus libris explicauit: de tertio autem genere, deinceps se scripsit dicturum, nec exoluit id quod promiserat. Quod eo magis miror, quia scriptum à discipulo eius Possidonio est, triginta annos vixisse Panætium, postquam illos libros ædidisset. Quem locum miror à Possidonio breuiter esse tactum in quibusdam commentariis: præsertim cum scribat, nullum esse locum in tota philosophia, tã necessarium. Minimé verô assentior iis, qui negant eum locũ à Panetio prętermissum: sed consulto relictum, nec omninó scribendum fuisse, quia nunquã posset vtilitas. cum honestate pugnare De quo alterum potest habere dubitationem, adhibendum ne fuerit hoc genus, ꝙ in diuisione Panætii tercium est,

those same to bee discerned: of the first two kindes, in three bookes hee opened his minde: and of the third kinde hee wrote, hee woulde speake afterwarde: and that dyd he not performe, which hee had promysed, whereat I meruaile the more, because it is written by his scholler Possidonius, that Panetius lyued thirtie yeares after hee had set foorth those Bookes, which place I wonder it was so briefely touched of Possidonius in certaine Abridgements: specially seeing hee writes, there is no place in al Philosophie so necessarye. But in no wise I agree with them, which denie this place did ouerscape Panetius: but that of purpose it was lefte out, and that it was not to be written at all, because profite might not striue with honestie. Touching the which, the one may haue in it a doubte, whether this parte, which in Panetius diuision is the thirde, was to bee added, or vtterlye to bee lefte out: the

other

other cannot bee doubted of, but of Panetius it was taken in hand, and yet left vntreated. For who so of a three paeted diuision, two partes hath finished, to him the third must needs remain. Moreouer in his third booke towarde the ende, he promised, that afterwarde he wyll speake of this part.

Heereto commeth a substanciall witnesse, Possidonius, who also writeth in a certayne Letter, that Publius Rutilius Rufus, which had heard Panetius, was woont to saie, Like as no Painter might be found who could finish vp that parte of Venus, which Apelles had left vnfinished: (for the beautye of her face tooke awaye the hope of counterfaytinge the rest of hir bodye) so those thinges, that Panetius hadde ouerpassed, and hadde not finished, there was no man to prosecute, because of the excellence of those matters which he had gone thorough withall, wherefore of

an plane omittendum, Alterum dubitari non potest, quin à Panætio susceptum sit, sed relictum. Nam qui è diuisione tripartita duas partes absoluerit: huic necesse est restare tertiam. Præterea in extremo libro tertio, de hac parte pollicetur se deinceps esse dicturum. Accedit eodē testis locuples Possidonius, qui etiam scribit in quadam epistola Publium Rutilium Rufum dicere solere, qui Panętium audiuerat: vt nemo pictor esset inuētus, qui Veneris eam partem, quam Appelles inchoatam reliquisset, obsolueret (oris enim pulchritudo, reliqui corporis imitandi spē ausferebat, sic ea quę Panetius prętermisisset & non perfecisset, propter eorum, quæ fecisset prestā tiam, neminē esse persequutū. Quāobrem de

Iudicio Panætij dubitari: non potest, recténe autē hanc tertiā partem ad exquirēdū officiū adiunxerit, an secus, de eo fortassè dubitari potest. Nam siue honestū solū bonū est, vt Stoicis placet: siue q̄ honestū est, id ita summum bonum est (quemadmodum Peripateticis nostris videtur) vt omnia ex altera parte collocata, vix minimi momēti instar habeāt: dubitādū non est, quin nūquā possit vtilitas cū honestate cōtēdere. Itaq; accepimus Socratem solitum execrari eos, qui primum hæc natura coherentia opinione distraxissent. Cui quidem ita sunt Stoici assensi, vt et quicquid honestum esset, id vtile esse censerēt: nec vtile quicquā q̄ nō honestū. Qd' si is esset Panęti⁹, qui virtutē ꝓpterea colēdam diceret, qd' ea efficiens vtilitatis esset: vt ij, qui res expetendas,

Panetius iudgement, it cannot bee doubted, but whether he to the searching out of dutie, this third parte adioyned well or no, therof peraduenture it may be doubted. For whether honestie be the onely good, as liketh the Stoikes, or else honestie in such sort be the soueraigne good (as seemeth to our Peripatetikes) that they count all things set on the other side, of very smal weight in comparison, it is not to bee doubted, but that profit can neuer be at strife w honestie. Therefore we haue heard saye, Socrates was wont to curse them, who first parted a sunder in opinion these that by nature wer coupled together, to whom doubtlesse the Stoikes so assented, that what so were honest, the same also they iudged to bee profitable, nor anie thing to bee profitable which were not honest. If Panetius were the man who would say, that vertue therefore shoulde bee honoured, because it is the causer of profite, as they, who measure thinges meete

to

to bee desired eyther by plea-
sure, or vngriefefulnesse: hee
might maintayne, that hone-
stie somtime striues wyth pro
fit. But seeing he is the man
who iudgeth that only good,
which is honest, and that
mans life is made neuer the
better, by increase of such
things, as bee repugnaunt to
honestye, vnder a certayne
shewe of profite, nor by de-
crease of them the worse, it
seemes hee shoulde not haue
brought in such manner ta-
king of aduisement, where-
in that, which shoulde seeme
profitable, shoulde be compa-
red with that which is ho-
nest. For that which of the
Stoikes is called the soue-
reigne good, as to liue agree-
able to nature, it hath (as I
suppose) this meaning, wyth
vertues alwaies to agree, and
other thinges which shoulde
be according to nature so to
those: if to vertue they were
not repugnant. Which seeing
it is so, some suppose, this
comparison was not well
brought in: nor anye thing
at all, touching the braunche

vel voluptate, vel indo-
lentia metiuntur, licere-
ret ei dicere honestatē,
aliquando cum vtilitate
pugnare. Sed cum sit is,
quid id solum bonum
iudicet quod honestum
sit: quæ autem huic re
pugnent specie quadā
vtilitatis, eorum neque
accessione meliorem vi-
tam fieri, nec decessio-
ne peiorem, non videtur
huiusmodi debuisse de
liberationem introduce
re: in quę quod vtile vi
deretur, cum eo quod
honestum est, compare
tur. Etenim quod sum-
mum bonum â Stoicis
dicit', conuenienter na-
turæ viuere, id habet
hanc (vt opinor) senten
tiam naturam cum vir-
tute congruere semper,
cætera autē q̄ secundū
naturam essent, ita lege
re, si ea virtuti non re-
pugnarent. Qd' cum ita
sit, putāt quidem hāc cō
parationē nō esse rectè
introductā, nec omnino
de eo genere quicquam

perci-

percipiendum fuisse. Atque illud quidem honestum, quod propriè verè que dicitur, id in sapiẽtibus est solis, neque à virtute diuelli vnquam potest. In ijs autẽ in quib⁹ sapientia perfecta nõ est, ipsum illud quidem perfectũ honestũ nullo modo sed similitudines honesti esse possũt. Hæc enim omnia officia, de quib⁹ his libris disputam⁹, media Stoici appellãt: & ea cõmunia sunt, & latè patent q̃ & ingenij bonitate multi assequũtur, & progressione discendi. Illud autẽ qd̃ rectũ ijdem appellãt, pfectũ atq; absolutũ est: et vt ijdẽ dicunt, omnes numeros habet, nec prẽter sapientem cadere in quẽquã potest. Cũ autẽ aliquid actũ est in quo media officia cõparãt̃, id cumulatè videt̃ esse perfectũ, ꝓpterea q̃ vulg⁹ quid absit a perfecto, ferè non ex toto intelligit: quatenus autem in-

should haue bene taught. And surely that honestie which is properly and truely so called, is in the wise onelye, and from vertue can neuer bee seuered, but in those in whome is not perfect wisdome, doubtlesse that same perfect honestie can in no wise bee, semblaunces of honestye there may be.

All these ductyes therefore, wherupon in these books we dispute, the Stoikes call the meane duties: and those be common dueties, and doe spread farre, which many attaine both by goodnesse of wit, and by going forward in learning. But that which they call Rectum, is the perfect and absolute duetie, and as they also saye, it hath all his partes, neyther can happen to anie, but a wise man. And when any thing is done, wherein the meane duetyes may appeare, it seemeth to be fully perfect, because the common people almost vnderstandeth not at all, what it wanteth of perfect, but as farre as they vnderstande,

they

they thinke nothing is lefte vndoone. And whereas it commonly chaunceth in meeters & paintings, & in other things more, that the vnskilfull be delyghted, and prayse those thinges that are not to be praised, for that cause I beleeue they doe so, that in those there is some good grace, that catcheth the ignoraunt, who indeede bee not able to discerne, what faulte is in euery thing. And therefore when they bee taught of the skilful, they soone fall frō theyr opinion. The Stoikes then say, that these dueties, whereuppon in these bookes we treate, be (as who sayth) certaine second sortes of honestie, not proper onelye to the wise, but common also to al manner of men. Therefore all be allured with these, in whom there is a forwardnesse of vertue. And when ý two Decij, or the two Scipios be vouched for mãly men, or else when Fabritius or Aristides, be alleadged as iust, neither of thē for mãlines, nor of these for iustice, ý exãple is

telligit, nihil putat prętermissum. Qd' autē in Poematib⁹ & in picturis vsu venit, in alijsque cōpluribus, vt delectēt imperiti, laudentq́; ea, q̄ laudanda nō sint, ob eam credo causam, qd⁹ insit in his aliquid probi, ꝙ capiat ignaros, qui ijdem quid in vna quaq́; re, vitij sit, nequeant iudicare. Itaq́; cum sint docti à peritis, facile desistunt à sententia. Hæc igitur officia, de quibus his libris disserimus quasi secunda quædam honesta, dicunt esse, non sapientium modo propria, sed cum omni hominum genere communia. Itaque his omnis in quibus est virtutis indoles, commouentur. Nec vero cum duo Decij, aut duo Scipiones, fortes viri commemorant', aut cum Fabritius, aut Aristides, iustus nominatur, aut ab illis fortitudinis, aut ab his iustiæ, tanquam à sapien-

ubus,

tibus petit' exemplum. Nemo enim horum sic sapiens est, vt sapientem volumus hic intelligi. Nec ij, qui sapiẽtes habiti sunt & nominati M. Cato, & C. Leli' sapientes fuerunt, nec illi quidem septem, sed ex mediorum officiorum frequentia, similitudinem quandam gerebant, speciẽq; sapientum. Quocirca nec id, qd' verè honestum est, fas est cum vtilis repugnantia cõparari: nec id qd' cõmuniter appellamus honestum, quodq; colit' ab ijs qui bonos se viros habere volunt cum emolumentis vnquam est comparandum. Tãq; id honestum. quod in nostrã intelligentiam cadit, tuendum, conseruandum que nobis est, quam illud quod proprie dicitur, vereque est honestum sapientibus. Aliter enim teneri non potest, si qua ad virtutem est facta progressio.

brought, as of perfect with men. For none of these in such sorte is wise, as in this place wee will haue a wyse man taken: nor Marcus Cato, and Caius Lelius, who were counted and called wise, were perfect wise men: no nor these seauen sages of Greece: but by the often vsing of the mean and common duetyes, they bore a certaine semblaunce and shewe of wise men. wherefore neyther is it lawful that the thing which in deed is honest, be compared with the contrarietie of the profitable, neither that which commonly we call honest, and which is exercised of them who wyll haue themselues good men to be counted with commodities at anie time is to be compared, and as well that honestie which falleth into our vnderstanding, is of vs to bee maintayned and kept as that is, of the wyse, which properly is called, and indeed is honestie. For other wyse it cannot bee holden on, if there bee attained anye proceeding to vertue.

But

But this wee saye by them who by keeping of duties are esteemed for good men.

But who doe measure all thinges by profites, and commodities, & will not the same to bee ouerweyed with honestie, these are wont in aduisement taking, to compare honestie with it, which they reken profitable, good men vse not so to doe. Therefore I thinke, Panetius, when he sayde, men are wont in this comparison too doubt, ment the very same that he spake, that men onely are wont, but not that they must needes.

For not onely to iudge the thinge, that seemeth profitable more worth than ỹ which is honest, but also to compare these together, and in them to cast doubtes, a very foule shame it is.

What is it then, that many tymes is wont too bringe a doubtfulnesse: and seemeth meete to bee considered? I suppose it is, if at any tyme there befall a doubtfulnesse? what manner of thinge it is whereof consideration is take

Sed hæc quidem de ijs, qui conseruatione officiorum existimantur boni. Qui autem omnia meriuntur, emolumentis & commodis, neque ea volunt præponderari honestate, hi solent in deliberando, honestum cum eo, quod vtile putant, comparare: boni viri non solent. Itaque existimo Panætium cùm dixerit homines solere in hac comparatione dubitare, hoc ipsum sensisse, quod dixerit, solere modo, non etiam oportere. Etenim non modo pluris putare quod vtile videatur, quàm illud quod honestum, sed hæc etiam inter se comparare, & in his dubitare turpissium est.

Quid est ergo quod nonnunquam ad dubitationem afferre soleat, considerandũque videatur? Credo si quãdo dubitatio accidit, quale sit id de quo consideretur.

Sæpe

Sępe enim tẽpore fit, vt qd' plerumq; turpe habere ſoleat, inueniatur non eſſe turpe. Exempli cauſa, ponatur aliquid quod pateat latius. Quod poteſt eſſe maius ſcelus quam non modo hominem, ſed etiam familiarem occidere. Nũ igitur ſe obſtrinxit ſcelere, ſi quis tirannum occidit, quamuis familiarem? Populo quidem Romano non videtur qui ex omnibus præclaris factis illud pulcherimum exiſtimat. Vicit igitur vtilitas honeſtatem, immô vero honeſtas vtilitatem ſecuta eſt. Itaq; vt ſine vllo errore di iudicare poſſimus, ſi quando cum illo, quod honeſtum intelligimus, pugnare id videbitur, quod appellamus vtile, formula quedam conſtituenda eſt, quam ſi ſequemur in comparatione rerũ, ab officio nunquâm recedemus.

For often by the tyme, it comes to paſſe, that it which for the moſt parte is wont to be counted diſhoneſt is found not to be diſhoneſt. For examples ſake lette there be put ſome caſe, that more largelye extendeth, what greater miſchiefe can there be than one to kill not onelye a manne but alſo his familiar: hath he than guiltid himſelfe of murder who hathe ſlaine a Tyrant, although he were hys familiar? To the people of Rome doubtleſſe it ſeemeth not ſo, who of all worthye deedes eſteemeth that the nobleſt, with them therefore profit paſſed honeſtie: yet rather honeſtie followed after profite.

Therefore that withoute any errour we may be able to iudge, if euer that which wee call profitable, ſhall ſeeme too ſtriue with it, which is knowen for honeſt: a certayne rule is to bee appointed, which if wee will followe in the compariſon of thinges, from ductie wee ſhall neuer ſwarue.

And

And this rule shall be moste agreeable with the trade and doctrine of the Stoikes: which verely in these bookes we therefore follow, because although of the auncient Academikes, and our Peripatetikes (who wer once all one with the Academikes) those thinges, which bee honest bee preferred before such as seme profitable: yet these more goodlily be disputed of ỹ Stoikes, to whome what so is honest, ỹ same semeth profitable: and nothing semes profitable which is not honest, than it is of those who reckẽ somewhat to bee honest & not profitable, or somewhat profitable, & not honest. But to vs our Academia geeues great libertie: that whatsoeuer most prouable comes in place, the same by our prerogatiue wee may lawfully defend. But I returne to the rule. To pul away thẽ any thinge from an other, & a man to encrease his commodities with an other mans discõmoditie, it is more against nature: than deathe, than pouertie, than payne,

Erit autem hęc formula Stoicorũ rationi disciplinęq; maximè consentanea: quã quidẽ in his libris propterea sequimur qd' quanquam a veteribus Academicis & Peripateticis nostris qui quõ dã ijdẽ erant, qui Academiciquę honesta sunt ante ponuntur ijs, quæ vidẽtur vtilia: tamẽ splẽdidi⁹ hæc ab eis differũtur, quibus quicquid honestũ est, idẽ vtile videtur, nec vtile quicquã, qꝑ non honestũ quã ab ijs, quibus aut honestũ aliquid non vtile, aut vtile non honestũ est. Nobis autem nostra Academi a magnam licẽtiam dat vt qd' cũque maximã probabile occurãt id nostro iure liceat defendere. Sed redeo ad formulã. De trahere igit' aliquid alteri, & hominẽ hominis in cõmodo suũ augere commodum magis est contra naturam quam mors, quam pauertas, quam dolor, quã

cętera quę possunt aut corpori accidere, aut rebus externis. Nā principio tollit cōuictū humanū & societatē. Si enim sic erimus affecti, vt propter suū quisq; emolumē tū spoliet aut violet alterum, disrumpi necesse est eam, quę maximè est secundū naturā humani generis societatē. Vt si vnū quodq; membrū sensum hūc haberet, vt posse putaret se valere, si proximi mēbri valetudinem ad se traduxisset, debilitari & interire totum corp⁹ necesse esset, sic si vnusquisq; nostrū rapiat ad se commoda aliorum detrahatq; quod cuiquę possit, emolumenti sui gratia, societas hominum & communitas euertatur necesse est.

Nam vt sibi quisquę malit qd' ad vsam vitæ pertineat quām alteri acquirere, concessum est non repugnante natura,

and other thinges which may happen either to the bodye, or to the outwarde state. For first of all it takes away the conuersation, and felowship of men. For if we shalbe so disposed: that euery man for his owne commoditie, spoyle and wrong an other: the felowship of mankinde which is moste according to nature, must needes be broken. As if euerye parte of the bodye shoulde haue this imagination: to thinke it might bee strong, if it had conueyed to it selfe the strength of the next limmes: of force it should folow, ẏ the whole bodie should bee weakened, and perishe, euen so if euerye one of vs catch to himselfe the commodities of other, and pulleth from eche man what hee can for his owne profites sake, the felowshippe, and common company of men must needes be ouerthrowen. For it is sufferable, and nature not against it: ẏ euery mā be more willing for himself, thā for an other man to get what so pertaineth to the vse of his lyfe.

This

This doubtleſſe, nature doth not ſuffer, that wyth the ſpoile of other, wee increaſe our riches, ſubſtaunce, and wealth. And not onely it is ordayned by nature, that is to wit, by the vniuerſall lawe of Nations, but alſo in lyke manner, by the lawes of people, whereby in euerie Citye the common wealth is vpholden, that it ſhould not be lawfull for a mannes owne profits ſake to hurt another. For the lawes tende to this, and this they meane, that the fellowſhippe of Citizens bee in ſafetie, which who ſo riue a ſunder, thoſe with death, baniſhment, priſoment, and penalties they puniſhe. And this much more doth the verie courſe of nature require, which is the lawe of God and man, & which who ſo is willing to obeye (all truely wyll obey it, that haue a minde to liue according to nature) ſhall neuer ſo offend, that another mans goods he woulde couet, and take to himſelfe that he hath pulled from another. For much more accordinge

Illud quidem natura non patitur, vt aliorum ſpoliis noſtras facultates, copias, opes augeamus. Neque verò hoc ſolum natura, id eſt, iure gentium, ſed & legibus populorum, quibus in ſingulis ciuitatibus Reſpublica continetur, eodem modo conſtitutũ eſt, vt non liceat ſui cõmodi cauſa nocere alteri. Hoc enim ſpectant leges, hoc volunt incolumen eſſe ciuium coniunctionem, quam quĩ dirimunt, eos morte, exilio, vinculis, damno coercent. Atque hoc multo magis exigit ipſa naturæ ratio, quæ eſt lex diuina & humana: cui parere qui velit (omnes autem parebunt, qui ſecundum naturam volunt viuere) nunquam committet, vt alienum appetat, & id quod alteri detraxerit, ſibi aſſumat. Etenim multo magis eſt, ſecundum

naturam celsitas & animi magnitudo, itemq; communitas iustitia, liberalitas, quam voluptas, quam vita, quam diuitiæ. Quæ quidem cõtemnere & pro nihilo ducere compatantem cũ vtilitate communi, magni animi & excelsi est. Detrahere autem alteri sui commodi causa magis est contra naturam quam mors, quam dolor, quã cętera generis eiusdẽ. Itẽq; magis est secundum naturã pro omnib⁹ gẽtib⁹ (si fieri possit) conseruandis, aut iuuandis maximos labores, molestiasq; suscipere, imitantes Herculem illum, quem hominum fama beneficiorum memor in concilio cęlestiũ collocauit, quam viuere in solitudine nõ modo sine vllis molestijs, sed etiã in maximis voluptatibus abũdantem omnibus copijs, vt excellas etiã pulchritudine & viribus.

to nature is the hygheſt, and greatneſſe of courage: and likewiſe common fellowſhip, iuſtice and lyberalitye: then pleaſure, then lyfe, then ryches.

Which things doubtleſſe for a man to deſpiſe and ſette at naught, in comparyſon of common profite: is a ſigne of a great and hautie courage. But to pull from another for ones own profit ſake, is more againſt nature, then death, then ſorrowe, then the reſt of the ſame kinde.

And in lyke manner, more according to nature it is, for the ſauing and aiding of nations (if it may poſſible be done) to vndertake great trauailes and paines following. That notable Hercules whome mens report (the recorder of deſertes) hath placed in the companie of them aboue: then to liue in ſolitarineſſe, not only without anie paines, but alſo in great pleaſures, flowing full of all riches, yea, though moreouer you maye excell all other in beautie and ſtrength.

Where-

wherefore euerie man of the best and most noble disposition, preferreth that iyfe farre before this. Whereof it comes to passe, that a man obedient to nature cannot hurte a man.

Furthermore, who so wrongeth another, that himselfe maye gette some commoditie, eyther beleeues that he doth nothing agaynst Nature, or weenes that he should shunne death, pouertie, sorrowe, the losse also of children, kinsfolk, friendes, rather then the doing of iniurie to anie man. If he thinketh nothing to be done against nature, in wronging of men? What shuld you reason with him which cleane takes awaie man from man? But if he plainely thinketh ỹ meet to be auoided: & yet these he demeth much worse, death, pouertie, sorrow, he is in this point out of the way, that hee taketh anie discommoditie, either of the bodie, or of fortune to be sorer, then ỹ vices of the minde.

Therefore there must bee in all menne one entent:

Quocirco optimo quisq; splendidissimoq; ingenio longè illam vitã huic anteponit. Ex quo efficitur, hominem naturæ obedientem, homini nocere non posse. Deindè, qui alterum violat, vt ipse aliquid cõmodi consequatur, aut nihil se existimat, cõtra naturam facere, aut magis fugienda censet mortem, paupertatem, dolorem, amissionem etiam liberorum, propinquorum, amicorum, quam facere cuipiam iniuriam. Si nihil existimat cõtra naturam fieri hominibus violandis, quid cũ eo differas, qui omninò hominẽ ex homine tollat? Sin fugiendum id quidem censet, sed multò illa peiora mortem, paupertatem, dolorem, errat in eo, quod vllum aut corporis aut fortunæ vitium, animi vitijs grauius existimat.

Ergo vnum debet esse omnibus propositũ,

vt eadem ſit vtilitas vnius cuiuſque & vniuerſorum: quam ſi ad ſe quiſque rapiat, diſſoluetur omnis humana conſociatio. Atque ſi etiã hoc natura præſcribit, vt homo homini quicũque ſit, ob eam ipſam cauſam, quod is homo ſit, conſultum velit: neceſſe eſt ſecundum eandem naturam, omnium vtilitatem eſſe communem. Quod ſi ita eſt, vna continemur omnes, & eadem lege naturæ. Idque ipſum, ſi ita eſt, certè violare alterum, naturæ lege prohibemur.

Verum autem primũ, verum igitur & extremum. Nam illud quidẽ abſurdum eſt, quod quidam dicunt, parenti ſe aut fratri nihil detracturos commodi ſui cauſa. Sed aliam rationem eſſe ciuium reliquorum. Hi ſibi nihil iuris & nullam ſocietatẽ communis vtilitatis cauſa ſtatu-

that alyke may be the profite of euerie free man, and of all vniuerſally. which profite if each man plucke vnto himſelfe, all mans fellowſhip ſhal bee diſſolued. And if nature dooth alſo oppoint this, that man woulde haue men prouided for, whatſoeuer he bee, yet euen for the ſame reſpect, becauſe hee is a man, it muſt needes followe, that according to the ſame nature, the profite of all bee in common. Which if it bee ſo, wee all bee contayned in one, and the like lawe of nature. And if the ſame be ſo, doubtleſſe by the lawe of nature, wee are forbidden one to wrong another.

Nowe, the antecedent is true, therfore true alſo is the conſoquent. For that verelye is reaſonleſſe, that ſome ſaie, from their parent or brother, they wyll take nothing away, for cauſe of their owne profite, but of other citizens, that there is an other reſpect to be had. Theſe be in opinion, that they haue no lawe nor fellowſhyppe to keepe wyth

Citi-

Citizens, for a common profits sake, which opinion doth rip a sunder all the societie of a Citie.

And they that saye, there must regard bee had of Citizens, and none of forreiners, doe riue a sunder the common fellowshippe of mankinde, which being destroyed, all bountifulnesse, liberalitie, goodnesse, and iustice, is vterly rooted vp, which who so take awaie, euen toward the Gods immortall, are to bee counted irreligious. For such doe ouerthrowe the fellowshippe by them among men ordained. Of the which fellowshippe the surest bonde is to thinke it to bee more agaynst nature, for one manne to vse extortion to another, for his owne profites sake, then to suffer all discommodities, either outward, or of the bodie, yea, or of ỹ mind: which happen without iust deseruing. For this vertue Iustice, of all vertues is the ladie and queene.

unt esse cum ciuibus: quæ sententia omnem societatem distrahit ciuitatis.

Qui autem ciuium rationem dicunt esse habendam, externorũ nẽgant, hi dirimunt communem humani generis societatem: qua sublata, beneficentia, liberalitas, bonitas iustitia, funditùs tollitur. Quæ qui tollunt, etiam aduersus deos immortales impij iudicandi sunt, ab his enim constitutã, inter homines societatẽ euertunt: cuis societatis arctissimum vinculũ est, magis arbitrari esse, contra naturam hominem homini detrahere sui commodi causa, quã omnia incommoda subire vel externa, vel corporis, vel etiam ipsius animi, quæ vacent iustitia. Hæc enim vna virtus, omnium est domina & regina virtutum.

Forsitan quispiam dixerit, nonne igitur sapiens si fame ipse conficiatur, abstulerit cibum alteri homini ad nullam rem vtili? minimé vero, non enim mihi est vita mea vtilior, quam animi talis affectio, neminem vt violem commodi mei gratia.

Quid si Phalarim crudelem tirannum & immanem vir bonus, ne ipse frigore conficiat', vestitu spoliare possit, non ne faciat? Hæc ad iudicandum sunt facilima.

Nam si quid ab homine ad nullam parté vtilitatis tuæ causa detraxeris inhumanè feceris; contraq; naturę legem. Sin autem is tu sis, qui multam vtilitatem Reip. atq; hominum societati, si in vita remanes afferre possis, si quid ob eam causam alteri detraxeris, non sit reprehendum. Sin autē id nō sit eiusmodi suū cuiq; incómodū ferēdum est,

Peraduenture some will say, shall not then the wise man, if he be driuen by famin, take awaie meat from another man good for nothing, no doubt: esse.

For my lyfe is no more profitable to me, then such a disposition of minde, ỹ I wrong no bodie for my profits sake. What if a good man coulde spoyle the cruell and beastlye tyrant Phalaris of his clothing, that hee should not die for cold himselfe? might hee not doo it? These be full easie to iudge.

For if you take ought from a man on no behalfe profitable, for loue of your owne commoditie: ye shall doo vnkindly, and agaynst the lawe of nature: but if you bee the man, who maye bring much profit vnto the cōmon weale, and the fellowshippe of men, if you remaine aliue: in case ye take awaye ought from another, vppon that consideration: it is not to be reproued, but if the matter standeth not, cuē so euery man must rather beare his owne discommodi-

tie,

tie, then pull awaye of anothers commodities. Sickness then or pouertie, or anie such lyke, is not more against nature, then extorcion and greedinesse of another mannes goods. But to leaue alone the common profit, is against nature, for it is vniust.

Therefore the verie lawe of nature, which preserueth and maintaineth mens profit, appointeth without doubte, that from the idle and vnprofitable man, necessary things to liue with, be conueyed to the wise, the good & the manly man: who if he should die for want, should drawe awaie with him much of ỹ common profit: and yet so he must doo it, that neither by ouerweening in himselfe, nor looking of himselfe too well, he make this a pretenced couloure to do wrong. Therefore alwaies let him dooe his dutie, prouiding for the profit of men, and that fellowship among men, which I oftentimes repeate. For as touching Phalaris case, ỹ iudgement is very esie.

potius quam de alterius commodis detrahendum. Nõ igit' magis est contra naturã morbus aut egestas, aut quid eiusmodi, quã detractio atque appetitio alieni. Sed communis vtilitatis derelictio contra naturam est: est enim iniusta. Itaq; lex ipsa naturę, quę vtilit' hominũ cõ seruat et continet, decernit perfecto, vt ab homine inerti, atq; inutili ad sapientẽ, bonum, fortemq; virum, transferantur res, ad viuendũ necessariæ, qui si occiderit, multum de communi vtilitate detraxerit: modo hoc ita faciat, vt ne ipsa de se bene existimans, seseque diligens, hanc causam habeat ad iniuriã. Itaque semper officio fungatur vtilitati consulẽs hominũ & ei, quam sæpe commemoro, humanæ societati. Nãqd' ad Phalerim attinet, perfacile iudicium est.

Nulla

Nulla nam nobis cum tirannis ſocietas eſt, ſed potius ſumma diſtractio neque eſt contra naturam ſpoliare eum ſi poſſis, quem honeſtum eſt necare. Atque hoc omne genus peſtiferum atque impium ex hominũ communitate exterminandum eſt. Etenim, vt membra quædam amputantur, ſi & ipſa ſanguine & tanquam ſpiritu carere cœperunt, & nocent reliquis partib⁹ corporis: ſic iſta in figura hominis feritas & immanitas beluæ à cõmuni tanquam humanitati corporis ſegreganda eſt. Hui⁹ generis queſtiones ſũt õnes eæ, in quib⁹ ex tẽpore officium exquiritur. Eiuſmodi igitur credo res Panætium perſecuturum fuiſſe, niſi aliquis caſus aut occupatio conſilium eius peremiſſet. Ad quas ipſas conſulationes, ex ſuperioribus libris ſatis multa præcepta ſunt,

For with tyrantes wee haue no ſocietie, but rather bee at extreme diſſention with them, neyther is it agaynſt nature to ſpoile him if ye can, whom it is honeſt to kyll, and all ſuche peſtilent and wycked rabbles are to be driuen out of the compenyes of menne. For euen as certayne limmes be cut off, if they once begin both to lacke blond and lyfe, (as you woulde ſaye) and alſo dooe hurt the other partes of the bodie: ſo this ſauageneſſe and cruelneſſe of a beaſt, vnder the ſhape of a manne, muſt bee parted (as it were) from the common naturalneſſe of a mannes bodie.

Of this ſorte bee all thoſe queſtions, wherein duetye is ſought out by circumſtaunce of time.

Such matters therefore I beleeue Panetius woulde haue treated of, had not ſome chaunce or buſineſſe preuented his purpoſe. Concerning which manner of taking of aduiſement, in my bookes afore, many thinges bee ſufficientlye taught, by which

which, it maye bee perceiued, what is to be auoided for dishonestie, and what is not to bee shunned, because it is not dishonest.

But forasmuch as of our worke begunne, yet almost ended, (nowe as who sayth) we set on the roofe, as the Geometers are woont not to proue all, but to require that certaine things be graunted, them, to the intent they maye more easily set out their purpose: so doo I require of you my Cicero, that yee graunt mee, if yee may, that nothing but that which is honest, is for it selfe to bee desired.

But if it may not be granted, because of Cratippus, yet this no doubte you wyll graunt mee, that the thing which is honest, is chiefly for it selfe to be desired. Whether ye will is inough for mee, and both the one and the other semes the more prouable, neither anie thing else appeareth prouable.

And first in this pointe Panetius is to bee defended,

quibus perspici possit, quid sit propter turpitudinem fugiendũ, quid sit id, quod idcireò fugiendum nõ sit, quia omnino turpe non sit, Sed quoniem operi inchoato prope tamen absoluto, tanquam fastigium imponimus, vt Geometræ solent non omnia docere, sed postulare, vt quædam sibi concedantur, quô facilius quæ velint explicent: sic ego à te postulo mi Cicero, vt mihi concedas si potes, nihil præter id, quod honestum sit, esse propter se expetendum.

Sin hoc non licet, propter Cratippum: at illud certe dabis, quod honestum sit, id esse maximé propter se expetendum. Mihi vtrum vis satis est, & tum hoc, tum illud, probabilius videt': nec preterea quicquam probabile.

Ac primum Panętius in hoc defendendus est,

quod

quod non vtilia cum honeſtis pugnare, aliquando poſſe dixerit (neque enim ei fas erat) ſed ea quæ viderentur vtilia. Nihil vero vtile quod non idem honeſtum: nihil honeſtum quod non idem vtile ſit ſæpe teſtatur: negatq; vllam peſtem maiorem in vitam hominum inuaſiſſe, quam eorum opinionem, qui iſta diſtraxerint.

Itaque non vt aliquã do anteponerimus vtilia honeſtis: ſed vt ea ſine errore dijudicarem⁹, ſi quando incidiſſent, induxit eam, quæ videretur eſſe, non quæ eſſet repugnantiam.

Hanc igitur partem relictam explebim⁹, nullius adminiculis, ſed (vt dicitur) marte noſtro.

Neque enim quicquam de hac parte poſt Panætium explicatum eſt, quod mihi quidem probaretur, de ijs,

becauſe he ſayd not, that profitable thinges at anye time ſtriue with honeſt (for it was not lawfull for him ſo to ſaie) but thoſe which ſeeme profitable might ſtriue with honeſtie. But he often witneſſeth, that nothing is profitable, which ſame is not honeſt, nor honeſt, which ſame is not profitable: and he denieth anye greater peſtilence to haue crept into mans life, thē their opinion, who haue diuyded theſe two a ſunder.

Therefore he brought in the repugnance, which dyd ſeeme to bee, and was not indeede: not that at anie time we ſhuld preferre profitable thinges before honeſt: but that without errour we might diſcerne them, if euer they fell in place.

This parte therefore lefte vntouched, wee wyll ſupplye with no others ayde, but (as they ſaye in warre) euen with our owne force. For touching this parcell, there hath beene, ſince Panenius wrote, nothing ſette out

that

that liked mee, of all that euer came to our hands.

Therefore, when anye shewe of profite is offered vs, wee must needes bee stirred: but if when yee giue good heede, yee see dishonestie ioyned with that thing which bringeth a shewe of profite, then the profite is not to bee despyzed, but wee must thinke, where dishonestie is, there profite cannot bee.

Now, if nothing there be so much against nature as dishonestie, (for nature doth desire good, and conuenient, and stedfast thinges, and despiseth the contrarie) and againe, ther is nothing so according to nature as profite, doubtlesse in ỹ same profitable thing, dishonestie connot be. And also, if we be borne to honestie: and it is eyther onely to bee desired, as to Zeno it seemed, or in all estimation, is to bee counted of more value, than all other thinges, as pleaseth Aristotle, it must needes bee, that the thing which is honest, is eyther the oneiye

quæ in manus meas venerunt.

Cum igitur aliqua species vtilitatis obiecta nos commoueri necesse est: sed si cûm animũ attenderis, turpitudinem videas adiunctam ei rei quæ speciem vtilitatis attulerit, tunc non vtilitas requirenda est: sed intelligendum, vbi turpitudo sit, ibi vtilitatem esse non posse.

Quod si nihil est tam contra naturam quam turpitudo (recta n. & conuenientia & cõstantia natura desiderat aspernaturque contraria) nihilq; tam secundũ naturam, quàm vtilitas certè in eadem re vtili turpitudò esse, non potest. Itemque si ad honestatem nati sumus eaq; aut sola expetẽda est vt Zenoni est visũ: aut certè õni pondere grauior habẽda, quã reliqua omnia, q̃ Aristoteli placet: necesse est quod honestũ sit, id esse aut solũ

aut

aut ſummum bonum: quod autem bonum id certè vtile. Itaque, quicquid honeſtum id vtile. Quare error hominum non proborum cum aliquid, quod vtile viſum eſt arripuit: id continuò ſecernit ab honeſto.

Hinc ſicæ, hinc venęna, hinc falſa teſtamenta naſcuntur: hinc furta peculatus, expilationes, direptioneſque ſociorum & ciuium: hinc opum nimiarum potentiæ non ferendę, poſtremo etiam in liberis ciuitatibus exiſtunt regnandi cupiditates: quibus nihil nec tetriùs, nec fœdiùs excogitari poteſt. Emolumenta enim rerum fallacibus iudicijs vident, pœnam non dico legum, quas ſæpe perrumpunt, ſed ipſius turpitudinis, quæ acerbiſſima eſt non vident.

Quam-

or the ſoueraigne good, and what ſo is good, the ſame doubtleſſe is profitable. And ſo all that is honeſt, is profitable. Wherfore when the errour of men not honeſt, hath caught holde of ſomwhat that ſeemeth profitable, by and by it diuides the ſame frome honeſtie.

Heereof murthers, heereof poyſoninges, heereof counterfait wills doo ſpring, heereof fellonie, hereof robbing the treaſurie, pillage, and extorcions from league friends, and Citizens, hereof groweth the power of two exceeding riches, not to be ſuffered and finally in free Cities, there bee the deſires of ruling, whereas nothing either more cruell, then they, or more deteſtable can be imagined.

For with deceiuable eyes they ſee the gaine of thinges, but the punishment I will not ſaie, of the lawes which they often break through, but of diſhoneſtie it ſelfe, which is foreſt of all, they ſee not.

Where-

wherefore let such takers of aduisement be driuen from among vs (for they are altogether wicked and vngodly) who vse aduisement whether they may follow that, which semes to be honest, or witting lie staine themselues with dishonesty. For in the very doubting a great fault there is, although they neuer come to ỹ doing of it. Therfore those things are not to be aduised on at all, in which the very taking of aduisement is dishonest.

And also in all deliberation, the hope, and opinion of concealing, & hiding of matters is to be put away. For fully (in case wee haue any whit profited in philosophie) wee ought to bee perswaded, though wee coulde hide it from all goddes, and men, that nothing yet couetously, nothing vniustly, nothing wantonly, nothing vnstayedly is meete to be done.

Here vpon that Gyges is brought in by Plato, who when the Earth had opened in certaine greate stormes

Quamobrem hoc quidem deliberantium genus pellatur e medio (est enim totum sceleratum & impium) qui deliberant vtrum id sequantur qd' honestum esse videant, an se scientes scelere contaminent.

In ipsa enim dubitatione facinus inest, etiam si ad id non peruenerint. Ergó ea deliberãda omnino non sũt, in quibus est turpis ipsa deliberatio. Atque etiam ex omni deliberatione cęlandi, & occultandi spes opinioque remouẽda ẽst. Satis enim nobis (si modo in philosophia aliquid profecimus) persuasum esse debet, si omnes deos hominesq; cęlare possimus nihil tamen auaræ, nihil iniustę, nihil libidinosę, nihil incontinenter esse faciendum.

Hinc ille Giges inducitur a Platone, qui cùm terra discessisset magnis

qui-

quibuſdam imbribus, in illum hiatum deſcendit, ęneumque equum (vt ferunt fabulæ) animaduertit, cuius in lateribus fores eſſent, quib⁹ apartis, hominis mortui vidit corpus magnitudine inuſitata, annulūque aureū in digito, quem vt detraxit, atque ipſe induit (erat autem regius paſtor) tum in conſilium paſtorum ſe recepit: ibi cùm palam eius annuli ad palmam conuerterat, a nullo videbatur, ipſe autem omnia videbat: idem rurſus videbatur, cùm in locum anulum inuerterat. Itaque hac oportunitate anuli vſus, reginę ſtuprum intulit: eaq, adiutrice regem dominum interemit, ſuſtulitque quos obſtare arbitrabatur, nec in his quiſquam eum facinoribus videre potuit: ſic repentè anuli beneficio rex exortus eſt Lidię.

went downe into the gaping hole: and ſpyed a brazen horſe (as the fables tell) in whoſe ſydes were doores: which being opened he ſaw the corſe of a dead man, of an vnwonted hugeneſſe, and a gold ring vppon his finger: which as ſone as he pulled of, hee put it on his own finger (This Gyges was the kinges ſhepard) Then he got himſelfe againe to the company of shephards, There when hee had turned the head of the ring towarde the palme of his hande: he was ſeene of no bodye, yet he ſawe euery thing: and hee was ſeene againe, when he had turned the ring in ſight. And ſo vſing this vauntage of the ringe, he lay with the Queene: and by her ayde, he ſlew the Kinge his mayſter: and made diſpatche of them, whom he thought to ſtand in his way.

Neyther could any man ſee him being about theſe miſchieuous deedes.

So by the commoditie of his ringe, he became ſodenly king of Lydia.

This

This ſame ringe then if a perfect wiſe man ſhould haue he wold think it no moꝛe lawfull foꝛ him to offend, than if he hadde it not. Foꝛ honeſt things, not ſecret things, by good men be ſought. And in this place certaĩ philoſophers and thoſe not of the woꝛſt, but yet not all of the fineſt, ſay: that Plato told a fained and deuiſed fable, as though hee defendeth, that either ẏ thing was done, oꝛ was poſſible to be done.

This is the effect of this ring, and of this example: if no man ſhould knowe oꝛ no man ſhuld once ſuſpect, when you ſhould doo any thing foꝛ regard of riches, power, rule, oꝛ luſt, yea if it ſhould be vnknowen foꝛ euer both of God and man: whether you wold doo it oꝛ no. They denie it poſſible to befal, and although it cannot ſo befall indeede, yet I demand, in caſe that might befall, which they denie to be poſſible, what would they do? They foꝛce on groſſelye in good ſooth.

Foꝛ

Hunc igitur ipſum annulũ ſi habeat ſapiens, nihilo plus ſibi licere putet peccare, quàm ſi nõ haberet. Honeſta.n. bonis viris nõ occulta quę runtur.

Atqûe hoc loco philoſophi quidam, minimè mali illi quidẽ, ſed non ſatis accuti, fictam, & commentitiam fabulam dicunt prolatam a Platone, quaſi vero ille aut factum id eſſe, aut fieri potuiſſe defendat. Hęc eſt vis huius annuli & huius exempli: ſi nemo ſciturus, nemoue ſuſpicaturus quidẽ ſit, cûm aliquid diuitiarũ, potentiæ, dominationis, libidinis cauſa feceris: ſi id dijs, hominibuſque futurum ſit ſemper ignotum, ſis nefacturus? Negant id fieri poſſe quanquam poteſt id quidem.

Sed quæro: quod negant poſſe id ſi poſſet, quidnam facerint? Vrgent ſanè ruſtice: ne-

gant enim posse, & in eo perstant.

Hoc verbum, si quid valeat, non vident.

Cùm enim quærimus, si possint cælare, quid facturi sint, non quærimus, possint ne cælare: sed tanquam tormenta quædam adhibemus: vt si responderint se impunitate proposita facturos quod expediat, facinorosos se esse fateantur: si negent, omnia turpia per se ipsa fugienda esse concedant.

Sed iam ad propositum reuertamur. Incidunt sæpe multæ causæ, quæ conturbant animos vtilitatis specie, non cùm hoc deliberetur relinquenda nè sit honestas propter vtilitatis magnitudinem (nam id quidem improbum est) sed illud, possit nè id, qd' vtile videatur, fieri non turpiter.

For they holde, it is vnpossible, and therein they stay still.

What this word, if, importeth, they see not. For when we demaund, if they be able to conceale, what they will doe? wee doe not demaunde whether they bee able to conceale it or no, but wee laye beefore them as it were the racke, and certeyne mantikes, that if they aunswere, they would doe what them liked, being sure to scape scotfree, they confesse them selues to be wicked: if they say, they would not they graunt all dishoneſt thinges for themselues meete to bee eschewed. But now let vs retourne to our purpose.

There doe often tymes befall diuers matters, which trouble mens minds, vnder a shew of profit, not when this is aduised vppon whether honesty is to be left for the greatnesse of profit (for that plainly is wycked) but whether the thing which seemeth profitable may bee done without dishonesty.

when

when Brutus tooke awaye the rule from Collatinus Tarquinus, his Office fellowe, hee myght haue beene thought to dooe it vniustly, for in driuing out the kinges, he had beene Brutus assistaunt, & aider also of his counsells.

But when the rulers had agreed thus in counsell, that the kinred of Superbus, and the name of ỹ Tarquinians, and the memorie of the kingdome, shuld be vtterly driuen out, because it was profitable to prouide for their countrie, the same was in such wise honest, that euen verie Collatinus ought to haue lyked it. And so profite preuailed, because of honestie, wythout which, profite could not haue ben at all.

But with the king, who builded this citie, it fared not so. For a shew of profite strake in hys minde, to whom when it appered more profitable for him to rule alone, then & another he slew his brother. This man forgot both godlinesse,

Cùm Collatino Tarquinio Collegæ Brutus imperium abrogabat: poterat videri facere id iniustè, fuerat enim in regibus expellendis socius Bruti consiliorum & adiutor.

Cùm autem consilium hoc principes cœpissent: cognationem superbi, nomenque Tarquiniorum, & memoriam regni esse tollendam quod erat vtile patriæ cõsulere id erat ita honestum, vt etiam ipsi Collatino placere deberet. Itaque vtilitas valuit propter honestatem, sine qua nec vtilitas quidem esse potuisset.

At in eo rege, qui vrbem condidit, non ita. Species nam vtilitatis animum impulit eius, cui cum visum esset vtilius solum se, quàm cum altero regnare, fratrem interemit.

Omisit hic & pietatem

& humanitatem, vt id quod vtile videbatur, neque erat assequi posset: & tamen muri causam opposuit speciem honestatis, nec probabilem, nec satis idoneam.

Peccauit igitur, pace vel Quirini vel Romuli dixerim.

Nec tamen nostrę nobis vtilitates omittendę sunt, alijsque tradendæ, cùm his ipsi egeamus: sed sua cuique vtilitati, quod sine alterius iniuria fiat, seruiendum est.

Scitè Chrisippus, vt mult. Qui stadium (inquit) currit, eniti & contendere debet, quam maximè possit, vt vincat: supplantare eum, quicum certet, aut manu depellere nullo modo debet.

Sic

and naturalnesse, ỹ hee might obtaine the thing that seemed profitable, and was not so indeede, and yet his brothers leaping ouer the wall he alleadged, for a coulour of honestie, neither allowable, nor sufficient inough.

He offended therefore, that by Quirinus, Romulus fauour I may say it. Notwithstanding we ought not to leue our own commodities, & giue them to other, whē our selues dooe neede the same, but euerie man must serue his owne profite so farre, as wythout anothers iniurie it maye bee done.

Featly sayde Chrisippus in this, as hee didde in many thinges more, who so quoth he, runneth in the race, ought to endeauour and labour as much as he may, that himselfe may winne the game, but in no wise hee ought to trippe him, with whome he runs, or to kepe him of with his hand.

So

So in this life it is not vnlawfull for euerye man to get himselfe that maye serue his vse, but to pull from all other, it is no right.

But most of all dueties be put out of order in friendshippes, in the which it is against duetie, both not to doo, that rightfullye you maye, and to dooe, that is not lawfull. But of all this matter a shorte and no hard rule there is.

For these, which seeme profitable, honours, riches, pleasures, and other of the same kinde, are neuer to bee preferred afore friendshippe. And a good mã for his frends sake, nether wyll doo against the common weale, neither agaynst his oath and promise, no not though he shal be iudge vpon his owne friend. For he puts of the personage off a friend, whẽ he takes vpõ him the person of a iudge. Thus much he shall leane to friendship, that he had rather hys friends cause were true, and that he will graunt him time throughly to plead his cause,

Sic in vita sibi quenque petere, quod pertineat ad vsum non iniquum est: alteri diripere ius non est.

Maximé autem perturbantur officia in amicis, quibus & non tribuere quod rectè possis, et tribuere quod non sit æquum, contra officiũ est.

Sed huius generis totius breue & non difficile præceptũ est. Quæ enim videntur vtilia, honores, diuitiæ, voluptates, cęteraq; generis eiusdem, hæc amicitiæ nunquã anteponenda sunt. Ac neque contra Rempublicam, neq; contra iusiurandum, ac fidem amici sui causa vir bonus faciet, nec si iudex quidem erit de ipso amico. Ponit enim personam amici, cum induit iudicis. Tantum dabit amicitiæ, vt veram amici causam esse malit, & vt perorandę liti temp°,

quod per leges liceat, ac commodet. Cùm verò iurato dicenda sentẽtia sit, meminerit. Deum se adhibere testem, id est, (vt ego arbitror) mentem suam, qua nihil homini dedit Deus ipse diuinius. Itaque præclarum a maioribus accepimus morem rogandi iudicis (si eum tenerem⁹) quæ salua fide facere possit. Hęc rogatio ad ea pertinet, quæ paulo ante dixi, honestè amico â iudice posse concedi. Nam si omnia facienda sint quæ amici velint, non amicitiæ tales, sed coniurationes putandæ sunt.

Loquor autem de cõmunibus amicitijs, nam in sapientibus viris atque perfectis, nihil potest esse tale.

Damonem & Pythiam Pythagoros ferunt hoc animo inter se fuisse, vt cùm eorum alteri Dionysius tyrannus, diem necis destinauisset,

as much as by the lawe hee may. But when by his oath he is to giue sentence, he must remember hee taketh God to witnesse, that is to meane (as I suppose) his conscience, for nothing more godlyke then it is, hath God himselfe giuen to man.

Therefore of our auncestors we haue receiued a goodlye manner of desiring the faueur of a iudge, if we would keepe it: To doo what hee may sauing his oath. This requeſt is referred to those thinges which a little before is sayde, might honestly bee graunted by a Iudge to his friend. For if all things shoulde be doone which friends woulde desire, such were to bee counted, not amities, but conspiracies.

I speake now of common friendshippes. For in menne wise and perfect, there canne be no such thing. We saye that Damon and Pythias, the Pythagorians, were so affectioned one towarde another, that when Dionisius the tyraunt had appoynted, one of them his dying daie,

and

and he, who was condempned to die: had required certaine dayes of respite, for the disposing of his thinges: the other became bound bodie for body, for his fourth comming, vpon condition, that if he returned not at his daie, he would himselfe die for him, who when at his day hee was come againe, the tyrant wondering at their faithfulnesse, required that they wold take him in for the third in their friendship, when therfore that which in friendship seemeth profitable, is compared with that which is honest, let the shew of profit yeeld, & honestie preuaile.

But when in friendshippe those thinges shall be requyred which be not honest, lette religion and vprightnesse bee preferred before friendshippe, and so shall that choise of dutie be had, which we seeke after. But vnder the shewe of profit, in the common weale, there is oftentimes doing amisse, as our men did in the razing of Corinth.

& is, qui morti addictus esset, paucos sibi dies commendandorum suorum causa postulauisset: vas factus est alter eius sistendi: vt si ille non reuertisset ad diem moriendum esset ipsi. Qui cum ad diem se recipisset, admiratus eorum fidem, tyrannus petiuit, vt se in amicitiam tertium ascriberent.

Cùm igitur id quod vtile videtur in amicitia cum eo quod honestum est, comparatur, iaceat vtilitatis species, valeat honestas. Cùm autem in amicitia, quæ honesta non sunt postulabunt: religio & fides anteponantur amicitiæ. Sic habebitur is, quem exquirimus, delectus officij. Sed vtilitatis specie in Republica sæpissimè peccatur, vt in Corinthi disturbatione nostri.

Durius etiam Athenienſes qui ſtatuerũt, vt Aeginetis, qui claſſe valebant, pollices præciderentur. Hoc viſum eſt vtile, nimis nam immine bat propter propinquitatem Aegina Pireo. Sed nihil quod crudele vtile. Eſt nam hominum naturæ, quam ſequi debemus, maximè inimica crudelitas.

Male etiam, qui peregrinos vrbibus vti prohibent, eoſque exterminant: vt Petronius apud partes noſtros, Papius nuper.

Nam eſſe pro ciue, qui ciuis non ſit, rectum eſt non licere, quam tulerunt legem ſapientiſſimi conſules Craſſus & Scæuola, vſu vero vrbis prohibere peregrinos, ſane inhumanum eſt. Illa præclara in quibus publicæ vtilitatis ſpecies, præ honeſtate contemnitur. Plena exemplorum eſt noſtra Reſpublica, cũm ſæpe alias,

Solon alſo dealt the Athenians, who made a decree, that the Eginets thombes, who were ſkilled in nauigation, ſhould be cut off. This was thought profitable: for Egina didde too much ouerlooke Pireum, by reaſon of ẏ neere bordering. But nothing that is cruell is profitable. For to mans nature, which we ought to follow, crueltie is moſt enimie.

They alſo dooe euyll, who barre ſtraungers from vſing their Citie, and doo banniſhe them, as did Petronius in our fathers daies, and Papius of late yeares.

For one to goe for a citizen who is no Citizen, it is reaſon, it ſhould not bee lawfull, the which lawe the verie wiſe Conſuls, Craſſus, and Scæuola did make: but to forbidde ſtraungers the vſe of the Citie, it is doubtleſſe an vnciuill part. Thoſe dooings be notable, wherein ſhew of common profit is deſpiſed, in reſpect of honeſtie. Our common weale is ful of examples, both often at other times, and chiefely

chiefelye in the seconde Punike warre, which after the ouerthrow taken at Cannas, had greater courages then euer in prosperitie, no token there was of feare, no mention of peace. So greate is the force of honestie, that it dimmeth the shewe of profit.

When the Athenians no waie were able to withstande the assault of the Persians, and were determined, that leauing the Citie, and setting their wiues and children in Troezen, they woulde take their ships and defend the libertie of Greece wyth theyr nauie, one Cyrsillus they stoned to death, who persuaded with them to keepe still the citie, and receiue Xerxes. And he seemed to folow profit: but that was none, where honestie gainestood it. Themistocles after the victorie of that battaile, which was holden with the Persians, sayde in the open assemblye, that hee had wealeful counsel for the state, but it was not expedient, it should bee openlye knowen,

tum maximè bello Punico secundo, quę Cannēsi calamitate accepta maiores animos habuit quam vnquam reb⁹ secundis. Nulla fuit timoris significatio, nulla mẽtio pacis. Tanta vis est honesti, vt speciem vtilitatis obscuret.

Athenienſis cûm Persarum impetum nullo modo possent sustinere, statuerentque, vrbe relicta, coniugibus & liberis Troxene depositis, naues conscenderent, libertatemque Græciæ, classe defenderent, Cirsilum quendam suadentem, vt in vrbe manerent, Xerxemque reciperent, lapidibus obruerunt. Atque ille sequi vtilitatem videbatur: sed ea nulla erat repugnantè honestate. Themistocles post victoriam eius belli, quod cum Persis fuit, dixit in concione se habere consilium, Reipublicæ salutare, sed id sciri opus non esset,

postulauit vt aliquem populus daret, qui cum communicaret. Datus est Aristides.

Huic ille, classem Lacedemoniorum, quæ subducta esset ad Gythe um, clàm incendi posse quo facto frangi Lacede moniorum opes necesse esset.

Quod Aristides cùm audiuisset, in cõcionem magna expectatione ve nit: dixitque perutile esse consilium, q̃ Themistocles afferret, sed minimè honestum.

Itaque Athenienses quod honestum non es set, id ne vtile quidem putauerunt: totamque eam rem, quam ne audiuerat quidem, autho re Aristide repudiauerunt.

Melius hi quàm nos, qui pirates impunes, socios vectigales habemus.

Maneat ergo, quod turpe sit, id nunquam esse

he required that the people shoulde assigne some man, to whom he should tell it. Aristides was appointed. He tolde him the Nauie of the Lacedemonians, which was conueyed to Gythcum, nyght priuely be set a fire, by which acte the Lacedemonians strength shuld of necessitie be abated.

Which thing when Aristides heard, he came to the open assembly, with their gret expectation, and sayde, it was verie profitable counsell, which Themistocles dyd giue, but nothing honest.

Therefore the Athenians, the thing that was not honest, dyd not account profitable at all, and being aduertysed by Aristides, they reiected the whole matter, which they had not once herd. Better dyd they, then wee doo, who haue Pirats vnpunished, and league friends tributarie.

Let this therefore stande for a conclusion, that the thing which is not honest,

is neuer profitable: no not e-uen then, when yee attayne the thing which you recken to be profitable. For the same to thinke profitable, which is dishoneſt, a myſurable caſe it is.

But often times (as I ſayde before) ther ſo befall caſes, when profit ſeemeth to ſtriue againſt honeſtie, that is to be conſidered, whether altogether it doth gainſtand it, or maye bee made agree with honeſtie.

Of that kinde be theſe queſtions: if for examples ſake, a good man departing from Alexandria, ſhall bringe to Rhodes a great quantitye of corne, in the time of ſcarcitie, and famine, and extreame dearth of Corne amonge the Rhodians, in caſe the ſame man know, that many Merchaunts bee alreadye ſet forth from Alexandrie: and ſawe theyr ſhippes fraughted with Corne, in theyr courſe, makinge towarde Rhodes: whether hee ought to declare it to the Rhodyans,

eſſe vtile: ne tum quidem, cùm id, quod eſſe vtile putes, adipiſcare. Hoc enim ipſum vtile putare, quod turpe ſit, calamitoſum eſt.

Sed incidunt (vt ſupra dixi) ſæpe cauſæ, cùm repugnare vtilitas honeſtati videatur: vt animaduertendum ſit, repugnet nè plane, an poſſit cum honeſtati coniungi.

Eius generis hæ ſunt quæſtiones. Si exempli gratia, vir bonus ab Alexandria profectus Rhodum magnum frumenti numerum aduexerit in Rhodiorum inopia, & fame ſummaquæ annonæ caritate, ſi idem ſciat complures mercatores Alexandria ſoluiſſe, naueſque in curſu frumento onuſtas petentes Rhodum viderit: dicturus ne ſit Rhodijs,

dijs id an ſilentia ſuum quam plurimo venditurus?

Sapientem & bonũ virum fingimus, de eius deliberatione & conſultatione quærimus: qui celaturus Rhodios non ſit, ſi id turpe iudicet, ſed dubitet, an turpe non ſit.

In huiuſmodi cauſis, aliud Diogeni Babilonio videri ſolet magno & graui Stoico, aliud Antipatro diſcipulo eius, homini acutiſſimo.

Antipatro omnia patefacienda, vt ne quid omnino, quod venditor norit, emptor ignoret. Diogeni, venditorem quatenus iuris ciuili cõſtitutum ſit, dicere vitia oportere, cætera ſine inſidijs agere: & quoniam vendat, velle quàm optimè vendere.

Aduexi, expoſui, vendo

or with ſilence ſhould ſell his owne for as much as hee might.

Wee put the caſe heere of a wiſe and good man, touching his deliberation and taking of aduiſement, we queſtion, who wold not hide it from ỹ Rhodians, if he thought it diſhoneſt: but hee doubteth whether it bee diſhoneſt or no. In ſuch manner caſes, one thing Diogenes the Babylonian, a great and graue Stoike, is wont to thinke another thing, Antipater his ſcholler, a verie ſharpe witted man.

Antipater holdeth that all muſt bee opened, that the buyer be ignorant of no manner thing, which the ſeller knoweth. Diogenes ſaith, the ſeller ought to tell the faults, that as farre as is appoynted by the ciuyll lawe and the reſt, to doo without deceites, and ſeeing he ſelleth, to deſire with the beſt aduauntage to ſell.

Hether haue I brought it, I haue ſet it foorth to ſale.

I

I sell mine for no more then other doo, perchaunce also for lesse, seeing I haue greater store, to whome is the wrong done: There groweth a disputation by Antipater, of the contrarie side, what goe ye about? Sithens ye are bound to profit men, and to serue the fellowship of man, and ye are borne vnder such a lawe, that ye should keepe those principles of nature, which ye ought to obey, and alwaies to folow, that your profite shoulde bee common profit, againe, and as wel, common profit should de yours: will you hide from mē both what commoditie and what store also is at hand for them.

Diogenes peraduenture will answere thus: It is not al one thing to hide from men and to holde ones peace, neither doe I now hide it from yee, though yee tell ye not, what is the nature of Gods, what is the ende of good, which thinges well knowen, woulde profite you more,

vendo meum non pluris quam cæteri, fortasse etiam minoris, cùm maior est copia, cui fit iniuria? Exoritur Antipatri ratio ex altera parte.

Quid agis? tute cùm hominib' consulere debeas & seruire humanæ societati: eaque lege natus sis, & ea habeas principia naturæ, quibus parere, & quæ semper sequi debeas, vt vtilitas tua communis sit vtilitas, viciſſim & æque cōmunis vtilitas tua sit cę-labis homines, quid his adsit commoditatis & copiæ.

Respondebit Diogenes fortasse sic: Aliud est cælare, aliud tacere, neque ego nunc te cælo si tibi non dico: quæ natura Deorum sit, quis sit finis bonorum: quæ tibi plus prodessent cognita, quam

quam tritici vtilitas. Sed non quicquid tibi audire vtile est, id mihi dicere necesse est. Immo vero, inquit ille, necesse est, si quidem meministi esse inter homines naturа coniunctam societatem. Memini inquit ille: sed num ista societas talis est, vt nihil suum cuiusque sit? Quod si ita est, ne vendendum quidem quicquam est, sed donandum.

Vides in hac tota disputatione non illud dici, quamuis hoc turpe sit tamen quoniam expedit faciam, sed ita expedire, vt turpe non fit. Ex altera autem parte, ea re quia turpe sit, non esse faciendum. Vendat ædes vir bonus propter aliqua vitia, quæ ipse norit, cæteri ignorent: pestilentes sint, & habeantur salubres: ignoretur in omnibus cubiculis apparere serpentes: male materiatæ, ruino-

then the cheapnesse of wheat. But it is not necessarie for mee to tel, whatsoeuer is profitable for you to heare. Yes verily sayth he, it is necessarie, if so be, you remember the fellowship knyt amonge men by nature.

I remember it sayth the other, but is this fellowshippe such, that each man may haue nothing of his owne. In case it be so, nothing doubtlesse is to be solde, but to bee giuen.

You see, in all this controuersie, this is not said, though it be vnhoneſt, yet because it is profitable. I wyll doo it, but that in such wise it is profitable, as it is not dishoneſt, And of the contrary side, that therefore it is not to bee done, because it is dishoneſt. But ỹ case, a good man sell a house for certaine discommodities, which he knoweth, and other know not, set case it be contagious, & is taken for wholesome: be it so, it be vnknowen, ỹ in all the chambers doo appere venimous creping beasts and that it is euill timbered,

and

and ready too fall, but thys none knoweth but the owner. I demaunde, if the seller open not this to the buyers, and selles the house for much more then hee thought, hee should haue done, whether he doth iustly or vnhonestly? He verely doth dishonestly, saith Antipater.

For what other thing is it, than not to shewe the wanderer his way (which at Athēs was forbidden vpon payne of common curses) if this bee not it? to suffer the buyer to rush sodenly and runne headlong by errour into a great deceyte? yea it is more, then not to showe a manne the waye. For it is wittingly to leade one out of the way into a false beliefe.

Diogenes replyeth againe, did he compell ye to buy, who not once moued ye to it? Hee sette to sale that lyked him not, you bought, that liked ye.

If they who offer to sell a good farme, and well buylded as they sette it out, bee not thought too haue deceyued,

ruinosę: sed hęc prętet dominum nemo sciat: quero si hęc emptoribus venditor non dixerit, ædesq; vendiderit pluris multò, quàm se venditurum putarit: num id iustè aut improbè fecerit? Ille verò improbè, inquit Antipater.

Quid.n. est aliud erranti viam non monstrare (quod Athenis execrationibus publicis sancitum est) si hoc non est, emptorem pati ruere, & per errorem in maximā fraudem incurrere? plus etiam est quàm viam non monstrare: nam est scientem in errorem alterum inducere.

Diogenes contra: num te emere cogit, qui ne hortatus quidem est? ille quod non placebat proscripsit, tu quod placebat emisti.

Quòd si qui proscribunt villam bonam benequè ędificatam, non existimantur fefelliſſe.

eti-

etiam si illa nec bona est, nec ędificata ratione, multô minus, qui domum non laudarũt. Vbi. n. iudicium emptoris est, ibi fraus venditoris quę potest esse? Sin autem dictum non omne prestandum est, quod dictum non est id prestãdum putas? Quid vero est stultius, quàm venditorẽ eius rei, quã vendat, vitia narrare? Quid autem tam absurdum, quam si domini iussu ita præco prędicet: domum pestilentem vendo.

although it bee neither good nor well buylded, much lesse then they, who haue not praised theyr house.

For where the buyers eye is his chapman, there what deceit can there be of the seller? and if euerye sayinge is not to be perfourmed, thinke ye that meete to be perfourmed, that was not sayde? But what is more fooliche then the seller to tel the faultes of the thinge, whiche he putts to sale? And what so fonde a hearinge is there, as if at the owners commaundemẽt, the cryer thus should make a noyes? I haue a contagious house to sell.

Sic ergo in quibusdã causis dubijs ex altera parte defenditur honestas: ex altera ita de vtilitate dicitur vt id, quod vtile videatur, nõ modó facere honestum sit, sed etiam non facere, turpe.

Thus therefore in some doubtfull cases, of the one parte is honestye defended, of the other parte there is speakinge of profitte, that it is not onelye honest to doe, but also dishonest not to do it, that seemeth profitable.

Hæc est illa, quæ videtur vtilium fieri cum honestis sæpe dissensio.

This is that dissention, whiche seemeth often to be falle betweene profitable thinges, and honest, which pointes are to be discussed.

Quæ dijudicãda sũt,

For

For we haue not set them forth to make questions, but to open them.

Nec thinke then, neither that same Rhodian cornemarchaunt, nor his houseseller ought too haue hidden ỹ forsaide thinges from the buiers. For whatsoeuer you keepe in silence, you do not fully so mache, as it is to hide, but when, for your profittes sake, ye woulde haue those ignorant of that you know, whom it stands vppon to knowe it. Now this kind of hiding of what nature it is, and what manner of manner, who seeth not? Doubtlesse it is a parte not of a plaine, not of a simple, not of a gentle, not of a iuste, not of a good man: but rather of a subtile witted, close wilie, deceitfull, gileful, craftie, fox like, and a verye dubler. These so manie, and other moe names of vyces to enter into, is it not vnprofitable? If they bee dispraise worthie, who haue helde theire peace: what is to be thought of those, who haue

Non enim vt quererem? exposuimus, sed vt explicaremus.

Non igitur videtur nec frumentarius ille Rhodius, nec hic ædium vẽditor cælare emptores debuisse.

Neque enim id est celare, cum quid reticeas, sed cũm quod tu scias, id ignorari emolumenti tui causa velis eos, quorum inter sit id scire. Hoc autem cęlandi genus quale sit, & cuius hominis quis non videt? Certè non aperti, non simplicis est, non ingenui, non iusti, non viri boni: versuti potius, obscuri, astuti, fallacis, malitiosi, calidi, veteratoris, vasti.

Hæc tot & alia plura, non nè inutile est vitiorum subire nomina?

Quòd si vituperandi sunt qui reticuerunt: quid de ijs existimandum est: qui orationis vanitatem adhibuerũt?

C. Cannius æques Romanus, homo nec infacetus, & satis literatus, cùm se Siracusas otiandi (vt ipse dicere solebat) non negotiandi causa contulisset, dictabat se hortulos aliquos velle emere, quò inuitare amicos, & vbi se oblectare sine interpellatoribus posset.

Quod cùm per crebuisset, Pethius ei quidam, qui argentariam faceret Siracusis, dixit venales quidem se hortos non habere, sed licere vti Cannio si vellet, vt suis, & simul ad cœnam hominem in hortos inuitauit in posterum diem.

Cùm ille promisisset, tum Pythius vt argentarius qui esset apud omnes ordines gratiosus, piscatores ad se conuocauit: & ab is petiuia, vt ante suos hortulos postera die piscarentur: dixit que quid eos facere vellet.

vsed a vainnesse of talk. Cayus Cannius, of the Equestrial order in Rome, a man not vnpleasaunt, and welynough learned, when hee had gotte him to Siracusa, euen for pleasure, and not for businesse (as hee was wont to tell) hee bruted, that hee woulde buy some place of pleasure, whether hee might bid his friendes, and where he might delight himselfe without troubles. Which when it was spred abroade, one Pythius who kept a banke of exchaunge at Siracusa sayde, that he had in deede a pleasant plot, howbeit not to sell, yet Cannius if it pleased him, might vse it as his owne, and therewith bad him to supper, against the next daye, when he had promised, then Pythius lyke a banker who was well in fauour with all degrees, called vnto him certayne Fyshermen, and requyred them, that the next daye they woulde fyshe beefore his grounde, and toide them what he would haue them doe.

Cannius

Cannius came at his time to Supper. Sumptuously there was prepared a number of Fisherboates were before theyr eyes. Each man for his parte, brought that he had taken. The fish was powred downe at Pithius feete. Then quoth Cannius, I praie yee Pithius, what is this, that there is so great store of Fish, so goodly a sort of boates: what meruaile? quoth he againe: for whatsoeuer fish there is about Siracusa, it is in this place: heere is the watering place, this ground these Citizens cannot well spare. Cannius kindled with desire to it, was earnest with Pithius, that he would sell it him. He made it strange at the first, what neede many words? He obtayneth it, the man beeing in loue with it, & rich, bought it for so much, as Pythius would aske: and bought it furnished: he putteth in sureties: and makes vp the bargaine, Cannius the next daie, desired his acquaintaunce thether, and came himselfe betymes;

Ad cœnam tempore venit Cannius. Erat opiparè à Pythio apparatũ conuiuium, Cymbarũ ante hortulos multitudo, pro se quisque quod ceperat afferebat, ante pedes Pythij, pisces abjicibantur. Tum Cannius: quæso inquit, quid est ô Pythi, tantumne piscium, tantũne Cymbarum? Et ille. Quid mirum, inquit hoc loco est, Syracusis quicquid est piscium, hæc aquatio, hac villa isti carere non possunt. Incensus Cannius cupiditate, contendit à Pythio, vt venderet: grauatè ille primo.

Quid multa? Impetrat: emit homo cupidus & locuples, tanti quanti Pythius voluit & emit instructos, nomina facit, negotium conficit. Inuitat Cannius postridiè familiares suos: venit ipse mature

ſcalmum nullum videt, quærit ex proximo vicino, num feriæ quædam piſcatorum eſſent, quod eos nullos videret. Nullæ (quod ſciam) inquit ille, ſed hic piſcari nulli ſolent, itaque heri mirabar, quid accidiſſet. Stomachari Cannius, ſed quid faceret? Nondum enim Aquilius, collega & familiaris meus, pertulerat de dolo malo formulas: in quibus ipſis cùm ex eo quæreret' quid eſſet dolus malus reſpondebat, cum eſſet aliud ſimulatum aliud actum.

Hoc quidem ſanè luculenter, vt ab homine perito definiendi. Ergo & Pythius, & omnes aliud agentes, aliud ſimulantes, perfidi, improbi, malitioſi ſunt. Nullum igitur factum eorum poteſt vtile eſſe cum ſit tot vitijs inquinatũ. Quôdſi Aquiliana diſinitio vera eſt, ex omni vita ſimulatio,

he ſawe neuer a boate: he enquired of his next neighbour, whether it were not ſome holy daie with the Fiſhermen, becauſe he ſawe none of them. None that I knowe, quoth hee: but heere none of them are wont to fiſhe: and therefore yeſterdaie I meruayled what chaunce was befallen. Canius beganne to chafe, but what could he doo: For as yet Aquilius, my office fellowe, and familiar, had not ſet foorth the caſes that ſhuld bee counted couine. In the which ſame, when I demanded of him, what was Couine: hee aunſwered, when one thing was pretended, and another done. This doubtleſſe was verie plainely aunſwered, as of a man ſkilfull in defining. Therefore both Pythius, and all that do one thing, and pretend another, be falſe, wicked, and guilefull. No deede then of theyrs can be profitable, when it is with ſo manye faultes beſpotted. If Aquilius definition bee true, out of all mans life muſt falſe pretending

ding, and diſſembling be baniſhed. So euery good man ſhal neither falſly pretend nor diſſemble, that he may buy or ſel the better. And this couine alſo was puniſhable by the lawes: as deceitfull gardenſhip in the twelue tables, and craftie beguiling young men of their goods, by the lawe Lectorian, and without lawe by iudgements, where the bil is put in vppon good conſcience. But of all other iudgements, theſe wordes bee moſt notable, that be of courſe in a caſe of arbitrement of marryage: the better, the iuſter, and in a caſe of truſt or confidence. That among honeſt men ther be honeſt dealing. What then? either in that which is the better, the iuſter: can there be any point of couine, or whē it is ſaid, among honeſt men, let there be honeſt dealing, can any thing deceitfully or guilfully be dōe? But couin (as ſaith Aquilius) is contained in fained pretence, and diſſimulation. All lying therefore in making of bargaynes is vterly to bee excluded. Let

diſſimulatioque tollenda eſt. Ita nec vt emat melius, nec vt vendat, quicque ſimulabit aut diſſimulabit vir bonus. Atque iſte dolus malus etiam legibus erat vindicatus, vt tutela, XII. tabulis: & circūſcriptio adoleſcentiū lege Lecto ria, & ſine lege iudicijs, in quibus ex fide bona agitur. Reliquorum autem iudiciorō hæc verba maxime excellunt, in arbitrio rei vxoriæ melius, æquius, in fiducia, vt inter bonos bene agier. Quid ergo? aut in eo, quod melius æquius eſt poteſt vlla pars ineſſe fraudis? aut cúm dicitur inter bonos bene agier, quicquam agi doloſe aut malioſe poteſt. Dolus autem malus, ſimulatione & diſſimulatione, (vt ait Aquilius) continetur.

Tollendum eſt igitur in rebus contrahendis, omne mendacium:

non liciatorem venditor nec qui contra se liceatur, emptor opponit, vterq; si ad eloquendū venerit, non plus quam semel eloquetur. Quintus quidem Scevola P. filius, cùm postulasset, vt sibi fundus, cui⁹ emptor erat, semel indicaretur, idque venditor ita fecisset, dixissetque se pluris æstimare, addidit cētum milia. Nemo est qui hoc viri boni fuisse neget, sapientis negāt: vt si minoris quam potuisset vendidisset. Hæc igitur est illa pernicies quod alios bonos alios sapientes existimant, Ex quo Ennius,

Nequequam sapere sapientem.

Qui sibi ipsi prodesse nequeat.

Verè id quidē, si quid esset prodesse, mihi cū Ennio conueniret. Hecatonem quidē Rhodiū discipulum Panætij video,

not the seller set a raiser of the price against the buyer, let not the buyer set one that maye lowe the price against him. If they both come to communication, they shall talke but once of the matter. when Quintus Scevola, Publius sonne, had required, that the price of the ground, whereof hee was a chaper, should once be shewed him, and the seller had so done, hee sayde, hee valewed it moze woorth, and gaue him moze by xxv. hundzeth crownes. There is no man that can denie, but this was the part of a good man, a wise mans parte they denie it to bee, euen as if the other should haue solde it for lesse, then hee might haue gotten. This therefore is the mischiefe, because they recken good to be one sorte, & wise of another. Wherupon qd Enni⁹

The wise man his wit
very vaine he may call,
If profit he cannot,
himselfe therewithall.

It were true indeede, if I agreed wyth Ennius, what

it

it is to profit. I see Hecato, ℔ Rhodian Panetius scholler, saith in those bookes, which of duties hee wrote to Quintus Tubero, that it is a wise mans part, doing nothing against customes, laws, & ordinaunces, to haue a respect to his substance. For we couet not onely for our selues to be rich, but for our children, our kinsfolke, our friends, & specially for ℔ common weale For the substance and wealth of euery free man, is the richnesse of a Citie. Sceuolas dooing, whereof I spake a little before, can in no wise lyke Hecato, for Sceuola vtterly denyeth, that hee will doe ought for his owne gaine sake, that is not lawfull. To this man neither great praise or thanke is to bee giuen. But whether both false pretending and also dissembling, be couine or no, fewe matters there bee, wherein this couin hath not a do, and whether he bee a good man, who profits whom hee may, and hurts no bodie, full well a iust man, but not lightly a good man we shall finde.

in ijs libris, quos de officijs scripsit. Quinto Tuberoni dicere, sapientis esse nihil contra mores, leges, instituta facientem habere rationem rei familiaris. Neque enim solum nobis diuites esse volumus sed liberis, propinquis, amicis, maximeque Reipub. Singulorum enim facultates & copię diuitiæ sunt ciuitatis. Huic Scæuolę factum (de quo paulò ante dixi) placere nullo modo potest. Etenim omninò se negat facturum compendij sui causa, quod non liceat. Huic nec laus magna tribuenda est, nec gratia. Sed siue simulatio & dissimilatio dolus malus est: perpaucæ res sunt in quibus dolus iste malus non versetur. Siue vir bonus est is, qui prodest quibus potest, nocet nemini, rectè iustum virum, bonum non facile reperiemus.

Nunquam igitur eſt vtile peccare, quia ſemper eſt turpe : & quia ſemper eſt honeſtum virum bonum eſſe, ſemper eſt vtile.

Ac de iure quidem prædiorum ſancitum eſt apud nos iure ciuili, vt in his vendẽdis vitia etiam dicerentur, quæ nota eſſent venditori.

Nam cum ex XII. tabulis ſatis eſſet cautum ea præſtari, quæ eſſent lingua nuncupata, quæ qui inficiatus eſſet duplicem pœnam ſubiret : à iure conſultis etiam reticentiæ pœna eſt conſtituta. Quicquid enim eſt in prædio vitij id ſtatuerũt, ſi venditor ſciret, niſi nominatim dictum eſſet, prẽſtari oportere. Vt cùm in arce augurum Augures acturi eſſent, iuſſiſſentq; Titum Claudium Centimalum, qui ædes in Cẽlio monte habebat, demoliri eas, quorum alti

It is neuer profitable then to doo euill, becauſe it is euermore diſhoneſt, and becauſe it is alwayes honeſt to bee a good man, it is alwaies profitable.

And ſurely touching the title of land, it is ordained wyth vs by ciuill lawe, that in ſelling of it, the faultes alſo ſhould be tolde, which were knowen to the ſeller. For whereas by the twelue tables it was ſufficiently prouided: that thoſe thinges ſhoulde be performed which were declared in word: which whoſo would denie, ſhoulde forfaite double damages: there was alſo by the Iudges of the lawe a paine ſet for concealement. For whatſoeuer faulte were in the lande: if the ſeller knewe it, except expreſſye hee had declared it: they decreed, that it ought to be made good. As when in the tower the Augures were about theyr prophelying by fowle flight: and had commaunded Titus Claudius Centimalus, who hadde houſes in mount Celie, to pull thoſe

downe

downe, whose height shoulde let the prophesying: Claudius did set them to sale, and solde the Ilande, Publius Calphurnius Lanaryues, bought it. He was commaunden the verie same by the Augurs, and so when Caphurnius had pulled them downe, and vnderstoode, that Claudius hadde set the houses to sale, after he had ben commanded of the Augurs to pull them downe: hee draue hym to arbitrement. For all that he ought in that case to recompence him, of good conscience. Marcus Cato, this our Catoes father, made the award. For as other are named from theyr Fathers: so this who begat such a starre, is to bee named from his sonne. Hee therefore as iudge, gaue sentence thus, ỹ seeing he knewe the thing, at the putting of it to sale, and did not declare it, he ought to render the buyer his damages. Hee therefore iudged, it stoode with good conscience: that the fault which the seller knew, shoulde be knowen to the buier. That

tudo officeret auspicijs: Claudius proscripsit insulam, vendidit: emit Publi⁹ Calphurnius Lanarius. Huic ab Auguribus in illud idem denũciatum est. Itaque Calphurnius cum demolitus esset, cognouissétq; Claudium ædes postea præscripsisse, quàm esset ab Auguribus demoliri iussus: arbitrum illud adegit: quid sibi de ea re facere oporteret ex fide bona. Marcus Cato sententiam dixit (huius nostri Catonis pater). Vt enim cæteri ex partibus, sic hic, qui illud lumen progenuit, ex filio est nominandus. Is igitur iudex ita pronunciauit: cũ in venundando rem eam sciisset, & non pronunciauisset emptori damnum præstari oportere.

Igit' ad fidem bonam statuit pertinere, notũ esse emptori vitiũ quod nosset venditor. Quod

si rectè dijudicauit, non rectè frumentarius ille, non rectè ædium pestilentium venditor tacuit.

Sed huiusmodi reticentiæ iure ciuili omnes cõ prehendi non possunt: quæ autem possunt, diligenter tenentur. Marcus Marius Gratidianus propinqu' noster Caio Sergio Oratę vendiderat ædes eas, quas ab eodẽ ipse paucis ante annis emerat.

Hæ Sergio seruiebant, sed hoc in mancipio Marius non dixerat, adducta res in iudicium est. Oratam Crassus, Gratidianum defendebat Antonius. Ius Crassus vrgebat, quod vitium vẽditor non dixisset, sciens id oportere præstari, æquitatem Antonius: quoniam id vitium ignotum. Sergio non fuisset, qui illas ædes vendidisset, nihil fuisse necesse dici: nec cum

and if hee gaue a true iudgement, neither wel did the corn merchaunt afore, neither well did this contagious house seller in holding his peace. But such manner of concealments cannot all be comprehended in the ciuill lawe, but such as may be perfectly contained. Marcus Marius Gratidianus, our kinsman, had sold to Caius Sergius Orata that house, which hee had bought of him a fewe yeares before. This house dyd a certayne seruice to Sergius, but Marius had not declared ỹ same, in the liuerie of seasin. The matter was brought to the lawe, Crassus pleaded for Orato, Antonius for Gratidianus, Crassus stoode vppon the letter of the lawe, because the seller, knowing the discommoditie, hadde not tolde it, that it ought to bee made good, Antonius enforced the equitie of the lawe, because that discommoditye was not vnknowen to Sergius, who had solde the same house, that it was nothing needfull to bee declared,

and

and that he was not deceiued, who vnderstood of what title it was that he hadde bought. To what purpose tendes all this?

That ye may perceiue, that couine lyked not our aunce-stours. But oue waye the lawes condempne couine, an other way the Philosophers. the Lawes, as farre as by open deede they canne gather vppon matters, the Philosophers, as farre as by reason and vnderstanding they can comprehend. Reason therfore requireth this, that nothing subtillye, nothing faynedly, nothing deceitfully bee done. Is it then anie deceit, to pitch ý toile, although you goe not about to rouse, nor chase the game? For the very game lightes vppon it oftentimes, when no bodie follows them. So when you offer your house to sale, you set vp your Bill, as a Nette, you sell the house because of the faultes, some bodie happes vppon it vnware of them, though I see this thorough corruption of vse,

eum esse deceptum qui id quod emerat, quo iure esset, teneret quorsum hæc vt illud intelligas, non placuisse maioribus nostris astutos.

Sed aliter leges, aliter Philosophi tollunt astutias. Leges, quatenus manu tenerere possūt: Philosophi quatenus ratione & intelligentia. Ratio igitur hoc postulat, ne quid insidiosè, ne quid simulatè, ne quid fallaciter.

Sunt né igitur insidiæ tendere plagas, etiam si excicaturus non sis bestiam, nec agitaturus. Ipse fære nullo insequẽte, sæpe incidũnt. Sic tu cùm ædes proscribas, tabulam tanquam plagam ponas, domum propter vitia vendas, in eam aliquis incurrat imprudens: hoc quanquam video propter deprauationẽ cõsuetudinis neque

neque more turpe haberi, neque aut lege ſanciri, aut iure ciuili: naturę tamen lege ſanctum eſt. Societas enim eſt, (quod etſi ſępe dictum eſt, dicendum tamẽ eſt ſępius) latiſſimè quidem quæ pateat hominum inter homines, interior eorum, qui eiuſdem gentis ſunt, propior eorum qui eiuſdem ciuitatis. Itaque maiores aliud ius gentium, aliud ius ciuile eſſe voluerunt, Quod enim ciuile, non idẽ continuô gentium, quod autem gentium, idem ciuile eſſe debet.

Sed nos veri iuris, germanæque iuſtitiæ ſolidam & expreſſam effigiem nullam tenemus, vmbra & imaginibus vtimur: eas ipſas vtinam ſequeremur.

Feruntur enim ex optimis naturæ, & veritatis exemplis. Nam quanti ſunt verba illa.

neither by cuſtome is counted diſhoneſt, neyther by ordynaunce, or ciuyll lawe of decrees, yet by the lawe of nature it is forbidden For there is a fellowſhippe of men amongſt men (which thing although it hath ben often times ſpoken of, yet oftner it muſt bee ſpoken) which indeede berie largely extendeth: and neerer there is of thoſe, who be of one nation, and a neerer of them who be of one Citie. Therefore our auncestours would needes haue the lawe of nations to be one thing, & the ciuill lawe another. For what ſo is the ciuill lawe, the ſame is not conſequentlye the lawe of nations: but what ſo is the lawe of nations, the ſame muſt needes be the ciuil law. But we keepe no ſound and expreſſe forme of very law and meere iuſtice: we vſe the ſhadowe and images thereof: yea, and euen thoſe ſame I woulde wee did followe. For they be taken out of the beſt principles of nature, and paternes of trouth, for howe precious be thoſe words.

That

That not by you, or your promise, I bee snared or deceiued, how golden woordes be those? That among good men, good dealyng ought to bee wythout deceiuing. But who bee good men, and what is good dealing, it is a greate question. Quintus Sceuola, the chiefe Bishop sayd, there was great substaunce of matter in all those arbitrements, in which they should bee treating according to good conscience, and the name of good conscience he iudged to reach verie farre: and that it had adoe in gardenships, companyes, matters of trust, commaundementes, thinges bought, solde, hired, and lette out: by which the fellowship of mannes lyfe is vpholden, in these thinges hee sayde, it was the office of a greate Judge to determine, what each man shoulde doo to another, specially seeing ỹ iudgements in most men be contrarie one to another, wherefore coum must bee vtterly auoyded: and that wylynesse which

Vt ne propter te, fidemue tuam, captus fraudatusue sim? quam illa aurea? Vt inter bonos benè agier oportet & sine fraudatione. Sed qui sunt boni, & quid sit benè agere, magna quæstio est.

Quintus quidem Scęuola Pontifex maximus summam vim esse dicebat in omnibus ijs arbitrijs, in quibus adderetur ex fide bona. Fideique bonæ nomen existimabat manare latissimè idque versari in tutelis societatibus: fiducijs mandatis, rebus emptis, venditis, conductis, locatis, quibus vitæ societas continetur.

In his magni esse iudicis, statuere (præsertim cùm in plerisque essent iudicia contraria) quid quemque cuique pręstare oporteret. Quo circà, astutiæ tollendæ sunt, eaque malitia, quę vult quidem videri

se

se esse prudentiam, sed abest ab ea, distatque plurimum. Prudētia est enim locata in delectu bonorum, & malorum Malicia si omnia quæ turpia sunt, mala sunt, mala bonis anteponit. Nec verò in prædijs solum ius ciuile ductum à uatura malitiam, fraudemque vindicat, sed etiam in mancipiorū vē ditione venditorū fraus omnis excluditur. Qui enim scire debuit, de sanitates, de fuga, de furtis, præstat edicto Aedilium.

Hæredum alia causa est. Ex quo intelligitur, quoniam iuris natura fons sit: hoc secundum naturam esse, neminem id agere, vt ex alterius prædetur insciția. Nec vlla pernities vitę maior inueniri potest, quàm in malitia simulatio intelligentiæ.

Ex quo illa innumerabilia nascūt: vt vtilia cum ho-

will needs haue it selfe seeme to be prudence, but it is farre from it, & differs very much. For prudence is placed in the choice of good and euill, wylinesse, if all thinges bee euill, which be dishoneſt, preferreth euil before good. And not only in matters of land, the ciuil lawe, that hath his orginall of nature, doth punish wilinesse and couine, but also in the sale of slaues and nieces, all couine of the sellers is forbidden. For he that should haue knowen of their healthfulnesse, of their fugitiuenesse of their thecuishnesse, doth make satisfaction by the Ediles decrees. Otherwise is the case of inheritours. Whereof is done to vnderstand, because nature is the fountaine of lawe, that this is according to nature, ỹ no man go about by anothers ignorance, to make his owne gaine. For anie greater destruction of mans life can bee found, then of a wilinesse, falsly to dissemble ones vnderstanding. Whereof those innumerable inconuenyences doe growe, that profitable

things

thinges ſeeme to fight with honeſt. For how many will be found, who being ſure to be free from puniſhment, and knowledge of all men, can refrain from doing wrong? Let vs make a proſe (if it pleaſe ye) in thoſe examples, wherin the common ſort of men perhaps do not think they doe amiſſe. For it falleth not in this place to ſpeake of murderers, poyſoners, wilfogers, theeues, and robbers of the common treſure, who not with wordes and reaſonings of Philoſophers, but with chaines and priſonmēt are to be puniſhed. But theſe things let vs cōſider, which they doe, who be compted good. Certaine menne brought out of Greece to Rome, a counterfet wil of Luci° Minuſi° Baſilius, a very rich mā, & to ẏ intēt they might ẏ eaſlier proue it they did put in as heires wᵗ thē Mar. Craſſus, & Quint° Hortēſius, men of moſt power in the ſame citie. Who whē they ſuſpected it to be forged, & were not giltye of any fault in theire owne conſcyence

honeſtis pugnare videātur. Quotus enim quiſq; reperietur, qui impunitate & ignoratione omnium propoſita abſtinere poſſit iniuria? Periclitemur (ſi placet) & inijs quidem exemplis, in quibus peccari vulgus hominū fortaſſe non putat. Neq; enim de ſicarijs, venificis, teſtamentarijs, furibus, peculatoribus hoc loco differendum eſt, qui non verbis ſūt & diſputatione philoſophorum, ſed vinculis & carcere caſtigandi. Sed hęc cōſiderem° quæ faciunt ij, qui habentur boni. L. Minutij Baſilij locupletis hominis falſum teſtamentum quidam è Gręcia Romam attulerunt, Quod quò facilius obtinerent, ſcripſerunt hæredes ſecum M. Craſſum & Quintū Hortēſiū, homines eiuſd° ciuitatis potētiſſimos, q̄ cùm illud falſū eſſe ſuſpicarentur, ſibi autē nullius eſſēt conſcij culpæ,

alieni

alieni facinoris munuſculum non repudiauerunt. Quid ergo? ſat in hoc eſt, vt nō deliquiſſe videantur? Mihi quidē non videtur: quanquā alterum amaui viuū, alterum non odi mortuum. Sed cūm Baſilius. M. Satyrium ſororis filium nomen ſuum ferre voluiſſet, eumq; feciſſet herędem, hunc autem dico patronum agri Piceni & Sabini (ò turpē notam temporum illorum) non erat & quū principes ciuitatis rem habere, ad Satyriū nihil pręter nomē peruenire. Etenim ſi is, qui non defendit iniuriam neque propulſat â ſuis cum poteſt, iniuſte facit vt in primo libro diſſerui: qualis habendus eſtis, qui non modo non repellit, ſed etiam adiuuat iniuriam? Mihi quidem etiam verę hereditates non honeſtę videntur, ſi ſint malitioſis blanditijs officiorum,

they refuſed not ẏ prety reward of an other falſehood. what ſay we then? Is this inough that they ſeme not to haue done anye faulte? To me truely it ſeemes not ſo: although the one I loued being aliue, ẏ other I hate not being dead: But when Baſilius would haue had Marcus Satirius his ſiſters ſōne to beare his name: and had made him his heir; I mean him who was protectour of the countrey of Picene, and Sabine. (O ſhamefull ſtain, in thoſe daies) it was not reaſon, that ẏ rulers of ẏ citie had the goods, and nothing but ẏ name deſcended to Satirius. For if he that doth not fence of iniurie, and kepe it away from his, when he may, doth vniuſtlye: as in my firſte booke I haue diſputed: what manner a man is he to bee compted: who not onlye doth not fence of, but alſo furdereth an iniurie? And true inheritance alſo ſeemes too mee not honeſt if it be purchaſed by wylye flatteringe dueties:

and not by trueth, but by falſe fayning. But in ſuch caſes, one thinge is wont ſometyme to ſeeme profitable, an other honeſt, yet vntruely it ſo ſeemeth: for alike is the rule of profit, as of honeſtie, who foreſeeth not this: no guyle, no miſchiefe ſhall faile in him. For thus imagining, this in deede is honeſt, but this is profitable: he will take vpon him by error to ſonder thinges coupled together by nature, which is the wellſpring of all deceiptes, wicked deedes, and miſchiefes. Therefore if a good manne haue ſuch power that if he do but beck with his finger, his name may creepe into the teſtament of the rich, let him not vſe this power: no not though hee know for certeintie, that no man at all wil once miſtruſt it.

But if ye ſhould giue this power to Marcus Craſſus, that with a becke of his finger, hee might bee put in as heire, being no heire in deede, he would (beleue mee) leape for ioy in the open ſtreete.

But a iuſte manne, and hee,

non veritate, ſed ſimulatione quęſitæ. Atqui in talibus rebus aliud vtile interdū, aliud honeſtum videri ſolet falſo. Nam eadem vtilitatis, q̄ honeſtatis eſt regula, qui hoc non prouiderit: ab hoc nulla fraus aberit, nullū faſcinus: Sic enimco gitas: Eſt iſtud quidem honeſtum, verum hoc expedit, res a natura copulatas audebit errore diuellere, qui fons eſt fraudū, maleficiorū, ſcelerum omnium Itaq; ſi vir bonus habeat hanc vim vt ſi digitis concrepuerit, poſſit in locupletum teſtamenta nomen eius irrepere, hac vi non vtatur: nec ſi exploratum quidem habeat, id omninō neminem vnquam ſuſpicaturum.

At ſi dares hanc vim M. Craſſo, vt digitorum percuſſione hęres poſſet ſcriptus eſſe qui re vera non eſſet hæres: in foro, mihi crede, ſaltaret. Homo autem iuſtus, iſq́ue,

quem ſentimus virũ bonum, nihil cuiquam, quod in ſe transferat, detrahet. Hoc qui admiratur, is ſe, qui ſit vir bonus, neſcire fatetur.

At veró ſi quis voluerit animi ſui complicatam notionem euoluere: iam ſe ipſe doceat, eum virum bonum eſſe, qui proſit quibus poſſit, noceat nemini, niſi laceſſitus iniuria. Quid ergo? hic non noceat, qui quodam quaſi veneno perficiat vt veros heredes moueat, in eorum locum ipſe ſuccedat?

Non igitur faciat (dixerit quis) quod vtile ſit, quodque expediat? immô intelligat, nihil nec expedire, nec vtile eſſe quod ſit iniuſtum, hoc qui non dedicerit, bonus vir eſſe non poterit. Fimbriam conſularem audiebam de patre noſtro puer, iudicem M. Luctatio Pythiæ fuiſſe equiti Romano,

whom we compt a good man, will catch nothinge from any man, to caſt it vpon himſelfe. Who ſo hath wonder at this: hee confeſſeth himſelfe not to know, who is a good man.

But if a man will vnfold the ſecret knowledge of his mind: by and by hee maye enfourme himſelfe, that hee is a good man who doth good to whom he may: and hurteth no bodie, but prouoked by iniury. How then? doth not he hurt another, who worke (as it were) with a certaine poiſon: that the true heires he maye diſplace, and make himſelfe ſucceede in their roume?

May he not then doe that wil ſome ſaye, which is profitable, and which is auaileable?

May let him knowe that nothing neither auayleth, nor is profitable, which is vniuſte. This who ſo hath not learned, cannot bee a good man.

I heard of my father, when I was a boy: that Fimbria ſometime Conſul, was iudge to Marcus Luctatius Pithi as one of ỹ Equeſtrial order

of

of Rome, indeed honeſt, when he had put in ſureties, to anſwere the action, if hee were not found a good man, that therefore Fimbria ſayd vnto him, hee woulde neuer gene iudgement of the caſe: leaſt he ſhould either rob a tried man of his good name, if he hadde iudged againſt him, or elſe ſhould ſeeme to haue determined, that ther is ſome good man, wheras that thing conſiſteth in dueties & commendations innumerable. To this good man then, whom alſo Fimbria, & not onely Socrates had conceiued: can no way ought appeare to be profitable, that is not honeſt.

Therefore ſuch a man wyll not be ſo bolde to doo, no nor purpoſe any thing which hee dare not auer. It is not a ſhame for Philoſophers to doubt in theſe things, wherof the clownes of the country do make no doubt at all. From whome is ſprong that Prouerbe, which nowe is well worne by continuaunce. For when they praiſe anie mans conſcience and goodneſſe:

ſanè honeſto cum is ſpō tionem feciſſet, ni bon⁹ vir eſſet. Itaque ei dixiſſe fimbriam, ſe illam rem nunquam iudicaturum: ne aut ſpoliaret fama probatum hominem, ſi contra iudicaſſet: aut ſtatuiſſe videretur virum bonum aliquem eſſe cum ea res innumerabilibus officiis & laudibus contineretur. Huic igitur viro bono quem Fimbria etiam, non modo Socrates nouerat, nullo modo videri poteſt quicquā eſſe vtile quod non honeſtum ſit. Itaque talis vir non modo facere: ſed nec cogitare quidē quicquam audebit, qd' non audeat prædicare. Hoc nonne eſt turpe dubitare philoſophos, quę ne ruſtici quidam dubitent: à quib⁹ natū eſt id quod iam tritum eſt vetuſtate prouerbium. Cum enim fidem alicuius, bonitatēq; laudant

dignum esse dicunt, qui cum in tenebris mices. Hoc quam habet vim nisi illam, nihil expedire quod non deceat, etiam si id possis nullo refellente obtinere? Vides né igitur hoc prouerbio, neque Gygi illi posse veniam dari, neque huic quem paulo ante fingebã, digitorum percussione hereditates omnium posse conuertere? Vt enim quod turpe est id quamuis occultetur, tamen honestam fieri nullo modo potest: sic qd' honestum non est, id vtile vt sit effici non potest, aduersante & repugnante natura. At enim cum per magna præmia sunt, est causa peccandi. Caius Marius cũm à spe consulatus longe abesset, & iam septimum annum post præturam iaceret, neque petiturus vnquam consulatum videretur Q. Metellum cuius legat⁹ erat,

they saie he is such a man, as ye may plaie with him blindfold, what other meaning hath that, but this, that nothing is expedient, which is not comly although you may obtaine it without any mãs resistance? Do ye not see then by this Prouerbe, that neyther the same Gyges can be borne with, nor this other, whome erewhile I fained with the wagging of his finger to be able to turn to himselfe all mennes inheritaunce: For as the thinges which is dishonest, although it be closely kept, can no way yet be made honest, so ỹ thing which is not honest, cannot be brought to passe to be profitable, euen nature being against it, and withstanding it. But yet where verie greate brybes bee, there is occasion of euyll dooing. When Caius Marius was farre off from hope of the Consulship, a vii. yeres after his Prætorshippe, laye still nor seemed as one, that euer would labour for the Consulshippe, to the people of Rome, hee accused

Quin-

Quintus Metellus, a noble man and Citizen, whose ambassadour hee was, when hee was sent to Rome from him, beeing his captaine, how that he prolonged the warres, and sayd, if they had made hym Consull, he woulde in a short space haue brought Iugurtha, eyther quicke or dead, into the subiection of the people of Rome. And so indeede he was made Consull, but hee swarued from all trust and iustice, who by false accusation, brought in an enuie a verie good and graue Citizen, whose Ambassadour he was, and from whom he was sent. No nor our Gratidianus, truely did the dutie of a good man, when hee was Prætor, and the Tribunes of the people had called vnto them the company of the Prætors, that there myght be set a standard of coine by the common consent. For in those dayes the money was made so to fall & rise, that no man could know what he had.

They pẽned a decree by a cõmon agreement vpon a paine

summum virum & ciuem, cum ab eo imperatore suo Romam missus esset, apud pop. Roma, criminatus est, bellum illum producere: si se COS. fecissent, breui tempore aut viuum, aut mortuum Iugurtham se in potestatem Pop. Ro. redacturum. Itaque factus est ille quidem COS. sed à fide iustitiaque discessit: qui optimum ac grauissimum ciuem, cuius legat⁹, & à quo missus esset, in inuidia falso crimine adduxerit. Nec nolter quidẽ Gratidian⁹ officio boni viri functus est, tunc cùm Prætor esset, collegiumque Prętorum Tribuni plebis adhibuissent, vt res nũmaria de communi sententia constitueretur. Iactabatur enim temporibus illis nummus, sic vt nemo posset scire quid haberet. Conscripserunt communiter, Edictum cum pœna,

atque iudicio : conſtitu eruntque vt omnes ſimul in roſtra poſt meridiem deſcenderent, & cęteri quidem alius alio

Marius a ſubſellijs in roſtra tecta, idque quod communiter compoſitum fuerat, ſolus edixit, & ea res (ſi quæris) ei magno honori fuit: omnibus vicis ſtatuæ factæ, ad eas thus & cærei.

Quid multa? Nemo vnquam multitudini fuit charior.

Hæc ſunt, quæ conturbant homines in deliberatione nonnunquam : cum id, in quo violatur æquitas eſt nō ita magnum : illud autem quod ex eo parit', permagnum videtur, vt Mario præripere collegis & Tribunis plebis popularem gratiam, non ita turpe : conſulem ob eam rem fieri, quod ſibi tunc propoſuerat, valde vtile videbatur.

Sed

and condempnation : and appointed, that they altogether at after noone, woulde goe downe in Roſtra. And then all the reſt went each manne his waie : Marius from the Senatours bench gotte him ſtraight to Roſtra, and alone proclaimed that, which by a common conſent was made, and that thing if ye deſire to knowe, was to him a greate honour, in all the ſtreets images were made him, and to ỹ ſame offered was Inſence & lightes of waxe. What neede many woꝛds? No man was there euer moꝛe beloued of the multitude. Theſe bee the thinges which trouble men often tymes, in taking of aduiſement, when that thing wherein equitie is bꝛoken, is not counted ſo greate, but that which is gotten by ſuch dealing, ſeemeth meruaylous greate, as to Marius it ſeemed not ſo diſhoneſt to gette awaye the peoples fauour from his fellows and the Tribunes, but to bee made Conſull foꝛ that doing, which then he had ſet

beꝛoze

before his eye, it seemed verie profitable. But one rule there is of al, which I would faine haue you throughly to knowe, either that thing which seemeth profitable, let it not be dishoneſt, or if it bee dishoneſt, let it not seeme profitable. What shall wee then saye? Haye wee eicher take this Marius, or that other, for a good man. Bende and straine your vnderstanding, to see what shape, forme, and image of a good man is in it. Dooth it then commonlye befall in a good man to lye for his profite, to accuse, to preuent or deceiue? Of a suretie nothing lesse. Is there then anie thing so precious, or anie gayne so much to be desired, that yee shoulde therefore leese the glorie and name of a good manne? What is there so much, that this profite (as they call it) is able to bring vs, as it may pull from vs, in case it take awaye the name of a good man, & spoile vs of trouth and iustice? for what difference is there, whether one shape turne him-

Sed omnium vna regula est, quam cupio tibi esse notissimam aut illud, quod vtile videtur turpe ne sit: aut si turpe est, ne esse vtile videatur. Quid igitur possumus nè, aut illum Marium virum bonum iudicare, aut hunc: Explica atque excute intelligentiam tuã, vt videas quæ sit in ea species, forma et notio viri boni. Cadit ergo in virum bonum mentiri emolumenti sui causa, criminari, præripere, fallere? Nihil ꝓfecto minus.

Est ergo vllares tanti, aut commodum vllum tam expetendum, vt viri boni & splendorem & nomen amittas. Quid est quod afferre tantũ vtilitas ist, a quæ dicitur possit, quantum auferre, si boni viri nomen eripuerit, fidem, iusticiamque detraxerit. Quid enim interest vtrum ex homine

se conuertat quis in belluam an in hominis figura immanitatem gerat belluæ? Quid qui omnia recta & honesta negligunt dummodo potentiam consequantur? Nonne idem faciunt quod is, qui etiam socerum habere voluit cum, cuius ipse audacia potens esset, vtile enim videbatur plurimū posse alterius inuidia. Id quam iniustum in patriam, & quam turpe esset non videbat. Ipse autem socer in ore semper Græcos versus Euripidis de Phœnissis habebat, quos dicam vt potero, incondite fortasse, sed tamen vt res possit intelligi.

Nam si violandum est ius,
Regnandi gratia violandum est:
Aliis rebus pietatem cola.

selfe from a man to a beast, or vnder the forme of manne, beares in him the brutish crueltie of beast: what of them who sette at naught all good and honest thinges, so they may attaine to power, do they not, euen as hee dide: who would needs haue him to his Father in lawe, by whose bolde enterprises hee might beare a swaye: For to him it semed profitable to be of much power by anothers enuie, but he sawe not how vniust, how vnprofitable, howe vnhonest, it was for his countrie. But as for his Father in lawe, hee hadde alwayes in his mouth Euripides Greeke beares of the Phenicians, which I wyll exprese as well as I can: Perchaunce without theyr grace, but yet so as the meaning maye bee conceyued.

If breach of lawes, a man
shall vndertake:
He must then boldly
break for kingdomes sake:
In each thing elle, looke
you regard the right.

Hai-

Hainous was the Etiocles or rather Euripides: who excepted not onely this, which was most detestable. Why do we thē gather these trifling cases as cōcerning inheritance, merchaundise, and deceitfull sale? Nate behelde him, that sought to bee kinge ouer the people of Rome, and all nations, and brought it to passe. This kinde of desire, who so counteth honest, he is not well in his wit: for he alloweth the ouerthrowe of lawe and lybertie, and the cruel and detestable oppression of them, hee reckens a glorious matter.

With what kind of chiding then, or rating rather may I attempt to tourne him from so great an errour, who confesseth, it is not honest to raigne as king in that Citie which both hath beene, and ought to bee free, and yet accountes it profitable for him that can bring it to passe.

For O yee Gods immortall, canne the most shamefull and cruell murther of a mans owne countrie bee profitable,

Capitalis Etiocles vel potius Euripides, qui id vnum quod omnium sceleratissimum fuerat, exceperit. Quid igitur minuta colligim⁹ hæreditates, mercaturas, venditiones, fraudulentas? Eccè tibi qui rex populi Romani, dominusque omnium gentium esse concupierit, idque præfecerit. Hanc cupiditatem si quis honestam esse dicit, amens est, probat enim legum & libertatis interitum earumq́; oppressionem terram & detestabilem, gloriosam putat. Qui autem fateatur honestum non esse in ea ciuitate, quę libera fuit, quæque esse debeat regnare: sed ei qui id facere possit, esse vtile, qua hunc obiurgatione, aut quo potius conuitio à tanto errore coner auertere? Potest enim (Dij immortales) cuiquam esse vtile fœdissimum & tarterrimum paracidium patrię

quamuis is qui se eo obstrixerit, ab oppressis ciuibus parens nominet'? Honestate igit' dirigenda vtilitas est & quidē sic, vt hæc duo verba inter se discrepare, sed tamen vnum sonare videantur. Nunc habeo ad vulgi opinionem quam maior vtilitas quam regnandi esse possit? Nihil contra inutilius ei, qui id iniustè consequutus sit inuenio, cum ad veritatem cępi reuocare rationem. Possunt enim cuiquam esse vtiles angores, solicitudines, diurni & nocturni metus, via insidiarum, periculorumque plenissima.

Multi iniqui atque infideles Regno.

Pauci boni sunt, inquit Accius.

At cui regno? quòd à Tantalo & Pelope proditum iure obtinebatur Nam quanto plures ei regni putas, qui cum exercitu

yea, though he that hath embrued himselfe in such bloud, bee cleaped of the oppressed subiectes parent of the common weale? Profit therefore is to be directed by honestie, & that so, as these two words may seeme to differ in themselues in tearmes, and yet to sound all one in meaning. Nowe to the opinion of the cōmon people. What greater profit canne there be, then to raigne and to rule. Contrariwise I finde nothing more vnprofitable for him, who iustly hath attained it, when I applie rèason to the troth. For can griefes, cares, dayly and nyghtly feares, and a life full of snares and daungers bee profitable to anye man? About the seeking of ỹ crown many euill and faithlesse bē.

But few good men in such a man shall lightly see (scarce quoth Accius.) But to which crowne? The same, that from Tantalus, and Pelops descending, was by iust title possessed. For howe manye more, thinke ye, were vntrue, and

and vntruſtie to ỹ king, who with an armie of Romane people oppreſſed the people of Rome, and forced ỹ city to be ſubiect to him, which was not onely free of it ſelfe, but alſo a ruler of other nations? What blottes of conſcience, ſuppoſe you, had he in his hart? what woundes of remorſe? But whoſe lyfe cannot bee ought worth to himſelfe, when the ſtate of his lyfe is ſuch, that who ſo takes it frō him, ſhall be in moſt fauour and fame? In caſe theſe things bee not profitable, which ſpecially ſeeme ſo to be, becauſe they be full of ſhame and reproch, we ought now to be fully perſwaded, ỹ nothing is profitable, which is not honeſt. Notwithſtanding the ſame, both at diuers other times, & namelye in the warres with Pirrhus, was ſo adiudged by Caius Fabritius in his ſecond Conſulſhip, and alſo by our Senate. For when king Pyrrhus vnprouoked, had mooued warre againſt the people of Rome, & the fight was all about ỹ empire with ỹ noble,

ercitu Populi Romani Populum ipſum Romanum oppreſſiſſet, ciuitatemque non modo liberam, ſed etiam gentibus imperantem ſeruire coegiſſet. Hunc tu quas conſcientiæ labes, in animo ſenſes habuiſſe? quæ vulnera. Cuius autem vita ipſi poteſt vtilis eſſe cum eius vitæ ea conditio ſit, vt qui illam eripuerit, in maxima & gratia futurus ſit & gloria? Quòd ſi hæc vtilia non ſunt, quæ maximè vident', quia plena ſunt dedecoris ac turpitudinis, ſatis perſuaſum eſſe debet, nihil eſſe vtile, quod non honeſtum ſit.

Quanquam id quidē cùm ſæpe alias tum Pyrrhi bello à C. Fabritio COS. iterum & à Senatu noſtro iudicatum eſt. Cum enim rex Pyrrhus Populo Romano bellum vltro intuliſſet, cūq; de imperio certamen eſſet cum rege generoſo

ac

ac potẽte, perfuga ab eo venit in castra Fabritij, eique est pollicitus, si præmium ei proposuisset se, vt clàm venisset, sic clàm in Pyrrhi castra rediturum, & eum veneno necaturum. Hunc Fabricius reducendum curauit ad Pyrrhum: id que eius factum à Senatu laudatum est. Atqui si speciem vtilitatis, opinionemque querimus, magnum illud bellum perfuga vn⁹, & grauem aduersarium imperij sustulisset, sed magnum dedecus & flagitium: quicum laudis certamẽ fuisset, eum non virtute, sed scelere superatum.

Vtrum igitur vtilius vel Fabricio, qui talis in hac vrbe, qualis Aristides Athenis fuit: vel Senatui nostro, qui nũquam vtilitatem à dignitate reiunxit, armis cum hoste certare, an venenis?

Si

and puisaunt Prince, a runaway traitour went from him to Fabritius campe, and promised, that if Fabritius wold offer him a good rewarde, as he came priuely, so he woulde returne priuelye to Pirrhus pauilion, and dispatch hym wyth poyson. Fabrius caused him to be carried backe againe to Pirrhus, and that deede of his was well commended of the Senate. But if we seeke the shew and respect of profit, true it is, this one runawaye might haue made an end of the great war, and that greeuous enimye of the Empire, but it had bene a great shame and foule deede, to haue hadde him subdued, not by prowesse, but by treacherye, wyth whom the fight was all for glorie. Whether then was it more profitable, eyther for Fabritius, who was such a one in our Citye, as Aristides was at Athens, or for our Senate, who neuer seuered profite from honour, to war against theyr enimie with armes, or wyth poyson?

If

If empire be to be sought for cause of glorie, let trecherie be eschewed, wherein can bee no glorie, againe, if riches bee sought any manner way, they cannot be profitable, if they come with infamie. Therfore that aduice of Lucius Philippus, Quintus sonne, was not profitable, that those Cities which Lucius Sylla for a certaint sum of money, had discharged of tributes by decree of the Senate, should agayne be tributarie, & yet wee shoulde not restore them the money, which for their being free, they had disbursed. The Senate house agreed all with him. A slaunder it was to the gouernment. For of Pirats better is the promise, then of the Senate. Yea, but the tributes (they wil say) wer therby augmented, therefore it was profitable. How long will they be bolde to call anie thing profitable, ỳ is not honest: Can hatred and infamie be profitable to anie state that shoulde bee vpholden with

Si gloriæ causa imperium expetendum est, scelus absit, in quo non potest esse gloria. Sin ipsæ opes expetunt', quoquo modo non poterunt esse vtiles cum infamia.

Non igitur vtilis illa Lucij Philippi Quinti filij sententia, quas ciuitates Lucius Sylla pecunia accepta ex Senatus cons. liberauisset, vt eæ rursus vectigales essent: neque his pecuniam, quam pro libertate dederant redderemus, & senatus est assensus, Iur pe imperio.

Pyratarum enim melior fides, quàm Senatus At aucta vectigalia. Vtile igitur, quousque audebunt dicere, quicquã vtile quod non honestum? potest autem vili imperio, quod gloria debet fultum esse, & beneuolentia sociorum,

vtile

vtile esse odium & infa mia. Ego etiam cum Ca tone meo sæpe dissensi. Nimis enim mihi vide batur prę facte ærarium, vectigaliaque defende re, omnia publicanis ne gare, multa socijs, cùm in hos benefici esse debe remus, cum illis sic age re, vt cũ colonis nostris soleremus. Eoque ma gis, quod illa ordinum coniunctio ad salutem Reipublicæ pertinebat, Malè etiam Curio, cum causam Transpadano rum æquam esse dice bat, semper autem adde bat, vincat vtilitas. Po tius diceret, non esse æ quam, quia non esset vtilis Reipublicæ quam cum vtilem esse diceret, non esse æquam fatere tur.

Plen° est sextus liber de officijs Hæcatonis taliũ questionũ sit ne boni vi ri in maxima caritate an nonę familiam nõ alere in

glorie, and good wyll of their league friends. I my self oftẽ time haue disagreed euẽ with my Cato: for ouerstifly me thought, he defended the tre surie gaine & tributes, & de nied all maner of allowances, to ẏ farmers of our custome, & many to our league friends, whereas towarde these wee should bee beneficiall, and so deale with those, as we were wont to do with our citizens, sent to inhabit new townes, & so much the more, because the knitting together of those de grees of men, did pertaine to the safetie of ẏ comon wealth. Curio also did euil, in that he said, the Transpadanes matter was iust, but yet euermore he cried. Let profit preuaile. Hee should rather haue sayd, the matter was not iust because it was not profitable for the common wealth, then when he said it was iust, hee should grant it was vnprofitable. Hecatos sixt booke of duties is full of such questions: whether it bee fit for a good man, in a verie great derth of corne, to giue ouer housekee ping:

ping? He disputes the matter on bothe sides: but yet at last he thinketh, duitie is directed rather after profit, then after humanitie.

He puttes the case, if one must needes take losse by sea: whether shoulde hee rather beare the losse of a horse much worth, then of a slaue lyttle worth. In this case, priuate profit leads a man one way, & humanitie an other. If a foole in a shippewracke catch hold of a boorde: shall a wise man take it from him, if he can? He sayth no, because it were iniurious. What may the owner of the shippe doe? shal he take his owne? No, no more then he may caste a passenger out of the shippe into the sea, because it is his.

For vntill they arriue at the place, whether the shippe was hiered: the shippe is not the owners, but theirs that fall in it. What if two in a shipwrack light vppon one boorde: and they both be wise men: should either of them pull it to himselfe or one giue ouer his holde to the other? yea, hee

in vtranque partem disputat: sed tamen ad extremũ vtilitate non putat officium dirigi, magis quàm humanitate.

Quærit si in mari iactura facienda sit, equi ne precioſi potius iacturam faciat, an seruili vilis? Hic alió res familiaris, alió ducit humanitas.

Si tabulam de naufragio stultus arripuerit, extorquebit ne eam sapiens, si potuerit? Negat, quia sit iniurium. Quid dominus nauis? Eripiet ne suum? Minimê? Non plus quàm si nauigantem in alto eijcere de naui velit, quia sua sit.

Quoad enim peruentum sit eô, quô sumpta nauis est, non domini nauis, sed nauigantium.

Quid si in vna tabula sint duo naufragi, hiqûe sint sapientes: sibi vterque rapiat? an alter cedat alteri:

alteri: cedat vero: sed ei, cuius magis interſit vel ſua vel Reipub. cauſa viuere. Quid ſi hęc paria in vtroque? Nullum erit certamen, ſed quaſi in ſorte, aut in dimicando victus, alteri cedat alter.

Quid ſi pater fana expilet, cuniculos agat ad erarium, indicerne id magiſtratibus filius? Nefas id quidē eſt, quin etiam defendet patrem, ſi arguatur. Non igitur patria præſtat omnibus officijs? immo verò, ſed ipſi patriæ conducit, pios habere ciues in parentes.

Quid ſi tyrannidem occupare, ſi patriam prodere conabitur pater, ſilebitnè filius? immò verò obſecrabit patrem ne id faciat: ſi nihil proficiet, accuſabit: minabitur etiam: ad extremum: ſi ad perniciem patriæ res ſpectabit:

ſhould giue oner: but to him, whome it wer moze expedient to lyue, eyther foz his owne oz the commō weales ſake, what if theſe be alike in both Then there ſhalbe no ſtriuing betweene them: but the one muſt yelde to the other, as the loſer doth in lots, oz at the Italian playe with the fingers called Tocco.

What if the father rob churches? oz vndermine ỹ walles of the treaſury: ſhould the ſonne open it to the magiſtrates: That were ſurely a curſed deed, yea rather he ſhould defend his father if hee were accuſed thereof. Is not our countrey then aboue all duties? yes truely, but it is profitable foz ones countrey, to haue the inhabiters reuerence theyz parents. What if ones father will go about to vſurp, as a tyzant, oz to betray his countrey, ſhall the ſonne conceale it? May he ſhal deſire his father not to doe it, if he nothing pzeuaile, he ſhall blame him, and thzeaten him alſo.

And laſt of all, if the matter tende too the deſtruction

of

of his countrie: he ſhall preferre the ſafetie of his countrie beefore the ſafetie of his father.

He puttes a queſtion alſo: if a wiſe manne vnwares receiued counterfeite money in ſtede of good: after he perceiues it, whether he ſhould paye it out againe for good money, if he were indebted to any bodie? Diogenes ſayth, he maye. Antipater denyeth it, too whome I rather agree.

He, that wyttingly ſelleth wine, & will not laſt: whether ought he to declare it, or no? Diogenes thinks, it is not needfull: Antipater reckens it the duety of a good manne. Theſe be (as ye would ſay) the caſes, in controuerſie, in the Stoikes matters of law. whether, in ſelling a bondeman, his faults are to be tolde or no? I meane not thoſe, whiche vnleſſe you declare, the bondeman may be tourned home againe by the ciuill lawe: but theſe, that hee is a lyer, a dycer, a picker, a dronkard: ſome think meets

patriæ ſalutem ante ponit ſaluti patris.

Querit etiam ſi ſapiens adulterinos nũmos acceperit imprudẽs pro bonis cum id reſcieric ſoluturus nê ſit eos, ſi cui debeat pro bonis. Diogines ait. Antipater negat: cui potius aſſentior.

Qui vinum fugiens vendat ſciens debeat ne dicere? non neceſſe putat Diogenes: Antipater viri boni exiſtimat. Hæc ſunt quaſi controuerſa iura Stoicorum, in mancipio vendendo dicenda ne vitia? Non niſi ea quæ ſi non dixeris, redhibeatur mãcipium iure ciuilj.

Sed hæc mendacem eſſe aleatorem, furacem, ebrioſum alterũ dicenda, videntur, alterũ

teri non videntur. Si quis aurum vendens, ori chalcũ se putat vendere, in dicet ne ei vir bonus aurũ illud esse an emat denario qd' sit mille denariorũ? Perspiciũ iam est, & q̃d mihi videat', & quæ sit inter eos philoso phos, quos nominaui, controuersia. Pacta, & promissa semper ne seruanda sint, que nec vi, nec dolo malo, vt prætores solent dicere facta sint. Si quis medicamẽtum cuipiam dederit ad apuam intercutem, perpigeritque, si eo medicaméto sanus factus esset, ne illo medicamento vnque postea vteretur: si eo medicamento sanus factus sit, & annis aliquot post incideret in eũdem morbum, nec ab eo qui cum pepigerat impetret, vt item ecliceat vti, quid faciendum sit, cũm sit is inhumanus, qui non concedat vti nec ei quicquam fiat iniuriæ?

to be told some other, not so. If one selling golde, supposeth he sells but copper, should a good man of dutie tell him, that it is golde? or he may buy for a penny that is worth a thousand? It is already very plaine, both what I think and what the controuersie is amonge the Philosophers, whom I named. Whether are couenauntes, and promises alwayes to be kept, which be (as the Pretors vse to speak) made neither by compulsion, nor by couine. If one minister to an other a medicine for the dropsie, and bindes the patient by couenaunt, that hee shall neuer after vse the same medicine, in case he bee made whole by that medicine, and within a few yeares after, doe fall intoo the same dysease, and canne not obtayne of him, with whome hee made the couenaunt, that he may vse it likewise againe, what is to bee done, seeinge hee is so vngentle, and will not graunt him to vse it, and yet hee shoulde take no harme thereby.

The

The man muſt haue regarde to his owne life and health.

What if a wiſe man bee requyred of one, who makes him hys heyre: where two millions, and fiue hundered thouſande crownes bee lefte him by Teſtament, that before hee haue the poſſeſſion of it, he daunce openly on the day time in the market, and hee promiſeth ſo to dooe, becauſe otherwyſe the manne woulde not put him in, as his heire: ſhould he doo then that he promiſed or no? I would wiſh he hadde made no ſuch promiſe: and that I thinke, had bene a point of grauitie: but ſeeing he promiſed it, if he count it diſhoneſt to daunce in the market: he ſhall wyth the more honeſtie goe from hys wooroe, if hee take nothing of the inheritaunce: except peraduenture hee wyll beſtowe the ſame mony vpon the common wealth, in ſome time of greate neceſſytie, that it may bee no ſhame for him, euen to daunce when he ſhall procure the wealth of his Countrie.

Vitæ & ſaluti conſulendum eſt.

Quid, ſi quis ſapiens rogatus ſit ab eo qui eum hæredem faciat, cùm ei teſtamento ſeſtertiũ milies relinquatur, vt antequã hæreditatem adeat, luce palam in foro ſaltet, idque ſe facturum promiſerit, quod aliter eum hæredem ſcripturus ille non eſſet: faciat quod promiſerit nec ne promiſiſſe nollẽ & id arbitror fuiſſe grauitatis.

Sed quoniam promiſit, ſi ſaltare in foro turpe ducet, honeſtius mentietur, ſi ex hæreditate nihil cœperit, quam ſi cœperit: niſi fortè eam pecuniam in Reipublicæ magnum aliquod tempus contulerit: vt vel ſaltare eum, cum patriæ conſulturus ſit, turpe non ſit.

Ac ne illa quidem promissa seruanda sunt, quæ non sunt his ipsis vtilia, quibus illa promiseris.

Sol Phaetonti filio (vt redeamus ad fabulas) facturum se esse dixit, quicquid optasset, optauit vt in currum patris tolleretur sublatus est insanus, atque qua constitit, ictu fulminis deflagrauit, quanto melius fuerat in hoc promissum patris, non esse seruatum.

Quid quod Theseus exigit promissum à Neptuno? cui cùm tres optationes Neptunus dedisset, optauit interitum Hyppoliti filij sui, cum is patri suspectus esset de nouerca: quo optato impetrato, Theseus in maximis fuit luctibus.

Quid Agamemnon? cum deuouisset Dianæ, quod in suo regno pulcherimum natũ

Nor those promises are to be kept, which be not profitable, euen for them to whome you made them.

Titan (that we may returne to Fables) sayd to Phaeton his sonne, hee woulde dooe whatsoeuer hee woulde desire. Hee desired to bee taken vp into his Fathers charyot: the madde foole was hoisted vp, and on the side where hee stoode, wyth a flashe of lyghtening, hee fell all on a fire. Howe much better had it bene, his Fathers promise had not beene in this performed.

What shall wee saie to the promise that Theseus required of Neptunus? To whom when Neptunus had graunted three boones: Theseus asked ỹ death of Hippolytus his son, when his Father had him in a iealousie for his stepmother: which boone beeing obtained, Theseus fell to in verie great lamentation.

What of Agamemnon? When he had vowed to Diana, the fayrest creature, that should

be

bee borne that yeare in hys kingdome: hee offered vp in sacrifice his daughter Iphigenia, who was the fayrest creature, borne that yeare. The promise rather shoulde not haue ben kept, then so hainous a deede should bee committed.

Wherefore promises also many times are not to be performed. Not at all times thinges layde to keepe, are to be restored. As if one well in his wit, shall leaue a swoorde with you to keepe: and aske it againe, when hee is mad, it were a sinne to restore it, and dutie to keepe it.

What if one who hath lefte money wyth you to keepe, woulde make warre agaynst your Countrey? shall ye restore, that was layde yee to keepe? No, as I suppose, for ye shall dooe against the common wealth, which ought to bee most deare vnto you. So, manye thinges, which by nature seeme to be honest, by chaunge of times, become dishonest.

esset illo anno immolauit Iphegeniam, qua nihil erat eo quidem anno natum pulchrius. Promissum potius non faciendum, quàm tam tetrum fascinus admittendum fuit.

Ergo & promissa non facienda nonnunquam neque semper deposita reddenda sunt.

Si gladium quis apud te sana mente deposuerit, repetat insaniens, reddere peccatum sit, non reddere officium.

Quid si is qui apud te pecuniam deposuerat, bellum inferat patriæ: redde né depositum? Non credo: Facies enim contra Rempublicam, quæ debet esse charissima.

Sic multa quę natura honesta videntur esse, temporibus fiunt non honesta.

Facere promiſſa, ſtare conuentis, reddere depoſita, commutata vtilitate fiunt non honeſta.

Ac de his quidem quæ videntur eſſe vtilitatis contra iuſtitiam ſimulatione prudentiæ, ſatis arbitror dictum.

Sed quoniam à quatuor fontibus honeſtatis, primo libro officia duximus: in eiſdem verſabimur cùm docebimus ea, quæ videntur eſſe vtilia, neque ſint, quam ſint virtutis inimica.

Ac de prudentia quidem quam vult imitari malitia, itemque de iuſtitia, quæ ſemper eſt vtilis, diſputatum eſt.

Reliqua ſunt duæ partes honeſtatis: quarum altera in animi excellentis magnitudine & præſtantia cernitur: altera in confirmatione et moderatione, continentię & temperantiæ.

Vti-

To performe promiſes, to ſtand to couenants, to reſtore that is layde yee to keepe, when it otherwiſe behoueth, it becommeth diſhoneſt. And of theſe, which ſeeme to be caſes of profit, contrarie to iuſtice, vnder pretence of wiſedome, I thinke it ſufficiently declared.

But for as much as in our firſt booke, wee haue drawne all dueties out of foure fountaines of honeſtie: wee ſhall continue ſtyll in the ſame: when we teach what enimies of vertue thoſe things bee: which ſeeme to be profitable, and are not ſo indeede.

And thus of wiſedome, whom wilyneſſe would reſemble: and likewiſe of iuſtice, which is alwayes profitable, we haue diſcourſed.

The other two partes of honeſtie remaine, whereof the one is ſeene in the greatneſſe, and worthineſſe of an excellent courage: the other, in the framing and meaſuring of ſtayednesſe, and temperaunce.

It

It seemed profitable to Ulysses (as some tragicall Poets haue it set out: for in Homer, the best author, there is no such suspition of Ulysses) but the tragedies do lay it as a reproch to him: that by counterfaiting madnesse, he would haue scaped going a warrefare. It was no honest deuice.

Yet profitable it was, (as some peraduenture will say) to rule, and to liue quietly, at Ithaca, with his parents, with his wife, and with his sonne.

Thinke you any honour got in dayly daungers, and trauailes, is to bee compared with his quyetnesse of lyfe? I verily iudge it meete to bee despised and reiected: because what so is not honest, I count it in no wise to bee profitable.

For what thinke you, Ulisses should haue hearde, if hee had continued still in hys counterfaiting? Who, hauing doone great feates in warre, yet hearde these woordes of Aiax.

Vtile videbatur Vlyssi, vt quidam Poetæ tragici prodiderunt nam apud Homerum optimũ authorem talis de Vlisse nulla suspicio est: sed insimulant eum tragediæ, simulatione insaniæ militanti subterfugere voluisse non honestum cõsilium: ac vtile (vt aliquis fortasse dixerit) regnare, & Ithacæ viuere otiosè cum parentibus cum vxore, cum filio.

Vllum tu decus in quotidianis periculis & laboribus cum tranquilitate hac conferendum putas?

Ergo vero istam contemnendam & abijciendam, quoniam quæ honesta non sit, ne vtilem quidẽ esse arbitror. Quid enim audituram putas fuisse Vlyssem, si in illa simulatione perseueraſſet? qui cum maximas res gesserit in bello, tamen hæc audiuit ab Aiece.

Cuius ipſe princeps iuſiurandi fuit.

Quod omnes ſcitis, ſolus neglexit fidem.

Furere aſſimulauit, ne ire-iret, inſtitit.

Quod ni Palamidis perſpicax prudentia.

Iſtius percepiſſet malitioſam audaciam.

Fide ſacratum ius perpetuo falleret.

For all the conſcience of that oath, he paſſed not a flie,

Which he himſelf procured firſt, ye wot as well as I.

He could put on a fained face, and fare as he were mad.

And not to go with them, hee wrought with all the wiles he had.

His ſlie boldneſſe, but Palamade by deepe pollicie did ſpie:

The ſacred lawe of ſolempne oath, the freke would ſtill denie.

Illi vero non modó cum hoſtibus, verum etiam cum fluctibus, id quod fecit dimicare melius fuit, quàm diſerere conſentientem Græciam ad bellum barbaris inferendum.

Sed omittamus & fa-

For him no doubt it was better to fight, not only with his enimyes, but alſo wyth the waues of the ſea, as hee did, then to ſhrink from them of Greece, who hadde concluded together to make warre vpon the Troians. But let vs leaue off both fables, and

forren

foꝛren examples, & come wee to troth and deeds.

When Marcus Attilius Regulus, beeing second time Consull, was taken by a traine in Affrike: Xantippus the Lacedemonian beeing the guide, and Amilcar, Annibals Father, the generall: he was sent to the Senate vppon his oath, that except certayne Gentlemenne taken pꝛisoners, were restored to the Penes, hee should himselfe retourne to Carthage.

Whē he was come to Rome, he sawe well the shew of pꝛofit, but as ẏ matter pꝛoueth, he iudged it very vain, which was but on this soꝛt, to tarrie still in his Countrie: to be at home with his wife and childꝛen, to keepe his degree of Consular estate, & to take the miserie which he had felt in warre, to bee common to warfaring foꝛtune.

Who can denie these things to be pꝛofitable? What think you? Greatnesse of courage, and manlinesse saith nay to it.

bulas & externa, ad rem factam nostramque veniamus.

M. Attilius Regulus, cùm COS, iterum in Africa ex insidijs captus esset, duce Xantippo Lacedemonio, Imperatore autem patre Annibalis Hamilcare, iuratus, missus est ad Senatum: vt nisi redditi essent Pœnis captiui nobiles quidam, rediret ipse Carthaginem.

Is cùm Romam venisset, vtilitatis speciem videbat, sed eam (vt res declarat) falsam iudicauit quæ erat talis, manere in patria, esse domi suæ cum vxore, cum liberis, quàm calamitatē accepisset in bello, communem fortunæ bellicæ iudicantem, tenere consularis dignitatis gradum. Quis hæc negat esse vtilia? quid censes. Magnitudo animi & fortitudo negat.

Num locupletiores quæris authores? Harum enim est virtutum proprium, nil extimescere? omnia humana despicere, nihil quod homini accidere possit, intollerandum putare.

Itaque quid fecit: in Senatum venit, mandata exposuit, sententiam ne diceret. recusauit: quam diu iureiurando hostium teneretur, non esse se Senatorem. Atque illud etiam (O stultum hominem dixerit quispiam, & repugnantem vtilitati suæ) reddi captiuos negauit esse vtile. Illos enim adolescentes, & bonos duces, se iam confectum senectute. Cuius cûm valuisset auctoritas, captiui retenti sunt, ipse Carthaginem redijt. Neque eum charitas patriæ retinuit, nec suorum.

Neque vero tum ignorabat se ad crudelissimum

Looke ye for more substanciall authorityes? For of these vertues is it the propertie, to bee afearde of nothing, to despise all worldlye vanities, to thinke nothing vnsufferable that to man may befall.

Therfore what did he? He came into the Senate: declared that he had in commandement, refused to giue hys sentence, and sayd, he was no Senatour, as long as hee was bound by oath, ministred by his enimies. Yea, and this moreouer he sayd (O foolysh man, wyll some saye, and against his owne profite) that it was not expedient to haue the captiues restored. For hee alleadged they were young, and good Captaynes, whereas hee was worne, and spent wyth age. Whose authoritie when it hadde preuayled, the captiues were kept styll, hee himselfe returned to Carthage. and neyther looue of his Countrye, nor of his kinsfolke stayed him.

Yet was it not vnknowen to

to him, that hee retourned to a verie cruell enimy, and too extreame tormentes: but hee thought hys oath meete to be performed. Wherefore euen at the time, when hee was put to death wyth continuall waking, hee was in better state: then if he had remained an aged captiue, and a periured Senatour at home. But fondlye, wyll some saye, hee dyd: who not onelye iudged it vnmeete, that the captiues should bee restored, but also disswaded it.

Howe, I praie yee, did he fondly? Did he so, seeing hee auayled the common wealth? May that bee profitable for anie Citizen, which is vnprofitable to the state? When doo wrest those foundations which nature layeth, when they seuer profite from honestie. For we all couet profit, and to it be carried, nor by anye meanes otherwise canne we doo. For who is hee, that flyeth profit? Or who rather is there that followeth not the same most diligentlye?

simum hostem, & ad exquisita suplicia proficisci: sed iusiurandum conseruandum putabat Itaque tum cum vigilando necabatur, erat in meliore causa, quam si domi senex, captiuus periuris, consularis remansisset.

At stultè: qui non modo non cẽsuerit captiuos remittendos, verum etiam dissuaserit.

Quomodo stultè? etiam ne si Reipublicæ conducebat. Potest autem quod inutile Reipublicæ sit, id cuiquam ciui vtile esse? Peruertunt homines ea, quæ sunt fundamenta naturæ cum vtilitatẽ ab honestate seiungunt. Omnes enim expetimus vtilitatem, ad eamque rapimur, nec facere aliter vllo modo possumus. Nam quis est, qui vtilia fugit: aut quis potius, qui ea non studiosissimé persequatur.

Sed

Sed quia nusque possum', nisi in laude, decore honestate vtilia reperire propter ea illa prima & summa habemus vtilitatis nomen non tam splendidum, quæ necessarium ducimus. Quid est igitur (dixerit quis) in iureiurando num ira tum tenemus Iouem? At hoc quidem commune est omnium philosophorum, non eorũ modô, qui Deum nihil habere ipsum negotij dicunt, & nihil exhibere alteri, sed eorum etiam qui Deum semper agere aliquid, & moliri volunt. Nunquam nec irasci Deum, nec nocere.

Quid autem iratus Iupiter plus nocere potuisset, quam nocuit sibi ipse *Regulus*. Nulla igitur vis fuit religionis quæ tantam vtilitatem peruerteret. Annè turpiter faceret: primum minima de malis. Num

But because no where we can finde things profitable, but in praise, seemelynesse, and honestie: therefore wee esteeme those as chiefe and highest, & the commendation of profite wee count not so honourable, as necessarie. What is there then in oath? Will some saye, Are we afeard, Iupiter will be angrie? May, this is common among al Philosophers, not onely those, who holde, that God himselfe hath nothing to doe, and nothing appoints to another bodie: but them also, who wyll needes haue God alwaye dooing and medling with somewhat: that God is neuer angry, nor euer hurteth any creature.

What greater harme could Iupiter haue done, being offended, then Regulus dyd to himselfe? There was then no respect of religion that myght ouerturne so greate a profite. What? should he haue doone dishonestly? First, of euils, the least were to be chosen. Shall then thys dishonestie haue in it so much discommoditye,

as

gs had that torment? Moreouer, this saying that is in Accius.

Hast thou thy faithed promise broke?
My fayth I neither gaue, nor giue,
To any faithlesse, while I liue

Though of a wicked king it bee sayd, yet it is excellentlye sayd.

Heerebnto they adde, that as we say, some things seeme profitable, which are not so in deede, that they in lyke maner saie, some things seeme honest which are not so in deede: as for example, this same seemeth honest that he dydde retourne to torment, for the sauing of his oath: but it became dishonest, because that which had beene wrought by the violence of his enimyes, should not haue ben by hym confirmed. They laye also to this, that who so is verye profitable, the same groweth lykewise to bee honest, although it semed not so at first.

igitur tantum mali turpitudo ista habebit, quã tum ille cruciatus? Deinde illud etiam apud Accium.

Fregisti ne fidem?
Neque dedi, neque do infideli cuiquam.

Quanquam ab impio rege dicitur, luculenté tamen dicitur.

Addunt etiam, quemadmodum nos dicamus videri quædam vtilia, quæ non sint, sic se dicere videri quædam honesta quæ non sint, vt hoc ipsum videtur honestũ conseruandi iusiurandi causa, ad cruciatum reuertisse. Sed fit non honestum, quia quod per vim hostium esset actum, ratum esse non debuit.

Addunt etiam quicquid valde vtile sit, id fieri honestum, etiam si antea non videretur.

Hac

Hæc ferè contra Regulum. Sed prima videamus.

Non fuit Iupiter metuendus, ne iratus noceret: qui neque irasci solet, neque nocere. Hæc quidem ratiô non magis cõtra Reguli, quàm contra omne iusiurandum valet.

Sed in iureiurando, non qui metus, sed quę vis sit debet intelligi. Est enim iusiurandum affirmatio religiosa. Quod autem affirmatè quasi Deo teste promiseris, id tenendum est. Iam enim non ad iram Deorum, quæ nulla est: sed ad iustitiam & ad fidem pertinet. Nam præclarè Ennius.

O Fides alma apta pennis, & iusiurandum Iouis.

Qui igit' iusiurandum violat, is fidem violat: quam in Capitolio vici nã Iouis Opt. Max. vt in Catonis oratione est,

These things commonly bee alleadged against Regulus. But lette vs consider the first.

Iupiter was not to bee feared, least hee shoulde hurt him in his anger: because neyther to bee angrie, nor to doo harme he is accustomed. This reason surely maketh no more agaynst Regulus, then agaynst all kinde of oathes. But in the oath making, not what the feare, but what the vertue of it is, ought to bee considered. For an oath is a relygyous assuring of anie thing. And what so assuredly you haue promised, as taking God to witnesse, it ought ro be obserued. For the oath nowe respectes not the wrath of the Gods, which is none at all, but iustice, and faithfulnesse. For notably sayd Ennius.

O heauenlye faith, tie to thy vvings the oath of Ioue also.

Who so then staynеth his oath, hee staynеth Ladye Fayth: whome as it appeares in Catoes Oration, our

our annecetours would needes haue to stand in our Capitole, next vnto the great and migh tie Ioue.

Yea but Iupiter being displeased, could not haue done more harme to Regulus than Regulus dyd to himselfe.

That is true if ther were nothing euill, but to feele paine. But the Philosophers, that bee of the greatest aucthoritie, do affirme that it not onely is not the vttermost euill, but also no euill at all.

For whome, I praye yt, doe not refuse to take Regulus as no meane witnesse but (I beleeue) the grauest of all.

For what more substaunciall witnesse do we looke for, thā a pere of the common weale who for the contynuinge of his duetie did willinglye enter into torments. For where as they say, of euils the least, are to be chosen, meaninge it is better dishonestly, then miserably to liue, is there anye greater euyll, than dishonestie: which if in the deformitie of the bodye it breedethe somme offence,

maiores nostri esse voluerunt. At enim ne iratus quidem Iupiter plus Regulo nocuisset, quām sibi nocuit ipse Regulus. Certè si nihil malū esset, nisi dolore: id autem nō modo non summum malum, sed nec malum quidem esse maxima authoritate philosophi affirmant.

Quorum quidem testem non mediocrem, sed haud scio an grauissimum Regulum, nolite quæso vituperare.

Quem enim locupletiorem quærimus quam principem. Po. Ro. qui retinendi officij causa crutiatum subierit voluntarium?

Nam quod aiunt minima de malis, id est vt turpiter, potius quām calamitosè an est vllum maius malum turpitudine? Que si in deformitate corporis habeat aliquid offensionis.

quan-

quanta illa deprauatio & fæditas turpificati animi debet videri:
Itaque neruosius qui ista dicerunt, solum audent malum dicere, id quod turpe sit: qui autem remissius, hi tamen non dubitant summum malum dicere.

¶Nam illud quidem.

Neque dedi, neque do infideli cuiquam.

Idcircô recte â poeta dicitur, quia cùm tractaretur Atreus, personæ seruiendum fuit.

Sed si hoc sibi sumant nullam esse fidem, quæ infideli data sit, videant ne quæratur latebra periurio.

Est autem ius etiam bellicum fidesque iusiurandi sæpe hosti seruanda. Quod enim ita iuratum est, vt mens conciperet fieri oportere

How much muste needes the corruption, and filth of a defiled minde appeare:
Therefore they who more pithily debate these matters are bolde too call that the onely euill, which is dishonest, and that, who dispute them not so earnestly, doe not sticke to call the same the vttereste euil.
As for the saying:

My fayth I neither gaue nor giue.
To any faithlesse, while I liue.

It is therfore wel brought in of the Poet, because when Atreus parte shoulde goe in hand, it was meete the speache should serue for his person. But if hereof they take themselues a rule, that it is no promise that is made to a promise breaker: lette them take heede, there be not sought a starting hole for periury. The lawe of armes, and the promise of an othe is manye tymes to be kept with our enimie. For what so in such sort is sworne, that ỹ minde of the swearer conceiueth, it is necessarie

ceſſarie to be done: that ſame is to be obſerued: what ſo falleth otherwiſe: the ſame if one doe not, it is no periurie. As if you bring not the ſumme of money that ye promiſed rouers for your lyfe: there is no deceiuing in it, no, though being ſworne thereto ye doe it not.

For a pyrate is not compted in the number of enimies to ones countrey, but a common enimie to all men, with ſuche a one neither promiſe, neither oath ought a lyke, as with vs to be kept.

For to ſwere an vntruth, is not to forſwere but not to perfourme that, which according to the meaninge of your heart yee haue ſworne, as by our cuſtome is expreſt in a certaine forme of wordes: ſurely it is periury. For fealtie ſayde Euripides:

In vvord I ſvvare, but heart vnſvvorne I bare.

But it was not fit for Regulus with periurie too dyſtourbe the condicions, and conenauntes with his enimies, & of warre. For with a iuſt & id ſeruandum eſt, quod aliter, id ſi non feceris, nullum periurium eſt.

Vt ſi prædonibus pactũ pro capite pretium non attuleris, nulla fraus eſt, ne ſi iuratus quidem id non feceris.

Nam pirata non eſt ex perduellum numero definitus, ſed communis hoſtis omniũ, cum hoc nec fides debet, nec iuſiurandum eſſe commune. Non enim falſum iurare peierare eſt, ſed quod ex animi tui ſententia iuraueris, ſicut vet bis concipitur more noſtro, id non facere, periurium eſt. Scitè enim Euripides.

Iuraui lingua mentem iniuratam gero.

Regulus verò non debuit conditiones, pactioneſque bellicas & hoſtiles perturbare periurio.

Cum iuſto enim & legiti-

legitimo hoſte res gerebater : aduerſus quem & totum ius feciale & multa ſunt iura communia.

Quod ni ita eſſet, nunquam claros viros ſenatus vinctos hoſtibus dedidiſſet. At veio T. Veturius & Sp. Poſthumius cûm iterum Coſſ. eſſent, quia cûm male pugnatum apud Caudium eſſet, legionibus noſtris ſub iugum miſſis pacem cum Samnitibus fecerant : dediti ſunt his, in iuſſu enim Po Senatuſque fecerant.

Eodemque tempore T. Numitius Q. Aemilius, qui tum tribuni plebis erant, quôd eorũ authoritate pax erat facta dediti ſunt, vt pax Sãnitium repudiaretur.

Atque huius deditionis ipſe Poſthumus, q̃ dedebatur ſuaſor & author fuit. Quod idem multis annis poſt C. Manc.

and lawfull enimie the thinge was done: toward whom both all the fecial law, and diuers other lawes bee in common, which if it were not ſo : the Sanate woulde neuer haue deliuered to their enimies, noble men being priſoners. But yet Titus Ueturius, and Spurius Poſthumius, the ſecond tyme, they were Conſuls becauſe when they hadde not fought it well at Caudium, and our legions being ſubdued they had made a peas with the Samnites : they were deliuered vnto them, for without commiſſion of ỹ people and the Senate, they had done it. And at the ſame time Titus Numitius, & Quint' Emilius, who were then the Tribunes of the people, becauſe the peale was made by their aucthority, were deliuered alſo, ỹ the peale & the Samnites might be refuſed. And Poſthumius ſelfe who was deliuered, was the perſwader and cauſer of the ſame deliuerie.

Which likewiſe Caius Mãcinus did, many yeares after : who

who, that hee might bee deliuered too the Numantines, with whom without authoritie of the Senate he had concluded a league, perſwaded ỹ perticular lawe, which Lucius Furius, and Sextus Attilius, made by the decree of the Senate, and when it was receiued, he was deliuered to the enimyes This man dealt more honeſtly then Quintus Pompeius, by whoſe interceſſion, when he was in the ſame caſe, it was brought to paſſe, that ỹ lawe was not receiued, with him that thing which ſeemed profit, preuailed more then honeſtie, with the other aforeſayd, the falſe ſhew of profit was ſuppreſſed by the authoritie of honeſtie. But that which was done by violence, needed not to heue ben confirmed. As who ſhould ſay, violence could be done to a manly man, why then did hee goe to the Senate, namelye, ſeeing hee was purpoſed to diſſwade them from the deliuerie of the captiues? That in him was moſt commendable, the ſame yee diſalowe.

cinus, qui vt Numantinis, quibus cum ſine Senatus authoritate fœdus fecerat, dederetur, rogationem ſua ſit eam, quã Lucius Furius & Sextus Attilius ex Senatus conſenſu ferebant: qua accepta eſt hoſtibus deditus. Honeſtius hic, quàm Quintus Pompeiꝰ, quo, cum in eadem cauſa eſſet, deprecante accepta lex non eſt. Hic ea quæ videbat' vtilitas plus valuit, quam honeſtas. Apud ſuperiores vtilitatis ſpecies falſa, ab honeſtatis authoritate ſuperata eſt.

At non debuit ratum eſſe, qd' erat actum per vim, quaſi vero forti viro vis poſſit adhiberi. Cur igitur ad Senatum proficiſcebatur, cũm præſertim de captiuis diſſuaſurus eſſet. Quod maximum in eo eſt, id reprehendius.

Non

Non enim ſuo iudicio ſtetit: ſed ſuſceperit cauſam, vt eſſet iudicium Senatus: cui niſi ipſe author fuiſſet, captiui profecto Pœnis redditi eſſent.

Ita incolumis in patria Regulis reſtitiſſet. Quod quia patriæ non vtile putauit, idcirco honeſtum ſibi, & ſenture illa & pati credidit. Nam quod aiunt, quod valde vtile ſit, id fieri honeſtum, immó veró eſſe non fieri.

Eſt enim nihil vtile, quod idem non honeſtum, nec quia vtile, honeſtum eſt, ſed quia honeſtum vtile. Quare ex multis mirabilibus exemplis, haud facile quis dixerit hoc exemplo aut laudabilius aut præſtãtius.

Sed ex tota hac laude Reguli, vnum illud eſt admiratione dignum, q captiuos retinendos cen-

for he ſtoode not in his owne iudgement, but tooke ẏ matter in hand, that it might bee ẏ iudgement of the Senate, wherevnto if he had not bene a counſellour, the captiues no doubt, had ben reſtored to the Carteginers. So had Regulus remained ſafe in hys Countrie, which becauſe hee tooke it not to bee profitable for his Countrie, therfore he thought it honeſtie for hym to be of the minde, and ſo to ſuffer. For where they ſaie, that it which is verie profitable, dooth become honeſt, naie they ſhould ſay, it is indecde, and not become honeſt. For there is nothing profitable, which ſame is not honeſt, & not becauſe it is profitable, it is honeſt, but becauſe it is honeſt, therefore it is profitable. Wherfore of many marueious examples, a man ſhal not lightly tel either a more commendable, or a more goodlye example then this. But in all this praiſe of Regulus this one thing is worthye of admiration, that hee thought it beſt, the priſoners ſhoulde be

bee kepte ſtyll. For in that he retourned, I thinke it no wonder at all, becauſe in thoſe dayes he could not dooe otherwiſe. Therfore that commendation is not the mans, but the times. For our auncestours were of this minde, ꝧ there is no straighter bond to binde a mannes promiſe, then an oath. The lawes in the twelue Tables declare, that our holy orders declare the ſame, and our leagues declare no leſſe, whereby bound is the promiſe made cuẽ with the enimie, the enteryes and punishmentes of the Cenſours declare as much, who about no matter more heedfully gaue iudgement, then about keeping of oathes. Marcus Pomponius, Tribune of the people, did ſummõ Lucius Manlius, Aulus ſonne, when he was Dictator to appeare at a daye, becauſe he had taken vpon him ꝧ occupying of his Dictatorſhip a few dayes longer then hee ſhuld, & accuſed him alſo, that he had driuen his ſon Titus, who afterwarde was calied

cenſuit. Nam quôd redi it, nobis nunc mirabile videtur: illis quidem remporibus aliter facere non potuit. Itaque iſta laus non eſt hominis ſed temporum. Nullum enim vinculum ad aſtringendam fidem iureiurando maiores arcti us eſſe voluerunt. Id indicant leges in XII. Tabulis indicant ſacra, indicant fœdera, quibus etiam cum hoſte deuincitur fides, indicant notationes, animaduerſionesqu Cenſorum, qui nulla de re diligentiûs, quam de iureiurando iudicabunt.

Lucio Manlio Auli filio, cum Dictator fuiſſet, Marcus Pomponius Tribunus plebis diem dixit, quòd is paucos ſibi dies ad dictaturam gerendam addidiſſet, criminabatur etiam, quod Titum filium qui Torquatus poſtea eſt appellatus, ab

ab hominibus relegasset & ruri habitari iussisset, quod cùm audiuisset adolescens filius, negotiũ adhiberi patri, accurrisse Romam, & cum prima luce Pomponij domum venisse dicitur.

Cui cûm esset nuntiatum ꝙ illum iratũ allaturũ ad se aliquid cõtra patrem arbitraretur, surrexit è lectulo, remotisque arbitris, ad se adolescentem iussit venire.

At ille vt ingressus est, confestim gladium distrinxit, iurauitque se illum statim interfecturum, nisi iusiurandum sibi dedisset, se patrem missum esse facturum. Iurauit hoc terrore coactus Pomponius, rem ad populum detuli, docuit, cur sibi à causa desistere necesse esset. Manlium missum fecit. Tantum temporibus illis iusiurandum valebat, Atque hic Titus

Torquatus from companie of men, and had commaunded him to dwell in the Countrie, which when the young man his sonne, once heard of, that his Father was brought in trouble, it is sayde, hee ranne to Rome, and by breake of daie came to Pomponius house. To whom when it was told, because hee thought, that hee beeing offended woulde bring some matter vnto him againſt his father, he arose out of his bedde, and all hearers beeing voyded out of the place, hee commaunded the young man shoulde come to him. But he as soone as he enterd, by and by drew his swoord, & sware he woulde kil him out of hand except hee made an oath vnto him, that he wold discharge his father. Pomponius constrayned wyth this terroure, made an oath, so hee opened the matter to the people, hee enformed them, why it was necessarie for him to let fall the action. Hee discharged Manlius. So greatly was an oath hadde in regarde at those dayes. And this Titus

Man-

Manlius is hee, who got his surname at the ryuer of Anien, of a chaine, that he pulled from a Frenchman, whom hee slewe, beeing dogged by him, in whose third Consulship, the Latines at Veleys, were discomfited and put to flight. A verye noble manne doubtlesse, and one, who not long afore beeing loouing towarde his Father, became sower and seuere against hys sonne. But as Regulus is to bee commended in keeping his oath, so those tenne, whom Annibal after the Cannensian fight had sent the Senate vppon theyr oath, that they should returne into the campe whereof the Carthaginers were then in possession, except they obtained his request, for the raunsoming of certayne prisoners, are to be dispraised if they did not returne. Touching whome, all men write not after one sorte. For Polibius, a speciall good author, writeth: that of the ten chosen Gentlemenne, who then were sent, nine retourned: when

Titus Manlius is est qui ad Anienim Galli quem ab eo prouocatus occiderat, torque detracto, cognomen inuenit: cuius tertio consulatu Latini ad Veserim fusi & fugati sunt. Magnus vir in primis & qui perindulgens in patrem, idem acerbè seuerus in filium.

Sed vt laudandus Regulus in conseruando iureiurando, sic decem illi, quos post Cannensem pugnam iuratos ad Senatum misit Annibal se in castra redituros ea quorum potiti erant Pœni nisi de redimendis captiuis impetrauissent, si non redierunt vituperandi.

De quibus non omnes vno modo. Nam Polibius bonus author in primis scribit: ex decem nobilissimis qui tunc erãt missi, nouẽ reuertisse

à Senatu re non impetrata vnum ex decem, qui paulo postquam egressus erat é castris, redisset, quasi aliquid esset oblitus, Romæ remãcisse. Reditu enim in castra, liberatum se esse iureiurando interpretabatur. Non rectè. Fraus enim distringit, non dissoluit periurium. Fuit igitur stulta calliditas, peruersè imitata prudentiam. Itaque decreuit Senatus, vt ille veterator & callidus, vinctus ad Annibalem duceretur.

Sed illud maximum: octo hominum milia tenebat Annibalem, non quos in acie cępisset, aut qui periculo mortis diffugissent: sed qui relicti in castris fuissent à Paulo & Varone Cos. Eos Senat' non censuit redimẽdos: cùm id paruâ pecunia fieri posset, vt esset insitum militib⁹ nostris

when the matter could not be obtained of the Senate, and that one of the temne, who a little after, hee was gone out of the campe, returned backe as though hee had forgotten somewhat, remayned still at Rome. For by his retourne to the campe, he tooke himselfe to be discharged of his oath, but that was not true. For guile confirmeth, & not dischargeth periurie. It was then a foolish craftinesse that did peeuishly counterfait wisdome. Therefore the Senate made a decree, that the same subtile and wily fox shuld be carried pinnioned vnto Annibal. But this is a maruelous matter. Annibal had in holde eight thousand of our men, whom he tooke not in battel, nor as flying awaie for feare of death: but they were leefte behinde in ỹ campe, by Paulus, and Varro, the Consuls. The Senate did not thinke it good to raunsome them: whereas they myght haue doone it for a lyttle money, that it myght sinke into our seuldyers herates, eyther

ther to winne the victorie, or manfully to die. Which thing when it was knowen, the sayd Polibius writes, that Annibals heart was daunted therwith, because the Senate and people of Rome, euen in chaunces of aduersitie, were of so loftie a courage. Thus the things which seeme profitable, be ouerweighed by comparison of honestie. But that same Acilius who wrote the storie in Greeke, sayth: there were more which returned to the campe vnder ỹ same guile that they might bee discharged of theyr oath, and that they were noted by the Censors with all manner of infamie. Here an end of this percell. For it is euident, ỹ such thinges as bee doone wyth a fearefull, seruile, dastardly, & weake heart, as the dooing of Regulus had bene, if eyther he had thought, concerning the prisoners, that hee sawe expedient for himselfe, & not for the common weale, or else would haue tarryed still at home bee not profitable, because they bee reprocha-

nostris, aut vincere, aut mori.

Qua quidem re audita, fractum animum Annibalis scribit idem: ꝙ Senatus Populusq; Romanus rebus afflictis, tam excelso animo fuisset. Sic honestatis comparatione, ea quæ videtur vtilia vincuntur. Acilius autem, qui græce scripsit historiam, plures ait fuisse, qui in Castra reuertissent, eadem fraude, vt iureiurando liberarentur: eosque à Censoribus omnibus ignominijs notatos. Sit iam huius loci finis.

Perspicuum est enim ea quæ timido animo humili demisso, factoq; fiant (quale fuisset Reguli factum, si aut de captiuis, quod ipsi opus esse videret', non quod Reipublicæ censuisset, aut domi remaneri voluisset) non esse vtilia, quia sint flagitiosa, fœda,

fœda & turpia. Reſtat quarta pars, quæ decore moderatione, modeſtia, continentia, temperantia continetur. Poteſt igitur quicquam eſſe vtile quod ſit huic talium virtutum choro contrarium. Atqui ab Ariſtippo Cyrrenaici atque Annicerij Philoſophi nominati, omne bonum in voluptate poſuerunt: virtutemq; cenſuerunt, ob eam rem eſſe laudandam, quod efficiens eſſet voluptatis. Quibus obſoletis floret Epicurus eiuſdem ferè adiutor, authorq́; ſententię. Cum his, velis, equiſq; (vt dicitur) ſi honeſtatem tueri, ac retinere ſententia eſt, decertandum eſt. Nã ſi non modo vtilitas, ſed vita omnis beata, corporis firma conſtitutione, eiuſq; conſtitutionis ſpe explorata (vt à Metrodoro ſcriptum eſt) continetur: certè hæc vtilitas & quidem ſumma, (ſic enim cenſent)

full, vile, and diſhoneſt.

The fourth pare is nowe behinde, which conſiſteth in ſeemlyneſſe, meaſure keeping, ſober moode, ſtayedneſſe, and temperaunce. May then anie thing be profitable, that is contrarie to ſuch an aſſemble of vertues: But the Cyrnaikes and Annicerians, who had theyr name of Philoſophers from Ariſtippus, placed all felicitie in pleaſure, and therefore they iudged vertue to be commendable, becauſe it was a cauſer of pleaſure, and when theſe were worne out of eſtimation, then flouriſhed Epicurus, a furtherer, and an author well nigh of the ſame opinion. Againſt them muſt wee ſtriue wyth tooth and nayle (as they ſaye) if wee meane to defende, and preſerue honeſtie. For if not, onely profite, but alſo all happie life conſiſteth in the good complexion of the body, and in a ſure truſt to the ſame complexion, as by Metrodorus it is written, doubtleſſe this manner profit, yea, and ꝑ very chiefe (for ſo doo they holde)

wyll

will ſtriue with honeſtie. For firſt of all, where ſhall there bee a place appointed for wiſdome? What meane they that on euerie ſide ſhe ſhould ſeeke after delicates? How miſerable a ſeruice wer it for vertue to be a waiter vpon pleaſure. But what ſhoulde bee the office of wiſdome? Skilfully to chooſe out pleaſures? Admit there bee nothing pleaſaunter, then ſo to dooe, what can there bee imagined more dyſhoneſt? Nowe wyth hym, who ſayeth, that paine is the vttereſt euill, what place ſhall manlyneſſe haue, which cares not for anie paines, or trauayles, that bee offered? For although Epicurus ſpeakes in manye places touchinge payne (as hee dooth in this) ſtoutlye inoughe: neuertheleſſe it is not to bee regarded what hee ſayeth, but what is meete for hym too ſaye, who hath pointed out the limits of good thinges to bee in pleaſure, and of euyll things in paine, as if I ſhuld heare hym ſpeake of ſtayednelle and temperaunce.

cum honeſtate pugnabit.

Nam vbi primum prudentiæ locus dabitur? an vt conquirat vndiq; ſuauitates quam miſer virtutis famulatus ſeruientis voluptati. Quod autem munus prudẽtiæ, an legere intelligetur voluptates. Fac nihil iſto eſſe iucundius, quod cogitari poteſt turpiuis?

Iam qui dolorem, ſummum malum dicat, apud eum quem habet locum fortitudo, quę eſt dolorum, laborumque contemptio? Quamuis enim multis locis dicat Epicurus (ſicut hic dicit) ſatis fortiter de dolore, tamen non id ſpectandum eſt quid dicat, ſed quid conſentaneum ſit ei dicere: qui bona voluptate terminauerit, mala dolore: vt ſi illum audiam de continentia & temperantia:

dixit

dixit ille quidem multa multis locis, ſed aqua hę ret, vt aiunt. Nam qui poteſt tẽperantiam laudare is, qui ponat ſummum bonum in voluptate? Eſt enim temperãtia libidinum inimica, libidines autem conſectatrices voluptatis. Atq; in his tamen tribus generibus quoquo modo poſſunt, non incallidẽ tergiuerſantur. Prudentiam introducunt, ſcientiam ſuppeditantem voluptates depellentẽ dolores. Fortitudinẽ quoq; aliquo modo expediũt: cũ tradũt rationem negligẽdę mortis, ꝑperi ẽdiq; doloris. Etiã tẽperãtiã inducũt nõ facillimè illi quidẽ, ſed tamẽ quomodo poſſũt. Dicũt enim voluptatis magnitudinẽ doloris detractione fieri. Iuſtitia vacillat vel iacet potiꝰ: omneſq; hę virtutes, quę communitate cernũt', & in ſocietate generis humani. Neq; enim bonitas,

He talkes in deede in manye places many thinges, but hee is myxed by the way, as they ſay. For how can hee prayſe temperance, that ſets the ſouereign good in pleaſure. For temperance is enimie to luſt, and luſt is a waiting ſeruant to pleaſure. And yet in theſe three kinds, not without ſubtiltie, they fall to their ſhifts. They bring in wiſedome as a ſcience miniſtring pleaſure, auoyding paines. They ſette vs out alſo manyneſſe, after a certaine ſorte, when they teach a waie to deſpiſe death, and endure paine. They alſo fetch in temperaunce, wyth much a dooe doubtleſſe, but yet as well as they may. For they holde that the greatneſſe of pleaſure aryſeth by putting off all payne. Juſtice ſtaggereth wyth them, or rather lyeth vnder foot, and all thoſe vertues that ſhew themſelues in the common knotte & fellowſhip of men. For ther canne bee neyther goodneſſe, neither liberalitie, nor ciuilitie, no more then friendſhippe may, if they bee not ſought

after

after for themselues, but bee referred to pleasure or to profite.

Lette vs then drive our matter into few words. For as we haue taught, there is no profit, which is contrarye to honestie: so we say, all voluptuousnesse is contrarie to honestie. And so much the more I take Calliphо, and Dinomachus, worthie to bee reproued, who thought they should end the controuersie, if they made a ioyning of voluptuousnesse with honestie, as of beast with man, honestie admittes not this knot, but both abhorre and reiecte it. For truely the ende of good and euill, which ought to bee after one sorte, may bee mingled & tempered with things disagreeable. But hereof hetherto, for it is a weyghtie matter, and in another place discoursed more at large Now to to the purpose. After what sort then the matter is to be resolued, if at any time profit in apparãce doth striue with honestie, it is before sufficiently debated, but if voluptas nec liberalitas, nec comitas esse potest, non plus quã amicitia si hęc nõ ipse expetat: sed ad voluptatẽ vtilitatẽue referãt. Cõferam⁹ igit in pauca. Nã vt vtilitatem nullã esse docuim⁹, quæ honestati esset cõtraria: sic omnẽ voluptatẽ dicim⁹ honestati esse contrariã. Quô magis reprehẽdẽdos Calliphonẽ & Dinomachũ iudico, qui se direpturos cõtrouersiam, putauerũt si cũ honestate voluptatẽ, tãquã cũ homine pecudẽ copulauissẽt, nõ recipit istam cõiũctionẽ honestas: aspernat, repellit. Nec vero finis bonorũ & malorum, qui simplex esse debet, ex dissimilib⁹ reb⁹ miseri & tẽperari potest, Sed de hoc magna enim res est, alio loco plurib⁹. Nũc ad propositũ. Quemadmodũ igit si quando ea, q̃ videret vtilitas, honestati repugnat: dijudicanda res sit satis est supra disputatũ

Sin

Sin autem ſpeciem vtilitatis etiam voluptas habere dicatur: nulla poteſt eſſe ei cum honeſtate coniunctio. Nam vt tribuam' aliquid voluptati, condimenti fortaſſe non nihil, vtilitatis certè nihil habebit.

PERORATIO OPERIS.

Habes à patre munus Marce fili, mea quidem ſententia magnum, ſed perinde erit vt acceperis. Quanquam & hi tibi tres libri inter Cratippi Commentatis tanquam hoſpites erunt recipiendi. Sed vt ſi ipſe veniſſem Athenas (quod quidem eſſet factũ, niſi me é medio curſu clara voce patria reuocaſſet) ali quando me quoque audires: ſic quoniam his voluminibus ad te profecta vox mea eſt, tribues his temporis, quãtum poteris: poteris autem quantum voles. Cum vero intellexero, te hoc ſci-

touſneſſe alſo bee compted to haue a ſhewe of profite, it can haue no felowſhip with honeſtie. For bee it ſo, wee ſomewhat eſteeme pleaſure, ſome ſawce perhappes it ſhall haue in it, but ſurely no profite at all.

The concluſion and dedication of his workes, with an exhortation to hys ſonne.

You haue from your father a preſent ſonne Marke, in my opinion verelye muche woorth, but it ſhall be euen ſo, as ye take it. Notwithſtanding theſe three bookes are, as ſtraungers to bee entertayned of you, among Cratyppus notes. But as ye ſhould once haue heard me alſo, if I had come to Athens, which hadde ben done in deed, but that my countrie called me back wyth open mouth in the middeſt of my iourney, ſo ſeeing in theſe volumes my voyce is conueyed vnto you, ye ſhall beſtow as much time vpon them as you maye, and ſo much you may, as you will. But when I ſhall vnderſtand that you take

take pleasure in this kinde of knowledge, then I both present there shortly, as I trust, and in your absence, absent will speake with you.

Fare you well therefore, my Cicero, and assure your selfe that you are to mee doubtlesse right deere, and yet far dearer shalbe if in such bookes, and lessons, you will sette your delight.

sciencię genere gaudere: tum & presens tecū propediē (vt spero) & dum aberis absens loquar.

Vale igitur mi Cicero, tibiq; persuade, te mihi quidem esse charissimū, sed multò fore chariorem, si talibus monumentis, præceptisq;, lætabere.

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